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Introduction: Health Care in the 21st Century: Cost,
Quality, and Access in the New Millennium
Kathy 1. Cerminara*
Everyone requires health care at some point during his or her lifetime,
and the law increasingly regulates the cost, quality, and access to such health
care. Through the 2001 Goodwin Seminar, Nova Southeastern University's
Shepard Broad Law Center examined health care in the twenty-first century
by adopting an interdisciplinary approach, focusing on concerns about cost,
quality, and access as the linchpins of health care policy, and considering the
future of health care in the United States and internationally. I am proud to
have created and taught the seminar, memorialized in this special issue of the
Nova Law Review.
The seminar's focus on health care policy was particularly timely
during the Winter term of 2001 and continues to be timely as this issue
appears. As the seminar proceeded, the news media reported debates about
the use of human embryonic stem cells in medical research,' an issue raising
continuing moral, ethical, legal, and medical quandaries. 2 Reports of nu-
merous incidences of medical error had recently surfaced,3 leaving one to
wonder and to continue wondering, about the basic level of problems that
remain in the health care system, even as medical advances magnify the level
of sophistication and expertise Americans expect in health care. As Ameri-
cans hear of and expect to receive more and more technologically advanced
medical treatment, policymakers struggle to facilitate appropriate access to
* Assistant Professor and Director, Master's in Health Law (M.H.L.) Program,
Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center; B.S., Ohio University, 1983; J.D.,
University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 1987; L.L.M. Columbia University School of Law,
1996.
1. See, e.g., Washington in Brief, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2001, at A4.
2. Compare Elliott Abrams et al., On Human Embryos and Medical Research: An
Appeal for Ethically Responsible Science and Public Policy, 16 ISSUES L & MED. 261 (2001)
(arguing against human embryonic stem cell research on moral grounds), with Ronald M.
Green, Stopping Embryo Research, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 235, 252 (1999) (terming opposition to
human embryonic research "research obstruction").
3. Comm. on Quality of Health Care in Am., Inst. of Med., To Err is Human:
Building a Safer Health System (L.T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999).
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such treatment, control costs, and assure quality of treatment.4 The decisions
of those policymakers affect not only the United States but also the interna-
tional medical community, for legal decisions governing health care policy
in the United States can and do affect access to medicines and medical care
in other countries.
In this issue of the Nova Law Review, the reader will find articles by
four distinguished visiting professors, each addressing issues arising within
his or her special sphere of expertise within the larger topic of health care
policy. Ranging from a former secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services, to an epidemiologist with an international human rights
organization, a former presidential advisor, and an expert in bioethics, these
authors permit the reader to explore the full realm of policy issues confound-
ing those attempting to improve health care.
For example, the Honorable Louis W. Sullivan, M.D. served as Secre-
tary of Health and Human Services from March 10, 1989 through the end of
President George H.W. Bush's administration. Now president of Morehouse
School of Medicine in Atlanta, Dr. Sullivan writes about health disparities in
the United States, 6 explaining that there exists severe and continuing dispari-
ties in the level of health care provided to and the health enjoyed by minori-
ties as compared with Caucasians.
In 1993, hoping to resolve some of those health disparities as well as to
equalize access to health care and coverage across the United States, Presi-
dent Bill Clinton proposed a comprehensive National Health Security Plan in
an attempt to restructure the health care system.7 Goodwin Distinguished
Visiting Professor, Christopher C. Jennings, served as Senior Health Policy
4. See generally Peter D. Jacobson, Regulating Health Care: From Self-Regulation
to Self-Regulation?, 26 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1165 (2001) (part of a special issue
discussing health care policy since and in light of the influential article, Kenneth J. Arrow,
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REv. 941 (1963)).
5. One example is the extent to which patent laws protect brand-name drugs. The
availability of generic drugs greatly affects the prices manufacturers of brand-name drugs can
charge for their products in both the United States and other countries. See generally S. Van
McCrary & Cheryl J.C. Erwin, Thinking Globally About Biotech Ethics: Is the Law Enough?,
666 PRAC. L. INST./PAT. 983, 1008-09 (2001) (noting this struggle relating to availability of
AIDS drugs in developing countries). Recent inroads on patent protections have encouraged
generic drug makers in their economic battle against brand-name drug manufacturers. See,
e.g., Glenn Singer, Makers of Generics Get Boosts in Courts, Capitol, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Jan. 15, 2002, at DI.
6. Louis W. Sullivan, A Conversation with Dr. Louis Sullivan, 26 NOVA L. REV. 467
(2002).
7. See THE PRESIDENT'S HEALTH SECURITY PLAN (1993).
[Vol. 26:397
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Advisor and Deputy Assistant to the President under President Clinton. As
such, working out of the President's Domestic Policy Council and in con-
junction with the National Economic Council, Mr. Jennings was charged
with developing the Administration's health care policy and played a lead
role in the drama surrounding the President's proposal and its subsequent
failure in Congress. Here, Mr. Jennings, from the perspective of someone
who has tried but whose efforts fell prey to the political process, discusses
steps that must be taken and issues that must be addressed to improve the
American health system.8
Many of the steps the United States may choose to take are governed,
not only by economic and political considerations, but also by moral and
ethical judgments. Medical research on human tissue, for example, holds
great promise for bettering the health care system by leading to cures or
treatments for a variety of diseases. Yet, the question arises as to how the
law should regulate such research, especially in light of ethical and moral
questions surrounding its use. R. Alta Charo is Professor of Law and Medi-
cal Ethics at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, where she is on the
faculty of the Law School and the Medical School's Program in Medical
Ethics. A former member of President Clinton's National Bioethics Advi-
sory Commission, Professor Charo has considered the role that ethical and
moral judgments play in health care policymaking. Her essay addresses
legal issues arising from the use of human tissue and concludes that "[a]
more robust form of national control over the market in human tis-
sue... will probably depend upon resolution of political and legal views of
the body." 9
Finally, the United States should not forget that, given today's global
economy, any decisions made with regard to health care policy inevitably
will affect other nations in some way. United States regulation of the pro-
duction of pharmaceuticals, for example, often impacts the drugs that are
available and the prices at which they are available in other countries. Anne-
Valerie Kaninda, M.D., a medical advisor and epidemiologist with Doctors
Without Borders/M~decins Sans Fronti~res, writes of the interrelationship
between pharmaceutical production, its regulation, intellectual property
8. Christopher C. Jennings, A Conversation with Christopher C. Jennings, 26 NOVA
L. REv. 403 (2002).
9. R. Alta Charo, Skin and Bones: Post-Mortem Markets in Human Tissue, 26
NovA L. REv. 421, 450 (2002). See generally Henry T. Greely, Breaking the Stalemate: A
Prospective Regulatory Framework for Unforeseen Research Uses of Human Tissue Samples
and Health Information, 34 WAKEFoEST L. REv. 737 (1999).
2002]
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rights, pricing, and the availability of certain drugs in developing countries.10
Dr. Kaninda's appearance at Nova Southeastern University was important,
not simply because of her distinguished career, but also because of the
esteem with which others regard her employer. Doctors Without Borders/
M6decins Sans Fronti~res received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999 for its
work in sending more than 2000 medical workers to provide care in nearly
ninety countries.
In addition to the articles from these distinguished visiting professors,
this issue of the Nova Law Review contains student articles on medical-legal
topics. Some of the students whose articles appear here-specifically,
Daniel Cohen, Judith Goodman, Jesse Lieberman and Stacy Warman-were
students in the Goodwin Seminar and benefited in their research and writing
from interaction with the Goodwin professors. Another, Sandy Martin, has
joined the Law Review since the Goodwin Seminar but undoubtedly also has
profited from the medical-legal knowledge Law Review editors gained
through the seminar. For all this, the NSU Law Center, and I in particular,
owe a special debt of gratitude to the Leo Goodwin Foundation, Inc. for its
generous support of the Goodwin Seminar and the Goodwin Chair in Law.
Finally, the reader should know that the seminar's health care theme
reflects the NSU Law Center's commitment to its health law curriculum and
programs. The NSU Law Center offers a health law concentration, provid-
ing law students the opportunity to specialize in either transactional or
litigation-related health law studies. In July 2001, it also began offering an
online master's degree in health law for non-lawyers, the first such program
to be offered by an ABA-accredited law school. Through the latter program,
the NSU Law Center intends to both help improve the health care system
and honor the American Bar Association's suggestion that law schools
educate non-lawyers about the law."
All of these efforts are linked. As the United States struggles with the
form of its health care system, and as the choices it makes during that strug-
gle affect patient care, health care professionals, lawyers and the public, all
must become more conversant with health care policy issues. Legal deci-
sions affecting health care cost, quality, and access in the new millennium
will determine the sort of care patients receive, not just here in United States
but also worldwide. This issue of the Nova Law Review, the 2001 Goodwin
10. Anne-Valerie Kaninda, M.D., A Conversation with Dr. Anne-Valerie Kaninda, 26
NOVA L. REv. 451 (2002).
11. See Philip S. Anderson, Learning to Educate the Public, A.B.A. J., July 1999, at
[Vol. 26:397
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss2/1
20021 Cerminara 401
Seminar, and the NSU Law Center's commitment to health law education
will help prepare both health care lawyers and members of the health care
industry to participate in decision making with regard to this important
subject.
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A Conversation with Christopher C. Jennings*
Christopher C. Jennings
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Kathy Cerminara: Good afternoon everyone. Today we have with us Christopher
Jennings, one of our Goodwin Series speakers. Chris Jennings served as Senior Health Policy
Advisor and Deputy Assistant for Health Policy to President Bill Clinton. As Deputy Assis-
tant to the President for Health Policy, working out of the President's Domestic Policy
Council and in conjunction with the National Economic Council, Jennings was in charge of
developing the Administration's health care policy. In this capacity, beginning in 1994, he
coordinated the health policy work of numerous federal agencies, including the Office of
Management and Budget and the Departments of Health and Human Services, Treasury, and
Labor. As the President's Senior Health Policy Advisor, Jennings advised the President on a
wide variety of issues, including Medicare, Medicaid, long term care, insurance coverage
expansions, and consumer protection. Recognizing his work, the National Journal in 1997
designated Mr. Jennings as one of Washington's 100 most influential individuals in the
federal government.
Before his White House appointment, from 1993 to 1994, Jennings was the Senior
Legislative Health Reform Advisor to the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), and
during his tenure in this position he worked with first lady Hillary Rodham Clinton, preparing
her for testimony on Capitol Hill regarding health care reform. Prior to joining the Clinton
Administration, Mr. Jennings served as a committee staff member for Senators Glenn,
Belcher, and Pryor. Today he is going to talk about health care policy and about what we can
do, or maybe, what we should think about when we are reforming the health care system in
America.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I had an extraordinary experience as Health Care Advisor to the Presi-
dent in the Clinton White House and I want to talk to you a little bit about
what we have done. More importantly, I have been asked to talk about how
we can improve the heath care system in this political world that we live in
and how we can apply some of the lessons we learned to the future.
There is no question that the Clinton Administration experienced both
the thrill of victory and the agony of defeat in our continuous struggle to
reform and to improve the nation's health system. Beyond the record,
however, I believe there were many significant lessons learned that can and
should be applied to future efforts to reform health care in the United States.
The most important of these are the critical steps of effectively defining the
problem, establishing the goals for reform, developing viable policy, and
designing a workable strategy to pass and enact legislation.
II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM; ESTABLISHING GOALS FOR REFORM
Before embarking on any major reform, one has to effectively define
the problem. Without first achieving broad agreement that there is a prob-
lem that virtually all understand and determine is worth addressing, it is
impossible to proceed with meaningful reforms. Although it may seem that
the problems of health care in this country are universally understood, many
of the examples I will subsequently share will illustrate that defining the
problem can actually be one of the most complicated parts of shaping health
policy.
As important as defining the problem, though, is establishing objec-
tives for change. Just as there are many differing opinions on the flaws (and
strengths) of the health care system, there are just as many perspectives on
what the goals of reforms should be. By providing examples of some of the
[Vol. 26:403
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most prominent issues in health care today, I will try to illustrate how the
broadly differing views people have about the problems and desired out-
comes for reform severely complicate any effort to improve the nation's
health care system.
A- The Uninsured
The fact that more than forty million Americans lack health insurance is
commonly believed to be the crux of the health care problem in this coun-
try. Improving access to health coverage is generally viewed as a primary
goal of health care reform. But even this seemingly obvious conclusion has
not achieved a consensus status.
Opponents of reform frequently argue that there really is not a problem
of access; they suggest that anyone without a preexisting condition can
purchase relatively affordable health insurance. They also argue that this
issue is not, nor should be, a national domestic policy priority because the
problem fs overstated, as anyone can go into an emergency room and receive
care, regardless of insurance status.
All the arguments and research to the contrary do not sway opponents
of major change.
For instance, one can cite the fact that the percentage of uninsured
adults who do not receive medical care is more than three times that of
2privately insured Americans. Or, one can point out that the uninsured are
fifty to seventy percent more likely to need hospitalization for avoidable and
expensive health conditions, like pneumonia and uncontrollable diabetes,
than those who have private insurance.3 The fact that children without
health insurance are nearly twice as likely to forego health care for condi-
tions like asthma or recurrent ear infections, which can lead to serious
problems throughout life, does not break through either.4
1. Robert Mills, Health Insurance Coverage: 2000, at 1, U.S. CENsus BUREAU,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS P60-215 (2001).
2. Linda Blumberg & David W. Liska, The Uninsured in the United States: A Status
Report, THE URBAN INSTITrE (Apr. 1996), available at http:/urban.org/pubsIHINSURE/
uninsured.htm.
3. Id.
4. Id.
2002]
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B. Access to Coverage
Clearly, the insurance coverage issue reflects the difficult nature of
identifying health care problems and corresponding goals. Even assuming a
sufficient base of bipartisan support for the general notion of policies to
expand insurance, (which parenthetically, I believe there generally is), there
are so many other issues. Even when policymakers advocate for all Ameri-
cans having health insurance, it becomes necessary to define what that
means in order to develop policy and consensus around it. Does it mean that
all Americans should have health insurance or should they have access to
health insurance? Access to health insurance and actually having health
insurance can be two very different concepts. Universal coverage requires a
Federal mandate; universal access to coverage does not necessarily require
one. However, the latter is generally less efficient and more costly per
person covered.
In addition, there is no broad agreement about what type and level of
coverage is minimally necessary to be defined as acceptable health insur-
ance. Does it mean comprehensive, first-dollar coverage, catastrophic stop-
loss coverage, or something in between? Similarly vexing is the definition
of affordability. Does affordability mean insurance premiums should not be
greater than a percentage of income, or does it mean an explicit dollar
amount? What are the levels of government subsidies that are necessary,
desirable and/or acceptable to make health care affordable for individuals
and businesses? And, most importantly, how are they to be financed?
A similar challenge is how to define and assure quality of health care.
This becomes frequently something more akin to the Supreme Court's
definition of pornography; you cannot define it, but you know it when you
see it. And finally, how do you weigh the relative importance of each one of
these essential issues? The following sampling of issues gives a sense of
how complicated and controversial health care can be and why I believe it to
be the most challenging domestic policy issue confronting the nation.
Im. HEALTH CARE ISSUES THAT CHALLENGE THE NATION
A. Choice
A commonly identified health care policy problem is lack of choice.
People constantly say that they want more choices in health care, but what
does that mean? What should our goals be in this area? Do we want more
choice of health plans? Assured choice of doctors? What about more choice
[Vol. 26:403
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of technology and new drugs? Do we need more choice of covered benefits?
If choice increases costs, do we want choice in all cases? Choice often
segments the healthy from the unhealthy, making it more difficult to af-
fordably cover the most vulnerable populations. Is that an outcome we
desire? In short, the concept of choice makes for great rhetoric, but not
always great policy. Rarely is there a consensus around the definition or the
desired outcome.
B. Health Care Costs
In identifying important problems in health care, it is impossible to
ignore the issue of rising health care costs. Should we care about cost
growth? Do we think that health care cost containment should be a signifi-
cant part of health care reform?
As the largest purchaser of health care in this country, the employer
community would certainly list cost containment as a major priority in
principle. But they rarely pursue it aggressively on the federal legislative
front. Regardless though, should this be a major priority of any federal
government health initiative? If taxpayer dollars are used for subsidizing
health care, should not health care be purchased in the most cost-effective
manner? If so, what is the policy that should be implemented? Should we
rely on price regulation or trust that market competition governed by certain
rules will do the trick? Will those who say they support cost containment
strongly advocate it in the end if it means confronting health care providers
and insurers directly or limiting consumer choices or benefits?
C. Risk Selection and Insurance Reform
When discussing the problems of the health insurance market, there is
more to think about than simply constraining costs. For example, can work-
able and politically viable reforms be structured to assure that insurers
provide affordable health coverage to all Americans, and do not discriminate
against people on the basis of preexisting conditions? In a voluntary market,
would these types of reforms have potentially dire consequences?
For example, what would happen if insurers enrolled every individual
with a preexisting condition at the same price as healthy popula-
tions? Inevitably, people would wait until they were sick to get insurance,
causing insurance prices to skyrocket, as insurers could not afford to provide
health care coverage if they were only insuring sick people. However, in the
absence of insurance reforms, insurers tend to develop and effectively
2002]
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implement strategies to avoid high-risk, high-cost enrollees. Because of
these factors, the current health insurance system encounters all sorts of risk
selection problems, pointing out the need for a balanced set of insurance
reforms as a major health policy goal.
D. Quality
Every American and every policymaker stresses the importance of
quality health care, but no one really knows how to measure, assure, or
improve it. The whole debate around a Patients' Bill of Rights illustrates
this point.5 This debate has been driven by the population of Americans that
has insurance, but is dissatisfied with the product and how it is delivered.
The Patients' Bill of Rights debate has clearly shown that the issue of quality
cannot be ignored, particularly because the Americans who already have
coverage may care more about this issue than covering the uninsured.
Long term care is also a concern. Presently, we do not provide any type
of significant coverage for those people who are chronically ill of all ages,
who want to stay in their home, in their communities, and want to be able to
receive some sort of support for doing so.6 When we do provide care, it is
generally Medicaid.7 We have tens of millions of Americans of all ages who
are chronically ill and need to have assistance.8 Clearly, these are issues that
need attention.
As a consequence, it is critically important to define and assure quality
health care. How can this be done? Is it determined by the availability of
certain health care services, the ability to appeal unsatisfactory health care
decisions, or is there a way to actually measure medical outcomes that can
work to hold plans and health care providers accountable? And lastly,
should there be penalties for health care plans or providers who provide
substandard care, and if so, what should they be, and how should they be
5. Stephanie Lewis, A Guide to the Patients' Bill of Rights Debate, INSTn-uTE FOR
HEALTH CARE REs. & POL'Y, GEO. U. (Aug. 2001), available at http://www.kff.org/content/
2001/3179/DebatePaper.pdf.
6. Democracy Compact, Pledge to Vote, at http://www.pledgetovote.com/vote/
difference.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002). The elderly vote more than any group in the
country.
7. Mills, supra note 1, at 2.
8. Study Says 100 Million Americans Chronically Ill, Nov. 12, 1996, at
http://www.diennet.com/cnnhealth.html. Study, done by researchers at the University of
California in San Francisco, reveals that over 100 million people who are chronically ill in
America today.
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applied? Because the state of the art in the health care industry today is such
that quality health care is frequently measured much more subjectively than
objectively, it becomes an extremely challenging issue to address effectively
and satisfactorily to all interested parties.
E. Technology
At the same time as the challenges of health care delivery are becoming
ever more complex, the industry is in the midst of an extraordinary age of
technology, with seemingly constant breakthroughs in pharmacological
interventions, treatments, and diagnostic techniques. 9 These represent great
opportunities to improve the quality of life and to extend the life span.
Recent breakthroughs in gene therapy have perhaps the most significant
implications for the future of health care. 10 Scientists have recently finished
mapping the whole genome, and the implications for this knowledge in the
future are beyond anything that we can imagine."
But while technology produces wonderful diagnostic tools, treatments,
and occasional cures, it also brings to the forefront extraordinary ethical
dilemmas. For example, there are widely differing opinions about the
benefits and potential harms of genetic screening. Should we know about
our gene makeup and our predisposition for disease? This type of informa-
tion could be very useful for insurers or employers, but would we ever want
them to have access to it? Can you imagine people having access to your
medical records or your genetic makeup and how that could be used or
misused in the future? Should health care reform include all those issues
too? How can we effectively balance the positive use of technology with its
potential for abuse? And finally, does our understandable love affair with
technology adequately take into account its expense and its potential for
further dividing the nation between those who have access to it and those
who do not?
9. ROY PORTER, THE GREATEST BENEFrr OF MANKIND, A MEDICAL HISTORY OF
HUMANrry (W.W. Noton & Co. 1997).
10. Id.
11. Optical Mapping: A Complete System For Whole Genome Shotgun Mapping,
available at http://www.oml.gov/hgmis/publicat/00santa/152.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
The website is provided as a service of the Human Genome Project and describes the optical
mapping of the whole genome using the "shotgun mapping" approach.
2002]
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F. Demographic Challenges
Finally, in defining the problems and goals of health reform, it is impor-
tant to determine if the inevitable financing and health delivery challenges
associated with the retirement of the baby boom generation should be ad-
dressed. This demographic challenge is undeniable, as the population of
Medicare beneficiaries will double from forty to eighty million by the year
2035.12 Although competitive reforms over the long term may achieve some
limited savings, the fact remains that if you double the population of people
on Medicare, the cost will likely double as well.
Linked to the demographic challenge is the need for updating the
Medicare benefit to provide for long-overdue prescription drug coverage. It
makes little sense to have a Medicare benefit that does not cover prescription
drugs in the twenty-first century. 13 The whole future of health care is largely
reliant on pharmacological interventions, yet we do not cover an outpatient
prescription drug benefit.' 4 Seniors and people with disabilities care pas-
sionately about this issue because they see the extent to which their health
care is pharmacologically based. They are scared of not having access to
their medications, and fear, as I will note later, is an incredibly powerful
motivating force.
Long-term care is also a concern. Presently, we do not provide any type
of significant coverage for chronically ill individuals of any age, who want
to stay in their communities, and desire to be able to receive some sort of
support for doing so.' 5 When we do provide care, it is generally through the
welfare-oriented Medicaid program.16 As a consequence, we have tens of
millions of Americans of all ages who are chronically ill who receive no
meaningful assistance.' 7 While these demographic problems are undeniable,
they also have great potential to be extremely expensive to address. Policy-
makers risk alienating a powerful constituency if they don't address these
12. Mills, supra note 1, at 2.
13. See Medicare, Medicare Basics, at http://www.medicare.gov/BasicslEligibility
.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
14. Id.
15. Democracy Compact, supra note 6.
16. Mills, supra note 1, at 2.
17. Study Says 100 Million Americans Chronically Ill, Nov. 12, 1996, at
http://www.diennet.concnnhealth.html. Study, done by researchers at the University of
California in San Francisco, reveals that over 100 million people who are chronically ill in
America today.
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issues, yet if they do take them on, they also risk weighing down any health
care expansions with expensive, mostly governmental, interventions.
IV. DEVELOPING HEALTH CARE POLICY AND DESIGNING A STRATEGY FOR
ENACTMENT
After effectively defining the problems in the health system that should
be addressed and developing a general consensus on the goals for reform, it
is necessary to design a policy that effectively achieves these goals. The
importance of developing a sound policy cannot be overstated, as the policy
will be forced to undergo extraordinary scrutiny by both objective policy
validators and interests who oppose it. As important as the policy and the
process by which it was developed is the subsequent strategy that is tapped
to pass and enact such reform. My following comments address both of
these essential components of a successful effort to reform the health care
system.
A. Overall Policy Approach
Even before developing explicit policy, it is essential to determine
whether the approach to health care reform will be comprehensive or incre-
mental in nature. There are advantages and disadvantages to both. Obvi-
ously, a comprehensive approach requires a great deal of political capital and
is much more difficult to develop and to advocate. However, a comprehen-
sive approach can also much more efficiently expand coverage to a greater
number of Americans and can do so while addressing the broad range of
financing, insurance reform, quality assurance, and cost containment policies
which are directly and indirectly impacted by any health reform. Con-
versely, a more targeted approach to health reform has the advantage of
being easier to achieve consensus around and doing so with less political risk
and capital expenditure. The downside, of course, is that while such incre-
mental initiatives are more likely to be enacted into law, they almost inevita-
bly cost more per individual assisted and are frequently more likely to incur
unintended consequences.
B. The Policy Development Process
Developing viable policy-from both a structural and political perspec-
tive-is certainly one of the greatest challenges facing anyone advocating
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health reform. It must be developed in a manner that a broad-based coalition
of internal and external policy validators will conclude is workable. To the
extent the policy design fails to work from either a financing or health care
delivery perspective, the policymaker advocating it will almost inevitably
receive merciless and devastating criticism that threatens the very survival of
the proposal.
To achieve success in this area, the talented policy analysts that are
familiar with financing, delivery, history, and practical application of health
policy must be utilized to frame the proposal. If it is an Administration
proposal, contributions to the policy must come from a broad array of inter-
nal power and policy centers such as the Department of Health and Human
Services, the Treasury Department, the Department of Labor, the Office of
Management and Budget, the Domestic Policy Council, and the National
Economic Council. This is important not only so that policymakers can
benefit from various sources of expertise, but also because these depart-
ments' investment in the policy is critically important to ensure a broad-
based, Administration-wide commitment to the eventual proposal released
by the White House. It is also critically important to receive such validation
from elite outside experts that the media and the Congress tap as resources
on questions of policy.
The last policy question that must be answered is whether the proposal
that is released is detailed or general in design. A detailed approach has the
advantage of being able to expedite outsiders' analysis of the proposal; for
example, achieving a relatively certain budget estimate from the Congres-
sional Budget Office. If there is already broad-based support for such a
policy, these details can help accelerate Congressional progress on passing
the legislation. The downside, of course, is that any detailed policy exposes
itself to easier scrutiny and a greater likelihood of explicit and effective
criticism. As such, it frequently becomes more appealing to delay the re-
lease of underlying details to avoid such criticism.
C. Timing and Trust in Government
Even the best of policies will have great potential to fail if they are not
proposed during a time in which the political environment is open to reform.
Generally, that means that there has to be a broad-based acknowledgement
that the problems in the health care delivery system are great enough to
justify legislative intervention. To advocate comprehensive reform, there
almost needs to be a sense of crisis. Ironically, however, there also needs to
be a general trust in the government's ability to intervene in a constructive
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way. Concurrent with that faith, the public must feel that they can trust the
leader advocating such change. These are all necessary prerequisites, as
health care is so controversial and so complex that the public must trust that
the leader advocating change has their best interest in mind in order to
support reform. Lastly, any policy that is promoted cannot be pursued if
there are too many other policy priorities also being advocated. In order to
both promote and defend a viable health policy, the advocates of that pro-
posal must be available to dedicate a significant amount of time to it.
D. Effective Policy Outreach and Rollout
Beyond securing external validation from the policy elite, it is impera-
tive to develop and implement a strategy that incorporates a broad base of
validators for the initiative. It is necessary to secure the agreement of out-
side validators to lobby the Congress and to illustrate broad-based support
from interest groups that are influential with the public, and therefore the
media. In addition to proving expert support for the policy, securing interest
group involvement increases the number of defenders against the inevitable
opposition to the policy. To achieve this end, it is necessary to understand
the priorities of key health care interest groups, such as consumer groups,
health care providers, insurers, manufacturers, and state and local interests,
and integrate them into both the policy and the strategy for enactment.
Unfortunately, these different interest groups rarely have a uniform
vision, and you often must choose who is going to be on your side from
among these different groups. It is nearly impossible to push through any
health reform without the validation of the consumer groups. The provider
community is often supportive of reforms that do not include significant cuts
to their current reimbursement rates. The insurers and the pharmaceutical
companies are often opposed to reforms that mandate significant cost con-
tainment while the business community is very focused on promoting cost
containment reforms.
Along with outreach to the various interest groups, there must be a
carefully designed communications strategy that is developed both for the
broader public message as well as the day-to-day press coverage of the
proposal. The press can play a constructive or destructive role, but they
frequently play a destructive role by default, as conflict is more newsworthy
than common ground. That is why I think that you will find that the best
reporters are those who recognize the conflict inherent in a reform debate
while simultaneously educating the public as to why such a reform is impor-
tant. It is necessary that they show what benefits can emerge with the pas-
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sage of a piece of legislation, as well as to fairly portray the alternative,
whether that be the status quo or another piece of flawed legislation.
In order to ensure a positive media relationship, it is essential to provide
sufficient and accurate information to enable the media to write knowl-
edgeably. The media need real evidence to support the contention that any
proposed solution is worth pursuing, and they are more likely to accept such
information if it is validated by independent sources.
No legislation can be enacted into law unless it is passed by the Con-
gress. Anyone who desires any legislation to be passed must understand the
role and the responsibility of the Congress. There is great interest in health
care on Capitol Hill, and a strong belief that their role is to be the final
legislator and compromiser of any initiative. Congress reacts harshly to any
hint that this authority could be undermined. As such, a well-understood
knowledge of the positions of key Members and Committees of Jurisdiction,
as well as a close working relationship with them, is essential. At least
initially, the role of the opposing party is frequently to raise serious concerns
about the proposal. Thus, policymakers' goal should not necessarily be to
achieve agreement at the beginning of the legislative process, but to provide
room for an acceptable compromise at the end of the process. It matters
little whether the compromise is something that the opponents want or fear
opposing; it matters significantly that the perception from the public is that
the final agreement is bipartisan in nature.
V. APPLYING THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION EXPERIENCE
Applying the lessons outlined previously to the experience of the
Clinton Administration helps explain why it failed to achieve success in
enacting the Health Security Act, but succeeded in enacting or implementing
a host of targeted health care reforms in the latter part of the Administration.
Regardless of the success or failure of particular policy priorities, the Ad-
ministration learned the importance of making health care a presidential
priority, and succeeded in laying the groundwork for the health care agenda
for years to come.
Applying these lessons to the Health Security Act, one can only con-
clude that despite an unprecedented effort, the outcome was, in retrospect,
preordained. By taking a comprehensive approach to reform, it was neces-
sary that almost all elements of the policy and the strategy be implemented
flawlessly. Unfortunately, this was not the case, as we failed in attracting
and retaining both internal and external validators that were critical to the
press and public evaluation of the policy. While we defined the problem and
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desired outcome quite well, we promoted a policy at a time when the trust in
the federal government was perhaps at its lowest. There was great dissatis-
faction with, for example, the government's inability to recognize the per-
ceived failure of the welfare system. As such, the idea that the federal
government would propose and significantly regulate health care was bound
to be vulnerable to fair and unfair criticisms of the proposed policy. This
helps explain why President Clinton now believes that in retrospect, it might
have been better to precede with welfare reform prior to pushing such an
ambitious health care initiative.
There were other timing problems, however. These included the fact
that the Administration had already pushed for very tough votes from the
Democratic Congress on deficit reduction and trade. We also were advocat-
ing a health care initiative at a time when the President and the First Lady
were being criticized (I believe unfairly and inaccurately) for a range of so-
called "scandals" such as Whitewater and Travelgate. Moreover, there were
foreign policy challenges, such as Haiti, that understandably distracted the
President. All this combined to undermine our traditional validators within
the groups and on Capitol Hill, and made it much more difficult and eventu-
ally impossible to produce a working majority in support of our policy to
secure universal coverage.
These factors, along with an overwhelming lobbying assault from
opponents of health care reform, served to not only undermine trust in the
government, but also trust in the President. The lesson here is that the
greatest motivating force in American politics is fear, not hope. Americans
are frequently more vulnerable to fear tactics designed to scare them into
thinking that they will lose something good than they are open to being
convinced that a new policy can improve their current lot in life. Republi-
cans, recognizing that public support for reform was diminishing and fear of
it was increasing, became less and less interested in making any compromise
on health care.
It is imperative to acknowledge, however, that many of these problems
outlined above were self-inflicted. We produced a policy that even some of
our own Administration did not support, and said so publicly. The policy
released was so detailed that it made it very susceptible to effective (yet
frequently unfair) criticism. Our sense of timing to promote this policy
perhaps could not have been worse. And our relationships with the Hill as a
consequence suffered significantly.
In contrast, subsequent health care efforts by the Clinton Administra-
tion were much more successful. They occurred subsequent to the reform of
the welfare system, and were targeted reforms that addressed insurance
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reforms, patient protections, children's health care, and Medicare and Medi-
caid modernization. They succeeded in making health care more accessible,
expanding coverage, extending the life of the Medicare trust fund to historic
levels, and producing the highest immunization rates and lowest infant
mortality rates in the nation's history. We also set the stage for future health
care debates on the Patients' Bill of Rights, expanding health insurance
coverage, modernizing Medicare to include a prescription drug benefit, and
reviving the public's interest in long-term care. These incremental reforms
were more inefficient than broader reforms would have been. Nevertheless,
such targeted reforms and successes were important perhaps at least as much
because they showed that government could develop and pass workable
health policy than they were comprehensive health achievements. Perhaps
most important, we succeeded in making health care a presidential priority,
something that I believe every subsequent President will have to emulate.
VI. LIKELY HEALTH CARE POLICY REFORMS IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION
Now, in Washington, we have a Republican administration and a
Republican Congress. Health care has not been their number one priority to
this point. Instead, they have focused on other issues, such as tax cuts,
defense, spending issues, and education (not necessarily in that order).18
Health care traditionally is not an issue that people often associate with the
Republican Party. People have been skeptical of their commitment, and they
feel that a lot of special interest groups are closer to them than they are to the
Democratic Party.
I think, however, that President Bush took a page from President Clin-
ton in the election. A lot of Republicans in the early 1990s were angry that
President Clinton talked so much about crime and welfare reform, tradition-
ally issues associated with Republican priorities. In fact, early in his first
term, President Clinton spent a lot of time and resources to illustrate his
commitment to these areas. He wanted to give the public a sense that he was
not only committed to traditionally Democratic issues, but with any issues
that frustrated the American people. These actions gave him common
ground with the center of the American public. President Bush has made
some early efforts to associate him with health policy reform, and has pro-
posed an interim solution he calls the "Helping Hand" solution to the pre-
18. Republican Liberty Caucus, at http://www.rlc.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
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scription drug benefit problem.' 9 This program is designed to help low
income people obtain health care and prescription drug benefits. 2°
Most Americans do not really focus on elections until election cycles.
There are strong Democrats and strong Republicans, but the people in the
middle are the ones who, in the end, influence elected politicians. So I
anticipate that President Bush will continue to do what he has already done
to a certain extent, both in the campaign and now, which is to acknowledge
that President Clinton raised very real health care issues that need to be
addressed and that there is an unfinished agenda that the American public
wants very strongly to get done.
VII. CONCLUSION
I always say that health care is the sex, drugs, and rock and roll of the
domestic policy scene. It is the fun issue. It has everything: it is complex, it
is emotional, it is special interest laden, it is money laden, it is full of poli-
tics, and it is full of policy. As maddening as it can be, it can also be the
most rewarding thing one can do. I can tell you personally from having done
work in health policy for so many years, that I have been privileged to meet
people, whether it is parents whose children did not have health coverage,
and now do, or the person who had a preexisting condition who could not get
health care before the implementation of the Kennedy-Kassebaum insurance
reforms,2 1 and now can, to someone who is now able to take time off to care
for a chronically ill spouse or parent because of the Family and Medical
Leave Act,22 or individuals with disabilities who are now able to go back to
work without the fear of losing their health coverage.
When you actually get policies enacted into law and see them making a
real difference in people's lives, there really is nothing like it. So I welcome
young, old, and committed new people to this field. I hope you will join the
cause and work towards improving the nation's health care system. As
Winston Churchill said, and I'm paraphrasing, "Americans will always do
the right thing, but not until they've exhausted every other option first."
Since we have tried almost every course of action, I have to believe we are
19. Morton M. Kondracke, Bush, Democrats Can Deal on Taxes, Medicare, Schools,
RoLL CALL, Jan. 4, 2001, available at http:llwww.rollcall.comfpages/columns/kondrake/oo/
2001/kond004.html.
20. Id.
21. See Press Release, supra note 16.
22. Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2654 (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 825 (2001).
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about to get it right. With your help, I hope and expect that we will achieve
the goal of assuring that every American has quality, affordable health care.
VII. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Student: I want to thank you for sharing some of the complexities of
the issue, for this was a very enlightening lecture. I do not know if your
definition of coverage expansion includes expansion of coverage for mental
health services, or is that a totally different battle?
Mr. Jennings: I have spent a lot of time talking to Tipper Gore about
those issues and we have succeeded in a number of important fields. First,
we passed the Mental Health Parity Act, which mandated that there should
no longer be inaccurate or discriminatory lifetime and annual caps on mental
health coverage. We required, through executive order, that all federal
employee health plans must have mental health parity in all benefits. The
implementation of this policy proved that mental health parity in health
coverage does not significantly increase health costs. This evidence may
prove to be a great tool for those advocates striving to extend mental health
parity to private health plans.
The Clinton Administration held a historic White House Conference on
mental health. We released the first Surgeon General report on mental
health. Tipper Gore served as a wonderful advocate for mental health, and I
am confident that she will continue to work on these issues. When we
passed the 1997 Balanced Budget Act we had to fight opponents of mental
health parity to ensure that mental health benefits would be part of the CHIP
program, which we succeeded in doing. I think that through the attention
that has been focused on mental health services within the last several years,
we are making real progress on these issues.
Student: On a pragmatic side, let's discuss finances. Incidents of fraud
within the health care system always seem to involve big bucks. As a tax-
payer, I say, okay, I am all for supporting those that need the assistance.
When you design these systems, do you, at all, consider the back end? What
are we going to do with those people caught abusing the system?
Mr. Jennings: That is a very good question. We have spent a lot of
time over the past eight years working to control health care fraud. We spent
a lot of time weeding out fraud in the Medicare program during the Clinton
Administration and we did it very successfully. In the minds of many pro-
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vider groups, we were too successful in this area. They feel that the Health
Care Financing Administration was far too aggressive in their enforcement;
they frequently felt that understandable compliance shortcomings resulting
from confusing directives from Medicare were not criminal acts.
So, in order to effectively fight Medicare fraud, you have to find the
right balance between strong enforcement and good communication with
providers. It is true that many Americans believe that if you just cut back on
the fraud, you would have all the money you need to take care of everyone. I
wish that were true, but it is not. There is no question that there must be
strong anti-fraud enforcement mechanisms to control fraud, and, also impor-
tantly, give yourself credibility on this issue. Americans must know that you
are doing everything you can to stop fraud. But you also need to diffuse the
public notion that no matter how successful you are, it will not be enough
money to take care of the problems.
I must say that I am proud, however, that the Medicare actuaries and
independent career analysts have concluded that the Clinton Administra-
tion's dedication to anti-fraud activities is one of the most important reasons
why we significantly extended the life of the Medicare trust fund during the
Administration. Additionally, I think our efforts have successfully changed
provider behavior, making it much less common for providers to bill for
services inappropriately.
Student: Sir, one other thing, also about financing. There is great
concern about a potential recession. Realistically, what will that do for the
efforts in Washington on health care?
Mr. Jennings: Well, it is interesting; sometimes in bad times you can
end up having more of a focus on health care. A lot of the surveys that are
most recently coming out are showing that people are concerned about job
layoffs. When the job security issue gets raised, so does people's fear of
losing their health care. When you lose your job you lose income, but it is
much easier to replace an income source than to replace health care. People
really fear losing health care.
In fact, in 1993, that was one of the driving forces for our attempt at
major health care reform. The people who feared losing health care were a
much more influential political force that those who were already uninsured.
So, interestingly, bad times can lead to more action on big issues. Now, I do
not anticipate that this recession would lead to discussions of universal
health coverage, but you might make efforts to expand coverage in other
ways. For example, one smaller policy that may become popular in a time of
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economic downturn is subsidies for COBRA coverage. Individuals who
leave or lose their jobs can opt to continue their health coverage by paying
102% of the premium their employer paid. However, many individuals
cannot afford to pay these premiums, but if you can develop a six-month or
year-long subsidy program for people who have lost their jobs, that stopgap
period could make a real difference, in both reducing numbers of uninsured
and creating a greater sense of security and trust in the government. So, in
an ironic way, bad economic times can lead to positive developments.
It is interesting to note that as private sector health care expenditures
have increased dramatically in recent years, we have succeeded in constrain-
ing health care spending to historic low levels. The outcome of this fact is
that the large surpluses we now have are largely attributable to our success at
moderating the growth of Medicare and Medicaid. I therefore believe that a
strong argument can and must be made that a significant portion of federal
surpluses should be dedicated to health care improvements. In the 1980s and
1990s, we always utilized health care savings to be the source of new financ-
ing for coverage improvements. While there no doubt will be an appropriate
interest in dedicating some of the surplus to tax cuts, it should not be at the
expense of long-overdue and needed investments in insurance coverage
expansions and a new Medicare prescription drug benefit. It is my hope that
the health care needs of the nation will not be bypassed by the tax cut fervor
that will almost inevitably be promoted by the new President and the Repub-
lican Congress. Only time will tell.
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Immediately the human corpse rises to a dignity and importance in
the commercial world which it may not have possessed in its life-
time. It is a commercium, a thing of value, a subject of political
economies, perhaps to be bought, sold, and exchanged, and subject
to the rules of supply and demand .... The whole foundation of
law and custom is shaken. It becomes a serious question how it
shall be rebuilt. A new civilization calls loudly for new definitions
of the rights and duties of society to the dead body. Up to the pre-
sent writing they have not been satisfactorily given.'
I. INTRODUCTION
This rather modem sounding cry for examination of the market for
human tissue actually dates to the late nineteenth century, when the supply
of cadavers for medical education was dwindling. Whether one dates the
transformation to the nineteenth or to the twentieth century, it is certain that
"[flor better or worse, we have irretrievably entered an age that requires
examination of our understanding of the legal rights and relationships in the
,2human body and the human cell." Where once the value of the human body
was seen exclusively in its ability to perform labor or to produce offspring or
to bring sensual and other personal satisfaction, the potential of the human
body as a source of transferable physical material has led some to see its
value in medical 3 and, if made available for sale,4 economic terms as well.5
1. William Boulier, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize
Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HorsTRA L. REv. 693 (1995) (citing Francis K.
Carey, The Disposition of the Body After Death, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 251 (1885)).
2. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1988).
3. See generally, Boulier, supra note 1.
4. For the past few decades advertisements and schemes have appeared offering the
sale of various parts. See, e.g., Michael Finkel, This Little Kidney Went to Market, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., May 27, 2001, at 26; RUSSELL ScoTt, THE BODY As PROPERTY (Viking Press
1981); Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Supplying Organs for Transplantation, 68 MICH. U. L. REV.
811, 811 n.1 (1970); Will Bennett, Advert Offered 10,000 Pounds for a Kidney, INDEP.
LONDON, Jan. 10, 1990, at 2; Andy Riga, Man on Dole Offers Kidney for a Job, GAZETTE
(Montreal), Mar. 12, 1994, at A3; David Adams, The Organ Theft Scandal, TRM OF LONDON,
Nov. 18, 1993, at 18; Tim McGirk, India's Poor Sell "Bits of Their Bodies" to the World's
Rich, INDEP. LONDON, Aug. 13, 1994, at 8; Charles P. Wallace, For Sale: The Poor's Body
Parts, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 27, 1992, at AI.
5. See Scott, supra note 4, at 179-97. Identifying a market value for the sum total of
all human tissue is a popular intellectual exercise. In the early 1970s, for example, one
student wrote on the possible tax consequences of organ sales, and relied on the figure of
$653.50 as the market value of the constituent minerals in the body including blood serum.
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This essay briefly describes the history of using various human non-
organ tissues, whether obtained from living or deceased donors, so that the
issues surrounding postmortem markets in bone, skin, and other tissues can
be better situated within the context of the American market and regulation
for tissue generally.
Human tissue is obtained in a variety of ways. Blood may be donated
or sold by living persons for use in transfusion or basic research. Hair may
be sold by living persons for wig makers, or placental tissue collected after
childbirth for cosmetics manufacturers. Surgical procedures may result in
pathological samples taken both for diagnostic purposes and for long storage
for both clinical uses related to the patient and research uses going far
6beyond the patient's lifetime. These tissues may also be manipulated to
create replicating cell lines that have characteristics resulting both from the
underlying tissue and from the laboratory manipulation. Gametes (sperm
and eggs) and fetal tissue from abortions and miscarriages can be collected
from donors and transferred to others, usually with reimbursement although
technically not with payment that would transform the transaction into a
formal sale. While each of these forms of tissue transfer are interesting, this
chapter will focus on a selection of human tissues-specifically, corneas,
gametes, and cell lines-in order to illustrate some of the legal and market
phenomena typically associated with tissue transfers.
Interestingly, there is relatively little law at either the state or federal
level governing tissue transfers, whether with regard to how tissue is
obtained, how it is transferred, or how it is manipulated and transplanted. In
part, this may be due to the low economic value of most human tissue. In the
absence of financially significant disputes, fewer cases come to courts for
resolution and there is less pressure for legislative bodies to anticipate and
regulate future disputes. In part, it is also due, to the complexities of
property law, the primary area of law applicable to the recovery and transfer
of human tissue, and its historical inability to reconcile the concerns of the
market with the more emotional and spiritual concerns associated with the
See Paul McCarthy, Note, Tax Consequences of Transfers of Bodily Parts, 73 COLUM. L. REv.
842, 860 (1973) (citing CHEMICAL AND ENGINEERING NEWS, Nov. 13, 1972, at 60, col. 2).
Today that figure would need radical adjustment to account for the potential economic value
of gene sequences, rare tissue types, and reproductive material. See LORI ANDREWS &
DOROTHY NELKN, BODY BAZAAR (2001).
6. National Bioethics Advisory Comm'n, Research Involving Human Biological
Materials: Ethical and Policy Guidance, at I (U.S. GPO, Washington, D. C. 1999)
[hereinafter Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical and Policy Guidance].
7. Id.
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legal characterization of personal control over one's body, both before and
after death.8 Thus, while there is a growing interest in health and safety
based regulation of tissue manipulation and transplantation, and a body of
rules governing the distribution of whole organs from cadavers, there is only
spotty legal coverage of other areas of what might be termed "tissue law."
The essay begins with a look at the interplay of property law and
personal autonomy, and at the origins of the law's treatment of the corpse. It
is here that one finds the beginnings of still lively discussions about the
relationship between ourselves and our bodies that, in turn, informs
discussions about the law and regulation governing markets in human tissue.
It turns next to some specific examples of markets in tissue, some in which
people know they are releasing tissue for the use of others and some in
which that knowledge may be absent. Finally, it summarizes the growing
body of regulatory law that governs tissue manipulation and transplantation,
an area of general application to many different kinds of tissue from many
different sources.
II. PROPERTY AND PERSONAL AUTONOMY
The value of the body is intimately linked to the question of personal
autonomy. Depending on which basis is chosen to explain notions of
personal autonomy, the removal of cadaver tissue without consent, a
frequent proposal in the area of "presumed consent" laws to foster greater
availability of transplantable organs and tissue, will or will not violate
notions of personal autonomy that run deep in the American legal system.
Autonomy can be promoted through many legal regimes. The value of
the body is intimately linked to the question of personal autonomy. Such
autonomy can be achieved through many legal regimes. In one, autonomy is
premised on the notion that one's body is one's personal property, and that
uninvited removal of tissue is a form of theft or trespass. In another, the body
is not property, but personal autonomy is premised on liberty interests of the
person within, and uninvited removal of tissue is a form of injury and a
deprivation of liberty. The question of personal control over one's body is
highlighted throughout civil and criminal law. An unwanted touching-
whether by a criminal attacker or by a doctor who exceeds the scope of
consent to surgery-is a battery. Bodily integrity is a highly protected legal
and cultural value in the United States, and informed, uncoerced consent is
8. Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm as Property: In the Absence of a Compelling Argument
Against Posthumous Reproduction, Individual Autonomy Should Prevail, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y
REv. 57 (1995).
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necessary before any bodily invasion. This conclusion can be reached
whether or not one views the body as a form of personal property.
But while it is clear that a living, competent person's body parts cannot
be removed without his or her consent, the law of bodily integrity is less
clear after someone has died. Here, the question of whether the body is
property becomes pertinent, as the liberty interests that support an alternative
theory of personal autonomy are usually considered to have died with the
person. Thus, by characterizing the body as property, personal control over
the removal of tissues can continue even after death, by virtue of testamen-
tary wishes in a will or ownership interests in heirs and next of kin. In the
context of determining decision-making authority for research and clinical
uses of organs and tissue, courts have tended to recognize that the source of
the tissue has decision-making authority-even over interventions that will
occur after death, or after the tissue has been removed-but at the same time
to eschew a clear jurisprudence of the body as a form of property. The result
is legal confusion in the market and quasi-market for human tissue. Adding
to the confusion is the fact that questions of control are distinct from the
issue of commercialization. Thus, in most cases, the donor of a cadaver
organ for transplantation cannot be paid for the organ, 9 but the living donor
of certain types of tissue (blood, sperm, eggs, genes) may be compensated.
And doctors or researchers who claim intellectual property rights in altered
versions of other people's cell lines or genes can earn millions.'0
III. THE LAW OF THE CORPSE
The earliest Anglo-Saxon cases to consider ownership of human tissue,
specifically corpses, were decided almost 1000 years ago by special
ecclesiastical courts in England who were given complete jurisdiction over
all matters concerning burials and disposition of corpses.11 With few
9. The federal National Organ Transplant Act prohibits payment for organs in
interstate commerce when those organs are being used for transplantation. 42 U.S.C. § 274e
(2000). However, under the California Anatomical Gift Act, the donor can be paid, but a
middleman cannot. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETr CODE ANN. § 7155 (2000). Pennsylvania passed
a law allowing a modest compensation-up to $3000 to pay for funeral expenses of organ
donors. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8622(b)(1).
10. Genetic Engineering News publishes an annual list of "molecular millionaires."
Prominent among them are researchers who have patented patients' genes. Brian O'Neill,
Biotechnology Bay State has share of "Molecular Millionaires," BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21,
1999, at D4.
11. PERCIVAL JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF BURIAL PLACES (Prentice-
Hall, N.Y., 1936).
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exceptions, control of dead bodies remained within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the church courts until the nineteenth century, when the growth of medical
schools and their need for cadavers for dissection created a challenge to
ecclesiastical dominion over bodies.1
2
In the earliest recorded treatise of the subject of property rights in the
human body, Lord Edward Coke wrote: "[t]he buriall [sic] of the cadaver
(that is caro data vermibus) is nullius in bonis, [the goods of no one] and
belongs to eccleflaftical cognifance, [sic]" ' 3 a statement that became the
foundation for the Anglo-American law that human body parts cannot be
property.
In colonial America, the absence of ecclesiastical courts resulted in
civil jurisdiction over bodies and the application of common law principles.
There were no commercial rights in cadavers, no right for a decedent to
direct the manner of burial, and no burial rights enforceable by the next of
kin; common law courts were more focused on commercial disputes than
sentimental concerns.
During the 1800s, however, common law doctrine was increasingly
viewed as incapable of managing the real emotional distress associated with
mismanagement of bodies, and courts began assigning to the next of kin an
enforceable right to possession of a body for burial. To preserve the
continuity of common law principles, the right was sometimes characterized
as a "property right."' 5 This right became so well established that in 1891, a
court suggested that the "fact that a person has exclusive rights over a body
for the purposes of burial leads necessarily to the conclusion that it is his
property in the broadest and most general sense of that term."'
16
Judicial references to property rights in corpses were misleading,
however.17 While common law property rights generally include the right to
12. Richard J. Sideman & Eric D. Rosenfeld, Legal Aspects of Tissue Donations from
Cadavers, 21 SYRACUSE L. REv. 825 (1970).
13. 3 EDWARDO COKE, INSTrUTES OFTHE LAWS OF ENGLAND 203 (1644).
14. See Griffith v. Charlotte, Columbia & Augusta R.R. Co., 23 S.C. 25, 32 (1884).
The Court noted that "Coke was understood to say that 'a dead body was the property of no
one.' No matter what he did say; this understanding, or misunderstanding, has come down to
us as law." Id.
15. See JACKSON, supra note 11.
16. Larson v. Chase, 50 N.W. 238, 239 (Minn. 1891).
17. Property is generally viewed not as a single indivisible concept but as a bundle of
legally protected interests, including the right to possess and use, to transfer by sale or gift,
and to exclude others from possession. Although the property concept can be invoked to
protect various legal interests, one's right to use property is commonly limited to uses that do
426 [Vol. 26:421
31
: Nova Law Review 26, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Alta Charo
possess and use, to transfer by sale or gift, and to exclude others from
possession, 18 few of these rights were applied to bodies. For instance, the
theft of a cadaver was not larceny, the sale of a cadaver was not a common
law crime, the heirs had no right to repossess a body wrongfully taken from
them, and a cadaver could not be the subject of a lien. Recognizing the
limited applicability of property law to corpses, twentieth century American
courts retreated from the broad pronouncement of bodies as property and
began referring to more limited "quasi property fights" vested in the next of
kin and arising out of their legal duty to bury the dead. These rights include
the right to possession and custody of the body for burial, the right to have it
remain in its final resting place, and the right to recover damages for any
outrage, indignity, or injury to the body of the deceased.19
The family's interest in the dead body was subject to various interests
of the state government, including concern for public sensibility, promotion
of public health, identifying cases of murder, and protecting the economic
interests of undertakers and insurers. Quasi property analysis became the
prevailing rule in both the United States and England during the early
twentieth century and continues to be applied to disputes over funeral
arrangements.20
In the 1930s, American jurists and legal scholars began questioning the
applicability of property law concepts to cases involving wrongful conduct
toward corpses. Gradually, the newly developing tort law framework of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (also called "outrageous
conduct") was viewed as a more appealing theoretical basis for a legal claim
against anyone who wrongfully removes, mutilates, or operates on the body
of a dead person, or who prevents its proper interment or cremation.21 The
cause of action is a personal right of the survivor rather than a right of the
decedent or his estate, as the courts are not primarily concerned with the
extent of the physical mishandling or injury to the body per se, but rather
not offend public safety or sensibilities. For example, a person may own a car but not have a
right to use it without first obtaining a driver's license.
18. RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 15 (Walter B,
Raushenbush 3d ed. 1975).
19. 22A AM. JuR. 2D Dead Bodies §§ 1-30 (2001).
20. William Boulier, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize
Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REv. 693, 705 (1995); Paul Matthews,
Whose Body? People as Property, 36 CuRRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 193 (1983).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oFTORTS § 868 (1977).
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with the effect of such improper activities on the emotions of the surviving
kin.22
Even these rights, however, are tempered by the public interest. In
American jurisdictions, a person may dictate the disposal of his or her
remains through a will, and if she fails to do so, the decedent's family may
exercise the power.23 This power, however, is subject to limitation by rights
of coroners and medical examiners. If the state interest is compelling
enough, the relatives of the decedent may lose any quasi-property right.2
Overall, courts have backed away from adopting a property theory for
the body, for example by discussing and rejecting conversion2 claims with
respect to corpses, in part because of the belief that the partial remains of a
26human body have no inherent value. On the other hand, they have
conflated quasi-property rights in the corpse with torts claims for infliction
of emotional distress due to improper handling of the corpse, leaving the
extent to which there is a legally recognized property interest in the body
still unclear. 27
22. Id.
23. Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K. Johnson, The United States System of
Organ Donation, the International Solution, and the Cadaveric Organ Donor Act: "And The
Winner Is... "20 J. CORP. L. 5, 10 (1995).
24. See State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986) (holding that the state interest in
providing sight to blind citizens is compelling enough to allow removal of corneas from a
corpse without notice to the next of kin).
25. The essence of the tort of conversion is interference with the owner's right of
possession or control. The plaintiff in a conversion suit must therefore show a right to possess
the property or the suit will fail. Historically, establishing a property interest in a bodily part
has been quite difficult. As discussed earlier, the sale or disposition of cadavers, cadaver
tissues, or the cadaver organs has generally been restricted. In addition to demonstrating a
property interest in the tissue, a successful suit for conversion must show that the plaintiff has
suffered some injury through interference with the property. One form of injury is a
diminution in the availability (and hence the value) of the property to the plaintiff, but "raw"
tissues and cells have little pecuniary value in themselves.
26. Shults v. United States, 995 F. Supp. 1270, 1272 (D. Kan. 1998). Whether a
change in the market demand for raw tissue would affect this analysis remains to be seen.
27. Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property Right in
Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REv. 209, 231 (1990). In a number of prominent scandals,
crematoria and funeral homes have been the subject of class-action suits following disclosure
of improper handling of corpses, including a $31 million suit in 1984 to the relatives of 5,000
people whose ashes were dumped on land instead of over the ocean; and $25 million suit in
1991 to relatives of people whose bodies were harvested for tissue and then cremated, with
mixed ashes returned to the families; and, most recently, a suit for improper disposal of
hundreds of bodies at a Georgia crematorium. Duane Stanford, Lawyers Target Funeral
Homes, Not Crematory, ATLANTA J. & CONST., March 3, 2002, at 1A.
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Without a clear notion of whether interference with the body is an
interference with property or an invasion of privacy, it is difficult to develop
a coherent and consistent set of rules governing control over the body and its
tissues. While either theory can support rules that permit dispositional
control to rest with the person, while alive, and with the person's kin, after
death, only a property theory can easily support a commercial market in
tissues, whether taken from live donors (or, perhaps, better defined as
sellers) or from cadavers now owned by those who inherit the body from its
"owner." In light of the existing markets and quasi-markets in tissue, and in
light of the growing range of commercial uses of tissue, this lack of clarity
poses a challenge to the orderly development and regulation of tissue
transfers for research, transplantation, and other uses.
IV. THE LAW OF CADAVERIC TISSUE DONATION
The first phenomenon to put pressure on this lack of clarity in the status
of human tissue arose in the mid-twentieth century, when scientific advances
led to an increasing need for transplantable tissue. From 1947 until 1968,
forty states enacted statutes permitting anatomical donations from cadavers28
for transplantation or scientific research. Variations among the statutes
lead to the formation of a special committee of the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws to draft a uniform donation statute.29 The result of this
effort is the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), which has been adopted
throughout the fifty states and the District of Columbia.30
The UAGA permits any competent adult to make a gift-to take effect
upon death-of all or any part of his body for purposes such as medical
education, research, and transplantation.31 Donations for research purposes
may only be made to hospitals, physicians, medical and dental schools, and
32tissue banks. Post mortem donations of human tissues and cells to
noncommercial biomedical researchers are therefore permitted, although
transfers from noncommercial researchers to commercial researchers are not
28. Sideman, supra note 12, at 841.
29. E. Blythe Stason, The Uniform Anatomical Gif Act, 23 Bus. LAw. 919, 920
(1968).
30. Id. The UAGA supersedes only those areas of the common law of cadavers that
are addressed by the act. Id. at 921-22.
31. Id. at925.
32. Id.
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addressed by the model law.33 It has been argued that the UAGA recognizes
rights in the human body that may be classified as property rights, but the
UAGA does not discuss inter vivos (during life) gifts, nor does it say
anything about the sale of organs or other body parts.34 The chairman of the
committee that drafted the UAGA has written that it was intended neither to
encourage nor prohibit sales.35
In 1984, Congress enacted the National Organ Transplant Act
36(NOTA). NOTA prohibits the sale of a human kidney, liver, heart, lung,
pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin. Although the act makes
it a felony to purchase specified human organs for transplantation,
reasonable payments for a living donor's expenses (e.g., travel, housing, and
lost wages) are permitted.37 Despite this prohibition, there is a quasimarket
in organs such as corneas.
V. PRESUMED CONSENT STATUTES AND CORNEAL TRANSPLANTATION
Corneal transplants have been done since 1905, and the Eye Bank
Association of America (EBAA) estimates that 45,000 people around the
world need such transplants each year.38 EBAA has 110 member eye banks
operating in over 100 locations in forty-three states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Canada, Europe, the Middle East, and Australia.
39
Corneas are considered "organs" under NOTA and many state statutes,
and many corneas are acquired by ordinary, voluntary donation practices,
such as prior authorization from the deceased or donation by next of kin, 
40
33. Stason, supra note 29, at 924. Gifts may be made either by will or by a gift
document such as a donor card. In the absence of contrary instructions by a decedent, the next
of kin may authorize a gift. Id. at 926.
34. Id. at 924.
35. Id.
36. National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-507 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§274-274e (2001).
37. The statute's organ sale prohibition was based primarily on congressional concern
that permitting the sale of human organs might undermine the nation's system of voluntary
organ donation. It was also driven by concern that the poor would sell their organs to the rich,
to the detriment both of poor people who might feel economically coerced to become organ
suppliers and those who need but cannot afford transplantable organs. It may also reflect
congressional distaste for sales of human body parts generally.
38. The Eyebank Ass'n of Am., at http://www.restoresight.org/pubsct.htm (last visited
Nov. 8, 2001).
39. Id.
40. Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REv. 163, 184
(2000).
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There is, however, an additional, lesser known process for gathering corneas
for transplantation. Statutes in approximately twenty states permit a coroner
to remove the corneas of a cadaver on which an autopsy is performed if there
is no known objection from surviving relatives.' Commonly referred to as
"presumed consent" laws, these statutes were enacted in the 1960s, 1970s,
42
and 1980s in order to ward off shortages.
Harvesting cornea tissue under presumed consent laws has resulted in
several challenges to the constitutionality of state laws that would remove
dispositional control over corneas from the next of kin. In a number of
cases, the state courts first found that the laws were valid under the state
constitutions and second, that there was no property interest in the deceased
person's body. Several courts held that the next of kin of the deceased has
no property right in the dead body.43 One of these courts also rejected the
argument presumed consent statutes invade a fundamental privacy right in a
person's body,44 holding that a right of privacy concerns the right to make
decisions about one's own body, and that this right dies with the person. 45
At the same time, however, these courts have acknowledged a quasi-
property right in the surviving relatives of the decedent to possession of the
body for purposes of burial. Indeed, two more recent cases in the federal
courts have suggested that next of kin may have a stronger property interest
in the dead body of a relative than these state cases would suggest, and that
their dispositional authority might go beyond mere control over burial. 6
The cases, however, do not develop this point enough to make it possible to
generalize to other tissues or other forms of more purely voluntary
donation.47
According to Professor Julia Mahoney of the University of Virginia:
The ability of coroners to harvest the corneas of corpses entrusted
to them creates opportunities for market transactions, as coroners'
41. Id.
42. Alexander Powhida, Comment, Forced Organ Donation: The Presumed Consent
to Organ Donation Laws of the Various States and the United States Constitution, 9 ALB. L.J.
Sci. & TECH. 349 (1998).
43. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986); Georgia Lion Eye Bank, Inc. v.
Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985); Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275
(Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
44. Tillman, 360 N.W.2d at 275.
45. Id. at 277.
46 Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111 (6th Cir. 1995); Brotherton v.
Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
47. Id.
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offices sell the retrieved corneas to tissue "banks" . .. which serve
an intermediary function, in turn reselling usable eyes to corneal
transplant programs. Late in 1997, press reports documenting a se-
ries of such exchanges appeared in the Los Angeles Times. From
1992 to 1997, reported the Times, the Los Angeles County coro-
ner's office delivered corneas to the Doheny Eye and Tissue
Transplant Bank in exchange for total payments of over
$1,000,000. Doheny paid the coroner's office $215 to $335 per
cornea, then resold the corneas for significantly more .... Eye
banks generally pay money to obtain corneas, whether obtained
from morgues, hospitals, or otherwise, and in turn receive money
from corneal programs. Corneal transplant programs in turn sell
transplant services-which, of course, include a cornea as part of
the deal-to patients.
48
Viewed as a question of privacy rights, the use of presumed consent
statutes to govern removal of corneas can be regarded as unproblematic for
the deceased person, whose privacy interests have also died, leaving only the
question of whether the public interest in ensuring adequate supplies
outweighs the public interest in protecting the sensibilities of the family.
The body itself becomes a kind of public resource, available for harvesting
and use to serve public purposes. But if corneas are the private property of
the deceased, property that should be controlled by will or the law of
intestacy, then this removal constitutes a form of taxation on the estate, or
worse, a taking, for which some argument about compelling public purpose
must be made, and some form of compensation provided. Without a theory
of the body as a public resource, this harvesting of corneas, especially when
coupled with financial transactions among intermediaries, is easily perceived
by the public as a rather ghoulish form of state-sanctioned theft, rather than
as a benign form of human tissue recycling in order to aid the living.
VI. THE LAW OF GAMETE SALES
An example of another large-scale market for human tissue lies in the
area of reproductive medicine, where sperm and ova are routinely obtained
from donors whose reimbursements for the service of providing gametes
strongly resemble a payment for the sale of their gametes. Gametes are
retrieved from thousands of Americans every year for use in assisted
reproduction. In many cases, the gametes are transferred to someone other
than the gamete provider's partner, a phenomenon commonly referred to as
48. Mahoney, supra note 40, at 184-85 (citations omitted).
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egg or sperm donation, even where the donors are reimbursed for the
gametes. The Centers for Disease Control, for example, estimates that donor
eggs were used in approximately ten percent of all Assisted Reproductive49
Technology (ART) cycles carried out in 1998, or 7756 cycles. A 1987
study by the congressional Office of Technology Assessment estimated the
frequency of sperm donation as considerably higher. 0
Sperm and egg donors are sought by advertisement, sometimes as low-
key as a flyer stuck on a billboard in a medical school and other times as
noticeable as an advertisement in a major national newspaper. Ron's Angels
bills itself as "the most visited egg and sperm site in the world."51 Whether
or not that is true, the intemet site offering to auction sperm and ova from
physically attractive people has generated much greater public awareness of
the market for human gametes.
Unlike most other developed countries, Americans can buy and sell
gametes, although the transactions are sometimes labeled as something other
than a sale, for example, where provision of a semen sample is rewarded
with a cash payment for "services" as opposed to a product. Similarly,
recipients will pay for a fertility service that includes the provision of the
necessary gametes, thus avoiding the need to consider the transaction strictly
as a purchase of gametes. Indeed, the American Society of Reproductive
Medicine condemned the Ron's Angels' site in these terms:
The ASRM Ethics Committee states that reasonable compensation
is justified for the time and trouble of both sperm and egg donors.
Compensation should not vary based on attributes that a child may
have. The "Ron's Angel's" website is essentially a donor egg 'auc-
tion' to sell human eggs to the highest bidder in the hopes of pro-
viding potential parents with more attractive-and therefore desir-
able-children. We believe that the "Ron's Angels" website vio-
lates the ethical principles outlined by the Committee, promotes
unrealistic expectations to potential parents, commercializes what
is otherwise a voluntary donation process, offers undue enticement
49. 1998 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates: National Summary and
Fertility Clinic Reports, at httpllwww.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drhlart98/section3.htm (last visited Jan.
27, 2002).
50. OTA, Artificial Insemination Practice in the United States: Summary of a 1987
Survey, US GPO, Washington D.C. 1988.
51. Ron's Angels, at http//www.ronsangels.com (last visited Jan. 27,2002).
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to potential donors, and has great potential to exploit highly vul-
nerable people.
52
The amount offered to reimburse gamete donors has varied over the
years. At the time of the 1987 congressional survey, men who met selection
criteria (for health, absence of transmissible disease, freedom from family
history of significant heritable disorders, and minimum height and physical
fitness) appeared to receive between thirty dollars and fifty dollars for each
semen sample provided, while egg donors (who must undergo a more
arduous, unpleasant, and risk prone retrieval) would receive up to several
thousand dollars. In 1998, however, an announcement by a New Jersey
fertility clinic of plans to double the compensation offered to egg donors
from $2500 to $5000 demonstrated that prices for egg donation were rising,
and generated extensive press coverage and commentary." The New York
Times reported that accounts of the price increase "put a spotlight on what is
perhaps the touchiest issue in the egg donation process: are the eggs a gift or
a free-market commodity?"54 In March 1999, the price offered for usable
ova increased by an order of magnitude when an advertisement placed in the
campus newspapers of several Ivy League schools offered a $50,000
"financial incentive" to an "Intelligent, Athletic Egg Donor.,
55
Both the pricing regimes and some cases suggest that, regardless of
rhetorical presentation, gametes are indeed treated as property. For example,
because gametes can also be retrieved from the dead, occasionally widows,
fiancdes, girlfriends, and parents of men who recently died have requested
sperm retrieval, raising the question of dispositional authority over
gametes. In Hecht v. Superior Court,56 which concerned the validity of a
provision in a man's will that his companion of five years be permitted to
52. ASRM Statement on "Ron's Angels" Website, Statement of R. Jeffrey Chang, M.D.
President, American Society for Reproductive Medicine, at http//www.obgyn.netlinfertility/
articles/asrmpr.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
53. Gina Kolata, Price of Donor Eggs Soars, Setting Off a Debate on Ethics, N.Y.
TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1998, at Al; Sharon Lerner, The Price of Eggs: Undercover in the Infertility
Industry, Ms., Mar./Apr. 1996, at 28.
54 Kolata, supra note 53, at Al.
55. Sydney Leavens, Yale U. Students and Professors React to Egg Donation Ad,
YALE DAILY NEws (New Haven), Mar. 4, 1999, at LEXIS, News Library (describing reactions
among members of the Yale community).
56. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). See also John A. Robertson,
Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1036-37 (1994); David Margolick, 15 Vials of
Sperm: The Unusual Bequest of an Even More Unusual Man, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1994, at
B18.
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use his semen,57 the appellate courts upheld the provision, treating the semen
as if it were the property of the deceased and therefore eligible for
disposition by testamentary provision. 8  The status of sperm-and, by
extension, other tissue-as the subject of property rights or personal rights
also arises in cases where there is no testamentary wish. In the mid-nineties,
for example, a newly married young man was killed in a quarrel with
police.5 9 His widow requested his semen even though there was no prior
indication of his wishes, in a will or by other meansi ° Physicians acceded to
her wishes, as they have on several other occasions to requests from
girlfriends and parents.'
Of course, the fact that courts have at times treated male gametes as if
they are property does not necessarily tell us whether this if a form of
property that ought to be bought and sold. In her analysis of the Hecht case,
philosopher Bonnie Steinbock writes:
ownership does not settle the question of the scope of control-that
is, what the owner may legally do with the stored sperm. Under
certain circumstances one can own something one is not permitted
to sell. For example, the Queen of England owns a great deal of
land and many art treasures that she may not sell. However, since
ordinarily one may sell one's property, the identification of sperm
as property creates a 6resumption that it may be donated, stored,
sold, and bequeathed.
Of course, ownership of something, whether of a pet or a piece of land
or one's own tissue, should also convey the right to sell the property is not
answerable merely by calling the item one's "property." "Too many
incidents are lacking to say that persons own their bodies. Restrictions on
transfer and the absence of a liberty to consume or destroy, for example,
indicate that persons do not own their bodies in the way that they own
automobiles or desks. 63
57. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276.
58. Id. at 290-291.
59 Beth J. Harpaz, Florida Woman Has Dead Husband's Sperm Saved, CHICAGO
SuN TiMEs, Jan. 20, 1995, at A8.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm As Property: In the Absence of a Compelling Argument
Against Reproduction, Individual Autonomy Should Prevail, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 57, 60
(1995).
63. Id. at 62 (quoting STEPHEN MuNzFR, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 56 (1980)).
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Looking at the question of personal control over one's body, it is
helpful to distinguish between property rights in one's body and personal
rights over its treatment:
Property rights are body rights that protect the choice to transfer.
Personal rights are body rights that protect interests other than the
choice to transfer. To note that someone has dispositional author-
ity over a body or body part is thus not necessarily to acknowledge
a property right; dispositional authority may indicate a personal
right instead.6
At the same time, the law's tolerance of our decisions to donate or sell
some of our body parts does suggest that some property rights clearly exist.
Whether these property rights include the right of sale hinges on a more
complex analysis of the social ramifications of such sales. Steinbock
elaborates:
[One should distinguish also] between weak property rights, which
involve only a choice to transfer gratuitously, and strong property
rights, which involve a choice to transfer for value. Most countries
permit the donation of organs, but forbid their sale. In these coun-
tries, people have weak property rights in their organs. In countries
where the sale of blood and semen is legal, individuals have strong
property rights in these bodily fluids65
The question of whether sperm and ova should be available for sale in
the United States, that is, whether they should be the subject of strong
property rights, is periodically revisited whenever controversies arise over
the scale of such sales or the connection of such sales to purportedly eugenic
goals, such as the sale of gametes from intellectually or physically
"superior" adults.66 But if we should ever conclude that such sales ought to
be permitted, then we should be prepared to apply the entire body of the law
of sales, as well as the body of tort law governing the sale of products.
VII. THE LAW OF TISSUES AND CELL LINES FOR RESEARCH
As mentioned in the introduction, many human tissues are obtained for
use in research, commerce, and clinical care. While most of these tissues are
64. Id.
65. Id. at 61.
66. Steinbock, supra note 62, at 65.
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obtained with the knowledge of the tissue source (if he or she is alive) or at
least the consent of the kin (when the tissue source is dead), the use of
tissues for research is characterized by a mix of both witting and unwitting
"donation" for use.
While individuals in the United States may possibly be seen to have a
strong property right in their gametes, no such strong property right has been
identified in the other tissues of their bodies, even when these tissues are
taken while the individual is alive.67 Human tissue is routinely excised in
medical procedures and stored for both clinical and research purposes. Once
stored, the tissues are then transferred among laboratories and researchers
for work on such things as genetic epidemiology, but there is virtually no
tradition of compensating the individuals from whom the tissues came.
Indeed, in many cases these individuals have no knowledge that they have
unwittingly made a gift of their human biological materials to the research
world.
The medical and scientific practice of storing human biological
materials is more than 100 years old. Human biological collec-
tions-which include DNA banks, tissue banks, and reposito-
ries-vary considerably, ranging from large collections formally
designated as repositories to blood or tissue informally stored in a
researcher's laboratory freezer. Large collections include archived
pathology materials and stored cards containing blood spots from
newborn screening tests (Gunthrie cards). Tissue specimens are
stored at military facilities, forensic DNA banks, government labo-
ratories, diagnostic pathology and cytology laboratories, university-
and hospital-based research laboratories, commercial enterprises,
and nonprofit organizations. Archives of human biological materi-
als range in size from fewer than 200 specimens to more than 92
million. Conservatively estimated, at least 282 million specimens
(from more than 176 million individual cases) are stored in the
United States, and the collections are growing at a rate of over 20
million cases per year. 6
The most common sources of human biological materials are di-
agnostic or therapeutic interventions in which diseased tissue is
removed or tissue and other material is obtained to determine the
67. Id.
68. Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical and Policy Guidance,
supra note 6, at 1.
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nature and extent of a disease. Even after the diagnosis or treat-
ment is complete, a portion of the specimen routinely is retained
for future clinical, research, or legal purposes. Specimens also are
obtained during autopsies. In addition, volunteers donate organs,
blood, or other tissue for transplantation or research, and some do-
nate their bodies after death for transplantation of organs or ana-
tomical studies. Each specimen may be stored in multiple forms,
including slides, paraffin blocks, formalin-fixed, tissue culture, or
extracted DNA. Repositories provide qualified commercial and
noncommercial laboratories with access to specimens for both
clinical and research purposes.
69
In addition to its future clinical use, a specimen of human bio-
logical material can be used to study basic biology or disease. It
can be examined to determine its normal and abnormal attributes,
or it can be manipulated to develop a research tool or a potentially
marketable product. Just as a clinician chooses biological materi-
als appropriate to the clinical situation at hand, a researcher's
choice of such materials depends on the goals of the research pro-
ject. The selected tissue can be used only once, or it can be used to
generate a renewable source of material, such as by developing a
cell line, a cloned gene, or a gene marker. In addition, proteins can
be extracted, or DNA isolated, from particular specimens.
70
There is substantial research value both in unidentified material
(i.e., material that is not linked to an individual) and in material
linked to an identifiable person and his or her continuing medical
record.71 In the former, the value to the researcher of the human
biological material is in the tissue itself and often in the associated
69. Id. at 2.
70. Id.
71. Id.
Human biological materials also may be used for quality control in health care
delivery, particularly in diagnostic and pathology laboratories. In addition, these
materials are used to identify an individual, such as in paternity testing and in cases
of abduction or soldiers missing in action, as well as in other forensic matters for
which biological evidence is available for comparison. The advent of technologies
that can extract a wide array of information from these materials generally has in-
creased the potential uses-in research and otherwise-of human biological ma-
terials that are unrelated to individual patient care.
Id. at 2-3.
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clinical information about that individual, without the need to know
72the identity of the person from whom it came. ... In such cases,
beyond knowing the diagnosis of the individual from whom the
specimen was obtained, researchers may not require more detailed
medical records, either past or ongoing.
Sometimes, however, it is necessary to identify the source of the
research sample, because the research value of the material de-
pends upon linking findings regarding the biology of the sample
with updated information from medical or other records pertaining
to its source.
73
By using the power of new DNA technologies and other molecular
techniques, scientists potentially can turn to millions of stored hu-
man biological materials as sources of valuable scientific, medical,
anthropological, and sociological information.74  Indeed, these
72. Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical and Policy Guidance,
supra note 6, at 2. "For example, investigators may be interested in identifying a biological
marker in a specific type of tissue, such as cells from individuals with Alzheimer's disease or
specific tumors from a cancer patient." Id.
73. Id. The recently published regulations designed to protect the privacy of medical
records and other health information do not appear to affect tissue banks. The regulations,
published by the United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) on
December 28, 2000, address not only medical records but also other individually identifiable
health information maintained by health plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health
care providers. They give consumers access to their health information and control the
inappropriate use of that information. They limit non consensual use and release of private
health information and give patients new rights to access their records and to know who else
has accessed them. The regulations specifically exempt tissue banks, organ procurement
organizations, eye banks, and blood banks because they are not considered "health care
providers" within the meaning of the regulation.
74. Id. at3.
The demonstrated use of these technical capabilities suggests that human tissue and
DNA specimens that have been sitting in storage banks for years-or even a cen-
tury-could be plumbed for new information to reveal something not only about
the individual from whom the tissue was obtained, but possibly about entire groups
of people who share genes, environmental exposures, and ethnic or even geo-
graphic characteristics. Clearly, the same is true for materials that may be collected
in the future. DNA, whether already stored or yet to be collected, can be used to
study genetic variation among people, to establish relationships between genes and
characteristics (such as single gene disorders), or, more generally, to conduct basic
studies of the cause and progression of disease, all with the long-term goal of im-
proving human health.
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technologies are so powerful-even revolutionary-that they also
hold the ability to uncover knowledge about individuals no longer
alive.
" In 1997, [for example,] scientists at the University of
Oxford announced that they had compared DNA ex-
tracted from the molar cavity of a 9,000-year-old skele-
ton (known as Cheddar Man) to DNA collected from
20 individuals currently residing in the village of
Cheddar; this resulted in the establishment of a genetic
tie between the skeleton and a schoolteacher who lived
just half a mile from the cave where the bones were
found.
75
* Scientists have used enzyme linked assays to analyze
tissues more than 5,000 years old and to track the his-
toric spread of diseases such as malaria and schisto-
somiasis, obtaining knowledge that can enlighten cur-
rent efforts to control infectious disease.
76
* In early 1999, a United States pathologist and a group
of European molecular biologists announced that they
had found DNA sequences in the Y chromosome of the
descendants of Thomas Jefferson that matched DNA
from the descendants of Sally Hemings, a slave at Mon-
ticello.77 The data establish only that Thomas Jefferson
was the most likely of several candidates who might be
the father of Eston Hemings, Hemings' fifth child, but
also have raised a storm of controversy.78
In light of these new uses for stored human tissue, academic and
government bodies have begun to ask whether the tissues may only be used
with permission of the individuals from whom they came-a position
consistent with the notion that these tissues are the property of those
75. Id. See also Marriette DiChristina, Stone Age Kin, POPULAR SCIENCE, June 1997,
at 90.
76. Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical and Policy Guidance,
supra note 6. See also Mummy Tissue Bank, at http://www.museum.man.ac.uk/newl
mummy.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
77. Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical and Policy Guidance,
supra note 6. See also Eugene A. Foster, et al., Jefferson Fathered Slave's Last Child,
NATURE, Nov. 5, 1998, at 27.
78. Research Involving Human Biological Materials: Ethical and Policy Guidance,
supra note 6, at 3.
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individuals-or whether the tissues are a kind of public resource that can be
used with impunity, provided that no undue harm would befall these
individuals by virtue of a release of tissue information to employers,
insurers, or family members who might misuse or misunderstand its import.
To date, it is this latter position that has guided federal policy, even while, in
other respects, professional societies have called for recognizing that
individuals do have an interest in the uses to which their body tissue is put.
79
In addition, the AMA Code of Ethics requires that patients' consent must be
obtained before their tissue is used for commercial purposes.
80
While federal human subjects research regulations and the 1999 report
of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission both call for a practice of
seeking consent from individuals in most cases, this practice is premised not
on a theory of property, but on a theory of personal privacy; and since
information revealed by studying the tissue may render these individual
research subjects vulnerable, they ought to have the privilege of declining
participation if they wish.81 Indeed, where risks are minimal and obtaining
consent is unwieldy, both current regulations and NBAC's proposals for
revised practices permit use of stored tissue without any authorization from
the person whose body provided the materials. 82 This is a sure sign that the
tissues are not the subject of strong property rights. It is also consistent with
the leading common law case on the question of property rights in excised
tissue, Moore v. Regents of the University of California,8 3 in which the
influential supreme court of California held that a patient whose cells had
been removed and used by others to construct a valuable cell line did not
have a cause of action for conversion, citing the lack of anL precedent
holding that an individual has a property interest in excised cells.
79. Ellen Wright Clayton, et al., Informed Consent for Genetic Research on Stored
Tissue Samples, 274 JAMA 1786 (1995). Ethical opinions, professional guidelines, and court
decisions are increasingly recognizing the importance of an individual's control over his or
her tissue outside of the body. A workshop of the National Institutes of Health and Centers
for Disease Control developed a protocol for the collection of tissue samples that recognizes
the personal and religious implications of tissue donation and allows people to control what
use is made of the tissue removed from their bodies. Id. More recently, the NIH adopted most
of the NBAC recommendations concerning the management of research on stored human
tissue. See http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/info/ninfo-14.php3.
80. AMA CODEOFETHicS, E-2.08 (2001).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
84. Id.
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One strong public policy reason advanced for withholding property
status to these excised tissues is the effect that would have on important
research and on the protection of human subjects of research. If considered
personal property, then much tissue could be used only with explicit
permission, something logistically difficult to obtain for the many thousands
of stored samples collected years ago from people who have since moved,
changed names, or otherwise become difficult to locate. Given the important
genetic and viral epidemiology that can be done on these stored samples,
prohibiting all uses without explicit donor consent would be a major blow to
public health and medical research. Of course, consent would be unneces-
sary in situations in which the tissue is considered abandoned, but under
such an abandonment theory, the tissue could be used with impunity, and
without regard for the potential invasions of privacy and social interests that
might arise on occasion, when analysis reveals stigmatizing information
about the person from whom the tissue was taken. By viewing the tissue not
as property, but as an invasion of privacy interests, a more nuanced public
policy can develop, in which tissue is used with permission where possible,
and without permission when the public interest in use is significant and the
possible dignitary or pecuniary harm to the individual is de minimis.
VIII. THE REGULATION OF TISSUE TRANSPLANTATION
Regardless of whether tissue is viewed as personal property, or whether
as personal property it can be sold, it is nonetheless possible to comprehen-
sively regulate tissue transactions for the purpose of ensuring minimum
safety in transplantation settings.
Tissue banking, the term that describes the process of removing and
then storing human tissue for future use, originated in the United States in
the 1940s.8 The first tissue banks established were eye banks, which stored
corneas, and bone banks, which stored bone removed during surgery for use
86in future patients. In 1950, the United States Navy established the United
States Navy Tissue Bank, which pioneered techniques for recovering,
processing, and preserving cadaver tissue. It was not until the late 1960s
that the federal government became involved, when a group of American
ophthalmologists approached the Division of Biologic Standards at the
National Institutes of Health and suggested the implementation of federal
85. Michael D. Strong, Tissue Banks: Drafting New Rules for Grafting, 79 Bus. &
Soc'Y REV. 42, (1991).
86. Id.
87. Id.
[Vol. 26:421
47
: Nova Law Review 26, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Alta Charo
guidelines for corneal storage media. At the time, however,
"[t]ransplantation was regarded as part of the practice of medicine or
surgery, and no effort was made to regulate the procedure or the human
organs and tissues being transplanted."89 The "FDA [merely] encouraged
the development of voluntary guidelines by those who retrieved, processed,
and stored human tissue intended for transplantation," which did indeed
occur.
90
In 1976, the American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB) was
established to develop standards and procedures and to assist new programs
in complying with standards. 91 The AATB's accreditation system "evaluates
tissue banks for compliance with a comprehensive set of standards through
document review and site visits." "The AATB standards cover acquisition,
processing, preservation, storage, labeling, and distribution of tissue."93 As
of 2002, the AATB's website lists seventy-four tissue banks in the United
States operating under AATB accreditation.94 The Eye Bank Association of
America (EBAA) serves a similar function for human eye banks.95
Throughout the 1980s, the FDA continued its 1970s policy of
96encouraging the development of voluntary industry standards. In 1985,
88. Stuart L. Nightingale, FDA Regulatory Philosophy, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 4
(1991).
89. Id. at 4-5.
90. Id. at 6. In 1976, the FDA considered the possibility of regulating tissue banks,
but came to the conclusion "that FDA jurisdiction over tissues would be asserted only in
response to an immediate need." Id. at 5. FDA's human tissue policy remained noninterven-
tionist throughout the 1970s. The goal was to "monitor what was taking place in the field of
transplantation and be particularly alert to instances of disease transmission by allografts, but
to refrain from formal regulation unless it was clearly necessary." Id. at 6.
91. Human Tissue Intended for Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,514 (Dec. 14, 1993)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1270).
92. Id. at 65,515.
93. Id.
94. Accredited Bank List, at http://www.aatb.orglaatbac.htm (last visited Jan. 27,
2002).
95. Human Tissue Intended for Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,515 (Dec. 14, 1993).
96. In 1983, the FDA submitted a statement to a United States House of Representa-
tives subcommittee that was holding hearings on the National Organ Transplant Act
explaining why the agency had not sought to regulate human organs. Nightingale, supra note
88, at 6. In spite of the fact that the statement by its literal terms encompassed only FDA's
position on human organs, and did not reference human tissue, the statement was an important
one for the human tissue industry. For each of the arguments the FDA put forth regarding the
regulation of human organs, an analogous one could be made regarding the regulation of
human tissue. In its statement, the FDA maintained that, although an organ arguably could be
classified as a drug within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),
2002]
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amid growing concern regarding the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV),
FDA worked with the Human Milk Banking Association of North America
to develop practices that would minimize the possibility of the transmission
of HIV through donor breast milk.97 Then, in 1988, the FDA and the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published a joint statement
98outlining their views on what constituted safe sperm banking practices.
The statement was endorsed by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, the American Fertility Society, and the AATB. 99
Despite its progress in encouraging self-imposed voluntary standards,
the FDA's position by 1990 on the regulation of human tissue was somewhat
different from what it had been in 1976. Although it was still the FDA's
policy "to promote the development of voluntary standards; to remain
constantly alert to any hazards to public health," the agency also vowed "to
promulgate regulations when needed and to publicize any regulatory
intentions on the part of the FDA."')° No longer would the FDA confine
itself to acting only in the face of immediate need. 10' The FDA, in
accordance with the growing concerns over the safety of the human tissue
supply, would take a more proactive attitude toward human tissue regulation.
The next six years witnessed several of the FDA's regulatory attempts
in the human tissue area, as well as a number of abandoned or unsuccessful
such a classification would not be in accord with either the traditional medical concept of the
term drug or the FDA's own current administrative definition of "drug." Likewise, although a
transplanted organ might be susceptible to regulation under the Medical Device Amendments
of 1976 as an implant, the FDA concluded that because organs are in no respect man-made
products, deeming organs to be "devices" would violate legislative intent. Finally, the FDA
noted that it arguably could regulate organs under the Public Health Service (PHS) Act by
labeling organs as "biological products." The Act allows regulation of material that is
"analogous" to, inter alia, blood, and because blood is essentially a liquid organ, solid organs
such as hearts and livers could be considered "analogous products." Nonetheless, the FDA
rejected this rationale, citing its belief that such an interpretation would be contrary to the
legislative history of the PHS Act. Thus, the FDA concluded, "under an expansive legal
interpretation, human organ transplants could possibly be regulated as drugs, devices, or
biological products. It would by no means, however, be clear that such an interpretation
would be consistent with the legislative intent underlying the definitions ... or that it would
withstand judicial challenge." Id. at 7.
97. Id.
98. Perspectives in Disease Prevention and Health Promotion Semen Banking, Organ
and Tissue Transplantation, and HIV Antibody Testing, MORTALITY & MORBIDITY WKLY.
REP., Feb. 5, 1988.
99. Nightingale, supra note 88, at 7-8.
100. Id. at 9.
101. Id.
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congressional attempts to regulate the field. The FDA's initial attempts at
regulation were not efforts designed to impose safeguards on the entire
human tissue banking industry; rather, the FDA sought to regulate the
industry with regulations targeted for specific tissues.1°2 As the scope of its
efforts increased, though, so did resistance from the industry, which
identified legal and practical problems with the FDA's actions.103  This
102. One approach the FDA took when promulgating these regulations was to define
the tissue in question as a "medical device," in spite of its 1983 statement to Congress.
Gordon Johnson, Director of the Office of Health Affairs at the FDA's Center for Devices
Radiological Health, defined human tissue devices as "tissues of human origin-usually
cadaveric--that have been processed, that have been changed or altered in some way, shape,
structure, or character. They may be cut and sculptured, disinfected, sterilized, or freeze-
dried. Any number of things may occur. These are tissues that have some structure or
structural character." Gordon C. Johnson, Regulating Tissues (and Organs?) as Devices, 46
FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 28 (1991) [hereinafter Johnson]. For example, the FDA classified
human lenticules, a product derived from human cornea and applied to the cornea to correct
vision problems, as post-amendment Class III devices, for which manufacturers of were
required to obtain premarket approval for those "products." Id. at 30. In addition, the FDA
determined that dura matter (the outer meningeal covering) allografts constituted pre-
amendment devices. Id. at 31. Those distributors who could not document having distributed
dura matter allografts prior to May 1976 would have to file premarket notifications, and all
distributing facilities were required to register as device manufacturers. Cardiovascular
Devices; Effective Date of Requirement for Premarket Approval; Replacement Heart Valve
Allograft, 56 Fed. Reg. 29,177 (June 26, 1991) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 812).
103. The piecemeal regulation that caused the most controversy was the decision to
regulate human heart valves as medical devices. Johnson, supra note 102, at 31. The origins
of the controversy lay in a 1987 rule that required the filing of a premarket approval
application, or a notice of completion of a product development protocol for the replacement
heart valve, a medical device. Id. This regulation attracted little controversy and the notice of
proposed rulemaking prompted only one comment, which was not related to the FDA's
classification of replacement heart valves. Cardiovascular Devices; Effective Date of
Requirement for Premarket Approval; Replacement Heart Valve Allograft, 56 Fed. Reg.
29,177 (June 26, 1991) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 812). The FDA embroiled itself in
controversy, however, when it published a June 1991 notice of applicability of a final rule
(NAFR) stating that the 1987 regulation would apply not only to mechanical replacement
heart valves, but to replacement human heart valves as well. Therefore, the premarket
approval requirement would apply to replacement human heart valve al-
lografts. Cardiovascular Devices; Effective Date of Requirement for Premarket Approval;
Replacement Heart Valve Allograft, 56 Fed. Reg. 29,177 (June 26, 1991) (codified at 21
C.F.R. pt. 812). Pointing out that it was illogical to test a human heart valve to see if it works
safely and effectively in humans, as it clearly does, the tissue banking industry argued that
forcing companies to go through the lengthy and expensive process of obtaining premarket
approval was wasteful and unnecessary because heart valves are already known to be the most
effective replacement heart valves available.
2002]
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resulted in the FDA backing away from its initial approach. °4 despite
successfully resisting judicial challenges from the industry, 10 5 and accepting
instead an approach that regulated all tissues under a common regime
focused on maintaining public health and safety. 6
Finally, at an October 16, 1991 FDA-sponsored public hearing on
federal regulation of human tissue, the National Tissue Bank Council
(NTBC), an organization comprised of nonprofit tissue banks, presented an
alternative regulatory plan to the FDA. Under the NTBC's plan, public
standards for dealing with different types or classes of tissues would be
promulgated by the FDA, following consultation with the public and experts.
Such a system, the NTBC maintained, would obviate the need for premarket
approval.
On December 14, 1993, the FDA issued an interim rule "to require
certain infectious disease testing, donor screening, and recordkeeping to help
prevent the transmission of AIDS and hepatitis through human tissue used in
transplantation."' 07 Unlike the FDA's previous regulatory efforts in the area
of human tissue, this rule applied not just to one type of tissue, such as heart
valves or dura matter, but rather applied to all types of human tissue.10 8 The
104. The industry mounted an effort, ultimately successful, to push back the date by
which FDA had mandated that investigational device exemptions (IDEs) or premarket
approval applications (PMAs) must be in effect to continue marketing. Heart Valve Allograft
Processors Ask Court to Prohibit FDA Call for PMAs; Non-Profit Tissue Bank Coalition
Calls for "Monographs" for Tissue Products, M-D-D-I REP. ("The Gray Sheet"), Oct. 21,
1991, available in LEXIS, EXEC Library, GRAY File.
105. Six tissue banks filed suit against FDA, alleging that human heart valves were
neither devices nor replacement heart valves within the meaning of FDA's prior regulations.
Alabama Tissue Ctr. of Univ. of Ala. Health Serv. Found. v. Sullivan, 975 F.2d 373 (7th Cir.
1992). The Seventh Circuit rejected both of these claims, ruling that human heart valves are
"implants" within the meaning of the applicable law. Id. at 378. The final rule notice was a
reasonable interpretation of prior regulations and "[a]ccordingly, the [rule was] an interpretive
rule not subject to appellate review." Id. at 379.
106. The FDA announced in October 1994 that it would no longer enforce the
extension of the regulation to human as well as mechanical heart valves. In explaining its
action, the FDA cited its belief that special controls effectiveness of heart valve allografts. The
decision to abandon this interpretation of NAFR marked not only the end of the human heart
valve controversy, but also indicated the end of the FDA's attempts to regulate human tissue
using a piecemeal approach. Concluding that the piecemeal approach left too many questions
unanswered, the FDA decided to take a broader approach to the regulation of human tissue, a
decision that played a part in the agency's rescission of its rule on human heart valves as well.
Id. at 373.
107. Human Tissue Intended for Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. at 65,516 (codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 16 & 1270).
108. Id.
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rule was a sweeping regulatory effort that encompassed the entire human
tissue industry.
In explaining its reasons for adopting this approach, the FDA noted that
its prior piecemeal efforts had resulted in incomplete coverage of the human
tissue field in that they did not cover "bone, ligaments, tendons, fascia,
cartilage, corneas, and skin that are used in the treatment of bone disease,
orthopedic injuries, ligamentous and joint complaints, degenerative skeletal
disease, blindness due to corneal opacification, and bum wounds."' 9 In
addition, the FDA referenced the fact that AATB, EBAA, and American Red
Cross all had expressed support for the notion of federal human tissue
regulation.'"0 Finally, the agency expressed its concern over the importation
of human tissue into the United States from unknown sources and of
unknown quality, and discussed its investigation into that issue, stating, "[i]n
a relatively brief period of time, the agency was able to ascertain, in a few
isolated instances, the availability for importation and distribution of tissue
materials that do not meet minimal screening standards for transmission of
infectious diseases."11 1 The FDA concluded,
donation has occurred, and continues to occur, when generally-
accepted donor screening through medical history review is largely
absent. The agency currently believes that these instances do not
represent the predominant practice within the industry. Nonethe-
less, the traffic in tissue for transplantation without adequate testing
or donor screening, whether domestic or imported, cannot be per-
mitted to occur.'
After explaining its legal basis for issuing the interim rule, the FDA
explained further that the "FDA is issuing this interim rule because of an
109. Id. at 65,515.
110. Id.
111. Human Tissue Intended for Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. at 65,516 (codified at
21 C.F.R. pts. 1270).
112. Id. The FDA promulgated the interim rule not under the FDCA, but instead under
the PHS Act, which authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) "to make and enforce such regulations as judged necessary to prevent the
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable disease...I." Id. If the FDA were to
classify human tissue as a drug or device under the FDCA, then a sponsor would have to
demonstrate that the product was both safe and effective to obtain FDA approval. As it had
been suggested by some that an effectiveness test is inappropriate for human products, and
that the FDA should only be concerned with such products' safety, under the PHS Act, such a
problem would be avoided.
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immediate need to protect the public health from the transmission of IV
infection and hepatitis infection through transplantation of tissue from
donors infected with or at risk of these diseases."' 3 In other words, the FDA
did not intend that the interim rule serve as a long-term regulatory program;
rather, the agency intended that more extensive and specific regulations
would be proposed in the near future. When the FDA promulgated the final
rule in 1997, more than three years subsequent to the issuance of the interim
rule, it adopted some new definitions and imposed some procedural changes,
but otherwise left the substance of the regulatory regime established by the
interim rule essentially unchanged.'
1 4
The FDA soon began to use the enforcement powers it had granted
itself under the interim rule. For example, in February 1993, it ordered
AlloTech, a tissue-processing firm that was engaged in the business of
importing tissue from Eastern Europe, "to retain or destroy stored tissue and
,,115
recall previously distributed tissue from about 180 donors. This action
was taken despite the fact that there was no evidence that any of the tissue
was infected; the action was based on the FDA's determination that the firm
"lacked adequate documentation of medical history screening and disease
testing for the tissue."
' 1 6
In 1998, the FDA's new approach described a comprehensive plan for
regulating human cells, tissues, and cellular and tissue-based products.1
1 7
113. Id. Responding to the concern over the transmission of communicable diseases
through human tissue transplants, the rule mandated that all tissue donors be tested for HIV-1,
HIV-2, hepatitis B, and hepatitis C. Furthermore, the rule specified that the process for
determining whether banked human tissue was suitable for transplantation must include
ascertainment of the donor's identity, as well as a determination that the donor's relevant,
accurate medical history "assures freedom from risk factors for or clinical evidence of hepatitis
B, hepatitis C, or HIV infection." Human Tissue Intended for Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg.
at 65,520 (codified at 21 C.F.R. §1270). The rule declared that records must be maintained as
to the results and interpretations of tests, the destruction of unsuitable banked human tissue,
and information on the identity and medical history of the donor. 21 C.F.R. § 1270.33 (2001).
The FDA chose not to require premarket approval of banked human tissue. As for
enforcement provisions, the interim rule granted the FDA the power to inspect all
establishments covered by the rule, and it also provided that, should the agency find tissue to
be in violation of the rule, the FDA had the power either to order its destruction or seize
and/or destroy it.
114. Proposed Approach to Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-Based Products;
Availability and Public Meeting, 21 C.F.R. §1.1 (2001).
115. John Henkel, Safeguarding Human Tissue Transplants, FDA CONSUMER 9, 11
(1994).
116. Id.
117. 21 C.F.R. §§ 207, 807, 1271 (2001).
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Under its new tiered, risk-based approach, the FDA proposed to exert only
the type of government regulation necessary to protect the public health, 8
such as requiring cell and tissue banks to register with the FDA and submit a
list of their human cellular and tissue-based products tissue banks, 9 setting
standards for suitability determination for donors, 20 and outlining a general
set of rules governing good facility management practices.1 Together,
these rules, when finalized, would establish a comprehensive regulatory
program for human cellular and tissue-basedproducts, to be contained in
part 1271 of the Code of Federal Regulations. In January 2001, the FDA
published its final rule, the first of these topics, registering tissue banks and
their products,123 even before finalization of the donor suitability and GTP
proposed rules.
IX. SUMMARY
Human tissue is obtained from those who are dead and those who are
alive. At times, the tissue is obtained with the full consent of the tissue
source or next of kin, especially in the context of organs and other tissue for
transplantation. At other times, it is taken without their knowledge, let alone
their consent, as is often the case for corneas or tissue taken for research
samples. In general, tissue sales are discouraged, as evidenced by some of
the national laws in this area, but tissue such as gametes, hair and blood can
be sold, albeit not always because of a coherent view of these tissues as the
property of the people from whom they came.
This lack of consistency in the treatment of human tissues has made it
difficult to propose models for comprehensive regulation of the human tissue
118. 21 C.F.R. § 207.20. To accomplish this goal, it planned to issue new regulations
under the communicable disease provisions of the Public Health Service Act (the PHS Act).
Id. Some human cellular and tissue-based products would be regulated only under these new
regulations, while other human cellular and tissue-based products would also be regulated as
drugs, devices, and/or biological drugs. Id.
119. Id. It also proposed modifications to current registration and listing requirements
for drugs and devices under which cell and tissue establishments already regulated under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the Act) and/or section 361 of the PHS Act would
register and list following the new procedures. Id.
120. Suitability Determination for Donors of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based
Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 52, 696 (Sept. 30, 1999). Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and
Tissue-Based Product, 21 C.F.R. §1271 (2001).
121. 21 C.F.R § 1271 (2001).
122. Id.
123. 21 C.F.R. §§ 207, 807, 1271 (2001).
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market. In part, this is due to underlying jurisprudential concerns about
treating the body and its parts as property, whether of individuals or of the
state. It is also partially due to concerns that important scientific endeavors,
such as research on banked tissue samples, would be slowed or halted should
the samples be considered the property of the people from whom they came,
and their use subject to voluntary and informed consent in all cases. It may
also be due to the low economic value of most human tissue, at least in its
raw form, resulting in relatively few conflicts arising to judicial or legislative
attention.
Outside the area of whole organ donation, the only area in which
comprehensive market regulation is appearing concerns the safety of the
tissue transfers, especially with regard to transplantation. Here, an evolving
federal policy has resulted in a new, comprehensive regulatory system that
would set federal standards to ensure that transplanted tissue is adequately
screened for infectious disease and competently handled and manipulated by
the tissue banks that act as intermediaries between those who collect the
tissue and those who use it.
A more robust form of national control over the market in human tissue,
then, will probably depend upon resolution of political and legal views of the
body, so that its treatment, whether as property or as some other thing, will
be consistent with underlying political and legal views concerning personal
autonomy and the appropriate respect to be paid to our bodies, whether
living or dead.
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I. INTRODUCTION
I am going to talk to you about the Campaign for Access to Essential
Medicine that has been launched by MSF, which stands for M~decins Sans
Fronti~res, the French name for Doctors without Borders.1 This campaign
was launched about three years ago.2 My focus today will be on AIDS,
especially AIDS in Africa.
* Kathy Cerminara: Our special guest today and, our Goodwin speaker is Doctor
Anne-Valerie Kaninda, who is a medical advisor to Doctors without Borders: Mddecins sans
Fronti~res Access to Essential Medicines Campaign. Dr. Kaninda is an epidemiologist
specializing in the control of emerging and reemerging diseases. She has worked with MSF
since 1994, and has been with the Access to Essential Medicines campaign since April 2000.
And I am sure most, if not all of you, know as an affiliate of MSF, she is with the 1999 Noble
Peace Prize winning organization that is involved in sending more than 2000 medical volun-
teers all over the world, especially in developing countries to provide medical care.
1. MSF Access Website, at http://www.access-med-msf.orglindex.asp (last visited
Feb. 17, 2002).
2. MSF Access Website, The Campaign: Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.accessmed-msf.org/campaign/faq.shtm (last visited Feb. 17, 2002) ("Launched in
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Before we start, I would like to say just a few words about the current
environment. Infectious diseases kill fourteen million people per year
worldwide.3  Ninety-seven percent of these deaths occur in developing
countries.4 Infectious disease is the leading cause of death worldwide.5
If you look at essential drugs, there are 306 active substances today that
governments list as such.6 To give you a point of comparison, there are more
than 5000 products today approved by the Federal Drug Administration
("FDA") in the United States, so essential drugs are only a very limited
subset. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), one-third of
the population is denied access to these drugs and the cost of anti-retroviral
drugs is approximately $35, the average monthly income in developing
countries. So there is no way for the people, or even the government, to
afford drugs to treat the people for whom it is medically required.
II. CURRENT ENVIRONMENT
Unfortunately, health care is not a priority in many developing coun-
tries. There is not a lot of money put in the health budget. In fact, a lot of
developing countries have a health budget less than $10 per year, per person,
sometimes even less than four dollars per year, per person.8 In addition, the
regulatory authorities are very weak and there is a fear of using generics. For
example, when the drugs are substandard, or counterfeit, people do not like
to use generic even though there are high quality generics which are much
cheaper than the brand name drugs and more readily available.9 There are
no real counter-forces to either industry or government in these societies.
November 1999, the MSF campaign has been working internationally to find long-term,
sustainable solutions to this crisis.").
3. Els Torreele, The Crisis in Drug Research & Development for Neglected Dis-
eases, The DND Conference (May 2001), at http://www.neglecteddiseases.org/thecrisis.shtml.
4. Id.
5. The World Health Report 2001, available at http://www.who.int/whr/2001/
archives/1998/factse.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
6. The World Health Organization, Essential Drugs Lists, at http://www.who.int/ml
topics/essentialdrugsjists/en/index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
7. See generally Carmen Pdrez-Casas et al., HIV/AIDS Medicines Pricing Report.
Setting Objectives: Is There a Political Will? (July 6, 2000), available at http://www.
accessmed-msf.org/prod/publications.asp (discussing a series of factors that influence prices).
8. The World Health Organization, Resources for Health Services, at http:/Iwww.
who.int/infectious-disease-report/2002/healthtext.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
9. Bernard Pdcoul, M.D. et al., Access to Essential Drugs in Poor Countries, 281
JAMA 361 (1999).
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Many of these countries have governments that are not as accountable as
governments can be in wealthy nations like here.
If we look at the pharmaceutical industry in the last two decades of the
twentieth century, there has been an incredible amount of consolidation
within the industry, with increased competition, and an increased pressure
for existing and new medicines to yield high returns.'0 That means that the
industry has turned increasingly into a big marketing machine, marketing
their new products rather than taking a more health-oriented or research-
oriented approach.
III. DRUG DEVELOPMENT
In general, drug companies focus their research and development in
areas where the prospect of high returns on their investments is favorable."
Between 1975 and 1997, among the 1223 new chemical entities that were
brought into the market worldwide, only one percent treat tropical diseases.
12
That is thirteen drugs.' 3 Out of those thirteen drugs, most were coming from
army research on malaria, such as, the compounds from the Walter Reed
Army Institute of Research, or from laboratories with public funding.
Now, if you look at the annual reports from the pharmaceutical compa-
nies in terms of market sales in 1999, the projected worldwide pharmaceuti-
cal market for Africa and Asia represented 10.6% of the total market.'
4
Approximately seventy-two percent of the population lives in Africa and
Asia today, and they consume 10.6% of the pharmaceutical market. 15 The
pharmaceutical industry's three largest companies are multinational, but they
have headquarters in the United States. Considering these companies'
annual reports, they have revenues in the billions of dollars. When you
compare the amount the companies spend on marketing versus the amount
they spend on research and development, at least twice as much is spent on
marketing than what is spent on research.
10. Id. at 364.
11. Patrice Trouillier et al., Drugs for Neglected Diseases: A Failure of the Market
and a Public Health Failure, 6 TROPICAL MED. & INT'L HEALTH 945, 946 (2001).
12. Bernard Pdcoul, M.D. et al., supra note 9, at 364.
13. Id.
14. Patrice Trouillier et al., supra note 11, at 946.
15. Id.
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In 1994, 130 countries signed a General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) agreement 16 and created the World Trade Organization
(WTO). This treaty included an agreement on intellectual property protec-
tion. All the countries that signed this agreement and are now members of
this World Trade Organization, have to change their national laws to become
compliant with the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
agreement. 17 In this agreement, pharmaceuticals are considered as any other
goods, like Barbie dolls, CDs, etc. This means the countries that signed the
agreement have to grant patents on pharmaceuticals. In many developing
countries, pharmaceuticals were not covered by patents. In some countries,
they were simply not patentable. Now, this all has to change. This agree-
ment sets the minimum standard for intellectual property protection. It will
have a negative effect on drug availability in developing countries because
countries that have strong generic industries, such as India or Argentina, will
no longer be able to make high-quality copies of medicine for a cheaper
price until the patent expires. So this means the Agreement will delay the
introduction of cheaper medicines into many developing countries.
In recent years, what we have seen is that the United States and Euro-
pean Union have lobbied poor countries to create national laws that restrict
the safeguards included in this TRIPS Agreement. These safeguards include
compulsory licenses and parallel imports.18 Compulsory licenses provide
that if a country can not have access to a product because the patent order
sets it at a price which does not make it available to the majority of the
public, or the product is not available, and the country is in an emergency
situation, then the government can issue a license. This, in effect, overrides
the rights of the patent order and grants a license to a third party to locally
produce the product or import it from a generic manufacturer from the
outside in exchange for a reasonable royalty. Of course, pharmaceutical
companies hate this safeguard because they see it as a threat to the intellec-
tual property of their patent.
The use of parallel importing is another safeguard that allows govern-
ments to do some comparison shopping. If a company, the owner of a patent
product, sells its product in country A for a certain price and in country B for
a lower price, then the government of country A is allowed to go and buy it
16. InterAm Database, International Treaties-GATT' (General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade), at http://www.natlaw.con/treaties/gatt.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
17. The TRIPS Agreement. A Guide for the South, The Uruguay Round Agreement
on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, at http://www.southcentre.org/publica-
tions/trips/ toc.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
18. MSF Access Website, supra note 2.
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for the lower price in country B. This is another safeguard the pharmaceuti-
cal companies do not favor. Parallel imports, by the way, are not allowed
here in the United States.
All of our amendments allow generic manufacturers to start preparing
their file for registration to obtain a generic products license before the
patent is expired, so that the very day the patent expires, the product is all
ready to enter the market. The generic manufacturers do not have to wait
until the day that the patent expires to start doing what is called reverse
engineering: start work on the product; learn how to make the product; and
provide all the necessary tests and records for the regulatory authorities to
get the registration approved.
Moreover, what we have seen in the field so far is that our patients die
because drugs become increasingly ineffective. When you use drugs, espe-
cially to treat infectious diseases, ultimately you will see resistance to the
drug. That is the case with any drug, any antibiotic, antiparasitic or anti-
retroviral drug. Thus, we have drugs that were introduced in the first half of
the last century that are increasingly ineffective. There are no new drugs
brought on the market to replace these drugs. In some cases, the production
of existing drugs is abandoned because they are not deemed profitable
enough by the pharmaceutical companies, especially drugs which treat
diseases affecting poor people in poor countries. These diseases include
sleeping sickness, or types of meningitis that do not occur here, in Europe, or
in Japan, and other diseases which occur in both the wealthy nations as well
as the developing world.
There are new drugs but these drugs, are usually patented and expensive
or inaccessible, so people do not have access to the drugs and they die. Over
the years we have seen research decrease. That is why we launched this
campaign. The objective of the campaign is to stimulate research and devel-
opment into neglected diseases, to ensure the production of abandoned and
endangered drugs, and also to establish a normal system that allows essential
medicines to be cheaper in poor countries.
IV. AIDS
Out of the 36 million people infected with the Human Immunodefi-
ciency Virus ("HIV") worldwide, ninety-five percent are in the developing
world.' 9 Overwhelmingly, the majority of patients do not have access to
19. The World Health Organization, Profiling the Killers, at http://www.who.int/
infectious-diseases-report/2002/textintroduction.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
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treatment; treatment for opportunistic infections, but more specifically anti-
retroviral treatment. This is really the treatment that has made the difference
in the last three years here, in Europe, and in other wealthy nations. As the
Health Minister of Zimbabwe said at last year's World Health Organization
assembly, there are treatments in the north and the patients are in the south
and there is no crossover.
Another paradox with AIDS, is that for the developing world and the
majority of the people infected with the virus today, we have been stuck over
the last ten to fifteen years with the promotion of "prevention-only" strate-
gies. The ideal prevention would be not to get infected. That is the best way
to stay healthy, but this strategy does not always work. Prevention-only
methods have not been able to control the course of the epidemic. We still
continue to say that the answer is prevention, but I am not sure that this is an
ethical medical attitude to have. Another problem is that the newer anti-
retrovirals, as of today, are not included in the World Health Organization's
model list of essential drugs.20 Of the anti-retrovirals, only zidovudine
(AZT) and nevirapine were listed as essential drugs in 1999.
Finally, another paradox is that in the very few local initiatives, where
treatment has been introduced-we have seen and witnessed this first-hand
in our own projects in the field-when you start treating people, people
come and get tested because there is hope for them. Each time you offer
treatment, you maximize the effectiveness of your prevention activities. If
you do not offer treatment to people, they do not want to know because it is
a death sentence for them and then there is another stigma associated with
this disease. That is, they are rejected and marginalized by their societies
and families and they just end up in a miserable, destitute state and die.
However, when you offer treatment, people are more open to the prevention
messages that you give them, and they come to get tested.
Today, less than ten percent of the people infected with the virus know
or suspect that they are infected with the virus. How can you do effective
prevention if people do not even know that they are infected? Also, when
you look for treatment, and especially if the treatment combination is highly
active anti-retroviral therapy, you decrease the amount of virus that repli-
cates in the bodies of people and they become less infectious and less likely
to transmit the disease. So why not treat people? For the answer to this
question, you have to look at the industry rhetoric on the issue.
20. JOINT UNICEF-UNAIDS-WHOIEDM-MSF PROJECT, SELECTED DRUGS USED IN
THE CARE OF PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV: SOURCES AND PRICES 10(2000).
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V. INDUSTRY RHETORIC-HIV/AIDS
If you listen to the industry rhetoric, the pharmaceutical companies will
say that patents are not the issue, rather, the rhetoric is that intellectual
property protections are fundamental to the way the industry works because
they have to invest a lot of money in research and development. Out of the
several thousand compounds screened, only one will be brought on the
market. Yet, so much money is spent on marketing that could be put to
better use in research and development.
When we ask companies to decrease their price for poor countries, they
are very reluctant to do so. At least until very recently, because they say that
the money is needed for research and development. But if you look at it,
what appears to drive their agenda is really the wealthy market. They actu-
ally recoup their costs and investments in this wealthy market.
So, what we are asking for is some extra production in markets where
they do not sell anything anyway today, where they are not interested in
selling anything. What is the point of protecting the intellectual property in
these markets if they are not interested in selling? At least they should let
other people, like the manufacturers of generics, sell the drugs. But, they
argue that intellectual property protections are fundamental and patents are
not the issue.
The pharmaceutical industry claims that with AIDS, the problem is not
drugs, the problem is infrastructure. Even if you had the drugs for free, you
would not be able to use them because you do not have transportation means,
you do not have distribution systems, you do not have clean water, and you
do not have human resources. You do not have the basic necessities. This is
a blanket statement. There is a huge heterogeneity among different countries
in the developing world, and there are countries today that are ready to start
treating people if they had the drugs. Countries like South Africa and Thai-
land, for instance, could do a lot today.
Within these countries, too, there is a huge heterogeneity. Even in the
least developed countries, in the large urban areas, there exists a minimum of
laboratory facilities and health care. It is not in the best shape of course. If
we had the drugs for free today, although we would not be able to cover
100% of the needs of the entire population of these countries, we could do
something. We could start. We need not do nothing or everything; there is a
significant something in between where we could start. That is what we
should be doing today. Infrastructure is a constraint, but it is not an excuse
for not doing anything.
20021
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Another issue is compliance. Some will argue that these are compli-
cated regimens and poor people in poor countries will not be able to comply.
They will not be able to take the drugs. This is simply not true. The evi-
dence consists of really limited experiences. But in Brazil, or in Senegal, or
in Uganda, for instance, it shows that if you offer drugs to people and they
are sick they are going to take the drugs. Of course, if you use a drug-
dumping program, just give the drugs and then leave, then people are not
going to take their drugs. But if you have a quality program, rational use of
drugs, and if you are careful with what you are doing, then people are as able
to take the drugs in that setting as they are able to take the drugs in the
United States.
Next, an issue which is often brought up is the issue of resistance. You
are not going to have good compliance if you do not have the proper facili-
ties to monitor the drugs. Then you are going to create super resistant germs
that will spread from country to country. With respect to anti-retroviral
drugs on a wide scale, of course we are going to create resistance, but what
is the point of having effective drugs if you are not going to use them?
Today, there are more than 100 compounds which are in the pipeline;
new drugs for AIDS. The drugs for which the virus is going to become
resistant are going to be replaced by new compounds in the next year or so.
In Europe, in the western world, we have started to create resistance by using
the highly active anti-retroviral therapy. When protease inhibitors have been
introduced we have seen a whole bunch of patients in which the viral load
was starting to increase and be resistant, but who still had a clinical benefit
and have been maintained on this therapy, just because the clinical benefit
was still there. If we are accepting the creation of resistance here, why
would we not accept it overseas in developing countries?
The final argument is that there is no political leadership in developing
countries. That is true. There is no political leadership. However, wealthy
nations lack political leadership on this issue as well. We have to push for
strong political commitments. We cannot accept this as a reason or an
excuse for doing nothing. We have to treat people. Today, needed drugs are
21prohibitively priced because of monopolies in other developing worlds.
Monopolies are one factor responsible for the high prices of drugs. Patents
in many of the developing countries, such as Thailand or South Africa, are
responsible for monopolies.22 The anti-retrovirals are registered and pat-
ented, and in this case, it is an issue.
21. See generally Pdrez-Casas et al., supra note 7.
22. Id. at 15.
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Anti-retroviral drugs are not patented in most of the least developed
countries; this is true. In many of these countries, they are not registered and
they are not available. Pharmaceutical companies do not even bother to
register their products in some of these countries. They are not interested in
selling them there. Lack of information is always very important in terms of
monopolies. In some countries, we see generics sold at the same price as
brand name products. And when you look at it, they are the only ones, so
you can have several sources of generic, but only one is registered there, so
why would choose one generic over another brand?
For example, the generic form of an anti-fungal drug used in the treat-
ment of cryptococcal meningitis is a sold at twenty-nine cents per tablet in
Thailand.23 In South Africa, the price of the same brand product by Pfizer is
approximately four or five dollars per tablet.24 Therefore, the cost of main-
tenance and treatment per year for 10,000 patients, if you buy the product
from Thailand, would cost a little over $1,000,000.2 If you buy them in
South Africa, you would have to spend almost $30,000,000 for exactly the
26same number of patients and the same treatment. Alternatively, if you look
at the number of patients treated per year with a $1,000,000 budget, there are
approximately 10,000 people treated with the Thailand product compared to
350 people treated with the Pfizer product in South Africa.
VI. THE AIDS PROGRAM IN BRAZIL
Brazil decided in 1997 that it would provide free anti-retroviral treat-
ment for its population infected with HV/AIDS when it is medically re-
quired.27 Today, that is almost 100,000 patients.28 They used local, generic
production and the threat of compulsory licenses when the drugs were
patented and no generic was available to decrease the price. They were able
to decrease the price for triple combination therapy on average, to about
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See supra note 21, at 12.
27. See Roy Wadia, Brazil's AIDS Policy Earns Global Plaudits (Aug. 16, 2001), at
http:llwww.cnn.corn20Ol/WORLD/americas/08/14/brazil.AIDSindex.html.
28. "The World Health Organization's latest figures estimate 540,000 people live
with HIV and AIDS in the country." Cristiana Mesquita, Brazil to Break Patent, Make AIDS
Drug (Aug. 22,2001), at http:llwww.cnn.com20011WORLD/americas/08/22/aids.drug.
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$3000 per year, per patient, compared to a cost of between $10,000 and
$15,000 per patient, per year here.
The program has been quite successful. They have halved their death
rate between 1997 and 1999.30 They have decreased hospitalizations for
opportunistic infections by sixty to eighty percent. 3' Between 1997 and
2000, the program has saved a little over $600,000,000 in hospitalization
costs. 32 Furthermore, because these people are not hospitalized and continue
to stay healthy for a while, they can still go to work and lead productive
lives. This benefit is not even included in the savings.
Presently, the United States is taking Brazil in front of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) to challenge their patent legislation.33 The article they
are particularly challenging states that Brazil will grant a patent to a product,
but there is a local working requirement; the patent owner has three years to
produce the drugs locally if they want the patent to continue to remain in
effect. After three years, if the company is not able to produce the drug, or
the company cannot prove that there is no way that it can produce the drug
locally, the government can then issue a compulsory license and resort to
generic production.
For Brazil, it is very important to have the local working requirement
because it is a way to attract technology and knowledge in their country
instead of granting patents to companies which are going to produce some-
where else and just import the product into the country. It is not clear-cut
whether this is or is not allowed under the TRIPS agreement and this is why
the dispute settlement has been initiated. The director of Brazil's AIDS
program is arguing that the country really needs this particular provision. In
particular, the country wants to be allowed to issue a compulsory license
after three years if the drug is not produced locally. Brazil also provides for
compulsory licenses in case of a health emergency.
29. Kaiser Family Foundation, Kaiser Daily HIV/AIDS Report, Amid 'Increasingly
Bitter' Dispute, WTO Reviews Legality of Brazil's Generic Drug Law (Feb. 6, 2001), at
http://report.kff.org/archive/aids/2001/2/khOlO206.4.htm.
30. See The World Health Organization, Brazil, at http://www.who.int/infectious-
disease-report/2002/healthtext.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Wadia, supra note 27.
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VII. CIPLA OFFER
Recently, you may have heard, that there was an Indian generic manu-
facturer that offered to provide HIV treatment combination therapy for $600
per year, per patient, to the South African government.34 So far, that is the
lowest that is available. This is good news because last year in Durban, at
the International AIDS Conference, we set a target goal of $200 per year, per
patient, for treatment combination therapy and we were far away from that.
The lowest price at that time was approximately $1000 per person, per year,
for a brand name product and then came this generic offer, which was really
good news. Cipla even offered what they called a humanitarian price, for
MSF of $350 per patient, per year.
We are not only campaigning for our programs, we are campaigning for
everyone, other "NGOs," or non-governmental organizations. Anyone
involved in the treatment and care of people in the developing world should
have access to these affordable prices. If the generic manufacturers can offer
a lower price than the brand name industry, with it's increased market share
should be able to offer a lower price as well.
yin. WHO CHANGE OF POSITION
Recently, there was an official breakthrough with the World Health
Organization ("WHO") change of position. Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland, the
WHO Director-General, said in essence in an editorial in the international
Herald Tribune that anti-retrovirals are essential drugs, which was really
good news.36 In addition he said anti-retroviral drugs can be administered
effectively in Africa without the Western standard of monitoring and follow
up. 37 This was really good news because one way you can kill the initiative
for treating patients in Africa is by setting up very high standards for moni-
toring and follow up, knowing that there is no way that you can monitor a
viral load every other week for patients who live in the middle of the bush,
1000 kilometers away from the center. The World Health Organization now
also supports offering the drugs at lower prices in developing countries.
34. Press Release, MSF, AIDS Triple Therapy for Less Than $1 a Day (Feb. 7, 2001),
at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.orgpr/2001/02-07-2001.shtml.
35. Id.
36. Gro Harlem Bruntland, M.D., Cheaper Drugs Offer Hope in the War Against
AIDS, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 14, 2001, Opinion, available at http://www.lexis.com.
37. Id.
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IX. PMA V. NELSON MANDELA
Then there was the South African lawsuit, PMA v. Nelson Mandela.
PMA stands for Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Association. 38 The Pharma-
ceutical Manufacturer Association is the South African brand name industry.
First, you have to understand that the patent legislation for pharmaceuticals
in South Africa was inherited from the apartheid era.
At one time, industries, not only pharmaceutical industries but all of
them, were highly discouraged to invest in South Africa. So the South
African government passed legislation in 1965 directed at the pharmaceuti-
cal industry which gave really sweet deals to brand name companies as an
incentive to invest in South Africa.39 After the end of the apartheid, the
South African government tried to rectify this legislation to allow the gov-
ernment access to cheaper drugs.4° The Medicines and Related Substances
Control Amendment Act signed by Nelson Mandela in 1997 provides for
things like parallel importation and compulsory licensing. Compulsory
licensing was alread' possible under the previous law, but the new law gave
it a broader scope. Generic substitution, or measures like that, would
enable the South African government to increase access to cheaper drugs.
Two to four months after that legislation was signed, thirty-nine com-
panies within the Pharmaceutical Manufacturer Association of South Africa
sued the government over this legislation.42 In effect, this really blocked the
enactment of the legislation.43 Since then, the legislation has been signed but
it cannot be enforced until the lawsuit is settled. The case was finally start-
ing to be heard on March 5th. 44 On March 6th, the case was suspended again
until April 18th, to allow companies to prepare information regarding pricing
38. For information about the lawsuit between PMA and Nelson Mandela, see, e.g.,
Josey Ballenger, Zuma's Health Laws to Be Contested in Court, Bus. DAY, Feb. 19, 1998,
available at http://lists.essential.org/1998/ pharm-policy/msg00005.html.
39. Medicines and Related Substances Control Act 101 of 1965.
40. Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Act (amending Act 101 of 1965).
See also Robert Block, Big Drug Firms Defend Right to Patents on AIDS Drugs in South
African Court, WALL ST. J. (New York), Mar. 6, 2001, at http://www.aegis.com/newslwsj/
2001/WJ010304.html.
41. § 15C of Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Act.
42. See SA Victory in AIDS Drugs Case (Apr. 19, 2001), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/
english/world/africa/newsid_1285000/1285097.stm.
43. Id.
44. Claire Keeton, SAfrica-AIDS: S. Africa's Treatment Action Campaign Advances
Fight Against AIDS, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 21, 2001, at http://www.aegis.com/news/
afp/200 1/AF0103A2.html.
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policies. What the AIDS activists in South Africa have done was to use the
case of AIDS and use the focus on AIDS to demonstrate how the prior
legislation was really affecting and hurting people living with HIV/AIDS. A
group of activists, the Treatment Action Campaign or TAC of South Africa
has presented evidence to the court that was not included initially and the
pharmaceutical companies asked for more time to prepare the case.45
On March 5th and 6th, the international media were present in Pretoria,
and filed reports that really hit the news big time. So the reaction from the
pharmaceutical companies came very quickly. On March 16th, the European
parliament passed an emergency resolution calling all companies to drop the
lawsuit in South Africa.46 The WHO also made a press release backing the
South African policy on drug patents. So, there is a lot of political support
for the South African government in that particular case.47
X. INDUSTRY REACTION
These developments probably explain the recent industry reaction
because they have been really bloodied in the press and public opinion is
really not in their favor right now. So Merck, a large pharmaceutical com-
pany, came very quickly with the offer of decreasing the prices of two anti-
retrovirals that they produce in the market.48 Their offer is a little bit puz-
zling. For the first time it put forth a press release that said it will offer these
products for $500 per year per patient, which is normally $600 per year per
patient in developing countries. 9 However, Merck said this is not for Brazil,
so Brazil is excluded from the deal. It is only for Africa. With Asia, we do
not know. So it appears they might be going one step in the right direction,
but then two steps back.
Then you look at the price and they say they are offering it at cost, but it
is really hard to tell if it is accurate. If you look at Cipla, it is offering a
45. Id.
46. Joint News Release, Oxfam & MSF, European Parliament Demands That Drug
Companies Drop Case Against South African Medicines Law (Mar. 17, 2001), at
http:/www.oxfam.org.uklwhatnew/presslcutcost-sa5.htm.
47. The case was eventually dropped by all thirty-nine companies. See SA Victory in
AIDS Drugs Case, supra note 42.
48. US Firm Offers Cheap AIDS Drugs (Mar. 7, 2001), at http://news.bbc.co.uklhi/
english/world/newsid_1207000/1207571.stm.
49. Id.
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combination of three drugs for $600 per year, per patient. ° So, if Merck is
offering one drug for $500 per patient, per year, it is a little hard to believe it
is at cost. It is not clear what they include in calculating cost, but it is hard
to believe Cipla is losing any money when they are offering $600 per year,
per patient, on that triple combination therapy.
Then there are the raw materials. If you calculate the quantity of raw
material needed per year per patient, then you come up with more than 1000
dollars for the treatment. They probably have discounts when they buy raw
material, but it could be ten percent or ninety percent. We do not know since
there is no price comparison. It is really hard to tell whether or not these
drugs are really offered at cost.
Bristol Myers Squibb is another story. They have exclusive licensing
agreements for two drugs and the patents are held by Yale University and the
National Institute of Health (NIH). Since they have exclusive licensing
agreements, they act as the patent owners and have monopolies. We asked
them for a price decrease for many years for both of these drugs for Thailand
and South Africa, but they have refused. They have refused, up until very
recently. We hooked up with some Yale law school students and told them
that their university owns the patent rights on these drugs, we need the drugs,
and asked for their assistance. The students went to the Dean and asked to
see the original contract. They started making some noise, and made the
point that if a professor at the university develops a drug, in the licensing
agreement there are usually fair pricing provisions that are not enforced.
That is OK here, because this country is rich and can afford the higher price
of the drugs, but that is not the case for other countries.
The South Africa media circus, combined with the investigation by the
students, made Bristol Myers Squibb announce last week that they were
giving an emergency relief patent right and they would make sure, finally,
that no patent would stand in the way of access to drugs. In addition, Glaxo
last week made a press release or short statement saying that they would
provide one of the drugs for $2 per day, per treatment. 2
50. Indian Firm Offers Cheap AIDS Drugs (Feb. 7, 2001), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
hi/english/health/newsid_1 158000/1158637.stm.
51. Michael Waldholz & Rachel Zimmerman, Bristol-Myers Squibb Offers to Sell
AIDS Drugs in Africa at Below Cost, WALL ST. J. (New York), Mar. 15, 2000, at
http://www.aegis.com/news/wsj/2001/WJO10312.html.
52. Glaxo Offers Cheaper AIDS Drugs (Feb. 21, 2001), at http://news.bbc.co.uklhil
english/business/newsid_1182000/1182652.stm. See also Mark Schoofs & Michael Wald-
holz, Price Wars Breaks Out over AIDS Drugs in Africa As Generics Present Challenge,
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XI. WHAT'S NEXT?
So, what is next? Triple combination therapy is probably going to be
made available for $500 to $600 dollars per patient, per year for the least
developed countries. This is probably where we are headed, hopefully by
the end of this year. The question is, who will pay for these drugs? At this
price level, the least developed countries do not have the resources necessary
to treat their patients, especially those who have between ten to twenty
percent of their adult population infected. They do not have the resources,
so wealthy nations have to come up with the money. Once you start imple-
menting treatment programs, it is really a long-term commitment. You can
not start a treatment program and say, "Ok, I am going to put people on anti-
retroviral therapy," and a year later say, "I am not going to pay anymore; I
am not giving any money, find your treatment somewhere else." Once you
start treating people, it is for life.
XII. SO WHAT HAPPENS WITH GENERICS?
What about generics? Generic companies are in business to make
money, exactly like the brand name, research-based pharmaceutical compa-
nies, but so far what has driven the prices down is public opinion and
competition. It might be tempting for wealthy nations to say they are going
to give money, but on the condition that you buy the drugs you need from
companies that are in those countries. That policy favors the research-based
companies. This would be a big mistake because the developing world has to
be part of the solution, as well. Right now, the only pharmaceutical industry
that is producing drugs in the developing world is the generic industry.
The generic industry serves as a tool to drive prices down and is needed
even if we reach low drug prices today. What about tomorrow when the
world's drug needs are going to increase? We will still need to continue to
drive the prices down. So, for this reason and because the developing world
has to be part of the solution, generics should be included in the equation.
Finally, what about the developing countries that are excluded as with the
Merck offer? The pharmaceutical companies come up with something that
WALL ST. J. (New York), Mar. 6, 2001, at http:llwww.aegis.comnews/wsj/2001/
WJ010306.html.
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will make them look generous, but they immediately restrict it to poor
African countries, not Brazil, not Thailand, and not South Africa.53
XIII. REASONS FOR HOPE
There is, however, reason for hope. You have to understand that the
United States is probably the only or one of the only countries on earth
where there is no pharmaceutical prescriptive drug price control. In Europe,
there is some level of prescriptive price control in all of the countries.
Therefore the United States is the most profitable market for them. Here, we
pay on average almost twice to ten times as much for the exact same drugs
that are available in France. What industries worry about is if they engage
heavily in these deferential pricing schemes, it could be used as a tool
against them, forcing them to decrease their price in the wealthy markets,
which is all they are concerned about.
In February, Oxfam launched a campaign for access to essential medi-
cines. It is an international campaign, but for now, the UK has launched its
campaign and its first target is Glaxo. They made it very clear to Glaxo that
since they own some stock in the company, they made it very clear to them
that they were going to attend the shareholders meetings and start challeng-
ing Glaxo on their pricing policy in the developing world. The same day or
the very next Glaxo issued a press release saying yes, this was indeed a
problem and they had some inconsistent policies so far but that they were
working on a solution and they were a very responsible company. It is really
good news to see that those companies can react quickly when the right
argument is used.
Human rights advocacy groups are also interested in taking up the issue
and domestic organizations have also expressed interest. So things are
probably going to move this year. This campaign is not only about AIDS, it
is really about what we call neglected diseases and essential medicines in the
developing world.54
53. In some cases aid comes with strings attached. See Michael Waldholz, Bristol-
Myers's AIDS Relief is Hitting Hurdles in Africa, WALL ST. J. (New York), July 7, 2000, at
http://www.aegis.comnews/wsj/2000/WJ00070l.html.
54. For information about additional diseases, see generally MSF Access Website, at
http://www.accessmed-msf.org (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
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I. INTRODUCTION
What I thought I would talk about today for this midday session is the
challenge, as well the promise, of addressing health disparities in the United
States. By health disparities, I mean a number of things. First of all, we
have as we look at various segments of our population, differences in life
* Kathy Cerminara: Welcome to the Nova Southeastern University School of Law
and I am pleased and proud this year to be the Goodwin Professor. Which means that I have
hosted and had the pleasure of bringing into our school a series of very special speakers.
Today we have the final speaker in that series, a very special speaker, the very honorable
Louis Sullivan M.D. Louis Sullivan started as Secretary of Health and Human Services
("HHS") from March 10, 1989 through the end of the senior President George Bush's
administration and since 1993, January of 1993, he has been President of Morehouse School
of Medicine in Atlanta. As head of the Department of HHS Dr. Sullivan administered the
federal agency responsible for major health welfare, food and drug safety medical research,
and income security programs for the American people. Dr. Sullivan went to HHS from
Moorehouse at which he played a founding role. And he joins us today as a member of
various medical organizations, the founding President of the Association of Minority Health
Profession Schools, and having served a variety of other positions I am so very pleased to
welcome him and please join me in welcoming him.
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expectancy, differences in incidence of diseases, differences in access to
healthcare, and differences in health insurance coverage. So, a variety of
factors infringe upon the health status of our citizens. Certainly, in a democ-
ratic society, the goal is to provide equal access to services provided for all
of our citizens.
I. HEALTH CARE ACCESS DISPARITIES
First of all, I think the United States of America has the most advanced
and sophisticated healthcare system in the world. How do I support such a
statement? As you know the Nobel prizes in physiology and medicine
worldwide are considered premiere scientific recognition awards. Although
the United States has only 6% of the world's population, half of the Nobel
prizes in physiology or medicine of the twentieth century were received by
scientists in American laboratories. That is a measure of the quality of our
scientific enterprise. Secondly, when a new pharmaceutical reaches annual
international sales of one billion dollars or more, because of great accep-
tance and utility, it is then called a "blockbuster" pharmaceutical. Of the
blockbuster pharmaceuticals of the twentieth century, more than 40% of
them came from United States pharmaceutical companies: a measure of the
effectiveness and efficiency of our pharmaceutical industry. Thirdly, as a
nation we have the most highly trained health personnel, not only physicians
and dentists, but also nurses, allied health personnel, and others.
It was not always that way. In fact, many of you have heard of the
Flexner report, which was issued in 1910.1 This report was issued by Dr.
Abraham Flexner, a microbiologist at Rockefeller Institute in New York at
that time. This report was commissioned by the Carnegie Foundation, with
their long interest in higher education. Over a two-year period of time
Professor Flexner visited all 148 medical schools in the United States and
Canada to assess their effectiveness. At that time Europe, not the United
States, was the leading center for medical education, with such Universities
as Bologna, Heidelberg, Edinburgh, London, and others considered to be the
pinnacle of training in medicine. The Flexner report was a revolutionary and
cataclysmic report. It is still available in medical libraries, and I would
1. Abraham Flexner, Medical Education in the United States and Canada: A Report
to the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, (Bulletin No. 4 1910), avail-
able at http:llwww.camegiefoundation.org/elibrary/docs/Flexner-report.pdf (last visited Jan.
27, 2002).
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invite you to read it because it has a brief description of every one of those
medical schools.
Dr. Flexner recommended strengthening medical education. He rec-
ommended that some schools should be closed, and he was very critical of
the quality of curriculum, or the absence of curriculum. Many institutions
were proprietary institutions, where the owners were usually physicians who
had simply obtained a license or charter from the state to operate a medical
school. There were no accrediting bodies at the time. Because of Flexner's
report, and his recommendation of the model that should be adopted, similar
to Johns Hopkins Medical School, a number of changes occurred. By 1925,
the number of medical schools had been reduced from 148 to 80 and re-
mained at eighty over the next thirty years. Then in the mid-1950s, with
federal, state, and private support, the United States began an expansion of
medical education, including the development of forty-five new medical
schools. The number of medical schools in the country grew to 125. With
the number of improvements that have occurred, there is no doubt that we
now have the most highly trained health care personnel in the world. We
have people coming from around the world to the United States for care
because it is often not available in their own countries.
Fourth, our technology is the most advanced, with medical devices,
clinical treatment protocols, and diagnostic procedures that are readily
available around the country. Fifth, as a nation we invest more dollars in
biomedical research than any other nation. For the current year, that invest-
ment comes to seventeen and a half billion taxpayer dollars invested by the
National Institutes of Health ("NIH'), not only in research carried on the
NIH campus in Bethesda, Maryland, but research that is supported in medi-
cal schools and hospitals, and other health profession institutions around the
country. That seventeen and a half billion is matched by twenty-six billion
dollars invested in clinical and applied research by industry, that is, by
medical devices industry and the pharmaceutical industry. The result is,
virtually every week we read about some new system of biology which has
been deciphered, such as, the genetic code; the discovery and use of stem
cells; the ability to grow nerve cells in the laboratory; and many other ad-
vances that formerly were not thought possible.
Well, in spite of these advantages, our system also has some problems.
Our healthcare system is the most expensive in the world. We spend more
than $4000 dollars per capita in our healthcare system for every man,
woman, and child in the country, virtually double that of most Western
nations. In spite of our expenditures, some nations do better than we do in a
number of health indicators, such as infant mortality. We rank around
2002]
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twenty-two in infant mortality, and other indicators of health status. So we
have a distribution problem in our country so far as health services and
access to healthcare.
We have a paradox: not everyone has access to health services, because
of economics and geography. We have forty-three million Americans with-
out health insurance, and an equal number who are underinsured. Second,
there is a geographic maldistribution of health professionals and health
services. In many fields we have adequate or even excess number of physi-
cians in such areas as ophthalmology or dermatology, but inadequate num-
bers in primary care fields such as family medicine, general pediatrics, and
general internal medicine. There are also cultural barriers to healthcare,
which is increasingly important with the expanding diversity of our coun-
try's population. There are also differences in education, which have an
impact upon health status and access to health services.
Ill. MINORITY HEALTH DISPARITIES
Finally, there remain vestiges of discrimination, or often, even uncon-
scious bias in the allocation of health services and resources. This bias has
been shown, for example, in two studies. One study involved the Medicare
population, showing that African-Americans in the Medicare system who
have chest pain are less likely to have a comprehensive cardiovascular
evaluation as are whites. A similar study, in the Veterans Administration
Hospital system, showed that there were similar glaring gaps in the quality
of health services that black veterans received. So we are faced with glaring
gaps for decades in the health status between the white population on one
hand, and the nation's minorities on the other. Now, poverty does play a
major role in this, but poverty is not the total answer.
The result of all of this is that in this year 2001, black Americans have a
life expectancy that is significantly shorter than that of white Ameri-
cans. For white females born this year, life expectancy approaches eighty
years. That compares to the life expectancy of black females of seventy-four
years, a six-year difference. When we look at our male population we see
that for white males, the life expectancy for a white male born this year is
seventy-four years, whereas for black males it is sixty-six years. An eight-
year difference in life expectancy. I was visiting a facility in the District of
Columbia just a week ago when I learned that the life expectancy for black
males in our nation's capital was only sixty-four years. The most striking
gap is between white females of eighty years and black males of sixty-six
years. An astonishing difference of fourteen years in life expectancy in this
[Vol. 26:467
75
: Nova Law Review 26, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Sullivan
most affluent technologically advanced country in the world. What this also
means is that for black males, on average, they only draw about two years of
social security retirement benefits, whereas for white females they draw and
average of fifteen years in benefits from a system in which we all pay,
according to our income during our working years.
IV. CAUSES AND CURES
A. Causes
What are some of the reasons for the disparities in health status affect-
ing the American minority populations versus the white populations? As I
mentioned, higher death rates in minority segments of our population are a
result of many conditions. The long list of conditions include: infant mor-
tality rates that are twice as high in the African-American population as the
white population; and one and a half times as high in the Latino population
as in the non-Latino white population; higher death rates from diabetes, heart
disease, stroke, kidney failure, AIDS, prostate cancer, violence and other
causes. Now, if you look carefully at all of these conditions there are cer-
tainly biological determinants that are very important. I maintain as well,
that individual health behavior contributes significantly to health outcomes
over a sustained period of time.
We also note, that the United States since its founding has always had a
shortage of minority physicians. I remind you that during slavery in many
Southern States it was illegal to teach slaves to read or write. Thus in 1864
with the Emancipation Proclamation, a number of illiterate adults were
released to fend for themselves in our country. Although that was more than
135 years ago, some of the lingering consequences are still affecting our
population. In 1950, 2.1% of all United States physicians were African-
American, even though, African-Americans comprised 10% of the United
States population at that time. In the mid-1950s, because of the projection
by a number of groups of a pending shortage of doctors, our country began a
unique and remarkable expansion of medical education.
This continued until 1981, resulting in the 125 medical schools we have
now versus the fifty that existed in 1950. Some of those new schools include
the University of South Florida in Tampa, affiliated with Nova Southeastern
University today, and other schools around the country, of which my school,
Morehouse School of Medicine, is one of those forty-five newer medical
schools. We are now graduating nationally some 6000 physicians every year
20021
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as opposed to 8000 physicians we were producing up through the mid-1950s
in our country.
In spite of efforts over the past thirty or more years we have only
increased the percentage of physicians who are African-American from 2.1%
in 1950 to only 4% today, even though the African-American population is
now 13% of the nation's population. Less than 8% of today's medical
students are African-American, and less than 7% are Hispanic-American,
even though Hispanics comprise 12% of the United States population. So,
one of the lingering issues we have today is the continued shortage of health
professionals from our nation's minority population.
In 1995, Dr. Miriam Komoromy and her colleagues reported in the New
England Journal of Medicine that those communities with a high percentage
of African-Americans or Hispanic-Americans among their citizens had a
lower number of physicians than did comparable white communities with
similar socioeconomic indices, such as similar income status and education
status. Dr. Komoromy also noted that Hispanic-American and African-
American physicians were more likely to establish practices in such commu-
nities with high percentages of minority citizens. Thus, part of the answer
for greater access to healthcare for the nation's minority populations is an
increase in the number of physicians from those groups.
A report released in May of 1999 in Washington D.C. by the Public
Health Policy Advisory Board revealed that our nation is not addressing
some of the prominent health issues confronting our children today. Those
are primarily deaths from injuries, homicides, and suicides. The title of this
report is Health and the American Child, Risks, Trends and Priorities for the
21st Century.2 This report is a result of a year long project and is the most
comprehensive study of its kind. While many causes of childhood death are
on the decline, the report finds alarming gaps in the progress of addressing
other important and many preventable threats that claim the lives of children
today. Adolescent suicides and homicides have increased dramatically in the
past few decades and now represent the number two and number three
causes of death in children between the ages of one through nineteen.
Indeed, the report found that the top three causes of death in the age group
one through nineteen years are unintentional injury, comprising 43% of the
deaths; homicide, comprising 12% of deaths; and suicide comprising some
2. Health and the American Child, Risks, Trends and Priorities for the 21st Century
at http://www.phpab.org/healthandtheAmericanChildReportPortal.htm (last visited Jan. 27,
2000).
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6% of deaths. All three together accounted for 63% or almost two-thirds of
all deaths in childhood.
In addition to identifying the leading causes of child mortality, the
report provides an important analysis of risk factors underlying those causes
of death, such as substance abuse and handgun violence. The report also
examines how social factors such as poverty and family structure affect
children's health. The report also provides broad recommendations to serve
as a catalyst for developing a better national framework for protecting the
health of our children. Presently our nation's policies and programs de-
signed to protect children's health are not as affective as they should be
because there is no comprehensive national strategy. The solutions to these
causes are multifaceted. They include improved access to healthcare, which
means more availability of health insurance to diminish the geographic,
economic, and cultural barriers as well as the improved health behaviors of
our citizens themselves. Sustained vigorous education efforts including
health promotion and disease prevention programs are needed to address
these problems.
B. Cures
A little more than a year ago, I was pleased to participate in the release
of Healthy People 2010 with the United States Public Health Surgeon Gen-
eral David Satcher. Also participating in the release of Healthy People
2010,3 was former Surgeon General Julius Richmond who served under
President Carter and who released the first set of national health goals in the
document called Healthy People in 1979.4 Having served as Secretary
between 1989 and 1993, I released Healthy People 20005 in September of
1990, which had some 298 health goals for the nation, which we hoped to
reach during the decade of the 1990s. While our nation did make significant
progress during the 1990s, including such gains as lowering infant mortality,
increasing the rate of childhood inmnunizations, decreasing death rates
3. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., Healthy People 2010: Understanding
and Improving Health (2d. ed. 2000) at http://www.health.gov/healthypeople/Document/
tableofcontents.htm.
4. Public Health Service, Healthy People: The Surgeon General's Report on Health
Promotion and Disease Prevention. Washington, D.C.: US Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, Public Health Service, 1979; DHEW publication no. (PHS)79-55071.
5 Healthy People 2000, at http:llwww.odphp.osophs.dhhs.gov/pubslhp2000 (last
visited Jan. 27, 2002).
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related to heart disease, cancer, and stroke, we actually lost ground in other
areas such as obesity in children and in adults. In spite of these setbacks,
overall, the Healthy People 2000 movement was a success during the decade
of the 1990s. Our new national health goals articulated a year ago with the
release of Healthy People 2010 include almost twice as many objectives; 467
as compared to 298 in 1990. The essential goals of Healthy People 2010 are
two firsts: 1) the increase of quality and years of healthy life and 2) to
eliminate disparities in health status.
During the twentieth century our nation experienced remarkable im-
provement in the health of our citizens. An infant born in 1900 had a life
expectancy of forty-seven years, whereas, today, an infant born has a life
expectancy of seventy-eight years. Almost a doubling of life expectancy
occurred during the twentieth century. This was due to multiple factors
including: improvements in public health such as the provisions of safe
drinking water; the availability of nutritious food; and improved sanitation as
well as advances in medical care. If you go to many developing countries
you will find that safe water is still not readily available. These are the
things that we take for granted in our society today.
In 1900, leading causes of death included pneumonia, tuberculosis,
diarrhea in infants, and diphtheria. In contrast, today, the leading causes of
death are such things as heart disease, our number one killer; cancer at
number two; and stroke, number three. Chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, kidney failure, diabetes, AIDS, and violence are also leading causes
of death. Upon review of the ten leading causes of death, disease, and dis-
ability today among our citizens, it is clear that our health behavior does play
a significant role with our biology and with our environment.
1. Promoting Healthy Behaviors
Health behavior will be increasingly important going forward into the
new century. Individually, and as a community, the decisions we make not
only shape our lives but they expand or limit our freedoms. They also
influence the lives of others, particularly our children. Working together as
a community, a state, or a nation can create a culture of positive values and
healthy behaviors. We can continue to improve the health of our citizens as
we improve the living conditions in our society.
Now, improvements in life expectancy over a twenty-year period, from
1970-1990, were calculated by a group of independent economists headed
by Hugo Sonnenschein of the University of Chicago. The improvements in
life expectancy have been estimated independently by these six economists
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at various academic institutions around the country to have added fifty-seven
trillion dollars, to our nation's economy through this twenty-year period or
an average of almost three trillion annually. This is a result of the preven-
tion of illness and injury as well as improvements in healthcare. This report
is titled Exceptional Returns: The Economic Value of America's Investment
in Medical Research,6 published in 1999 by Hugo Sonnenschein and other
economists.
2. More Research
The gap in health status between blacks and whites results in an esti-
mated 73,000 excess deaths annually in the nation's African-American
community. An effort to close the gaps in health status should reduce these
excess deaths, as well as, result in significant economic returns as well,
lower healthcare costs, increased wages, more tax revenues, and less demand
for social services. This will result in a healthy working population as
compared to a health-impaired disabled population. So, from an humanitar-
ian perspective, as well as from an economic vantage point, efforts to ad-
dress the disparities in health status and healthcare will show significant
results for our society as a whole. We need more research into the underly-
ing reasons for persistence of health disparities in our nation.
In 1989, an article in the Chronicle of Higher Education reported that
less than 1% of grants from the National Institutes of Health, our public
research agency, as part of the United States public health service, were
awarded to minority scientists, whether those scientists were at minority or
majority institutions. Ten years later in January of 1999, the Institute of
Medicine found that the National Cancer Institute, the largest of our NIH
with a three billion dollar budget funded studies specifically focused on the
problems of cancer in the nation's minority populations, with grants of less
than $150 million dollars in a three billion dollar budget.
3. The Center for Research in Minority Health Disparities
I attended hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and Human
Services of the United States Senate Appropriations Committee headed by
Senator Arlen Spector. We proposed that greater attention and resources be
6 The report is available at http://www.laskerfoundation.org/reports/pdf/
exceptional.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
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given in our nation to addressing the issue of health disparities. We recom-
mended that the Office of Research in the Minority Populations of NIH be
elevated to a Center for Research in Minority Health Disparities. Now the
significance of that is as follows. First, a Center has direct grant making
authority, which an Office does not have. Secondly, the director of a Center
sits as a member of the policy-making body of the National Institutes of
Health, which the director of an Office does not. Finally, the profile of the
programs would be higher for a Center than an Office. Consequently,
legislation was introduced and passed by the Congress to establish such a
Center at the National Institutes of Health. That bill was signed into law in
December of 2000 by President Clinton.7
The purpose of the Center is to develop and monitor the NIH strategic
plan to increase funds for research programs focused on health disparities
and minority health. Now this is an encouraging development, but the
Senate is still young and it is still organizing its programs and its personnel.
It is hoped that other health agencies in the United States Public Health
Services such as, the Centers for Disease Control, the Health Resources and
Services Administration, the Agency for Health Care Quality, and other
public health agencies, as well as, state agencies and private research organi-
zations, will join a comprehensive sustained effort to understand all the
reasons for disparities in health status and in healthcare for our coun-
try. This should be coupled with the development of programs to eliminate
these gaps in the health of our poor citizens and minority citizens. The
benefits to our nation would be not only improved health but greater produc-
tivity from the work of citizens, resulting in a significant increase in our
standard of living. It is primarily a question of political will and of commit-
ment.
V. CONCLUSION
My hope is that our leaders and our citizens will provide that commit-
ment for a greater, healthier nation in the new millennium. In the profes-
sions, we need you and your colleagues to provide your talents and your
leadership skills and your commitment to helping solve these problems.
Health, is not simply a problem for health professionals. It is a problem for
all of our citizens. The challenge is great but so are the rewards. Never has
7. Minority Health & Health Disparities Research and Education Act of 2000, S.
1880, 106 Cong. § 101 (2000).
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the need, nor the promise, been greater for achieving significant changes to
benefit those who have not been as well served by our system. I leave you
with this challenge because it is an opportunity for leadership. Thank You.
VI. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
Professor Cerminara: Actually, if I may, take introduction prerogative and
ask the first question. I am curious, with regard to access to care issues; it
seems that we see a lot going on right now with the explosion of the Internet.
We hear a lot of talk today about wireless technology and everybody being
on the Internet. We see a lot going on with regard to consults over the
Internet, medical records being shipped back and forth for information
purposes. Just information becoming available on the Internet to anybody
surfing around who can learn something about conditions, statistics, causes
of death, possible stuff you could take to be in better health. Do you think
that this increasing interaction of the Internet and medicine will help elimi-
nate some healthcare disparities, or do you think it will perpetuate or deepen
them?
Dr. Sullivan: Well, first of all, I think that there is no question that the
Internet will contribute to improving the health of Americans. The challenge
will be to see that it does not cause further widening of the divide between
those that have and those that have not. There are many efforts under way
around the country to be sure that we do not have that divide that widens.
But I think the Internet certainly is playing a very positive roll, and it also
fits with the fact that our citizens want to be more in charge of their health-
care than previously.
I have lived long enough to go from the phase where the typical patient
would say "well doctor you do what you think is best, etc." So the patient
would not even bother to understand what the problem was but simply put it
into the hands of the doctor. It is very different now. People want to know
what is wrong, what is the diagnosis, and what does this mean in terms of my
health, my ability, my ability to work, life expectancy. What are the treat-
ment options? I would like to get a second opinion. I want to know what are
the side effects of this drug. So people are taking a much more active role
and certainly the Internet helps that very much. And of course, typically a
patient comes into the doctor's office already with a huge print out about
what the symptoms are. So, certainly that is a part of it.
I think that it is healthy and as I have mentioned, with the healthy
people movement, this is a process that does require it to be effective, active
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participation by individuals themselves in preserving and affecting their
health. There is more change in the profile of diseases that Americans are
dying from today versus one hundred years ago. Many diseases are chronic
conditions, which are affected by lifestyles, such as heart disease, our num-
ber one killer.
We have a little more than two million deaths a year, and of those,
roughly three quarters of a million or 750,000 are related to heart disease.
Well, heart disease is related to whether or not you are overweight, whether
or not you exercise. Studies have shown repeatedly that people who are
active, whether it is simply walking or playing tennis, or golf, or doing
aerobics, those people have lower incidents of heart attack or stroke. They
live longer; if they have high blood pressure, their blood pressure tends to
come down. They may eliminate the need for medicine entirely.
So those are things that the patients themselves can do. People who are
well educated or have access to the Intemet can get that information. So
clearly, it will have an overall positive affect. The problem that we have to
address is making sure that everyone does have access to the Internet be-
cause those who do not could be left behind.
Student: Dr. Sullivan, can you tell us which specific causes of mortality
have the largest discrepancy between black and white populations?
Dr. Sullivan: Well there are several. For example, deaths from stroke, for
example, among African-Americans are twice as high as among Whites.
Infant mortality again is twice as high. As you look at the various popula-
tions, you see other discrepancies. For example, deaths from diabetes are up
one and a half times as high in African-Americans. But they are about five
and six times as high among the Pima Indians of Arizona as among Whites.
They are being investigated there because we do not understand all of the
reasons why they are showing a higher incidence. Diabetes is one of those
conditions that has an underlying genetic propensity. It tends to run in
families, but it does not mean that if you have that tendency, you will de-
velop diabetes. I am sure many of you know people who may be in their 40s
or 50s and suddenly found that they have diabetes. They may have gained
weight, or other risk factors may have developed. So, there are a number of
other environmental factors that influence whether or not they indeed be-
come overweight, which may bring out the diabetes tendency. Vietnamese
women have a high incidence of cervical cancer compared to Whites. So
there are a number of specific discrepancies when you look at different
populations. However, the major discrepancies based upon size of the
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population is between the African-American community and the White
community.
Perhaps the worst discrepancies overall are really among the Native-
American population. We do not have good data there. That is, we have
enough data to know, but the data we do have is not as voluminous or as
precise as that of the African-American population. Again, heart disease,
stroke, and infant mortality are the greatest discrepancies.
Interestingly enough, when you look at such things as breast cancer you
find that the rate of the incidence of breast cancer is about the same between
African-American women versus white women. Nevertheless, deaths from
breast cancer are higher; about 40% higher among black women. It is
thought to be an access to care issue including the lack of health insurance.
It also can mean the attitudes of individuals. That is if you wait, if you
do not come in early when you have a lump, discharge from the nipple, or
other signs, and you come in six to nine months later, well you may have a
disease that has progressed much further. Individuals need to be aware of
the advantages that can accrue to them by early medical care and not ignor-
ing a problem. Again, that is part of the individual's attitude. Does the
health system benefit them? Because again, I maintain that the health trans-
action is a scientifically based but socially influenced transaction. The
biology is there, but it depends on how the interaction occurs and of course
the other thing that I mentioned, is that some of the unconscious bias that
studies have shown in how patients are treated when payment for services is
not an issue.
The Medicare studies and the Veteran studies of diabetic of black
veterans with vascular problems in their legs, because vascular problems are
common in diabetes, show that more had amputations rather than arterial
grafts. Here again, we do not know how much of this is the attitude of the
patient or the patient may just feel that the best thing is to get rid of the leg,
where you have circulatory problems versus how much advocacy the health
professional gives, in terms of arterial grafts.
Student: Regarding your comments about economics and insurance. Do you
have any thoughts about the evolution of managed care in the last ten years
and any predictions about where the American insurance system is going;
more regulation or maybe more public sectors, or is the public sector thing
really "in the tank" after Clinton's initiatives?
Dr. Sullivan: Well, first as you know, we have a public/private healthcare
system. Where the care is provided by public insurance such as Medicare
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and Medicaid, a federal/state system. The other 60% is really primarily
private sector employer-based insurance. In the end, the costs are quite
significant. I should have made one other comment too about the Internet:
one of the real challenges right now are the so-called Health Insurance
Affordability Act Provisions of 1996,8 the Kennedy-Kassenbaum Act.
One of the requirements is that before information can be released we
have to have the permission of the patient. Moreover, the question is what
does that mean. Someone predicted that means that even getting a prescrip-
tion filled is transferring information. What is consent? What does consent
mean? In addition, the other thing is carrying on a number of clinical trials,
which have been helpful in giving us better treatment.
There are a number of treatment protocols that are going around the
country whether it is cancer or heart disease or diabetes or a number of
things. You really have to collect a lot of information and sort it out. How
do we do that while we protect patient confidentiality? If you are a physi-
cian and you are referring a patient to someone else for a consultation, does
it mean you have to have written permission of the patient? So in other
words, these are the regulations that go into effect at the end of this month
that many in the health industry have asked that they be delayed, because of
the complexity of them and adding to cost of the healthcare transaction.
We just spent $1.2 trillion dollars or almost 14% of the GNP last year
on healthcare. People are saying: well this could really cause glitches in
provision of care but send cost up tremendously. There is conflict here. How
do we really provide security? Everyone agrees that no one should be
compromised by learning that you have a tendency for diabetes. But how do
we do this without interfering with the provision of care and without adding
to the cost?
The other thing I should like to mention is we have 14% of GNP
healthcare now; the percentage of GNP that the healthcare consumed in 1960
was 5.6%, so this is threefold and this is the very time that our economy has
expanded. And that is an issue.
Now, on the issue of managed care I think that, first of all, managed
care has contributed to our ability to control cost because in 1989 when I
went to Washington it was predicted then that the healthcare system would
consume 18%, even 20% of the GNP by the year 2000 if we did not bring
cost under control. Well, we are at 14% now rather than at eighteen, perhaps
8. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Public Law
104-191, (previously H.R. 3103).
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even 20%. The significant part of that has been the contribution of managed
care. However, managed care assistance are like anything else we have, it is
like the differences in your choice of automobile mechanics. Some are very
good and others you would not go to again.
Some of the managed care programs have been very restricted and more
focused on cost containment rather than provision of quality services. There
has been a backlash against a number of managed care programs. We have
some loosening of programs, of greater growth of what we call point of
service programs or PPO programs as opposed to strict managed care opera-
tions.
I think that we are going to see continued efforts, though more modest
ones, than the Clinton effort to provide reform of the healthcare system. I
think the Clinton effort fell of its own enormity, but that was not the only
problem. Politically, I think, a serious mistake was made. As you try to
reform a system that has a lot of moving parts, a lot of very bright people
with dedicated constituencies and what happened with release of the plan by
President Clinton was: the hospital industry was attacked; physicians were
attacked as being greedy, insurance companies were attacked, and the
pharmaceutical industry was also attacked. Furthermore, there was this "five
hundred person secret committee," which how can you, in Washington you
cannot have a secret committee of three people let alone five hundred. The
AMA for example was not invited, was not included. So it created a very
powerful collection of adversaries.
In my view it would have been much smarter to bring everyone in and
to debate the issues out here and perhaps they would have ended up with a
less sweeping effort, but I maintain that with a more modest effort we would
have succeeded. That would have put us in better shape today than we are.
So, that was the problem. Such things as the Children's Health Insurance
Program that has been implemented is still not working as well as it should.
The prescription drug debate that is well under way now is for our seniors.
Student: Do you think that we are going to get one this year?
Dr. Sullivan: I would not bet on it. No, it may happen but I think I am not
seeing a galvanized effort to really bring that together yet. Because first of
all, it is defined differently by different groups; as you know President Bush
had a more modest prescription drug plan than some of the Democrats would
want. So, with Congress being virtually evenly divided, still its slightly
Republicans and Republican President the last thing that Congress wants to
do would be to override the President. The chances are, we are going to get
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a modest bill or not one at all. The key thing that existed in 1993, was a
general agreement with the public that we had a system that needed to be
fixed. We still have a lot of understanding there but not the level of public
agreement that we really needed to bring this about. So I think there will be
incremental changes here and again. Continued efforts like the Health
Insurance Affordability Act is designed not only to enhance the transaction
but also, by use of Internet and electronic systems, to reduce the cost of the
healthcare transaction. It is predicted, with full implementation of electronic
commerce, that over a period of four or five years we could save at least
forty-five billion dollars in administrative costs because of the cost of pa-
perwork. Therefore, I think that we are going to continue to see modest
efforts tinkering with the system. But I predict that it is going to be perhaps
two to three years or more before we see enough dissatisfaction to really
provide a political imperative for significant change. Hopefully, those
efforts will actually include the major players in the healthcare system, as
opposed to exclude.
Student: As far as the economic position of specific minorities, are they
affected by their ability to have access to higher levels of insurance with our
managed care system the way it is, and is that possibly the responsibility for
the disparity of the longevity between minority group and the Whites? And
if so, do minorities or anybody in general have rights to the same quality
care? And if so, do you foresee some kind of solution for the systems that
equalize that?
Dr. Sullivan: Well, first of all, so far as the lack of health insurance, it does
affect different groups differentially. Around 13% of the White population
is uninsured. 21% of African-Americans and 31% of the Latino population
lack health insurance. The absence of health insurance does not include the
percentage of people that are underinsured, they have an insurance policy
but really, it is very limited in what is actually provided. Another factor is
that our private system is based primarily on employer-based insurance.
Therefore, the unemployment rate affects our health insurance rates as well.
It is very expensive to have an individually purchased health insurance
policy, about 40% of what you pay in premiums are administrative costs.
Those are the two main contributing factors. A third factor involves choices
influenced by economics. The choice between paying for health insurance
or providing food and clothing for their children. I think that clearly, the
solution in my view is going to be a public and private system, and that is to
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really help provide for poor people or low-income people in purchasing
health insurance.
In fact, during the first Bush Administration, we proposed a bill that
would have provided for people with low income levels, that is incomes up
to 200 percent of the poverty level would receive a voucher provided by the
taxpayers for purchase of health insurance. Today that voucher would have
been worth $3750 a year. However, it was criticized for being insufficient.
Some felt that it should probably be about a thousand dollars higher or more.
That was during a time when there was a Republican President with a De-
mocratic Congress. It was introduced in February of 1992 and we could not
get congressional hearings that year. That was an election year, and if you
have the White House and the Congress in different parties, from a political
standpoint, you do not want to provide the other party with potential issues
with which they could win. In other words, the timing for the introduction of
that legislation was not good because we were getting into an election
season.
That bill would have provided help towards health insurance and it had
features in it that we estimated at that time, if enacted, the bill would have
reduced the number of people without health insurance from thirty-seven
million to between five and seven million. It was not perfect because there
still would have been a significant number of people without health insur-
ance. But we reason that the system would have been able to absorb that
level of citizens without health insurance because right now in public hospi-
tals, perhaps as many as 50% of the people seen at a hospital, like Jackson
Memorial Hospital, are uninsured. Which means that Jackson Memorial and
the taxpayers of Dade County are providing the dollars to pay for healthcare
in less than ideal circumstances; people are having long waits, or missed
appointments because again people do not have a quote, "friendly encoun-
ter" with the healthcare system. They come in and have to sit around and
wait for hours and a lot of other things that happen to them.
I think that we will see a resurrection of some features, like the devel-
opment of group purchasing cooperatives for health insurance, particularly
for small businesses. A reason for this is that most of the people without
health insurance are those in small businesses, because the cost of insurance
in small businesses represents a greater cost than in larger groups. But in
some parts of the country where you have group purchasing cooperatives,
that has brought down the cost of insurance because you have a larger pool
over which you spread your risk, and your administrative costs also come
down on a per capita bases as a group gets larger.
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Student: You mentioned the constitutional institutionalized legalities of
young slaves being educated, and as a result we have fewer professionals out
there than otherwise. Can you give me some numbers on African-Americans
and other minorities being actively involved in a study program. And do you
believe that the Tuskeegee study may have made an impact on their partici-
pation.
Dr. Sullivan: Yes, clearly the Tuskeegee study has had a negative impact
that continues today. And for those who may not be familiar, the Tuskeegee
study was a study that was started back in the 1930s looking at the natural
history of syphilis in black men in Tuskeegee, Alabama, because in the
1930s there was no treatment for syphilis. Penicillin was introduced in 1941
and cured syphilis. But, in spite of that, the study was continued until 1972.
When it was reported there was outrage. This was a study conducted with
support from the United States government. This has had a profound impact
on the level of trust that African-Americans and some others have on the
healthcare system. That is, am I going to be experimented on? If I go there,
will I be given the best treatment? So yes, there is a wariness.
Pharmaceutical companies today, for example, are really pressed very
hard by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") to have a diverse popu-
lation group to test new therapies, and among those groups, they include a
significant number of minorities. The similar thing, but for different rea-
sons, exists for women in studies. Women were excluded from clinical trials
over the years for a number of different reasons. Primarily, one being that if
a woman is pregnant she is unaware the experimental protocol that may do
damage to the baby. Similar things for children, because of their rapid
growth, accelerated metabolism, they were often not used for studies.
So even today, a lot of the drugs we use in children we have extrapo-
lated our understanding of the drug from the use of adults to children. But
the FDA now has over the last decade or so, changed that to say if the drug is
going to be used in children or women, it should be tested in them. So there
is a very different environment now for clinical testing of drugs.
But coming back to the African-American population, it is because of
that as well as other encounters that African-Americans have had with the
system that would account for their unpleasant view or distrust of the health
professional. There is a great difficulty now in getting a significant number
of African-Americans enrolled in clinical trials and that raises an ongoing
problem.
Professor Cerninara: Thank you very much Dr. Sullivan.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two babies were born this morning. They are both premature-each of
their mothers was only twenty-three weeks pregnant at the time of birth.
Because they were born at such an early stage, it is clear that both of these
babies will need neonatal care.' However, only one will receive it. The first
baby, named Sarah, will be taken to the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit
("NICU') where she will be given care and treatment to both comfort her
and prolong her life. She will be held, fed, and examined to monitor her
progress. The second baby will not be given a name. She will instead be
taken to an empty room, a utility or laundry room, where she will be left
alone to die. No care will be administered to her, not even the comfort of a
warm blanket to surround her as she breathes her last breath. It will take her
anywhere from forty-five minutes to eight hours to die, the whole time
* Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, 2001, J.D., summa
cum laude; Pennsylvania State University, 1997, B.A. in Journalism.
1. Babies born at this stage are at a severe disadvantage when it comes to long-term
survival. Most of their lungs are underdeveloped and only adept at amniotic fluid intake. Air
is, in a sense, poison to a child born at this stage of development and Respiratory Distress
Syndrome (RDS) is a common condition.
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gasping for the air her lungs cannot process. This unnamed infant will not
have the chance to prove she can survive.
Why will these two babies receive such different treatment in the same
hospital, by the same health care professionals? The answer sparks more
questions than it resolves. Sarah is wanted, the second baby is not. Sarah
was born premature to parents who were hoping for a healthy child. The
second baby was born as a result of an abortion gone wrong. Despite the
intent of each mother when she arrived at the hospital, both of these babies,
regardless of their circumstances of birth, feel the same pain, struggle to
breathe the same air, and fight for the same chance to live. That both of
these babies are alive, moving their arms and legs and trying to breathe, does
not result in equal treatment.
The question of when life begins is not exclusively linked to conception
and gestational age. For some, the denial of personhood has been extended
through birth to living, breathing infants. Instead of using medical or even
common definitions to determine when a baby is alive, the standard has been
reduced to a legal argument. Because it has become legally and politically
popular to define a living baby in terms of whether that child is wanted,
healthcare professionals have been forced to make medical judgments
concerning aborted newborns based upon the simple fact that the baby is not
welcomed into this world.
This article explores how courts and lawmakers in this country have
extended a woman's right to choose an abortion to a point beyond that of
birth, and how there is an immediate need for legislation to protect the rights
of an infant born alive during a botched abortion. Part two introduces the
Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2000 ("the Act") and describes its
intended purpose. Part three discusses the types of abortion procedures
afforded to women and identifies those most commonly associated with the
result of a live birth. Part four discusses the progression of case law and
political thought that has fostered the deterioration of the right to life. Part
five analyzes the arguments for and against the Act and why it is essential
that this legislation is passed. Part six concludes this article.
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II. A CRY FOR HELP OUTSIDE THE WOMB
A. The Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2000
The text of the Born-Alive Infant Protection Act of 20002 basically has
two parts. Section 8(a) states:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any rul-
ing, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bu-
reaus and agencies of the United States, the words "person," "hu-
man being," "child," and "individual," shall include every infant
member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive at any stage
of development.
Section 8(b) provides:
As used in this section, the term "bom alive," with respect to a
member of the species homo sapiens, means the complete expul-
sion or extraction from its mother of that member, at any stage of
development, who after such expulsion or extraction breathes or
has a beating heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite
movement of voluntary muscles, regardless of whether the umbili-
cal cord has been cut, and regardless of whether the expulsion or
extraction occurs as a result of natural or induced labor, cesarean
section, or induced abortion.4
The Act serves two main functions. Section 8(a) adds a baby who is
born alive to the traditional definition of person, human being, child, and
individual. Section 8(b) includes a baby who has survived an abortion as
being born alive. The Act was proposed in the House of Representatives by5
then Representative Charles Canady. According to Representative Canady,
the legislation "would provide legal protection to living, fully born babies
who survive abortions."6 In Representative Canady's words, these babies
are "tiny, helpless infants brought into the world through no choice of their
own and struggling to survive."7
2. H.R. 4292, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted). An identical bill was introduced in the
Senate. See S. 3127, 106th Cong. (2000).
3. H.R. 4292 § 8(a).
4. H.R. 4292 § 8(b).
5. See H.R. 4292.
6. 146 CONG. REC. H7967 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).
7. Id.
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B. Care and Nourishment
In explaining why the Act is needed, Representative Canady focused on
the notion that fully born babies entitled to full protection of the law is in
serious jeopardy.8 Evidence that this fear is a reality was offered by Jill L.
Stanek9 and Allison Baker,10 both registered nurses who work in the Labor
and Delivery Department at Christ Hospital and Medical Center in Oak
Lawn, Illinois. Stanek testified that the hospital performs abortions on
women in their second and third trimesters, aborting both healthy babies and
babies with severe disabilities. 1 According to Stanek:
In the event that a baby is aborted alive, he or she receives no
medical assessments or care but is given only what the Christ Hos-
pital calls "comfort care." Comfort care is defined as keeping the
baby warm in a blanket until he or she dies, although even this so-
called compassion is not always provided. It is not required that
these babies be held during their short lives.
12
Stanek told of an aborted Down's Syndrome baby who was born alive
and subsequently taken to a "Soiled Utility Room" in the hospital because
neither his parents nor the attending nurse wanted to or had time to hold
him.' 3 Stanek cradled and rocked him for the forty-five minutes that he
survived.'4 One baby actually lived for eight hours after being aborted.15 No
care was offered to that child either. Many of the babies who survive
abortions that late in the pregnancy are healthy babies who are aborted
because they are misdiagnosed with birth defects and disabilities.16 Even
though these babies are healthy, they are left to die simply because their
birth is the result of an abortion.17 The most disturbing story that Stanek told
concerned a healthy baby with a fetal age past twenty-three weeks:
8. Id.
9. Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2000: Hearings on H.R. 4292 Before the
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representa-
tives, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Nurse Jill L. Stanek).
10. Hearings, supra note 9 (testimony of Nurse Allison Baker).
11. Hearings, supra note 9 (testimony of Nurse Jill L. Stanek).
12. Id. at 15.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 14.
16. See Hearings, supra note 9 (testimony of Nurse Jill L. Stanek).
17. See id. One baby who was aborted weighed much more than expected and the
attending nurse was "haunted because she [did not] know if she made a mistake by not getting
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I was recently told about a situation by a nurse who said, "I can't
stop thinking about it." She had a patient who was 23+ weeks
pregnant, and it did not look as if her baby would be able to con-
tinue to live inside of her. The baby was healthy and had up to a
39% chance of survival, according to national statistics. But the
patient chose to abort. The baby was born alive. If the mother had
wanted everything done for her baby, there would have been a
neonatologist, pediatric resident, neonatal nurse, and respiratory
therapist present for the delivery, and the baby would have been
taken to our Neonatal Intensive Care Unit for specialized care. In-
stead, the only personnel present for this delivery were an obstetri-
cal resident and my co-worker. After delivery of the baby, who
showed early signs of thriving, was merely wrapped in a blanket
and kept in the Labor & Delivery Department until she died 2
hours later. 8
In addition to Stanek's testimony, Baker told of three separate instances
where she witnessed babies left to die without even so much as a blanket to
keep them warm.19 Recalling one occasion, Baker said:
I happened to walk into a "soiled utility room" and saw, lying on
the metal counter, a fetus, naked, exposed and breathing, moving
its arms and legs. The fetus was visibly alive, and was gasping for
breath. I left to find the nurse who was caring for the patient and
this fetus. When I asked her about the fetus, she said that she was
so busy with the mother that she didn't have time to wrap and place
the fetus in the warmer. 20
Due in no small part to the testimony of Stanek and Baker, on September 26,
2000, the Act passed in the House by a margin of 380 to 15.21 The Act was
then introduced as a bill in the Senate the very next day by Senator Rick
Santorum.2 Despite bipartisan support, the bill died when Senator Kent
Conrad objected to a request made by Senator Trent Lott to pass the bill by
that baby any medical help." Id. at 15. Stanek testified that she heard of a live aborted baby
who was left to die on the counter of the utility room, wrapped in a disposable towel. Id. The
baby was accidentally thrown into the garbage. Id.
18. Hearings, supra note 9, at 16 (testimony of Nurse Jill L. Stanek).
19. Hearings, supra note 9, at 18 (testimony of Nurse Allison Baker).
20. i.
21. See H.R. 4292, 106th Cong. (2000) (enacted).
22. See S. 3127, 106th Cong. (2000).
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unanimous consent.2 3  The Act was reintroduced into both houses of
Congress on June 14, 2001.2
Senator Conrad is not the Act's only opponent. The main argument
against its passage is that it violates a woman's right to choose to have an
abortion. Political activists groups like the National Organization for
Women ("NOW") and the National Abortion Rights Action League
("NARAL") argue that the Act is a direct attack on the Constitution.2 This
belief stems from the perception that the sole determining factor in abortion
decision making is the intent of the mother.26 However, the very purpose of
the Act is to separate the rights of the baby from that of the mother at the
moment of birth.
Ell. THE STAGES OF TERMINATION
As the purpose of the Act is to define a newborn who survives an
abortion as a person, it is necessary to understand the stages of pregnancy
and which abortion procedures have the potential of resulting in a live birth.
The abortion procedure a doctor chooses to perform is determined by the age
of the fetus, namely, whether the fetus has reached the point of viability.
Viability is defined as "'the capacity for meaningful life outside the womb,
albeit with artificial aid,' and not just momentary survival." 27 It is presumed
28to exist after twenty-seven weeks of gestation but not before twenty weeks.
23. Id. See also 'Born Alive' Bill Fails in Senate, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Jan. 8, 2001,
at 20.
24. See Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 2175, 107th Cong. (2001);
S. 1050, 107th Cong. (2001). There have been no further hearings or votes concerning the
Act since its reintroduction.
25. John Leo, Baby Saving Made Easy: Any Bill that Protects Against Infanticide
Should Be Backed, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Sept. 25, 2000. The NARAL announced
that "this bill attempts to inject Congress into what should be a personal and private decision
about medical treatment." Id.
26. Id. Leo writes:
The intent of the mother is something of a frontier for abortion supporters. It shifts
attention away from the reality of the baby, already bom with rights, and back toward
the purpose of the operation-to abort. Pro-choice literature is filled with suggestions
that the developing life within a mother is an unborn baby if she wants it, simply
discardable tissue if she doesn't.
Id.
27. Janet E. Gans Epner et al., Late-term Abortion, 280 JAMA 724, 724 (1998).
28. Id. Weeks of gestation are calculated "in terms of the first day of the last
menstrual period. However, gestational age may vary depending on whether the stage of
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The period between the twentieth and twenty-seventh week is considered to
be the "gray zone" in which some fetuses may be viable and some may not.
29
Pregnancy and fetal age are calculated by trimesters. The first trimester
is measured from the start of the pregnancy to the thirteenth week, the
second trimester is measured from the thirteenth week to the twenty-seventh
week, and the third trimester is measured from the twenty-seventh week until
the date of delivery. 30 Ninety-five percent of abortions are performed in the
first or very early second trimester, usually at or before fifteen weeks
gestation. 31 It is estimated that "two thirds of abortions beyond [twenty]
weeks are performed between [twenty-one and twenty-two] weeks. 32
Furthermore, the number of abortions that are performed after twenty-six
weeks gestation is estimated to be between 320 and 600.
31
In the first trimester, abortions are usually performed on an outpatient
basis. 34 Procedures which are used at this stage include vacuum aspiration,
menstrual regulation, and prescribing Mifepristone ("RU-486"). 35 Vacuum
aspiration, the predominate method, involves inserting a vacuum tube into
the uterus to evacuate the fetus from the woman's body.36 It is usually not
required to use anesthesia or dilation at this time.37 Because the fetus is at
the earliest stage of development and has not reached the point of viability,
abortions performed in the first trimester do not result in a live birth. The
Born-Alive Infants Protection Act would therefore most likely not apply in
these situations.
Once a pregnant woman enters the second trimester her options change.
The most common procedure used in the early second trimester is dilation
and extraction ("D&E"). 38 This "is similar to vacuum aspiration except that
the cervix must be dilated more widely (usually with osmotic dilators)
because surgical instruments are used to remove larger pieces of tissue."
39
Intravenous fluids, sedatives and a local anaesthetic may be administered to
pregnancy is calculated from the first day of the last menstrual period, from the estimated time
of fertilization, or from the estimated time of implantation." Id.
29. Id.
30. Id
31. Gans Epner, supra note 27, at 725.
32. Id
33. Id.
34. Id at 726.
35. Id
36. Gans Epner, supra note 27, at 726.
37. Id
38. Id
39. Id
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the patient.40 After the fetus is removed, a curette is used to remove the
tissue that remains on the uterine walls. 41 Labor induction is sometimes used
at this stage, but this procedure is usually more common in the mid second to
third trimester. 42 The most common abortion procedures performed in the
mid second and third trimesters of pregnancy include D&E, intact dilation
and extraction ("D&X"), labor induction, hysterotomy, and hysterectomy.43
During a third trimester D&E procedure, "[b]ecause the fetus is lar-
ger ... and because its bones are more rigid," a physician is more likely to
use a destructive procedure to perform the abortion. 44 Uterine and cervical
perforation caused by medical instruments and fetal parts are more likely.
45
The risks involved in an abortion at this stage of pregnancy cause some
doctors to perform D&X on patients who are in the third trimester.46 D&X,
commonly known as partial birth abortion, consists of:
deliberate dilation of the cervix, usually over a sequence of days;
instrumental or manual conversion of the fetus to a footling breech;
breech extraction of the body except the head; and partial evacua-
tion of the intracranial contents of a living fetus to effect vaginal
delivery of a dead but otherwise intact fetus.
47
Labor induction as a means to perform an abortion increases in conjunction
with fetal age. The procedure has three steps:
First, the physician opens the cervix... using either prostaglandin
E2 gel, Cytotec3 or laminaria (little match-like sticks composed of
seaweed) .... He inserts one.., or two ... pills in or near the cer-
vix, irritating it and causing it to open. Second, after the cervix
opens, the small baby... literally drops out of the womb. Some-
times, the baby dies in the process. However, many are born
40. Id.
41. Gans Epner, supra note 27, at 726.
42. Id.
43. Id. Hysteromony and hysterectomy are rarely used because of increase in
maternal mortality and morbidity rate associated with these procedures. Id. These procedures
involve the "surgical delivery of the fetus through an incision in the uterine wall and
abdomen." Id.
44. Gans Epner, supra note 27, at 726.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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alive-thus the name, "live-birth" abortion. --In this case, the third
step is letting the baby die.48
Late term abortions are most often associated with the possibility of the
baby actually surviving and, in essence, being born alive. This has created a
confusing situation for health care professionals. If a woman comes into the
hospital with the intent to have an abortion, is she entitled to that and
nothing less? Because our legal and political systems have created a
standard that choice is absolute, health care professionals are now in a
quandary as to what to do when a child who was marked for abortion is born
alive. At this point, the only two choices that they are left with is to let the
baby die or finish the job.49
IV. THE EROSION OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE
The right to have an abortion extends further than reproductive
decision making as the concepts of abortion rights and of life's parameters
are scientifically amorphous at best. Attempts to resolve this enigma have
taken the debate from the delicate subject of determining when life inside the
womb begins to an all out conclusion that a woman's intent controls. This
progression, and the effect thereof, are the reasons why the Born-Alive
Infants Protection Act has been proposed.
A. The Cases
In Roe v. Wade,50 the Supreme Court found that a woman has a
fundamental right to privacy established by the Fourteenth Amendment
which is "broad enough to encompass [her] decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.' Because of this, the state must show a
compelling interest in order to restrict this fundamental right.52 According to
the Roe Court, the state's interest in the life of the fetus becomes compelling
48. Catherina Hurlburt, Live-Birth Abortions: The Next Step After Partial-Birth
Abortion, Concerned Women for America, (July 2000), at http://www.cwfa.orglibrary/life/
2000-07_pp.lba.shtml; see also David A. Grimes, The Continuing Need for Late Term
Abortions, 280 JAMA 747, 748 (1998).
49. Huriburt, supra note 48.
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. Id. at 153.
52. Id. at 155.
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only at the point of viability.53 Therefore, before viability, the right of a
woman to have an abortion overrides any interest of the unborn child.
5 4
Despite this fundamental right, the Court was careful to note that the right to
have an abortion is not unconditional. 5  Both the life and health of the
mother are parts of the equation that the physician should analyze when
determining whether to perform an abortion post viability.
5 6
In order to balance both the interest of the mother in choosing an
abortion and the interest of the state in protecting what it called "potentiality
of life, 57 the Court established a trimester test.58 During the first trimester,
the Court held, the state may not regulate abortion.59 During that stage the
decision to terminate a pregnancy should be left to a woman and her
doctor. 6 0 In the second trimester, the Court concluded, the state may only
regulate abortions "in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health."' 1
Finally, the Court ruled that in the third trimester, the state may regulate and
even proscribe certain abortion procedures unless such procedure is
62necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
Despite occasional challenges in court and a plethora of scholarly
dissatisfaction, the standard set forth in Roe remained in place for almost
63twenty years. Then, in 1992, the Court decided Planned Parenthood of
53. Id. at 163. In Roe, the court defined viability as the point that the fetus can
survive independent of its mother. Id. at 160.
54. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 153. In Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe, the Court stated that a
physician's medical judgment may be exercised according to physical, emotional,
psychological, familial, and age factors relating to the health of the mother. 410 U.S. 179, 192
(1973).
57. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
58. Id. at 163.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 164.
62. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165.
63. Cf Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976) (stating
that "[t]he time when viability is achieved may vary with each pregnancy, and the
determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment
of the responsible attending physician"); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 515
(1989) (upholding a state statute creating a presumption of viability at twenty weeks which the
attending physician "must rebut with tests indicating that the fetus is not viable prior to
performing an abortion"); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979) (clarifying a statute
subjecting physicians who performe an abortion to potential criminal liability if they failed to
attempt to preserve the life of a viable or potentially viable fetus); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down a provision in a statute
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Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.64 In Casey, the Court affirmed the
fundamental tenets of Roe, but changed the legal standard. Instead of
affirming the compelling state interest and trimester test of Roe, the Court
held that "a law designed to further the State's interest in fetal life which
imposes an undue burden on the woman's decision before fetal viability" is
unconstitutional. 66 The Court described an "undue burden" as a state
regulation that "has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in
the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus."67
Although the Casey Court disregarded the trimester test established in
Roe, it quoted the language of Roe with regard to the health of the mother
and noted that "subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in
the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."68
This new standard, coupled with the Court's decision to uphold certain
restrictions imposed by the state,69 brought dissatisfaction to both sides of
the abortion debate. Although Casey did not overturn Roe like many had
assumed it would, the new language used by the Court was an indication that
the interest of the state would be more respected in the balancing analysis.
At the very least, the Court moved away from the impression that abortion
was an absolute right-a theory which brought outrage to some abortion
advocates.7° However, because the Court upheld the legality of abortion, the
that mandated every person performing an abortion to "exercise of that degree of
care... 'required... to preserve the life and health of any unborn child intended to be born
and not aborted"').
64. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
65. Id. at 870. The Court reaffirmed that, pre-viability, a "woman has a right to
choose to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
66. Id. at 877.
67. Id.
68. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65).
69. See id The Court upheld four of five provisions imposed by the State including
informed consent, twenty-four hour waiting periods, extensive reporting requirements, and the
medical emergency exception. Id.
70. See Janet Benshoof, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Impact of the New Undue
Burden Standard on Reproductive Health Care, 269 JAMA 2249 (1993). Benshoof wrote
that "[wjhile the majority opinion reaffirmed a woman's right to choose an abortion, the
opinion opens the door to a multitude of new restrictive abortion laws, which diminish, and in
some cases completely block, a woman's ability to exercise that right." Id. at 2249. She
continued that "for the first time in a case that did not involve government funding, the Court
abandoned the principle that the government must act with neutrality with regard to the
woman's decision whether to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
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burden remained on the pro-life side to lobby for change. Since a complete
ban on abortion appeared to be a fruitless fight, the focus turned to time and
manner-namely, partial birth abortion.
When Stenberg v. Carhart came before the Court in 2000, the focus• 72
was on the ability of a state to ban the late term D&X abortion procedure.
The Court framed the issue as "whether Nebraska's statute,73 making
criminal the performance of a "partial birth abortion," violates the Federal
Constitution" as interpreted in Roe and Casey.74 The Court ruled that the
statute was unconstitutional for "two independent reasons. ' 7  The first
reason was that the "law lack[ed] any exception 'for the preservation of
the ... health of the mother.' ''76 The second reason was that the statute
."impose[d] an undue burden on a woman's ability' to choose a D&E
abortion,77 thereby unduly burdening the right to choose abortion itself. 78
The Court discussed the health exception prong first, intentionally
emphasizing that the earlier undue burden test would no longer be the sole
arbiter of statutory validity.79 As the Court discussed, this health exception
prong applies to more than the ability to choose abortion:
[Al State cannot subject a woman's health to significant risks both
in [the context where the pregnancy itself creates a threat to
health], and also where state regulations force women to use riskier
methods of abortion. Our cases have repeatedly invalidated stat-
utes that in the process of regulating the methods of abortion, im-
posed significant health risks. They make clear that a risk to a
woman's health is the same whether it happens to arise from regu-
lating a particular method of abortion, or from barring abortion en-
tirely.80
71. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
72. Id. at 921-22.
73. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-328(1) (Supp. 2000).
74. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 929-30.
75. Id. at 930.
76. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 880).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
78. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 930.
79. Id. at 930-39. The Court extended the health exception prong to a previable fetus
as well. Justice Breyer noted that because the "law requires a health exception in order to
validate even a postviability abortion regulation, it at a minimum requires the same in respect
to previability regulation." Id. at 930.
80. Id. at 931.
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This decision made clear what was unresolved in Casey-that the health of
the mother stands on its own and is not to be balanced against the interest of
the state.8 '
B. The Language
Although this case could have been decided by applying only the undue
burden test, the Court split the previous test, which incorporated the
concerns for the health of the mother in determining whether the state had
imposed an undue burden on her choice, into a separate and distinct two-part
test. 82 In deciding that the statute posed an undue burden, the Court relied on
a vagueness challenge. It held that the statute had the "effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus." 83 The language of the statute, the Court reasoned, could
have been interpreted to apply to the more commonly used D&E procedure
84as well as D&X because the procedures are similar in form. If this were
the case, Nebraska and any other state would have had the opportunity to
revise the statutory language and clarify that the ban only covered D&X
abortions. The Court did not afford the State the opportunity to do this but
instead promoted the health exception prong, a test that would virtually
block any state from creating legislation to stop this procedure.
This Carhart decision came as a surprise to some who had presumed
that the Court would uphold the Nebraska statute. In fact, prior to that
decision, similar statutes had been interpreted by courts to apply only to the
D&X procedure. 85 After the Carhart decision, those courts were called to
reconsider such decisions.86
81. See The Supreme Court, 1999 Term Leading Cases-Constitutional Law, 114
HARV. L. REV. 219, 220 (2000).
82. Id. at 226-27.
83. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 921 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).
84. Id. at 939.
85. See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. For Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir.
1998). The court in Gilmore noted that the "term 'partial birth abortion' in the statute
applie[d] only to the intact dilation and extraction procedure" and that the conventional
dilation and evacuation procedures were not subject to prosecution. Id. at 331. That
interpretation was also provided by the Attorney General of Virginia. Id. The court also
relied on the interpretation of the AMA with respect to the federal partial birth abortion
statute, an act similar in language to the Virginia statute as well. Id. at 332. The AMA said
that the federal statute "'clearly defines the prohibited procedure so that it is clear on the face
of the legislation what act is to be banned... physicians will be on notice as to the exact
nature of the prohibited conduct."' lId In Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, the court
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Although the language of these decisions seem at first blush to be
relatively harmless, the implications are of significance to the validity of the
Born-Alive Infants Protection Act. With each passing abortion case, the
language becomes more offensive to the rights and needs of the baby. For
example, in Carhart, the Court completely disregarded the fetus' experience
in a partial birth abortion and instead focused exclusively on the will of the
mother. It relied upon information supplied by the American College of
Obstetricans and Gynecologists ("ACOG") which provided that dilation and
extraction "may be the best or most appropriate procedure in a particular
circumstance to save the life or preserve the health of a woman. 87
However, the same panel which released that opinion "'could identify no
circumstances under which [this] procedure.., would be the only option to
save the life or preserve the health of the [mother]."' 88
In fact, more evidence supports the belief that intact D&X should be
banned.89 The American Medical Association ("AMA") has recommended
"that the intact [dilatation and extraction] procedure not be used unless
alternative procedures pose materially greater risk to the woman" and that
the abortions "not be performed in the third trimester except in cases of
serious fetal anomalies incompatible with life."9  Furthermore, according to
the AMA, there are no credible studies on intact D&X to attest to the
held that the "intentional removal of the fetus intact is what distinguishes an intact D&E
procedure from a [conventional] D&E procedure." 9 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1036 (W.D. Wis.
1998).
86. In Gilmore, the court vacated its stay order pending appeal after the Carhart
decision. See Richmond Med. Ctr. For Women v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376 (4th Cir. 2000). In
reluctantly vacating the stay, Judge Luttig stated:
As a court of law, ours is neither to devise ways in which to circumvent the opinions of
the Supreme Court nor to indulge delay in the full implementation of the Court's
opinions. Rather, our responsibility is to follow faithfully its opinions, because that
court is, by constitutional design, vested with the ultimate authority to interpret the
Constitution.
Id. at 378. Judge Luttig believed that the Supreme Court would hold the partial birth abortion
ban to be constitutional, based on the "overlay of deference customarily afforded state statutes
in facial challenges .... Id. at 377.
87. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 932; see also George J. Annas, Partial Birth Abortion & the
Supreme Court, 344 NEw ENG. J. MED. 152 (2001).
88. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 934.
89. Gans Epner, supra note 27, at 729.
90. Id. The AMA recommendations provide that "except in extraordinary
circumstances, maternal health factors that demand termination of the pregnancy can be
accommodated without sacrifice of the fetus, and the near certainty of the independent
viability of the fetus argues for ending the pregnancy by appropriate delivery." Id.
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procedure's safety.9' Finally, the AMA has argued that none of the risks
associated with a D&X procedure are medically necessary because other
procedures are necessary to doctors who decide that terminating the
pregnancy that late in the term is necessary.92 The Carhart Court could have
at least balanced the recommendations of these two agencies. However,
instead of fairly weighing the two, the Court chose the statement that fit its
intended result and concluded that the D&X procedure should remain an
option. Furthermore, in speaking about the health exception prong, the Court
reasoned:
the division of medical opinion signals uncertainty. If those who
believe that D&X is a safer abortion method in certain circum-
stances turn out to be right, the absence of a health exception will
place women at an unnecessary risk. If they are wrong, the excep-
tion will simply turn out to have been unnecessary.
93
The problem with this line of thought is that it does not eliminate the fact
that hundreds or thousands of babies will have been subject to excruciating
torture all for the protection of a procedure which may or may not be
necessary. If this reality were a legitimate concern, then the result may have
been different.
Carhart set a new standard of denial which was quickly adhered to as a
legitimate rationalization for the intended result to follow the will of the
mother first, last, and only. In Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v.
Farner,94 the Third Circuit drew a distinction between a partial birth
abortion and infanticide by reasoning that:
Positing an "unborn" versus "partially born" distinction, the [New
Jersey] Legislature would have us accept, and the public believe,
that during a "partial-birth abortion" the fetus is in the process of
being "born" at the time of its demise. It is not. A woman seeking
an abortion is plainly not seeking to give birth.95
91. Id. The partial birth abortion procedure is also not recognized in medical
textbooks or taught in medical schools or residencies. Id.
92. M. Leroy Sprang & Mark G. Neerhof, Rationale for Banning Abortion Late in
Pregnancy, 280 JAMA 744 (1998).
93. Carhart, 530 U.S. at 916.
94. 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000).
95. Id. at 143.
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The language of this case is further evidence that the rights of the fetus have
become obsolete.
C. The People
In addition to a twenty-eight year downward spiral in which the courts
have continued to chip away at the minuscule interest in potential life
granted to the state by Roe, political and philosophical thought has in many
ways pushed our society into believing that an unborn or even newly born
baby should not enjoy the rights of full personhood. Peter Singer, Professor
at Princeton University, has argued that "birth is an arbitrary point for
society to bestow personhood .... 96 He and other influential scholars
"want parents to have some time to decide whether to dispatch the baby or
keep it."' 97 Jeffrey Reiman, professor at American University, has expressed
that "infants do not 'possess in their own right a property that makes it
wrong to kill them.' 98 He has denied "that infants are members of the
community who share equal worth, dignity, and rights, and explicitly [has
concluded] that 'there will be permissible exceptions to the rule against
killing infants that will not apply to the rule against killing adults and
children."' 99 Furthermore, Michael Tooley, a philosopher writing at the time
of the Roe decision declared that fetuses and newborns do not have a right to
life because they are not people. °° In other words, Tooley advocated the
belief that infants do not qualify as human beings because "a human
being... 'possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of
a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and
believes that it is itself such a continuing entity.""°1
This belief that infants are not entitled to full protection of the law has
even permeated the Oval Office. In November, 2000, then President Bill
Clinton's Office for Civil Rights wrote that "protections against discrimina-
tion on the basis of age and disability [do not] require doctors to treat
seriously ill newborns as long as the parents consider them aborted.' 0 2 This
statement is less than shocking considering the fact that Clinton twice vetoed
a ban on partial birth abortion which was passed by both houses of Congress.
96. Leo, supra note 25.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Hearings, supra note 9 (testimony of Prof. Robert P. George).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Insider Report: Are Newborns "Persons?," NEW AMERICAN, Nov. 20, 2000.
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Before the first veto the procedure was believed to be implemented in rare
medical emergencies.'03 This misconception was due not only to a lack of
available information, but also intentional skewing of statistics. After
Clinton vetoed the ban in April, 1996, conflicting information began to
surface. 104 The fact that the original statistics had been skewed for political
purposes, and that the evidence concerning the effects of this procedure were
by that time widely publicized did not stop the former president from vetoing
the ban a second time. It is actions like these that signal the need for a clear
and distinct determination that a baby born alive is entitled to personhood.
D. The Need
The cases, legal theories, and political arguments surrounding the
abortion debate have enabled the intent of the mother to be paramount to any
and all rights of the child. The thought that a baby aborted during the mid-
second to third trimester can survive the abortion, be born alive, and feel the
effects of the abortion have been consistently dismissed. Pain perception
centers develop early in the second trimester of pregnancy."' Infants of
similar gestational age, that are born prematurely, are cared for with pain106
management as one of the tenets used in the NICU. The pain management
practiced for a partial birth abortion "would not meet the federal standards
for the humane care of animals used in medical research. 10 7 These views
support the need for the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act.
In speaking in support of the Act, Representative Canady summarized
the Supreme Court's decision in Carhart as resting "on the pernicious notion
that a partially-born infant's entitlement to the protections of the law is
dependent not upon whether the child is born or unborn but upon whether or
not the partially-born child's mother wants the child or not."108 He also
pointed to the decision in Farmer as holding that "an infant who is killed
103. Sprang, supra note 92. The circulated numbers were 450 to 500 per year. Id. at
744.
104. Id. For example, in November 1995, the National Coalition of Abortion
Providers Executive Director Ron Fitzsimmons stated that "women had these abortions only
in the most extreme circumstances of life endangerment or fetal anomaly." Id. After President
Clinton vetoed the bill, Fitzsimmons "admitted that his own contacts with many of the
physicians performing intact D&X procedures found that the vast majority were done not in
response to extreme medical conditions but on healthy mothers and healthy fetuses." Id.
105. Sprang, supra note 92, at 745.
106. lId
107. lId
108. 146 CONG. REc. H7967 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2000) (statement of Rep. Canady).
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during a partial birth abortion is not entitled to the protections of the law
because.., a woman seeking an abortion is plainly not seeking to give
birth."' 0 9  After reflecting upon these cases, Representative Canady
demonstrated the potential consequences of this line of thought. He
concluded that:
[u]nder the logic of these decisions, once a child is marked for
abortion it is not relevant whether that child emerges from the
womb as a live baby. A child marked for abortion may be treated
as a nonentity even after a live birth and would not have the slight-
est rights under the law; no right to receive medical care, to be sus-
tained in life or to receive any care at all. Under this logic, just as a
child who survives an abortion and is born alive would have no
claim to the protections of the law, there would appear to be no ba-
sis upon which the government may prohibit an abortionist from
completely delivering an infant before killing it or allowing it to
die. 1
0
Representative Canady was not hypothesizing when he told of the conse-
quences of these decisions. The testimony of Nurses Stanek and Baker are
proof that these practices are already in use. 1
V. BUT YOU'RE SUPPOSED TO BE DEAD
Senator Conrad is not the only opposition that the Born-Alive Infants
Protection Act faces.1 2 During the hearings before the House, doctors,
scholars, and lawmakers spoke out against the proposed law. The attacks
stem from two systems of belief. First, there is the content neutral attack.
This is the group which would base their resistance on the addition of a born
alive infant to the list of those entitled to personhood, such as the Peter
Singers of the world.!1 3 They would essentially deny personhood to a
newborn baby regardless of whether the baby was wanted by its parents or
not. This argument is an across the board ban on recognition of a living
baby.
The second attack is content based. The argument is that babies who
are born alive as the result of an abortion are not entitled to personhood.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See supra pp. 488-89 and accompanying notes.
112. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
113. See supra p. 500.
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The proponents of this are groups like NOW and the NARAL. It is also
fostered by the language of noted court opinions. This theory focuses solely
on the woman's determination that she will abort the baby. For the
followers of this line of thought, once this decision has been made, the
concept of being born alive ceases to exist.
Of the two lines of thought, the first grouping seems to make more
sense. At least it does not discriminate on the basis of self-worth. However,
as pointed out by its supporters, no argument for banning this Act can
reconcile the distinction between a woman's right to choose to have an
abortion and the rights of a born alive infant. Opponents of the bill have yet
to explain how the mother's right to terminate her pregnancy extends
through the birth of a live baby. There are several more concise arguments,
upon which those opposing this Act rely. Each of these arguments, however,
does not appear strong enough to deny personfood to a newborn baby.
The first argument against the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act is that
it restates current law.1 14 Opponents contend that "[e]xisting federal and
state law already provide adequate protection for the fetus."' 15 It is true that
more than forty states have laws that either grant a new born personhood or
proscribe the killing of a baby born alive, but these laws only apply to babies
who are born to mothers who either planned to have them or at least did not
have an abortion. If the judiciary does not interpret those laws as applying to
an aborted baby who is born alive, then the laws do not solve the problem
that this Act would. Enacted laws are of no support to a class that is not
protected by the legislation.
The second argument against the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act is
that the language of the bill "would impose on doctors and parents a
universal definition of life or 'alive,' which is... inconsistent with the harsh
reality presented by a number of circumstances."116 In other words, this bill
would "significantly interfere with the agonizing, painful and personal
decisions that must be left to parents in consultation with their physi-
cians."'1 7 It would cause parents to prolong the life of a dying infant out of
fear that choosing to discontinue treatment would be a "termination of life"
instead of a termination of the "painful process of death." 1 8 What all of this
means is that there are physicians who would be confused as to "whether this
114. Hearings, supra note 9, at 35 (testimony of Rep. Stephanie Tubbs-Jones); see also
146 CONG. REc. El 647 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000) (statement of Rep. Kilpatrick).
115. Hearings, supra note 9, at 35 (testimony of Rep. Stephanie Tubbs-Jones).
116. Hearings, supra note 9, at 56 (testimony of Dr. F. Sessions Cole).
117. Id. at57.
118. Id.
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bill would mandate that doctors provide care beyond what they would
normally deem to be appropriate for newborns who have no possibility of
survival."' 19 In addition to the testimony of doctors who analyzed the bill
and concluded that the criteria of live birth as set forth in the Act is
"unambiguous and easily discernible by any birth attendant,"'120 it is common
knowledge that a baby who is lying on a table, moving its arms and legs, and
gasping for air is, in fact, alive.
Furthermore, any parent who was planning on giving birth and raising
their child will not arbitrarily decide to stop life sustaining methods based on
a legal definition of live birth. 21 The Act is intended to apply to babies born
alive as a result of a botched abortion. It is for the purpose of granting those
children the same rights as children born to parents who want them. It is not
meant to force parents and doctors to keep babies, who clearly have no vital
signs, nor is it meant to force them to administer treatment that would be
ineffective. When medical attention will no longer help the child survive,
doctors are not required, under the Act, to keep the baby alive, regardless of
the circumstances of birth.122 The effect of this Act is to define a baby who
survives an abortion as a person, so doctors do not leave a baby to die, in an
effort to fully perform their end of an abortion contract.
A third argument against the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act is that it
is a back-door attempt to restrict a woman's right to choose to terminate her
pregnancy. 23 However, there is a distinction between having an abortion
and killing a living baby. Once a woman delivers her baby, there is no way
she can terminate her pregnancy because the pregnancy has already been
terminated through the birthing process.12 Because the Act defines born
119. 146 CONG. REC. E1647 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 2000) (statement of Rep. Kilpatrick).
120. Hearings, supra note 9, at 59 (testimony of Dr. Watson A. Bowes, Jr.).
121. Parents who want their baby will fight until they feel that it is a losing battle.
122. Hearings, supra note 9, at 59. Dr. Bowes testified:
It is my opinion that this definition of being born alive does not and will not have a
detrimental effect on either maternal or infant health care. I am confident of this
because this is the definition of live birth that is in effect in the state of North Carolina
in which I practiced for 18 years. During this time, these criteria for defining live birth
did not interfere with physicians making clinical judgments about providing appropri-
ate care for newborn infants nor with parents being involved in those decisions.
Importantly, this definition of live birth does not restrict a physician's prerogative to
recommend that medical care regarded as futile be withdrawn or withheld.
Id.
123. Id. at 35 (testimony of Rep. Stephanie Tubbs-Jones).
124. Id. at 56 (testimony of Prof. Gerard V. Bradley).
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alive as "complete expulsion or extraction" from the womb, 125 there is no
conceivable way to abort a child who has already been completely expelled
or extracted from a woman's body.
The only chilling effect that this bill may have on a woman seeking an
abortion is the thought that the woman who goes in for an abortion may,
nonetheless, end up being a mother if the child is born alive. 126 So, the issue
boils down to determining whether a baby who survives an abortion can
force a woman to be a mother.127 Roe spoke to this possibility:
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent.
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family al-
ready unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other
cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continuing
stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.128
As testimony before the House has indicated, these detriments that the
court in Roe spoke of are "not of pregnancy, but of having and raising a
child. '129 Neither the text nor the spirit of the Born-Alive Infants Protection
Act mandates that a woman is required to keep and care for the child that she
aborted in the event that the baby survives the abortion. She has the same
ability as any other mother who gives birth to terminate her parental rights
and give the baby up for adoption. She never has to see the baby, know how
it is progressing, or provide any care whatsoever.
While a woman who intends for an abortion to be successful can
relinquish her rights as a parent, health care professionals should not be
entitled or even forced to relinquish their obligations to a living human being
based solely on the will of the mother. It is the very essence of a physician's
responsibility to care for a patient who is alive and in need of medical
attention. That the mother did not intend to have the child should,
125. Id.
126. Hearings, supra note 9, at 55.
127. Id.
128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
129. Hearings, supra note 9, at 55 (testimony of Prof. Gerard V. Bradley). Bradley
noted that the Court in Roe "stressed in unmistakably clear terms that this liberty [interest in
choosing to have an abortion] was not absolute, and that it was limited by the social interest in
protecting 'potential life'-a child in utero-and, after birth, by the excepfionless protection
of new persons." Id. at 55-56.
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realistically, not be part of the equation for a doctor in deciding whether to
care for a baby who has obvious signs of life. The answer is certainly not to
ignore the baby until the intent of the procedure is achieved. The same
standards that apply to any person who presents at a hospital for care should
be applied to a baby who survives an abortion. The fact that this standard is
not equally applied means that we have different levels of care for living
people based upon whether they are considered valuable by others. If that is
a legitimate criterion, then the most rudimentary theory of worth holds no
authority.
The fourth argument against the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act is
that it is vague and overbroad.130 According to its opponents, because the
Act could affect over 70,000 sections of the United States Code ("the
Code"), it would be impossible to predict all of its possible ramifications. 131
Although this argument was presented as a serious problem that could
emerge from enacting this bill, there have never been any examples provided
of how this Act would negatively affect the Code. Surely, if this were a
legitimate problem that could potentially redefine 70,000 sections of the
Code, there could be at least one example provided of how these sections
would be detrimentally affected.
Although no opponent stepped forward and offered evidence concern-
ing the Act's statutory effect, the House Subcommittee on the Constitution
requested that two attorneys from the American Law Division of the
Congressional Research Service discuss the possible statutory impact of the
Act. 32 The attorneys concluded that the "addition of [the] new language
would have minimal effect on the prospective application of federal
statutes.' 33 They analyzed the effect on tort, trusts and estates, and criminal
law-the areas of law where the interests of those born alive are most often
recognized. 34
They began with federal tort claims which are most commonly brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).135 The Act would not effect this
practice because "the relevant portions of the FTCA do not use the terms
'person,' 'human being,' 'child,' or 'individual' in establishing damages
130. Id. at 35 (testimony of Rep. Stephanie Tubbs-Jones).
131. Id. at 36.
132. See id. at 48 (testimony of Ken Thomas, Attorney, American Law Division of the
Congressional Research Service).
133. Hearings, supra note 9, at 50 (testimony of Ken Thomas).
134. Id. at50-52.
135. Id. at 50.
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claims. 136 For trust claims, state law and the trust instrument determine
whether those born alive are considered beneficiaries. 137 Therefore, these
new definitions would have little effect on that area of the law. 13 The most
damaging effect to existing law that the attorneys found would be in the area
of criminal law. They stated that the concept of born alive proposed by the
Act is broader than that of common law because it appears to be intended to
apply to fetuses which were born prior to viability. 139 It also adds abortion to
the common law definition which was previously limited to non-consensual
fetal demise.' 4 Because of this, the attorneys concluded that:
[I]t is not clear if the statute would be limited to the situation where
the cause of death was inflicted after the fetal expulsion, or whether
it could be interpreted to cover injury inflicted in utero during an
abortion. Application of the homicide statutes for damage[s] in-
curred during an abortion would raise constitutional issues based
on a woman's liberty interests under the 14th Amendment. While
the canon of constitutional doubt would lean against the application
of a statutory ambiguity in a way that may violate the Constitution,
it is not clear how this statute would be applied.1
41
The answer to whether this Act would affect the point of viability can
be answered by responding to the fifth argument proposed by the opposition.
The argument is that the Act defines viability-a task which the Supreme
Court has consistently refused to do.142  This argument fails for three
reasons. First, viability, like a woman's right to choose to have an abortion,
is a concept only applicable to a pregnant woman. Once a baby is born, the
definition of viability is extinguished. Either the newborn baby is alive or it
is dead. Whether the baby lives or dies, there is no longer any need to
calculate the potential for the baby to live outside of the womb.
Second, even if the viability test were used once the baby was aborted,
the test would not be altered by any significant amount of time. Because
viability is measured by fetal age, it is more likely that an older fetus will
survive a late term abortion. The gray area between the twentieth and
136. Id.
137. Id. at 51 (testimony of Ken Thomas, Attorney, American Law Division of the
Congressional Research Service).
138. Hearings, supra note 9, at 51.
139. Id. at51-52.
140. Id. at 52.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 44 (testimony of Rep. Stephanie Tubbs-Jones).
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twenty-seventh week may be carved out to a clearer degree if a substantial
number of twenty week old fetuses live, but administering aid to aborted
babies that live is not going to automatically turn a pre-viable fetus into a
viable fetus. This argument leaves out the most important part of the
equation-the baby has to be born alive. Just because the Act applies to all
stages of fetal development, does not excuse the fact that the baby has to be
born alive to receive protection.
Third, the chances of a pre-viable fetus living through an abortion
remain low due to both the age of the fetus and the abortion procedures that
are used on fetuses that young. Early term abortion methods destroy the
body of the fetus, ripping it apart. By the time the fetus exits the womb, it is
reduced to tissue, and often times it is not expelled in full form. With a live
birth abortion, not only is the child usually at the point of viability but the
child is delivered in its entirety, similar to an actual birth in the ninth month.
The chance of survival obviously increases dramatically when the child is
delivered like a full birth as opposed to being removed like a tumor.
Furthermore, viability is determined inside the womb. The essence of
this term is its potentiality. The Roe Court defined viability as the point
when the fetus can survive independent of its mother, but that definition has
changed over the years to now mean "'the capacity for meaningful life
outside the womb, albeit with artificial aid,' and not just momentary
survival. 1 43 Once the child is born, there is no need to measure viability
because potentials have become realities, and the reality is that there is now
a living, breathing human being. Even if viability were the determining
factor, the fact that the baby may need artificial aid to survive is meaning-
less. The definition explicitly allows for medical help in determining
viability. The argument that the Act would have any effect on the definition
of viability is simply untrue and irrelevant.
A related argument was provided by the NARAL. This organization
claims that the Born-Alive Infant Protection Act is "yet another anti-choice
assault on the basic tenets of Roe v. Wade."'144 However, the point of birth
143. See Gans Epner, supra note 27, at 724.
144. Stuart Taylor, Jr., When Does Abortion Become Infanticide?: Approval of RU-
486 May Help Pull Us Back from That Line, 23 LEGAL TMEs 84 (2000). Another argument
that has been offered, though not by the NARAL, is based entirely on statistical data and
population counts. It provides:
"[Blirth" has always been understood as the delivery of an infant who has at least some
chance of living more than a few minutes. Since no baby has ever survived birth
before 22 weeks of pregnancy (20 weeks since fertilization), a miscarriage or abortion
during the first half of pregnancy is not considered to result in a live birth even if the
embryo or fetus exhibits some signs of life after delivery. The reason for this definition
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"marks the earliest possible time.., when the interests of the [mother] can
be separated entirely from the interests of the child."' 45  Additionally,
prosecutors and lawmakers are already injected into the medical decision
making process. They have been involved since the profession began.
Passing the Act may be the first step toward leaving this decision to health
care professionals by providing a definition of "alive" based on heart beats
and respiration instead of a convoluted interest-serving legal definition. In
other words, maybe "[i]f we understand that we are dealing with a human
being, reasons of convenience and self-interest [would] become radically
inadequate in supplying a 'justification' for the killing of [a] child."' ' 1
While most of the arguments against the Born-Alive Infants Protection
Act are based on the constitutional right of a woman to choose to have an
abortion, no critic has provided any analysis of the Act's validity under the
current test. If the argument challenges the Act's constitutionality under
Roe, Casey, and now Carhart, then the opponents should at the very least be
prepared to apply those standards to the present situation. Despite this
retreat to the security of Roe and its progeny, implementation of this doctrine
is incompatible with any form of relief under these circumstances. In other
words, abortion rights and live children do not mix.
In order to strike down the Act under a right to choose analysis, a
litigant would have to prove that either the law does not contain a vital
is obvious: [it is] important to know how many babies are born alive each year for all
kinds of vital statistics and public health purposes. For instance, we want to know how
many stillbirths and infant deaths there are as a percentage of live births, in order to
address medical problems. Because the birth of a living child has tax consequences,
we need to define birth in a reasonable way. Including miscarriages and induced
abortions as births would make nonsense of these efforts.
Margaret Sykes, Congressional Follies of Fall 2000: The Born Alive Infant Protection Act,
Pro-Choice Views, at http:llprochoice.about.comlnewsissueslprochoicellibrary/weekly/
aal01200b.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2001).
145. Hearings, supra note 9, at 9 (testimony of Prof. Hadley Arkes). Arkes testified
that:
Even if Roe v. Wade articulated an unqualified right on the part of a woman to end her
pregnancy, the pregnancy would now be over. No right to end the pregnancy would
require at this moment the death of the child. And of course no one, at that moment,
claims to be suffering any doubt that we are dealing with a human being-as though
the offspring of homo sapiens could have been anything less than human at any phase
in its life. This is the first moment then, under our current law, when we should be
able to declare, with unchecked conviction, that the law may extend its protections
over that child.
Id.
146. Id. at 10.
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exception for the preservation of the life or health of the mother, or it
imposes an undue burden on a woman's right to obtain an abortion. 47
Proving either of these as a way of showing that born alive infants are not
entitled to personhood is impossible. The argument is fundamentally flawed
under both prongs, as once a baby is born alive, it is no longer a part of the
mother. As soon as the baby leaves the womb, the privacy right becomes as
important to the mother as the placenta is to the already born child.
The basic tenet behind the abortion rights analysis is that a woman
should be able to do what she wants with her own body. But basic biology is
cogent evidence that once it survives birth, the baby is its own separate,
independent being. No health exception is needed because allowing the
living, breathing baby to be considered a person has no correlation to a
mother's life or health. There is no undue burden imposed on the woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy because the pregnancy has already been
terminated through the birth. Although this reality may be unpopular to
those who would prefer that a woman retain total control over the life and
death of her child, even through birth, it cuts right to the heart of this debate.
Once a child is born, its mother does not have the right to a dead baby.
VI. CONCLUSION
How can what seems like such a simple theory be so complex? It
would appear that within the most basic of thought processes that the
evidence that a child is born alive is for all necessary purposes proof that it is
a person. Politics has once again been injected into a formula where it does
not belong. A child's worth should not be placed on whether he or she is
wanted by the person who gave birth to him or her. Although there is a right
to prevent the birth of such a child, that right ceases to exist when the child
is born. There is no clearer point of individualism than that of separation.
When a child is born, it is its own being, no longer dependant upon its
mother for food, shelter, and comfort. All of those essentials can be
provided by another once the child leaves the womb. There are others who
want to step in and take over the role that is often times so casually
disregarded. But before that can happen, the child must be given the chance
to survive. The Born-Alive Infants Protection Act would allow such a child
to have that chance at life.
147. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000).
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INTRODUCTION
In form and fashion, in proposition and purpose, the breadth and depth
of human culture ever demonstrates a remarkable diversity. The sundry
peoples of the earth differ, not only in their appearance, clothing, and diet,
but no less in their social systems, religious beliefs, and political philoso-
phies. Yet whether king or commoner, aristocrat or pauper, notorious or
anonymous, each human being shares with every other, one fundamental
condition of life, as indeed human beings have throughout their history on
* Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, 2001, J.D. Thank
you to Professor Kathy Cerminara for her invaluable observations and insightful criticism; to
Lori Bangor, Esquire, for her single but vital question on the issue of cloning and free speech;
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earth. Each man, and each woman traces his or her origin to a mystifying,
microscopic biological event: the fusion of male and female gametes that
describes the process of sexual reproduction. Moreover, this nascent
physiological occurrence is universally precipitated by, and generally
subservient to, a greater, inexorable "carnal" desire of a man and woman,
each for the other. It is a desire that oft constitutes not only a corporeal
passion, but no less an emotional (some might say a spiritual) yearning that
draws the two together for that ecstatic union of the sexes by which new
human souls are conceived. Yet the aggregate result of recent scientific
advances in physics, chemistry, biology, genetics, and medicine, has led
humankind to the astonishing discovery that reproduction in animals, non-
human in fact, and human in theory, may also be achieved asexually through
a laboratory procedure known as cloning. Scientists have already success-
2 3 4 5 6fully cloned animals, including frogs, salamanders, mice,4 sheep, cows,
and monkeys." Many scholars and scientists working in related fields of
biochemistry believe that it is just a matter of time before humankind
acquires the knowledge needed to similarly procreate, or more precisely,
replicate human beings. Indeed, in January 2001, a Kentucky infertility
specialist informed the world he is forming a consortium, intending, he
announced, to produce the first human clone.9 Remarkably, many scientists
firmly believe that human beings have already been cloned clandestinely.' 0
1. Suggesting the horticultural origin of the term, the word "clone" is derived from
the Greek word "klon," which means "twig." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 342 (2d ed.
1989).
2. Nat'l Bioethics Advisory Comm'n, Cloning Human Beings: Report and
Recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Vol. 2, B-5 (1997)
[hereinafter Cloning Human Beings].
3. What is a Clone?, at http://www2.worldbook.com/features/cloning/html/what-is
.html.
4. Leon Eisenberg, Would Cloned Human Beings Really Be Like Sheep? 340 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 6, (Feb. 11 1999).
5. Id.
6. Gina Kolata, Japanese Scientists Clone a Cow, Making Eight Copies, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 1998, at A8.
7. Nancy Gibbs, Baby, It's You! and You, and You... , TME, Feb. 19, 2001, at 2,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printoutl0,8816,98940.html; Tim Beardsley,
A Clone in Sheep's Clothing, S¢. AM. available at http://www.sciam.comlexplorations/0303-
97clone/030397beards.html (last visited Mar. 3, 1997).
8. Gibbs, supra note 7, at 2.
9. Id. at 1.
10. Brian Alexander, Human Cloning Has Always Been Frightening, Seductive-and
Completely Out of Reach. Not Anymore, available at http://www.wired.comwired/archive/
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Cloning, even at the most rudimentary level, holds out the extraordinary
promise for curing otherwise incurable diseases," perfecting the transplanta-
tion of life saving organs, 12 eradicating defective lines of genes, 13 forestal-
ling the process of aging, 14 as well as for what may be the most sophisticated
use of cloning envisioned: a form of human reproduction that will one day
incorporate all these achievements to produce a radically different,
ostensibly superior form of human being. 5 On the other hand, the prospect
of human cloning holds out equally grave dangers: for the sacrilegious
abuse of human embryos and fetuses,' 6 the mutation of human beings into
monstrous, transgenic forms,' 7 gratuitous stillborn births and malformed
9.02/projectx-pr.html. (last visited Nov. 1, 2001); (reporting repeated assertions, such as
"[m]any animal cloners and in vitro fertilization experts are certain that a human has already
been cloned in secret."). Id. Gibbs, supra note 7, at I (reporting the claim of a South Korean
company that claims to have successfully created, and then destroyed a cloned human
embryo); Kristen Philipkoski, All The World's a Stage of DNA, WinED, Feb. 10, 2001
(interview with James Watson who won the Nobel Prize with Francis Crick and Maurice
Wilkins in 1962 for their work in identifying the structure of the DNA molecule).
These assertions, proceeding from among the most respected scientists in the
world, demonstrate the fallible judgment of even the finest scientific minds. For the present
knowledge of cloning suggests that it would take literally hundreds of attempts to successfully
produce a cloned human being. See, e.g., infra note 54. Thus, it is a doubtful proposition at
best that, based upon the current, relatively superficial knowledge of non-human mammalian
cloning, a renegade scientist or even organization, would have sufficient time and resources to
secretly succeed in the enterprise to clone a human being. If the assertions about the difficulty
of cloning are true, one would need the immediate accessibility of hundreds of women willing
to subject themselves to the physical, if not emotional, trauma of carrying embryonic clones to
serve the cause of science. Even supposing that a scientist, or laboratory, found a few women
willing to undergo repeated implantations, at this writing, in May 2001, it is only five years
since the announced successful cloning of a sheep, a period so short that it renders
conclusions that a human being has already been cloned to be suspect at best.
11. L Madelaine Nash, The Case For Cloning, Time.com, http://time.comtimel
magazine/1998/dom/980209/science.the case_for_clo26.html.
12. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2, at 30; John A. Robertson, Human Cloning
and the Challenge of Regulation, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 119, (July 9, 1998).
13. Nash, supra note 11 (quoting Princeton University molecular biologist Lee
Silver).
14. Jerome P. Kassirer & Nadia A. Rosenthal, Should Human Cloning Research Be
Off Limits?, 338 NEw ENG. J. MED. 905 (Mar. 26, 1998).
15. Ronald Bailey, Petri Dish Politics, at http://reason.conit9912/fe.rb.petri.html. (last
visited Dec. 1999).
16. Kassirer, supra note 14.
17. Human Cloning Foundation, The First Cloned Human Embryo,
http://www.humancloning.org/firsthumanclone.html (describing a report from Advanced Cell
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infants, 8 the promotion of some socially favored racial characteristics over
others, 9 and the cruel infliction of needless suffering on experimental
subjects, human and nonhuman alike.20 As a result of the potential for both
good and evil in cloning, advocates and opponents of the technology
continue to compete with one another to define the ancillary issues, and in
particular, they seek to do so through the assignment of legality or illegality
to the propositions they respectively favor.
Part I of this paper constitutes a brief primer on the subject of human
reproductive cloning. Section A consists of a discussion of the actual and
anticipated benefits of cloning, while section B discusses the fears, myths,
and the prospective dangers of the process. Part II evaluates cloning in the
light of constitutional law and principles. Section A of Part II reviews the
present legal status of cloning in the United States. Section B analyzes
cloning as it relates to reproductive freedom and the right to pri-
vacy. Section C examines how anti-cloning legislation might violate the
principles of Equal Protection, while section D discusses cloning and
freedom of speech.
I. BASIC FACTS ABOUT HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE CLONING
A. Reproduction, Sexual and Asexual
Scientists tell us that each human being consists of literally trillions of
cells. 21  Each of these cells, though undetectable to the human eye,
constitutes an entire world unto itself, an unimagined and unimaginable
intricacy of activity that takes place in every moment, in every place where
human cells thrive. Perhaps even more intriguing, almost every human cell
22contains the complete "genetic code" of an individual . The genetic code
may be understood as a storehouse of sorts, a place in which all the
information concerning a person's physical composition and hereditary
potential are maintained on a submicroscopic level. Through this genetic
prodigiousness, whereby a person's full genetic code exists in almost every
Technologies describing the successful cloning of a human embryo by inserting human DNA
into a cow's egg).
18. Scott F. Gilbert, Human Cloning (Correspondence), 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 21,
(Nov. 19, 1998).
19. Kassirer, supra note 14.
20. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2, at 4.
21. BOYCE RENSBERGER, INSTANT BIOLOGY 59 (Fawcett Columbine 1996).
22. Bailey, supra note 15, at 7-8.
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one of his or her trillions of cells, it is, at least theoretically, possible to
transform each one of those cells into a complete human being.
Though a human being consists of an incomprehensibly prolific number
of cells,U that singularly fantastic integration and complexity originates from
a single cell, the ovum or egg, produced by the female of the species. 2 By
fusion with a male gamete, and subsequent progressive cell division and
growth, an embryo forms that will eventually evolve into a fully-formed
26fetus. However, just before the male and female gametes unite, each
possesses only twenty-three chromosomes, incomplete by half of the number
needed to create a human being.27 Once united, a new cell is created
possessing the full forty-six chromosomes required for human life.28 These
forty-six chromosomes consist of segments of DNA molecules, known as
genes, which carry and transmit the traits and attributes of each of the two
parents.29 It is this process, at once mundane and miraculous, that is
commonly referred to as sexual reproduction.
Cloning, in contrast, is a form of asexual reproduction. That is to say, it
requires neither a coupling of the sexes, nor the union of male and female
gametes. In the prospective process of human reproduction wrought through
cloning,30 the entire forty-six chromosomes of a prospective parent or donor
are transplanted into a female's enucleated egg. The resulting embryo is
then implanted in the womb of the actual or surrogate mother where it can
gestate. As with in vitro fertilization, it is only the initial microscopic event
of conception that occurs in a laboratory, outside of the female's uterus.
Scientists have alread Y successfully performed this procedure with several
species of mammals.31 The offspring of the process constitutes not a
physically or biologically novel form of life, but a precise physical or genetic
duplicate, a "delayed identical twin" of the parent.
32
In fact, cloning already takes place both in nature and in human culture.
Plants reproduce through a form of cloning scientists refer to as "vegetative
23. Id.
24. RENSBERGER, supra note 21.
25. Embryology, Compton's Interactive Encyclopedia (Softkey Multimedia Inc.
1996).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Robertson, supra note 12.
31. Scientists have succeeded in cloning mice, sheep, calves, and monkeys. See supra
notes 5-8.
32. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2.
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• ,,33propagation. In horticulture, cuttings of a single plant are cultivated to
propagate desired botanical characteristics.34 It is through cloning that
farmers cut and graft their crops, favoring the traits of some plants over the
traits of others. 3f Clonin6 also occurs naturally in higher animals, as when
identical twins are born. Undertaken in the province of the scientific
laboratory, cloning has resulted in such achievements as the artificial
production of insulin, 37 and the growth of vital cultures.
38
In sexual reproduction, a new form of life constitutes a convergence of
the genetic identity of each parent. It is for this reason that a child carries
physical traits of both parents, not only in the genotypes such as hair, eye,
and skin color, but also in recessive traits that may later appear in the child's
offspring. In asexual reproduction, however, the new form of life is, in most
cases, genetically identical, that is, an exact duplicate of the parent.
39
33. What Is a Clone?, supra note 3.
34. Eisenberg, supra note 4.
35. What Is a Clone?, supra note 3, at 2.
36. Id.
37. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2.
38. What Is a Clone?, supra note 3.
39. In what seems the most fundamental contradiction of reason and experience, many
express fears that a clone will constitute not only a genetic duplicate, but also a spiritual or
behavioral replication of the source of the cloned cell. That is to say, many people have
expressed fears that a clone will duplicate a cloning parent's evil personality, moral
disposition, or political purpose, which expressions conjure up dystopic images of the
conspiratorial cloning of armies of murderous dictators and criminals.
An appeal to simplest reason and reflection however, suggests that the
determinant of a human being's personality (alternately referred to as the "mind," "soul,"
"self," "psyche," and "spirit") is not essentially, and certainly not exclusively, biological.
Rather, it is shaped passively by the uterine environment during the term of gestation, and
actively from the first moments of a person's birth by his or her surrounding domestic and
social environments.
In sum, the determinable biochemical causality of the brain's formation does not
necessarily imply a similar rudimentary, mechanical causality of the ideas and purposes forged
by that mystery called the "mind," even if the mind finds its corporeal foundation and physical
correspondence in the brain. Men and women may find a natural appeal in the simplicity of
the notion that all human beings may be reduced to a summation of microscopic, biochemical
events. However, that simplicity is no more entitled to endorsement than the similar but
mistaken appeal men and women found in past centuries in the notion that the planets must, of
necessity, travel in perfect spheres, and not as they actually do, in inelegant ellipses, or in the
notion that the earth must be flat. (For after all, how could it be round? How would it stay
suspended in space? If the earth wasn't flat, wouldn't we all fall off the surface?)
Genetically identical twins raised in different cultures may possess some
similarities, perhaps even striking similarities. However, the differences in the languages they
speak, their dialects, interests, religious beliefs, and avocations are directly traceable to their
[Vol. 26:511
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B. The Anticipated Benefits of Human Reproductive Cloning
Successful development of human reproductive cloning technology
holds out visionary promise for the treatment and cure of otherwise
untreatable and incurable diseases.40 Indeed, it is now conceivable that
certain genetic diseases may one day be eradicated from the face of the
earth. For example, if both partners in a marriage carry the gene for Tay-
Sachs disease, through cloning they might be able, not only to conceive a
child free of the disease, they may be able to create that child free of the
• 41
gene itself, so it would never be suffered by future generations. By
creating an embryo from a cloned cell, scientists could supplant the flawed
gene with a healthy one.
42
Perhaps equally remarkable with the prospect of conquering dread
diseases, cloning technology offers the possibility of an entirely novel,
unimagined, and heretofore unimaginable form of human reproduction.
Cloning may provide a new means of reproduction for couples, or even
individuals, who otherwise find themselves unable to procreate children.43
Thus, in the cases in which a couple is unable to conceive a child because of
gametic failure,44 cloning technology may enable them to roduce a child
that is biologically related to one, and perhaps both parents. E For example,
if the man is the infertile partner, by cloning his DNA into his wife's
enucleated egg, the DNA implant might be understood as an imperfect,
genetically dominant substitute of sorts for the male gamete. Through this
process, a child will be conceived that carries the traits of both parents. Both
the process and the result of this form of cloning closely resemble existing
treatments for reproductive dysfunction-in vitro fertilization and artificial
insemination. In contrast, where the woman is the infertile partner, cloning
could produce a child by implanting the woman's DNA within a donor egg,
but the child would not carry any of the biological traits of her husband. In
respective environments, that is, to the home, family, friends, and society, as well as some
independent form of internal psychological engagement that describes the process of
reflection, introspection, creation, and the application of one's reason from a uniquely relative
perspective.
40. Nash, supra note 11.
41. ld.
42. Id
43. Robertson, supra note 12.
44. Gametic failure takes place when a woman cannot produce eggs or a man cannot
produce sperm necessary to produce healthy offspring.
45. John A. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, 27 HOEsTRA L. REv. 609,
638 (1999).
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addition, where a person carries flawed recessive genes, such as those that
46transmit Tay-Sachs disease, sickle cell anemia, or cystic fibrosis, the
asexual reproduction of cloning would provide a couple with the otherwise
unavailable security of producing a physically healthy and genetically sound
child.
C. Actual Fears and Prospective Dangers of Human Reproductive Cloning
As great as the anticipated benefits of cloning are, the fears and dangers
are perhaps greater. Within weeks of the Roslin Institute's publication of the
paper describing the successful cloning of a sheep,47 members of Congress
began drafting anti-cloning legislation. In addition, some countries in
Europe declared human cloning to be illegal.48 Highly respected profes-
sional organizations within the scientific and medical communities, as well
as more than two dozen recipients of Nobel prizes in science, agreed "there
should be a moratorium on the creation of a human being through cloning.
'
,
9
So serious are the fears and dangers inspired by the technology, that in
1997, President Clinton's National Bioethics Advisory Commission
concluded, unequivocally, that human cloning should not be attempted.5
The Commission also expressed multiple concerns about the physical safety,
the autonomy, the kinship, and possible objectification of the resulting
children. 51 Moreover, in the years since the announcement of the cloning of
the first sheep, members of Congress have repeatedly held hearings and
52proposed bills expressly drafted in order to prohibit cloning.
As naturally occurs with the introduction of new ideas with the
potential to transform human self understanding and the order of society, the
discussion of cloning in the public arena has been accompanied by grave and
46. John A. Robertson, Why Human Reproductive Cloning Should Not in All Cases
Be Prohibited, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 35, 38 (2000-01).
47. Tim Beardsley, A Clone in Sheep's Clothing, SCI. AM., available at
http://www.sciam.comlexplorations/030397clone/O30397beards.html (last visited Mar. 3,
1997
48. Robert S. Schwartz, Book Review, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2 (July 9, 1998).
49. George J. Annas, Why We Should Ban Human Cloning, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2
(July 9, 1998).
50. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2.
51. Id.
52. Should Cloning Be Banned? at http://www.reason.com/biclone.html. (last updated
Oct. 2001); Reuters, Scientists Warn Against Cloning Human Beings, (Mar. 26, 2001),
available at http:/ing.philly.com/contentlinquirer/200 1/03/26/nationallclone26lhtm.
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often highly imaginative fears.53 However, although some concerns may be
freely dismissed as unfounded, cloning does indeed present genuine dangers
53. A human clone is misunderstood in the popular imagination as an exact copy of a
person, physically, behaviorally, and morally. For popular books of fiction in which cloning is
featured as a central theme, See IRA LEVIN, THE BOYS FROM BRAZIL, (Dell Pub. Co., 1976);
KATHLEEN ANN GooNAN, THE BONES OF TIME, (Harper Collins, 1996); JOHN CHASE, THE
GENESIS CODE, (Brilliance Corp. 1997); KEN FOLLE'T, THE THIRD TWIN (Ballentine Books,
1997). Popular films that treat the subject of cloning include THE BoYs FROM BRAZIL (Artisan
Entertainment 1978), JURASSIC PARK (Universal Pictures 1993), INVASION OF THE BODY
SNATCHERS (Walter Wanger Pictures, Inc. 1956), and MULTWLIcrrY (Columbia/Tristar 1996).
However, although a clone will indeed, in all cases, constitute an exact genetic
duplicate of the parent cell, and possess a very strong (but not necessarily identical) physical
resemblance, a clone will not constitute an exact, or even necessarily, an essential behavioral
or moral copy. The natural occurrence of identical twins in society provides an ideal form of
proof of this fact. Though identical twins are genetically indistinguishable, both common
experience and scientific studies demonstrate that, salient similarities notwithstanding, each
twin is endowed with his or her own unique personality. See, e.g., NANCY L. SEGAL, PH.D.,
ENTWINED LIVES (1999). Not only do twins differ in the whorls of their respective
fingerprints, studies of twins raised apart indicate their performance on intelligence quotient
tests varies as much with environment as with genetic constitution. Id. In other words, genes
may provide the raw material for a person's intelligence, emotion, and purpose, but each
person's necessarily different and distinct environment gives that material its unique form.
The scientific ability to trace the causality of, and so, produce otherwise naturally occurring
pigments in paint does not by any means imply the ability to similarly trace the causality of,
and so, produce infinitely higher works of creative virtuosity produced with those paints, such
as those produced by Rembrandt or Van Gogh.
Three factors insure that a clone will differ in fundamental ways from his or her
parent:
1) The primary material from which a cloned human being is formed, the DNA
from the somatic cell, must be supplemented by the contrasting mitochondrial DNA of the
enucleated egg in which it is placed. Alexander, supra note 10, at 12 (quoting Infigen's
Michael Bishop). The convergence of two different forms of DNA will result in necessary
differences in the newly conceived child from its parent.
2) While the debate over whether nature or nurture determines human behavior
may serve an invaluable heuristic purpose, it is a self-evident fact that the domestic and social
environments within which a child develops shape his or her psyche in the most fundamental
ways. Moreover, it is not only these extrinsic environments that determine a person's
language, dialect, interests, beliefs, and aptitudes; the necessarily unique uterine environment
in which a child gestates, as well as the home in which child development takes place, have
been shown to play a key role in determining a child's biochemical, and so, neurological
development. Id. Thus, though a cloned child will possess the precise hereditary information
of a parent cell, because the child gestates in a particular womb at a necessarily unique time in
the surrogate or actual mother's life, and because it is further introduced to the experiences of
life through a unique social place and historical time, a child's personality, in all instances will
take an independent, differentiated form.
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with which men and women must reckon if they are able to exploit the
technology at last for the public weal. All human invention, from the
artificial production of fire, to the generation of power through nuclear
fission, may be used for good or for evil; cloning, of course, is no different.
Expressly conceding the great inefficiency of current cloning
technology, the chief executive of the company that introduced the first
cloned sheep to the world advised that "it would take more than 400 eggs
and 50 surrogate mothers to produce a cloned baby.'' 54 He noted that cloning
the first sheep required "277 reconstructed eggs, of which 29 developed into
normal embryos placed in 13 sheep, and that only one embryo resulted in
success."55  "Such a high failure rate will mean numerous malformed and
stillborn infants will be produced., 56 Thus, the genuine dangers to the health
and the life of the fetus, as well as to the welfare of prospective mothers,
whether natural or surrogate, must be properly addressed before the cloning
of human beings may be reasonably advanced.
Another concern is that "cloning is a harbinger of the genetic alteration
and control of human characteristics in offspring." 57  Indeed, cloning is
closely related to "transgenic modification," the ability to modify the genes
of a cell in order to predetermine the physical, and perhaps, behavioral
characteristics of the prospective offspring.58 The notion of the progressive
genetic modification of a human being over generations suggests a change in
human self understanding perhaps as revolutionary as the Copernican
explanation of the heliocentric order of the solar system,5 9 and the Darwinian
proposition that man came into being not by a spontaneous act of Divine
3) A clone will differ fundamentally from his or her parent as a necessary
consequence of the indeterminable causality of gene activity. A person's chromosomes
contain at least thirty-thousand genes. Philipkoski, supra note 10. Only some of the genes are
expressed; that is, only some of them unfold into actual characteristics of a person. Whether
or not a particular gene is expressed is a result of an ultimately indeterminable, sometimes
random, extraordinarily complex activity among different genes, and between genes and the
environment. Mark D. Eibert, Cloning: Myths, Medical Benefits, and Constitutional Rights
(Sept. 23, 1999), available at http://www.humancloning.org/users/infertil/humancloning.htmil.
54. Robertson, supra note 12, at 43 n.1.
55. Id.
56. Gilbert, supra note 18.
57. Robertson, supra note 46, at 36.
58. Id. at 39. Scientists have already successfully altered the genes of laboratory
animals, creating models of human disease within mice. Kassirer, supra note 14. This
"transgenic modification" of mice allows scientists to study the role of genes in normal
development and disease. Id.
59. NicoLAus CoPERNIcus, ON THE REvOLUTION OF THE CELESTIAL SPHERES (1543).
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Will, but by a process of natural selection that transpired over the course of
millenia.60 The social, legal, and moral implications of humankind's
prospective self-transformation through cloning and genetic manipulation
are so overwhelming as to be inassimilable. Thus, many discern in cloning
the potential "to tamper with the 'moral and social' sense of what it means to
be a human being."
61
It is also feared that the acceptance of asexual human reproduction will
harm society by eliminating reproduction in its sexual form as an essential
characteristic of human life, disrupting the traditional and conventional
classification of human society by generations, and confusing parent-child
62
relationships. Indeed, one wonders whether the source of a cloned child's
DNA should be properly described as the child's parent, or as the child's
63twin. In addition, fears have been expressed that, with the acceptance of
asexual reproduction of human beings, the diversity of the human gene pool
will be diminished.6
Indeed, it would seem that cloning, in conjunction with similarly
revolutionary advances in genetics and biochemistry, has brought society
one step closer to realization of the formerly fictional notion of eugenics, the
highly controversial science that supposes to improve the human race
through controlling inherited characteristics. 65 Among the first attempts in
the field of eugenics was undertaken by National Socialist Germany which,
in paying tribute to the ideology of a glorified Aryan race, engaged in
ineffably cruel and horrific experimentation on human subjects, and
sterilized those considered racially undesirable or inferior.66 It is also most
disturbing to learn that a eugenics movement existed in the United States,
60. CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL
SELECTION (1859).
61. Robertson, supra note 12, at 43 n.4, (quoting E.J. Dionne Jr.); see also E.J.
Dionne Jr., Hold Off on Cloning, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1998, at A15.
62. George J. Annas, Human Cloning (Correspondence), 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 21
(Nov. 19, 1998).
63. "[The donor of a cloned cell] is not the child's 'parent' in any biological sense,
but simply an earlier offspring of the original parents." George J. Annas, Why We Should Ban
Human Cloning, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2 (July 9, 1998).
64. Andrea Wang, Regulating Human Cloning Within an Environmental Human
Rights Framework, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL L. & POL'Y 165 (2001).
65. OxFORD ESSENTIAL DICTIONARY AMERICAN EDITION 342-43 (2d ed. 1998).
66. Mary Z. Pelias & Nathan J. Markward, The Human Genome Project and Public
Perception: Truth and Consequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 837, 843 (2000); see also ROBERT J.
LIFrON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE (Basic
Books, Inc. 1986); ARTHUR I. CAPLAN, WHEN MEDICINE WENT MAD: BIOETHICS AND THE
HOLOCAUST (Humana Press 1992).
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one that came into existence long before the National Socialists came to
power in Germany.67 The theoretical potential of cloning and transgenic
modification, and the historical record left by the governmental programs of
Germany and the United States, demonstrate that the acute fears expressed
by both scientists and laypersons are not properly dismissed as unfounded or
fanciful.
Other somewhat less menacing, but nevertheless disturbing fears give
cause for concern. Some worry that the wealthy and powerful may use
cloning to replicate themselves, or that entrepreneurs might seek to market
69the DNA of a celebrated athlete, model, artist, or entertainer. In an
alternate scenario, a person might seek to appropriate the DNA of a third
70party without that party's consent, and use the stolen genetic material to
produce a clone.7'
The prospective capacity to reproduce human beings asexually through
cellular vestiges that survive a person's death has inspired some rather
confused and troubling ideals. In what is a startling, recurrent theme among
those who advocate human cloning, the technology is endorsed for its
72
apparent ability to resurrect a living replica of a dying or deceased child. In
such instances, some people, it seems confuse the possibility of genetic
replication with hopes of spiritual resurrection. In what seems a sadly
misguided ideal, the surviving parents seek to create a new child, apparently
to perpetuate the myth that their deceased child lives again. One may
speculate that such parents misunderstand a clone as somehow constituting a
reincarnation of their deceased child, or perhaps they seek to indulge the
67. Pelias, supra note 66, at 843; Mark D. Eibert, Cloning: Myths, Medical Benefits, and
Constitutional Rights, Sept. 23, 1999, at http'/www.humancloning.org/users/imfertil/ human-
cloning.html (observing that thirty-six states in the United States passed eugenics based sterilization
laws in the early part of the twentieth century. California sterilized more than 30,000 of its citizens).
68. Robertson, supra note 12, at 119.
69. Id.
70. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2.
71. Id. The commission of such an act, it seems, might give new meaning to the tort
of conversion, and raises the question of whether a person can claim legally protected
possessory rights in his or her DNA. See, e.g., Kojo Yelpaala, Owning the Secret of Life:
Biotechnology and Property Rights Revisited, 32 McGEORGE L. REV. 111 (2000).
72. See, e.g., Gibbs, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that the Clonaid project operated by the
UFO Raelian sect, advertised its plans to clone a ten month old deceased infant; parents of six-
year-old child who died in a tragic fall seek to clone the child, though they could procreate
another child, and other children, through natural means of procreation); Alexander, supra
note 10, at 3, 10; Annas, supra note 62, at 3; John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human
Cloning, 76 TEx. L. REv. 1371, 1381 (1998); Thomas H. Murray, Even If It Worked, Cloning
Wouldn't Bring Her Back, WASH. POST, Apr. 8, 2001, at B 1.
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whim or vanity of creating another child with an appearance identical, or
nearly identical, to the first. In fact, it is difficult to imagine a proposition
that more greatly diminishes the sanctity of the memory of a deceased child
than the confused supposition to blithely replace the child with a surrogate
physical replica. Such a notion would seem to constitute a denial, indeed,
annihilation of the unique place the late child held in time, and in the hearts,
of those by whom he or she was loved. Moreover, because of the inherent
danger in producing a human clone, it seems a profound irony that "in trying
to make a copy of a child who has died tragically, one of the most likely
outcomes is another dead child.,
73
Cloning has also produced fears concerning the psychological welfare
of children born from the asexual process of reproduction. Questions have
been raised whether such children will suffer psychological harm because of
a "diminished sense of individuality and personal autonomy."74 The
National Bioethics Advisory Commission has expressed the fear that a child
borne of cloning might be "severely harmed" by the knowledge that he or
she possesses identical DNA to the source of his birth.75
73. Gibbs, supra note 7, at 4.
74. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2. If the sanctity of a human being is in his or
her uniqueness, and men and women value what is distinctive, then it is reasonable to
conclude that they will disregard, or diminish the worth, of that which is common. Thus, the
less unique a person, the more he or she is likely to know a diminished sense of worth in the
world, in the eyes of others, and consequently, in his or her own eyes.
75. Id. However, it might be reasonably argued in response that a child's primary
development, whether mental, emotional, or spiritual, will be complete by the time he or she is
able to understand and assimilate the relatively abstract and subtle concepts of asexual
biological origin. Such initiation, it is reasonable to suppose, would affect the child no more
traumatically than does news learned by a child that he or she was adopted, rather than
biologically conceived, by his mother and father. While such news potentially might confuse,
or even disturb a person, it is hardly an event that, as some maintain, would properly bring
into question whether he or she should have been born.
According to one observer, "the central problem of cloning [is] the devaluing of
persons by depriving them of their uniqueness." Annas, supra note 62, at 122. "The only
reason to clone an existing human," Dr. Annas suggests, "is to create a genetic replica." Id. at
123 (It should be noted however that although in vitro fertilization and artificial insemination
provide the means for procreation to many otherwise infertile couples, these processes do not
work universally). See Alexander, supra note 10. Neither in vitro fertilization, nor artificial
insemination, can help those couples in which one of the partners suffers from a condition of
gametic failure that is perfect. (For couples seeking to sire a child that is biologically related
to at least one of the parents, and for whom the notions of extra marital donors of eggs or
sperm, like adoption, are unacceptable, cloning may indeed fulfill a need that cannot be
dismissed as merely capricious, vain, or gratuitous). "The danger is that through human
cloning, we will lose something vital to our humanity, the uniqueness (and therefore the value
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According to the National Bioethics Advisory Commission ("NBAC"),
the most real and immediate danger in the attempt to clone a human being
76
would be to the fetus. Indeed, the NBAC observed, "at present, the use of
this technique to create a child would be a premature experiment that would
expose the fetus and the developing child to unacceptable risks.",77 The
identification of this prospective danger by the Commission back in 1997,
has been supported by subsequent cloning research on animals. In March,
2001, scientists conceded that clones are often borne with "serious
developmental problems," such as heart and lung defects and defective
78immune systems. In recent months, mice produced by cloning technology
suffered what seems to be a spontaneous metabolic transformation. 79 From a
condition of apparent normalcy, the mice developed conditions of obesity in
what seems to be random genetic errors that can emerge at any time in a
cloned animal's life.80  Moreover, only two to three percent of efforts to
clone mice, and only one percent of efforts to clone a cow succeed in
producing live offspring. According to another source, "ninety-eight
percent of embryos never implant, or die off during gestation or soon after
birth.' 82 If the embryos do not die in fetal development, they may die shortly
83
after birth; if they survive, they often suffer major developmental defects.
and dignity) of every human." Annas, supra note 62, at 123. On the other hand, if the
underlying premise of Dr. Annas' argument is true, that is, that human beings naturally cherish
the novelty, creativity, and distinction that defines a condition of uniqueness in the world, and
conversely, consider dispensable that which is redundant, common, and prosaic, then the
argument refutes the underlying premise it supposes to advance-any interest in producing a
society of clones characterized by a staggering redundancy fails to accord with human nature
as we know it. Id.
76. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2.
77. Id.
78. Reuters, Scientists Warn Against Cloning Human Beings, P-iMA. INQUIRER, Mar.
26, 2001, at A4; Gibbs, supra note 7, at 2.
79. Gina Kolata, Researchers Find Big Risk of Defect in Cloning Animals, N.Y.
TIES (Mar. 25, 2001), available at http:l/www.nytimes.com/2001/03/025/science/
25CLON.html.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Gibbs, supra note 7, at 4.
83. Id.
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II. CLONING AND THE LAW: Do THE PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTITUTION
PROTECT OR PROSCRIBE REPRODUCTIVE CLONING?
A. The Present Legal Status of Reproductive Cloning
While fears, both justified and fanciful, have driven much of the
opposition to the notion of asexual human reproduction, at present, only four
of the fifty states have passed laws that prohibit human reproductive
cloning. California, Louisiana, Michigan, and Rhode Island have enacted
laws that ban attempts to create a human being through asexual reproduc-
85tion. While the laws of three of the states threaten offenders with
formidable financial and licensing penalties, 86  Michigan's anti-cloning
statute is a criminal one, under which violators may be sentenced to ten
87years in prison. Moreover, Michigan's criminalization of human cloning is
88
enforceable against researchers, doctors, and their infertile patients.
Mindful of the rapid advances in science, however, both Rhode Island and
California included "sunset" clauses in their legislation; so the respective
laws automatically expire after several years if they are not extended.
8F
The federal government has prohibited the use of federal funds for
embryo research since 1996.90 Reinforcing this prohibition, President
Clinton issued an Executive Order forbidding the use of federal funds for
human cloning research. 9' However, although sundry anti-cloning bills have
been proposed,92 no accommodation could be reached between Republicans
84. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 24185 (West 2001); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 1299.36.2 (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.16274 (West 2001); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 23-16.4-2 (1998). Missouri prohibits the use of state funds for cloning research. Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 1.217 (West 2000).
85. Id.
86. In Louisiana and Michigan, violators of the statute may be fined up to ten million
dollars. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.36.2 (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 333.16274 (West 2001). In California and Rhode Island, an organization that violates the
statute may be fined up to one million dollars. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 24185
(West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-16.4-2 (1998).
87. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.430a (West 2000).
88. Id.
89. Unless extended, California's statute will expire on January 1, 2003, and Rhode
Island's statute will expire on July 7, 2003. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 24189 (West
2001); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-16.4-4 (1998).
90. Bailey, supra note 15, at 6.
91. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2.
92. See Should Cloning Be Banned? at http://www.reason.com/biclone.html (last
updated Oct. 2001).
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who seek a comprehensive ban on human cloning, and Democrats who wish
to protect those forms of nonhuman cloning research that are unrelated to
93human reproduction. Biomedical researchers and interested patient groups
have lobbied with intensity against anti-cloning legislation. 94 Because their
interests lie in nonreproductive, and so, noncontroversial forms of cloning,
the constituents of those lobbyists are concerned that a blanket ban will
outlaw established commercial and scientific enterprises.95 Thus, private
research undertaken to clone human beings is legal in most of the United
States. However, after controversial testimony before a House subcommit-
tee in March of 2001, House members advised that they have acquired
stronger conviction in favor of a national ban on human cloning.96 Through
a White House press secretary, President Bush announced that he supports
the idea of anti-cloning legislation: 'The president believes that no
research-no research-to create a human being should take place in the
United States."
' 97
Strangely, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), presumably
because of its power to regulate the pharmaceutical industry, declared that
human cloning is subject to its authority. 98 An official of the FDA stated
that the agency can prohibit human cloning experiments based upon public
safety concerns. 99 Violators, according to the FDA, could face fines up to
$100,000.00, and be sentenced to up to a year in prison. However, despite
these assertions, the FDA does not seem to have statutory jurisdiction over
the practice of medicine or cloning,l°° and despite the agency's assertion of
such authority,1°' even members of the House of Representatives have
expressed doubts about the FDA's jurisdiction over cloning.102
93. Eibert, supra note 67; Gibbs, supra note 7. (The primary source of embryos for
stem cell research is provided by in vitro fertilization clinics, whereas cloning of embryos, not
to produce human beings but only to produce stem cells, would provide an almost infinite
supply).
94. See Rick Weiss, Scientists Testify on Human Cloning Plans; Some House
Members Vow to Seek a Legislative Ban on Controversial Procedure, WASH. POST, Mar. 29,
2001, at A10.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Letter from Stuart L. Nightingale, Associate Commissioner, Food & Drug
Administration, to Colleague (Oct. 26, 1998); Eibert, supra note 67.
99. Lisa Richwine, U.S. Lawmakers Criticize Human Cloning Efforts, REUTERS Mar.
29, 2001, available at Compuserve Newsroom.
100. Weiss, supra note 94.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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B. Cloning, Reproductive Freedom, and the Right of Privacy
The charter political document of the United States, the Declaration of
Independence, proclaims that liberty stands premier among the inalienable
rights of man. The charter legal document of the United States, the
Constitution, seeks to ensure liberty through a separation of governmental
powers, 103 and a Bill of Rights that enumerates the comprehensive and
fundamental rights of the individual.' 4 Despite the proclamation of the
sanctity of freedom, and recurrent articulation of liberty's preeminence
throughout the Bill of Rights, those very rights of freedom so fundamental to
men and women, (tenuous perhaps by nature), have been ever under
challenge since the Republic was founded. Thus, citizens of the United
States have found themselves forced to resort to the judiciary to establish
that the Constitution protects their rights to marry, 10 5 to have children,10 6 to
educate and raise their children, °7 to marital privacy,1°8 to acquire and use
contraception, 10 9 to bodily integrity," 0 and the right of a woman to choose to
have an abortion.' These and other decisions relating to the family and
procreation form a constellation of sorts, establishing a right of privacy that,
though formally not enumerated, finds its authority in the Constitution;
indeed, these Supreme Court decisions confirm that the Constitution upholds
an inherent right to privacy, most particularly where matters of the family
and procreation are concerned. The Court has also observed that the
Constitution protects "personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education," having
stated unequivocally that such freedom concerns "the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime."" 2 The right of privacy
precludes governmental interference with an individual's decision on matters
of his or her body." 3 Moreover, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,"4 the Court stated,
103. U.S. CONsT. art. I-I1.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
105. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
106. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
107. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 511
(1925).
108. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
109. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
110. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
111. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
112. Id.
113. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114 405 U.S. at 453.
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"if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child."' 5 In addition, in more than one opinion, the United States
Supreme Court has expressly identified a constitutionally protected right to
reproduce, also referred to as "reproductive freedom."'
16
Some states assign even greater importance to the right of privacy; the
Florida Constitution, for example, enumerates an express right to privacy. 17
This provision states, "[e]very natural person has the right to be left alone
and free from governmental intrusion into the person's life.. . .' Thus, a
person in Florida has a right to be free from governmental intrusion into
areas where he or she can demonstrate a reasonable expectation of
privacy." 9
Considering then the strength of the federal and state recognition of the
right of privacy, particularly as it relates to reproductive matters, one might
suppose then that the right of a person to procreate through cloning cannot
be gainsaid. Closer analysis requires the more cautious conclusion that the
answer depends upon how the question is cast. If the question of human
cloning is defined as a matter of reproductive freedom, the governmental
proscription of human cloning will violate citizens' "fundamental liberty to
have and rear healthy, biologically related children."'120 Human cloning is,
according to this point of view, sufficiently similar to other means of
reproduction, whether natural, or artificial by in vitro fertilization and
artificial insemination, to be classifiable as conduct protected by the
principle of reproductive liberty. 21 It is also worth noting that while in vitro
fertilization is thoroughly legal and, some might say, now even conventional,
it was illegal in many states a mere twenty years ago.122
115. Id.
116. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (confirming
the right to reproductive freedom as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause); Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173 (1991).
117. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
118. Id.
119. Fla. Bd. Bar Exam'rs Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983).
120. John A. Robertson, Human Cloning, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 21 (Nov. 19, 1998).
See also John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1371-
456 (1998).
121. Robertson, supra note 12.
122. Gibbs, supra note 7; Eibert, supra note 53, at 13.
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In diametric opposition to such a view, however, it may be argued with
equal vigor that a person's right to clone him or herself is not a fundamental
right entitled to constitutional protection. Based upon the principle that
citizens universally enjoy a right to what the courts call "substantive due
process," the state cannot violate a citizen's "fundamental rights" without a
compelling, narrowly-tailored interest.123 Fundamental rights, in turn, have
been juridically defined as those "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition' ' t 4 and "necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered
liberty."'2 Because there is no tradition of asexual replication in the United
States, and permitting asexual replication is not necessary to safeguard any
existing concept of ordered liberty, staunch opponents of the technology
argue conversely that there is no constitutional right to be cloned in the
United States. 2Those who oppose human cloning have also drawn support
from an unlikely source; Ian Wilmut, who cloned the first sheep, and so, is
perhaps the scientist most associated in the public perception with cloning,
has openly declared his opposition to attempts at asexual reproduction of
human beings. 27 Moreover, there already exist limits on citizens' right to
reproduce that are almost universally recognized: reflecting universal social
mores, every state in the Union, if not every nation in the world, has adopted
legislation criminalizing incestuous relations and marriages. Florida law, for
example, prohibits a person from engaging in sexual relations, as well as
marriage, with a parent, sibling, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece." Thus, the
right to privacy, and reproductive freedom, like all other rights and
freedoms, are not absolute.
Dr. Annas suggests cloning human beings is not only redundant, but
that it is also gratuitous. 29 "Although it is possible to imagine some
scenarios in which cloning could be used for the treatment of infertility, the
use of cloning simply provides another choice for choice sake, not out of
necessity.'' 30 Cloning, Annas states, is "a technique that can produce an
indefinite number of genetic duplicates."'' "It is the duplication," Annas
123. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
124. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
125. Duncan v. Louis. 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 n.14 (1968).
126. John A. Robertson, Why We Should Ban Human Cloning, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED.
21 (July 9, 1998).
127. Gibbs, supra note 7.
128. FLA. STAT. § 826.04 (2001).
129. Annas, supra note 62, at 3.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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observes, "of an already existing person, who is replicated only and precisely
to create a genetic duplicate (since this is all that cloning can do)."13
While the cloning of individual cells may serve as an invaluable
resource for treating and curing disease, because human beings already
possess the capacity to reproduce sexually, whether naturally, or in the case
of gametic failure, through in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination, or in
the alternate, adoption, some might posit that there is no genuinely
meaningful purpose for cloning human beings, in what is an essentially
uncreative, asexual form of human reproduction. However, it is important to
note that the success rate of in vitro fertilization is under thirty percent,
133
and it is an expensive and onerous process as well. 34 Moreover, because the
infertile condition of some couples is complete, neither in vitro fertilization,
nor artificial insemination are options.
35
Finally, some opponents of cloning advance the proposition that, while
citizens may possess the constitutionally protected right to know freedom
from governmental interference in matters that concern reproduction and
procreation, child bearing itself is not a privilege, condition, or benefit to
which citizens can suppose to claim entitlement at the government's
expense. "[T]he government does not have the obligation to ensure that each
citizen who wants a child has a child.' 36 According to this argument, the
right to reproductive freedom to which the Supreme Court has identified
both expressly and implicitly in multiple decisions, protects only those who
have the capacity to reproduce through the traditional method of sexual
reproduction.
37
C. Cloning and Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment expressly, and the Fifth Amendment
implicitly, provide each citizen with a constitutional right to a standard of
legal protection that is equal to that known by all others. 3 Thus, the
Constitution prohibits the government from invidious treatment of one
132. Id.
133. Eibert, supra note 53, at 3; Alexander, supra note 10, at 6.
134. Alexander, supra note 10, at 10.
135. Robertson, supra note 46, at 37.
136. Sophia Kolehmainen, Human Cloning: Brave New Mistake, 27 HoFsTRA L. REV.
557, 565 (1999).
137. Id.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, V.
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person, or class of persons similarly situated to others.139 In addition, if a
law violates a citizen's right that the Supreme Court has identified as
fundamental, that law may violate the principle of equal protection. 4 The
Supreme Court has already ruled that the freedom to procreate constitutes a
fundamental right. Thus, if scientists attain the ability to clone human
beings, any proposed governmental prohibitions against human cloning may
have to withstand the legal test of strict scrutiny, the judicial standard by
which the constitutionality of alleged violations of fundamental rights are
measured. 42 If a law infringes upon the rights of a so-called suspect class,
one defined by race or national origin, the law must be necessarily related to
a compelling governmental interest. 43 If the law infringes the rights of an
intermediate class, defined by gender or children borne out of wedlock, the
law must be substantially related to an important state interest. 44 Laws that
infringe upon the rights of almost all other classes need only be rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest in order to be upheld. 45
Laws that prohibit reproductive cloning of humans, considered in light
of current case law, would thus only need to be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. Even if the purpose of the law is considered
legitimate, the means to achieve that aim must be reasonable."46 If the ban
on cloning is a total one, the law would be significantly underinclusive,
inasmuch as it would not similarly prohibit artificial forms of reproduction,
such as in vitro fertilization, that share similar dangers to public safety and
139. See City v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); Plyler v. Doe,
457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (For
state and local governmental laws). See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (For federal
governmental laws).
140. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (access to courts); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 665 (1966) (voting).
141. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). See also, Bragdon v. Abbot 524 U.S.
624, 637-38 (1998) (ruling that, under the American with Disabilities Act, the inability to
reproduce and bear children constitutes an impairment of a major life activity, classifiable as a
disability).
142. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
143. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214,216 (1944).
144. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461
(1988).
145. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 14 (1988); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S.
314, 331 (1981).
146. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
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health. 47 But even if underinclusive as well as overinclusive, the Supreme
Court would not find sufficient reason to strike down the law if it is shown
to be both rational and legitimate. 48 Only if opponents of the law could
demonstrate that the underlying purpose of the ostensibly legitimate state
interest is insidiously biased or prejudicial, would the Court strike the law
down as unconstitutional.149  Thus, a law that prohibits human cloning,
denying infertile couples access to technology that might otherwise provide
them with the freedom to procreate that is naturally known by others, and
even if indisputably constituting a form of discrimination, still might not
violate equal protection under the law. For if the state can demonstrate a
rational relationship of the law (e.g., prohibition against reproductive
cloning) to a legitimate state interest (e.g., protecting the health of unborn
children and prospective mothers,) and no bias is established, the discrimina-
tory law will still be upheld by the courts.
D. Cloning and the Freedom of Speech
At first blush, it would seem that the subject of cloning, would have no
relationship to First Amendment speech issues. For the first amendment of
the United States Constitution prohibits the state from violating citizens'
sacrosanct right to speak freely, 50 while cloning concerns the seemingly
unrelated spheres of science, technology, and human reproduction. Yet
other forms of human activity, not otherwise identifiable as speech, have in
fact been so classified, thereby acquiring the First Amendment shield of
invulnerability against governmental prohibition or intrusion.1 51 Indeed, it is
147. Elizabeth Price Foley, The Constitutional Implications of Human Cloning, 42
ARiZ. L. REV. 647, 707 (2000).
148. Id.
149. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996); Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v.
County Coal Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 343 (1989); City v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 450 (1985).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
151. Among the forms of human expression the Supreme Court has classified as
"speech," and so protected by the First Amendment include commercial advertising,
expressive conduct, and symbolic speech. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag
burning as a form of protest against governmental policies); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist.
393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing of black armbands as a form of civil protest); Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (upside down display of the American flag with an attached
peace symbol); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (flag
saluting as a form of utterance); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (classifying
pornography as a form of speech that should be protected unless classifiable as "obscene"
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primarily those who engage in speech that are deemed to pose an unequivo-
cal danger or destructiveness by way of immediate incitement, 52conscious,
willful calculation,15 3 or deception154 who can not look to the Constitution
for protection.
55
Some proponents of cloning who seek to advance the notion that
scientific research should be endowed with immunity from governmental
prohibition, argue such research constitutes an alternate, unrecognized form
of human speech. Even the National Bioethics Advisory Commission,
appointed by President Clinton, observed in its report on cloning, "If the
First Amendment protects a marketplace of ideas, it seems likely [that] it
would protect the generation of information that would be included in that
marketplace.' ' 156  On the other hand, the government is free to regulate
according to a broad and complex legal definition); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987)
(extending the rule of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
152. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (fighting words that present "clear and present danger").
153. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973)
(conspiracy and criminal anarchy); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (holding that
advocacy of criminal anarchy, a doctrine to overthrow the government using violence and
assassinations by word of mouth, is not protected speech); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (discussing libel).
154. Central Hudson v. Public Serv. Cormn., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (ruling that the First
Amendment does not protect commercial speech that is misleading).
155. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (rejecting a First Amendment
attack on a New York law prohibiting the distribution of child pornography.)
(Most of the cases cited in notes 149-53 concern speech as it is produced by, or
effects individual citizens in their capacity as private and general members of society. Of
course, the law also classifies, and restricts, the communication peculiar to society's many
subcultures. For example, restrictions on speech, whether civil or criminal, are found in the
realm of commerce in the prohibition against the revelation of trade secrets; in public
broadcasting in proscriptions against "indecency;" amongst lawyers and judges on one hand,
and doctors, hospitals, psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers, on the other, in the
confidentiality with which they are bound to hold client and patient records; in the courtroom,
against lawyers from introducing evidence the court deems prejudicial; amongst journalists
and newspapers, against publishing the names of rape victims and minors; against publishers
as well as individuals from unauthorized copying of the creative works of others under
copyright law; and against workers within governmental agencies, for speech disruptive to the
agency's operation, or policy alms and objectives among others. These subcultural speech
issues, as well as governmental regulation of the time and place of speech, irrespective of
conduct, is beyond the scope of this discussion).
156. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2, at F-6.
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scientific research to protect and promote public health and safety. As one
scholar has observed, "there are ample precedents for such restrictions, as in
the case of regulation of experiments with new drugs and with nuclear
materials and facilities.'
5 8
One point of view suggests that scientific experimentation constitutes a
form of expressive conduct, or symbolic expression, and so is entitled to
First Amendment protection.1 59  Scientific research, according to these
observers, can be classified as a constitutionally sanctioned type of symbolic
speech, comparable to students wearing black armbands or burning draft
cards as an expression of protest. 60 According to this proposition, scientific
research is a form of protected speech, no different in essence from the
creative expression of ideas by playwrights or musicians.16' Therefore, it is
argued, research devoted to the end of cloning human beings is protected
from governmental proscription by the First Amendment.
Such an argument, however, stretches the meaning of the word out of
shape, causing it to collapse under the weight of the conduct wrongly
assigned to it. Speech, in all the forms in which it has been deemed to be
entitled to protection by the Constitution, concerns the conveyance of an
idea or ideas, from a speaker to another listener or other listeners, whether
those listeners are concurrently engaged, or merely prospective. All human
speech, whether political, commercial, religious, social, or purely personal
speech,162 whether expressed verbally in words, pictorially in images, or
symbolically in conduct, shares the quality of constituting a message of some
157. Henley v.Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind. 1969); see generally Lori B. Andrews,
Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on Human Cloning, 11 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 643 (1998) (providing an in depth analysis on the constitutional issues involved
with cloning restrictions).
158. Harold P. Green, Constitutional Implications of Federal Restrictions on Scientific
Research and Communication, 60 UMKC L. REV. 619, 621 (1992).
159. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see Cantrell, infra note 161, at 73;
Green, supra note 158, at 620; Foley, supra note 147, at 682-87.
160. Melissa K. Cantrell, International Response to Dolly: Will Scientific Freedom
Get Sheared, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 69 (1998-1999); see IRA H. CARMEN, CLONING AND THE
CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO GOvERNMENTAL POLICYMAKING AND GENETIC EXPERI-
MENTATION 34 (The University of Wisconsin Press 1985); Robertson, supra note 46, at 39
(citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
161. Foley, supra note 147, at 683-84.
162. Remarkably, the category of personal speech is not recognized by the courts.
Thus, the mundane speech of the common man, certainly the most fundamental and practical
use of speech by human beings, has been left unrecognized, and so, unprotected by the United
States Judiciary.
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kind, a message through which the speaker seeks to reach and communicate
with another or others. 163
In contrast, while it is undisputed that scientific research should be
entitled to broad protection, (albeit for entirely different reasons,) research
consists of actions, actions that apply the scientist's thought, examination,
and inquiry.164 Scientific research consists of the application, not the
communication of ideas. The actions of the scientist, in the form of
research, contrast with his or her ideas. 65 Speech consists of the expression
of ideas, whether by voice, gesture, pen, or image, created by a person in
order to communicate with another or others. 166 Scientific research might be
classifiable as the expression, or exploration of the validity, of ideas. But
the purpose of that expression is discovery, not communication. Scientists, it
is true, may invariably wish to communicate the consummating discoveries
of their research to others. But the proposition that such purely physical
action and engagement of the world constitutes a form of speech is simply
invalid, advanced by its proponents, it seems, only in order to exploit the
supreme legal protection afforded by the First Amendment. While no
rational or caring soul can suppose to dispute the great virtue of science for
its material improvement of the human condition, the cause of Truth in
general, and science in particular, is not properly served by disingenuous
definitions. Moreover, while some advocates of cloning may argue that
prohibitions against the related research and procedures would inhibit
163. How might the observations entered into a diary be classified? For, at least
apparently, the diarist writes for his or her own self, and not to any consciously intended
recipient. Shall we suppose as a result that the speech of the diarist is unprotected by the First
Amendment? It would seem the diarist's purpose does not include the intention to
communicate the related ideas to another or others. And if the diarist affirmatively seeks to
keep the diary private, the proposition becomes even stronger. However, diaries may be
published posthumously as a historical, social, or familial record, a fact of which many serious
diarists, certainly those more educated, may be aware. The fact that the diarist consciously
creates a record might suggest eventual readers, absent express words or actions to the
contrary. Moreover, many diarists, especially children, consciously indulge the conceit that
the diary itself is a conscious, understanding recipient of the chronicler's confessions, a fact
manifest in the common practice of commencing entries with the salutation, "Dear Diary," or
alternately, addressing a fictional recipient by a given moniker. On the other hand, it may be
equally argued that the maintenance of a diary provides a purely private, expedient means in
which a person seeks to forge linguistic order on the chaos of his or her otherwise wordless
experience of thought and feeling.
164. Foley, supra note 147, at 683.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 679.
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scientific inquiry, there is no reason to suppose that all scientific goals or
practices are proper, moral, or need be socially accepted.1
67
In Spence v. Washington,168 the Supreme Court ruled that some conduct
can be identified, at least legally, as expressive, and so entitled to First
Amendment protection.169 The first element of that test requires that the
source of the conduct intend to "convey a particularized message. ' 70
Though scientists naturally hope to share the fruit of their scientific labors
with colleagues, if not with society in general, and to communicate the
nature of the work in the publication of papers and the delivery of lectures at
conferences, the research itself does not constitute speech. The manipula-
tion of elements and compounds by chemists, the exacting measurement of
anatomy and physiology by biologists, the studied calibration of the stars by
astronomers, the search for the existence of subatomic particles by
physicists, none of these activities constitute ideas that occur in the mind;
nor do they constitute the communication of such ideas to another or others
in the speech of the spoken, written, graphic, or symbolic kind. Rather, each
of the respective scientific endeavors constitute an application of the
scientist's internal idea to the external, physical world of matter and energy.
Consider the diagram below:
I- ------------I ------- -- ---- I----------------- I
idea speech action matter
(spoken, written, (manual, mechanical
graphic, symbolic) electronic, digital)
intent to communicate intent to alter or effect some
ideas or information aspect of the material
to another or others world, through exertion
capable of understanding
167. Sophia Kolehmainen, Human Cloning: Brave New Mistake, 27 HoFSTRA L. REV.
557 (1999); see Declan Butler & Meredith Wadman, Calls for Cloning Ban Sell Science
Short, 386 NATuRE 8, 8 (1997) (discussing the concern of some scientists that legislating too
quickly on cloning techniques may hinder innovative research).
168. 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (holding that an inverted display of the American
flag with a peace symbol affixed thereto is a form of communication protected by the First
Amendment).
169. Id. See Foley, supra note 147, at 682.
170. Spence, 418 U.S. at 411; Foley, supra note 147, at 682.
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Pure idea as it occurs in the human mind stands at one extreme of a
greater spectrum; physical matter as it occurs outside the human mind stands
at the other. When we refer to speech, we refer to the expression of the
feelings and thoughts, whether spoken, written, graphic, or symbolic.
17 1
When we refer to conduct, we refer to action taken by a person as a
consequence of ideas.
Of course, this distinction can be obliterated by proposing to define
ideas in physical terms as primarily or merely neural activity of the brain.
172
In this way, one could suppose to blur the distinction between speech and
action, defining speech as the residual effect of neural and oral physical
activity. 1 3  As a concomitant of this proposition, the distinction can be
171. For example, communicative gestures such as sign language employed among the
deaf, or a mourner's self-attirement in black garments as a means of communicating his or her
condition of bereavement.
172. Such a proposition is not nearly as far-fetched as the uninitiated reader might
suppose. Behavioral psychologists, for example, enamored of the objective measurement that
distinguishes science from other disciplines of human inquiry, early endorsed the absurd,
nihilist notion that, in the endeavor to change human conduct, the attributes of thought,
feeling, and speech should be entirely disregarded. See, e.g., the works of John B. Watson and
B.F. Skinner. The great error of the behavioral psychologists, and indeed all who suppose to
translate human or animal behavior in scientific terms, is their failure to recognize one
fundamental fact: the universally determinable knowledge scientists acquire in their objective
measurement of the world, as manifest in the disciplines of mathematics, physics, chemistry,
and astronomy, exists not as a superior or supreme form of knowledge; to the contrary, it is an
inferior form of knowledge, existing precisely to serve the greater purpose of individual
sentient creatures in their several, necessarily unique, subjective engagement to the world.
(This is one reason the mystery of human intelligence, of necessity, defies anything close to
meaningful measurement.).
Doctors, insurance companies, and others in the health care industry have already
committed a similar error. Despite the most grave and far-reaching social consequences, they
essentially, and expediently, deny the historic, universal distinction drawn by human beings
between the mind and body. Consider:
Throughout their lives, human beings suffer, as a natural and necessary condition
of life, varying degrees of what may be called "psychic" pain. Such a condition is commonly
described as "mental" or "emotional" suffering, and is invoked in such words as "unhappi-
ness," "discontent," "distress," "anger," "grief," "depression," and "despair." Such pain may
be understood metaphorically as a herald of sorts, conveying to the recipient the existence of
some form of internal discord, which condition calls for the sufferer's recognition, appraisal,
and resolution.
The psychic pain that men and women call "unhappiness," in any of its myriad
forms, may thus be understood to occur within human beings as a signal, in the same way that
physical pain in one's knee or one's shoulder occurs in response to the suffering of some
precipitating trauma. That signal informs the recipient of the fact of an emergent condition
requiring immediate attention. Indeed, the more intense the signal, the greater the danger to
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the person should he or she fail to heed it. Thus, the athlete who suffers a sudden, acute
tearing pain in his or her knee must urgently suspend the precipitating activity; failure to do so
will result in an aggravation of the pain and injury. Indeed, if the victim fails to heed that
urgent sensory warning, he or she may suffer the thorough destruction of the limb or organ's
utility. The internal suffering identified as "psychic," "mental," or "emotional," invariably
proceeds from some form of frustration-for example, the inaccessibility of food when
hungry, poor performance on a school exam, the infliction of a harsh reproach by one's
employer. It may occur suddenly, as with the unexpected death of a loved one, or it may
transpire in a more subtle manner, as with the cumulative effect of a person's protracted action
in compliance, not with his or her own internal needs, but rather, with the contrary desires of
family, friends, co-workers, employers, or society. Such frustration may be benign, as when
the quenching of one's thirst is delayed a few moments. Or it may take far more serious
forms, as when a child is deprived of reliable affection, instruction, or security in his life, and
as a result, his or her sovereign ability to harmoniously engage the world is proportionately
impaired. In all but the most extreme cases, that is, in all cases in which a person's ability to
function socially is not substantially impaired, relief from suffering may be found in careful
reflection and reason, integration of the consequent understanding, and the determination of
appropriate remedial action. In many cases, this process may take place naturally, with the
passage of time. In other cases, a more conscious and deliberate approach may be required.
Over the past decade or so, with successful penetration of the subvisual molecular
and atomic realm of human anatomy and physiology, scientists have succeeding in discovering
a neurochemical analogue that corresponds to the emotions. As a result, with the introduction
of certain chemicals into the body, scientists are now able to manipulate the neurochemical
composition of a person's brain, and so, freely alter that person's emotions. With the
successful commercial promotion of such drugs as Prozac, Xanax, and Elavil, the sale of anti-
depressants and mood stabilizers has grown into a powerful multi-million dollar industry.
Whether expressly by invoking "scientifically proven" truth, or implicitly by silent practice,
physicians now, it seems routinely, diagnose human distress and despair as constituting
something other than necessary conditions of life, properly resolved by a person through the
sovereign employment of his or her reflection and reason. Rather, human emotion is
commonly defined and understood in this, the dawn of the twenty-first century, as an
essentially biological, neurochemical aberration, an essentially physiological condition that,
when identified as the source of pain, is properly treated with the purported curative of
prescribed chemicals.
Physicians, and society as a whole, commonly recognize the legitimacy of grief
that arises in a person who suffers some sudden trauma, such as the death of a loved one.
Similarly, they usually recognize that the natural resolution of that condition, in most cases,
may be achieved with the mysterious but naturally therapeutic effect of time's passage.
Strangely, however, they rarely recognize the grief that results from the cumulative effect of
some protracted trauma to the mind or soul, such as may occur in a more subtle manner with
the eventual failure of a more prolonged endeavor. The resulting "melancholy" or
"depression" is rather mis-defined in biochemical, rather than social, spiritual, or philosophi-
cal terms.
When a person suffers a failure of some protracted enterprise, such as may occur
in work, school, or marriage, the aspects of the world that formerly served to divert and
engage may become strangely muted and hollow. An amnesia of sorts may overcome the
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person so that he or she can barely, if at all, recall ever having found any type of delight or
uplift in the world. He or she may suffer a relentless despair, perhaps over past errors,
whether real, exaggerated or imagined, or alternately, over some form of misfortune recalled
or envisioned. He or she may suffer as well a perfect hopelessness towards any imagined
course of action in the future that will bring desired but elusive relief. Unreason usurps the
throne of reason in the person's attempt to conceive of ideals and goals towards which
laboring is deemed worthy, as the sufferer commonly presumes an unfounded sense of
omniscience and clairvoyance--omniscience in his or her certain conclusion that there is no
good to be known in the world, and clairvoyance in his or her identical presumption
concerning the perfect deficiency of goodness to be ever known again in the future. In most
cases, a person can redress this tyranny of emotion over reason by withdrawal from those
engagements that, previously unacknowledged, serve to oppress him or her, as well as
tenaciously searching out affirmative, recreational engagements that will serve to please,
restore, and uplift his or her mind. For if there is a neurochemical analogue, or biological seat
to the emotions, then any putative imbalance caused by misfortunate events is surely
redressable through fortunate ones. Simply put, if adverse events upset the balance of the
body's emotional chemistry, then uplifting events should, in most cases, be able to restore it.
The problem, indeed, the challenge, a person faces in seeking to overcome melancholy is the
immobilizing inertia and delusive pessimism that so often accompany that condition, to search
out and find those pleasing and restorative engagements that, in such a state, are so elusive.
The word "recreation" is formed from the verb "to recreate." To recreate is "to restore to a
good or normal physical condition from a state of weakness or exhaustion." OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTiONARY 372 (2d ed. 1989). And it is ultimately, and precisely a want of that recreative
engagement to the world, in sufficiently bounteous degree, that may prevent a person from
overcoming the paralyzing melancholy he or she may suffer.
Of course, the mortality of human being has its limits. While the body possesses
extraordinary resources for self-healing, an extreme physical trauma may require external
intervention. Similarly, an extreme mental, spiritual, or emotional trauma can be so acute that
a person's ability to function becomes impaired, or worse, the victim may find him or herself
driven to self-destruction in the attempt to overcome unbearable psychic pain. In such cases,
of course, medical intervention is redemptive. Just as the physician must at times concede the
mysteriously curative power of non-physical agents such as a patient's positive outlook, or the
unknown therapeutic agent animated by the so-called placebo effect, so too, the soul must at
times rely upon physical intervention as the requisite means of survival. However, in
conventional medical understanding and practice, one finds an institutional confusion of cause
and effect, or translated into more apt metaphorical terms, a confusion of disease and
symptom. The intense experience of discontent and frustration that may be described as
distress, depression, or despair, as well as the physical, bio-chemical analogue thereto, do not
constitute the cause of a person's pain; they constitute the pain itself. They constitute the
effect that proceeds from an undiscerned, private (but perfectly accessible) psychic cause; in
most cases, that cause is the failure to acknowledge and withdraw from oppressive
engagement to the world, and concomitantly, to seek out more uplifting engagement. By
supposing to prescribe medication to redress the corresponding neurochemical imbalance,
doctors, (again, metaphorically speaking,) mistakenly treat the symptom rather than the
disease. Where a person's pain is acute, where he or she is so overwhelmed that he or she
cannot function, where he or she is self-destructive or suicidal, then resorting to chemical
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treatment is, of course, justified. But even then, the conscious, greater goal, too often absent
in contemporary practice, should be to prudently wean the patient off the medication, while
helping him to re-organize the order of his life so he or she can recover his or her sovereignty,
and exploit the natural and proper means of his or her restoration.
With the great, looming authorities of science, advertising, and social convention
conjoined in purpose, the common man of the twenty-first century, afflicted by acute
unhappiness, is just as likely as not, to conclude that his affliction proceeds, not from the
discordant order of the purposes and aims of his life, but from an anatomic, neurochemical
imbalance in need of medical treatment. But it is precisely the pain of sadness, of frustration,
of grief, that provide the very foundation for the penultimate two questions of life: 1) What is
meaningful? and 2) What is moral? Or put another way, ever vulnerable to finding him or
herself ultimately oppressed by action undertaken in conformity with convention, habit, or
impulse, a person must ever ask himself, 1) What must I do today to successfully sustain or
improve my life? And 2) Does the prospective course of action raise any question of moral
injury to others, or to myself? Despite the radical technological transformation of human
society in the twentieth century, these questions abide, remaining undiminished in their
primacy. In contrast, to suppose to eliminate a person's psychic pain chemically is thus to
block his or her access to the very means of his or her human growth, of his or her human
being, now for the forging of faith in the fire of abiding despair, now for creative discovery of
new realms, or an alternate path of uplifting engagement. Ironically, it is precisely because of
the potential use of narcotics for such a socially subversive purpose that legislators rigidly
require medical prescription for some drugs, and absolutely outlaw the acquisition,
possession, or use of others. Moreover, neurochemical treatment leaves the problems that
introduced the original condition of discontent unresolved, leaving that person's mind, soul,
or spirit, in a static, and so, ultimately frustrated condition.
As with the false proposition that scientific research constitutes a form of speech,
the proposition that a chemical imbalance in the brain is the cause, rather than the effect of
human unhappiness, constitutes a principle expediently fashioned out of self-interest: 1) The
pharmaceutical industry enjoys, and stands to continue to enjoy, monumental profits with
society's adoption of the exotic notion that unhappiness is properly defined as the want of
some form of medication. 2) Insurance companies endorse the proposition, false though it is,
for it eliminates the enormous cost they would otherwise have to incur if they were required to
provide the alternate treatment, (woefully flawed though it often is,) of more mystically-based
forms of psychological consultation. 3) Physicians are served by this fiction simply because it
is so expedient; they need not spend time listening and assigning significance to patients'
complaints when the routine, momentary dispensation of prescriptions provide instant, even if
ultimately, only illusory resolution. And it is precisely the want of such significance that
precipitates the suffering that impels patients to seek medical resolution or treatment for what
is essentially a nonmedical condition. (Indeed, the ineffably radical transformation of society
over the last century, wrought by television, computers, motion pictures, radio and recorded
sound, in diminishing and displacing a person's traditional engagements to family, friends,
nature, and religion, has left the individual human soul thoroughly dislocated. As electronic,
anonymous engagement of that which is remote has displaced the natural, familiar engagement
of that which is at hand, the significance so deeply and vitally coveted by human beings, at
one time naturally accessible, has all but vanished.) In a day and age in which physicians
seem almost universally to aspire to schedule as many patients in a given hour as possible, any
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similarly denied by supposing to define matter as sensory ideas, received,
classified, and suffered within the mind. However, if there is to be a basis of
agreement among human beings on any subject, a starting point must be
established with certain primary principles, of which idea and matter, as well
as speech and conduct, naturally, and to be sure, universally, are observed by
human beings in the practical exigencies of daily life.
While some legal scholars may conclude that the First Amendment's
freedom of speech protects scientific speech, 74 the Supreme Court has ruled
that freedom of speech, while protected by the Constitution, is not
absolute.175 And just as the definition of freedom is properly circumscribed,
so equally the definition of speech should not be allowed to suffer the
dilution, diminution, or distortion of indiscriminate or inappropriate
employment.
CONCLUSION
Some strenuously advocate cloning based upon the Constitution's
protection of individual right of privacy and reproductive freedom. Others
peremptorily oppose asexual reproduction because it is neither historically
rooted nor necessary to the Anglo-American tradition of ordered liberty.
Clearly, the fear of the unknown has driven much of the opposition to
reproductive cloning as have legitimate fears and skepticism about scientific
and medical abuse. Hence, should scientists develop the ability to clone
human beings in a manner that is reliably safe for both mother and child, no
course of action which reduces the time they must spend with patients will surely be welcome.
In short, there is simply no material disincentive to deter those in the health care industry-
pharmaceutical companies, insurance companies, and physicians, from endorsing and
promoting a neurochemical definition of human emotion, and so, human being.
174. Cantrell, supra note 160, at 73; see CARMEN, supra note 160, at 35.
175. Cantrell, supra note 160, at 73; see CARMEN, supra note 160, at 36; see also
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I do not doubt
for a moment that by the same reasoning that would justify punishing persuasion to murder,
the United States constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a
clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("But, although the rights of free speech and assembly
are fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute."); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
716 (1931) ("the protection [of free speech] even as to previous restraint is not absolutely
unlimited.").
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constitutional basis seems to exist for denying infertile couples access to
such technology.
1 76
However, the ability to clone human beings has not yet been achieved.
While politicians and philosophers debate how many clones can dance on
the head of the proverbial pin, the immediate, practical considerations render
the matter peripheral rather than primary in importance. A more practical
issue that calls for immediate resolution concerns the disputed domain where
research into reproductive human cloning takes place-the scientific
laboratory. While science has radically transformed society through such
revolutionary inventions as the airplane, the motion picture, antibiotics, and
the computer, science has also amplified humankind's destructiveness by
providing society with the means to construct hydrogen, atomic, and nuclear
bombs, as well as the means to irrevocably pollute the land, sea, and air.
Moreover, the burgeoning ideals of eugenics have already wrought
176. It may be a mistake to speak of a constitutional right to reproduce through
cloning, just as it may be equally inaccurate to speak of a constitutional right to vote, to marry,
or to raise and educate one's children. One speaks more accurately, perhaps, by asking
whether the principles of the Constitution protect or proscribe the challenged speech or
conduct. The Constitution's enumerated rights are finite, and relatively few in number. The
application, of these rights, of course, are inestimably broad and diverse in scope. Rather, the
more proper inquiry might be whether the Constitution, in some provision or aspect, prohibits
the disputed aim or interest.
The transcendent authority of the Constitution, and the greater cause of Truth, are
better served by discussion of citizen's rights, not in terms of affirmative or express
constitutional articulation, which enumeration, of necessity, is quite limited. Rather, we more
wisely speak in terms of whether or not citizen's interests are, by the principals of the
Constitution, protected or constrained. That is, does any principle of the Constitution protect
or prohibit a man or woman from engaging in the challenged activity?
All legitimate and just rights are bestowed upon men and women, not by human
edict or pronouncement. Rather, they are endowed by Nature, and acquire entitlement to
protection by natural law; the Constitution merely provides the political and legal mechanism
by which men and women may protect themselves from insidious governmental encroach-
ment. To defiantly demand, insist upon, or proclaim one's interests because, one asserts, they
are not enumerated but no less sacrosanct constitutional rights, threatens to mistake both the
condition of life bestowed by Nature, and human aptitudes endowed by Providence, as mortal
in origin or justification. It is a person's right to speak his or her mind, to seek redress from
those who govern, to marry, and to reproduce, not because the Constitution gives a person
these or any other rights. For surely these are not enumerated anywhere in that document,
transcendent though its contents may be. Rather a person is entitled to protection of these
rights because the attributes of a person's mind, and the innocence of his or her purpose, are
sustained by a source greater than mortal men, which men, politically, commercially,
religiously, and interpersonally, are wont to enslave and oppress their brethren. The
Constitution embodies a finite number of rights, but the principles determinable from those
rights are not similarly bound by a finitude in application.
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catastrophic results: the infliction of suffering in the cruelest, most
incomprehensible terms by Nazi Germany during World War 11,177 thus
proving that those who fear the abuse of such discoveries are not rightly
dismissed as hysterical Cassandras. Because of the consequent apprehen-
sion, and in particular, the immediate fear of the casual misuse of fetal tissue
and embryos, governmental regulation of human cloning research constitutes
a proper, and ultimately, necessary step in the advance of science.
The most immediate danger in the attempt to clone a human being
would be to the fetus. 178 Indeed, the National Bioethics Advisory Commis-
sion observed that presently, using this technique to create children would
pose significant dangers to developing children and the fetus. 179 Such
statements may appear to some as little more than governmental cant, but
even Ian Wilmut, the scientist famed for cloning the first sheep, has
condemned human cloning attempts as "criminally irresponsible," observing
that ninety-eight percent of embryos fail to survive gestation or birth.18°
Wilmut has further expressed certainty that cloned human children would be
born with abnormalities, and be predisposed to die prematurely.' Indeed,
so serious are the fears, and so legitimate are the dangers, that the Commis-
sion concluded unequivocally that human cloning should not presently be
attempted.182 Moreover, a series of bills have been proposed by Congress in
the attempt to prohibit human cloning.1 3 The Commission has expressed
concerns about physical safety, about eugenics, as well as about the
individuality, autonomy, objectification, and kinship of the resulting child.184
Legislation proposed in Congress has followed the specific regulations of the
National Bioethics Advisory Commission.185  The Commission recom-
mended a federally legislated prohibition on any attempt "whether in a
research or a clinical setting, to create a child through somatic cell nuclear
transfer cloning."'186 However, in anticipation of imminent advances in
existing research, the Commission qualified its ban with the suggestion that
such legislation include a sunset clause to ensure that Congress will review
177. Pelias, supra note 66, at 843.
178. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2.
179. Id.
180. Gibbs, supra note 7, at 4.
181. Id.
182. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2, at 3.
183. Kassierer, supra note 14; Should Cloning Be Bannede at http://www.reason.com/
biclone/html (last updated Oct. 2001).
184. Robertson, supra note 126.
185. Cloning Human Beings, supra note 2, at iv.
186. Id.
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the issue after a specified period in order to determine if the prohibition
should continue.
187
The reproductive technology of cloning, like all scientific processes that
prescribe human ingestion, implantation, and transplantation, requires
governmental regulation as the only means available to protect the powerless
and unknowing. Such regulation will serve not only the prospective parents
of a cloned child, and the cloned child him or herself from the moment of
conception; it will also protect society as a whole by upholding the sanctity
of human life. Governmental regulation of human cloning will serve to
ensure the health of prospective children, the safety and well-being of the
mother, and ensure the propriety of genetic diagnosis and therapy.
Later in this century, the ability to reproduce asexually may be regarded
as an utterly pedestrian fact of life much as the instant generation regards the
ubiquitous presence of mobile telephones and portable computers as
unremarkable. It is a potential that nevertheless succeeds in disorienting the
minds of most men and women in the current day, who never supposed to
imagine a means of human procreation other than sexual reproduction.
While politically, socially, and legally, America's commitment to human
freedom must check any hint that the government might suppose to exploit
its power to proscribe a safe and reliable, albeit scientific means to
reproduce, in contrast, the scientific and medical procedures themselves,
precisely because unchecked, they may be abused with potentially disastrous
effects, must be subject to governmental regulation. It is only with prudent
and proper governmental regulation that society will be able to properly
exploit cloning to achieve such heretofore unimaginable visionary ideals
such as the finding of cures for disabling and horrific diseases, and defeating
the continued hereditary transmission of defective genes.
187. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Christy is a seventeen-year-old pregnant girl.1 She is a junior in high
school and in the top of her class. Christy plans on going to college and law
school and eventually becoming a lawyer. Christy has never been as stressed
as she is now. She has her SATs coming up in one month, a math test on
Friday, and must make the toughest decision of her life-whether she should
get an abortion.
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1. This story is fictional, however, it demonstrates the practical effects of Florida's
Parental Notice of Abortion Act.
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She definitely does not want to have this baby. If she becomes a mother
now, she will not be able to live the life she was planning to live. She will
not be able to go to college because she will have to get a job to support her
child. Christy will not even get to go on her junior trip to Disney World
because she will have to stay home and take care of her child. She simply is
not ready to become a mother!
In order for Christy to obtain an abortion, under Florida law, the
physician performing the abortion must first notify one of Christy's parents.2
Christy knows her parents hold strong views on the subject of abortion and
will force her to carry the pregnancy to term against her will. She fears they
will do whatever they can to prevent her from having an abortion, including
confining her to the house. She fears the significant medical risks that
carrying a pregnancy to term poses on minors. Such risks include,
"hemorrhage; infection; worsening medical complications, such as a seizure
disorder or hypertension; risks associated with a caesarian section; and
aggravation of chronic diseases, such as bowel problems, colitis, and
anemia.",
3
Christy has no idea what to do. The longer she delays this decision, the
greater the risks in obtaining an abortion. She is now thirteen weeks
pregnant. Her risk of mortality from an abortion is now nine times as great
as it was five weeks ago. She knows that she must make a decision soon
before it is too late to obtain an abortion. Christy is considering either going
to another state that does not have this notice requirement or obtaining an
illegal abortion in Florida.
Jennifer is Christy's friend and feels that she is in an even greater
predicament. Jennifer is also a seventeen-year-old pregnant girl who has her
SATs in a month, a math test on Friday, and wants to have an abortion.
Jennifer fears that if one of her parents is notified that she is pregnant, her
parents might force her to leave the house and will terminate financial
support. She also fears that her parents will physically and emotionally
abuse her if they find out that she was sexually active.
Tragically, the stories of Christy and Jennifer will be very similar to the
stories of many minor girls in Florida if Florida's Parental Notice of
Abortion Act ("Act")4 is ultimately found constitutional. The Act provides:
2. FLA. STAT. § 390.01115(3)(a) (2001).
3. Appellees' Supplemental Brief at 28, State v. N. Fla. Women's Health &
Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly 419 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001) (No. ID99-
3279, ID99-3282, ID00-1983).
4. § 390.01115.
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[a] termination of pregnancy may not be performed or induced
upon a minor unless the physician performing or inducing the ter-
mination of pregnancy has given at least 48 hours actual notice to
one parent or to the legal guardian of the pregnant minor of his or
her intention to perform or induce the termination of pregnancy.
5
The Act further provides that notice is not required if: 1) an immediate
abortion is medically necessary; 2) a parent or guardian waives notice; 3) the
minor is "married or has had the disability of nonage removed;" 4) the minor
has a minor child dependent on her; or 5) the minor has had the notice
6
requirement removed through a judicial bypass procedure.1
This Act was supposed to become effective on July 1, 1999. 7 However,
on June 15, 1999, physicians who perform abortions, clinics that provide
abortion services, women's rights organizations, and some minor female
members filed a complaint presenting a facial challenge to the Act, along
with a motion for a temporary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the
Act. 8  The circuit court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary
injunction on July 27, 1999 .9 On May 12, 2000, the circuit court granted a
final judgment granting a permanent injunction and concluded that the
Parental Notice of Abortion Act was unconstitutional. 10 On February 9,
5. § 390.01115(3)(a).
6. § 390.01115(3)(b)(1)-(5). In order for the notice requirement to be removed
through a judicial bypass procedure, the minor must petition the court through clear evidence
that she is sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy, that there is
parental abuse, or that notice is not in her best interest. The court shall hear evidence relating
to the emotional development, maturity, intellect, and understanding of the minor. If the court
does not make a ruling within forty eight hours after the petition is filed, the petition is granted
and the notice requirement is waived. The minor has a right to appointed counsel,
confidential proceedings, a full transcript of the proceedings, and an expedited appeal if
necessary. § 390.01115(4).
7. Appellants' Initial Brief at 1, N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc.,
26 Fla. L. Weekly at D419.
8. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D420.
Ordinarily only a person or family whose privacy rights are infringed or
threatened has standing to assert the rights. But a "recognized excep-
tion" (citations omitted) applies where enforcement of a challenged restriction
would adversely affect the rights of non-parties, and there is no effective
avenue for them to preserve their rights themselves.
Id. at D420-21. This exception applies to physicians in the present case because physicians'
own interests are at stake here. They are subject to discipline if they violate the notice
provisions of the Act.
9. Id. at D420.
10. Id.
2002]
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2001, the First District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed this decision and
found the statute constitutional."
This article discusses whether Florida's Parental Notice of Abortion
Act is constitutional under the Florida Constitution by analyzing the case of
State v. North Florida Women's Health & Counseling Services, Inc.1
2
Section II of this article explores the circuit court's opinion, which found the
statute to be unconstitutional.13 Section II also discusses the case of In re
T. W., t4 since the circuit court held that case was controlling precedent.
t5
Section II focuses on the appellants' arguments. Section IV addresses the
appellees' arguments. Section V examines the opinion of the First District
Court of Appeal of Florida, which found the statute constitutional and
reversed the circuit court's ruling.16  Section VI discusses why the first
district's holding should be reversed. Finally, Section VII concludes this
comment.
II. THE CIRCUIT COURT'S RULING
On May 12, 2000, the circuit court ordered a final judgment granting a
permanent injunction and concluded that the Parental Notice of Abortion Act
was unconstitutional.1 7 The circuit court based its conclusions of law on the
seminal case of In re T. W. 8 In In re T.W., the Supreme Court of Florida
ruled that a parental consent to abortion statute violated the Florida
Constitution's right to privacy.' 9 The circuit court applied the same legal
principles in the present case as were discussed in the case of In re T.W.
20
This section examines the legal principles applied in the case of In re T.W.
11. Id.
12. 26 Fla. L. Weekly D419 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001). This article only
addresses whether the Florida Parental Notice of Abortion Act is consistent with the Florida
constitutional right to privacy. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23. However, plaintiffs in this case also
made claims that the Act is not consistent with the Florida Constitution's Equal Protection
Clause, that the Act violates minor females and physicians' due process rights, and that the
Act is in violation of the United States Constitution.
13. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 1, N. Fla. Women's Health &
Counseling Servs., Inc., No. 99-3202 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. App. May 12, 2000) [hereinafter Final
Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction].
14. 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1989).
15. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 8.
16. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D424.
17. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 1.
18. Id. at 8.
19. InreT.W.,551 So. 2d at 1196.
20. See generally Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 8-16.
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After reviewing In re T.W, the Appellants' Arguments section, summarizes
the reasons why appellants in the present case feel that the circuit court's
holding should be reversed.
In In re T.W., the Supreme Court of Florida first discussed how the
United States Supreme Court has, for the most part, left the issue of privacy
to the states, like protection of a man's property and his own life. The
court stated that "[w]hile the federal Constitution traditionally shields
enumerated and implied individual liberties from encroachment by state or
federal government, the federal court has long held that state constitutions
may provide even greater protection., 22 The court then held that the Florida
citizens opted for a greater protection of the right to privacy when they
approved, by a general election in 1980, Article I, Section 23, of the Florida
Constitution:2 3 'Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free
from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the public's
right of access to public records and meetings as provided by law." The
court further discussed how the drafters of the amendment rejected the
words "unreasonable" or "unwarranted" before the phrase "governmental
intrusion," making the right to privacy an even stronger right for the citizens
of Florida.2
After discussing the right to privacy in Florida, the court entertained the
issue of whether this right is implicated in a woman's decision to continue
her pregnancy.2 The court found that the right is in fact implicated and held
that "[t]he Florida Constitution embodies the principle that 'few decisions
are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to
individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman's decision... whether to
end her pregnancy. A woman's right to make that choice freely is
fundamental."' 27
The next question the court addressed was whether this freedom of
choice concerning abortion extends to minors.28 The court concluded that it
does, based on the language of the amendment: "[t]he right of privacy
21. Id. at 1191.
22. Id. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980).
23. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191. At the time this opinion was written, Florida was
one of the few states in this country having its own express constitutional provision
guaranteeing an independent right to privacy. Id. at 1190.
24. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
25. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1191.
26. Id. at 1192-93.
27. Id. at 1193.
28. Id.
2002] 549
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extends to '[e]very natural person.' ' '29 The court held that minors are natural
people and, therefore, the amendment clearly applies to them.30 Even though
the court held that the right extends to minors, a person's right to privacy is
not absolute.31 A governmental intrusion into a person's private life is
lawful,32 only if the following standard is met:
[s]ince the privacy section as adopted contains no textual standard
of review, it is important for us to identify an explicit standard to
be applied in order to give proper force and effect to the amend-
ment. The right of privacy is a fundamental right which we believe
demands the compelling state interest standard. This test shifts the
burden of proof to the state to justify an intrusion on privacy. The
burden can be met by demonstrating that the challenged regulation
serves a compelling state interest and accomplishes its goal through
the use of the least intrusive means.
33
In applying this standard, the Supreme Court of Florida reviewed every
state interest that is implicated in a minor's abortion decision to determine
whether any of these interests were compelling.34 The court found two
interests implicated in a minor's abortion decision, "the health of the mother
and the potentiality of life in the fetus. 35  To determine whether these
interests would be deemed compelling, the court used the same analysis that
36 37was used by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. Under Roe v. Wade, the
mother's health does not become a compelling state interest until immedi-
ately following the end of the first trimester and the potentiality of life in the
fetus first becomes a compelling state interest when the fetus becomes
viable. 38 The court in In re T. W. discussed how the parental consent to
abortion statute intrudes upon the privacy of the pregnant minor from
conception to birth.39 The court thus concluded that the health of the mother
29. Id.
30. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1192 (quoting Winfield v. Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 477 So. 2d 544,
547 (Fla. 1985)). This standard applies to everyone, regardless of age. In Winfield, this
standard was applied to adults, and in In Re T.W., the standard was applied to a minor.
34. InreT.W.,551So. 2dat1193-95.
35. Id. at 1193.
36. Id.
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. Id. at 163.
39. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989).
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and the potentiality of life in the fetus were not compelling state interests,
because the statute's "invasion of a pregnant female's privacy by the state
for the full term of the pregnancy is not necessary for the preservation of
maternal health or the potentiality of life.
' 4
The T.W. court found that two more state interests were implicated in a
minor's abortion decision, "protection of the immature minor and preserva-
tion of the family unit.' 41 To determine whether these interests were com-
pelling, the court examined section 743.065 of the Florida Statutes.42 The
court then noted that "under this statute, a minor may consent, without
parental approval, to any medical procedure involving her pregnancy or her
existing child-no matter how dire the possible consequences--except abor-
tion. 43 The court concluded:
[i]n light of this wide authority that the state grants an unwed minor
to make life-or-death decisions concerning herself or an existing
child without parental consent, we are unable to discern a special
compelling interest on the part of the state under Florida law in
protecting the minor only where abortion is concerned.44
40. Id. at 1194.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 1195. Section 743.065 of the Florida Statutes provides:
Unwed pregnant minor or minor mother; consent to medical services for
minor or minor's child valid.-
(1) An unwed pregnant minor may consent to the performance of medical or
surgical care or services relating to her pregnancy by a hospital or clinic or by
a physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459, and such consent is
valid and binding as if she had achieved her majority.
(2) An unwed minor mother may consent to the performance of medical or
surgical care or services for her child by a hospital or clinic or by a physician
licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459, and such consent is valid and
binding as if she had achieved her majority.
(3) Nothing in this Act shall affect the provisions of s. 390.001 [the abortion
statute].
FLA. STAT. § 743.065 (2001).
43. Inre T.W.,551So. 2dat 1195.
44. Id. In N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., the circuit court also
found that sections 384.30 and 394.4784 of the Florida Statutes were inconsistent with the
Parental Notice of Abortion Act. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 11-12,
State v. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D419 (1st Dist.
Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001). These statutes provide that physicians, health care professionals, and
health facilities "may examine and provide treatment for sexually transmitted diseases to any
minor" without any parental involvement, and a minor age 13 or over may obtain mental
health diagnostic and evaluative services and outpatient crisis intervention services without
20021
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Since the court found none of these interests compelling, the court held
the statute requiring parental consent to abortion unconstitutional. 45
I'. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS
The appellants in North Florida Women's Health & Counseling
Services, Inc. first argued that the case of In re T. W. was not precedent, and
therefore, the circuit court had no right holding the case of In re T.W. as
controlling precedent. 46 The appellants argued that "under the Florida
Constitution, both a binding decision and a binding precedential opinion are
created to the extent that at least four members of the Court have joined in
an opinion and decision." 47 The appellants argued that In re T. W. was a
plurality opinion and "[t]he views of the justices in T. W. were divided into
five separate opinions, none of which garnered the four votes necessary to
constitute a precedential 'opinion' under the Florida Constitution"4
s
The appellants next argued that even if In re T. W. is precedent, "[t]he
T. W. holding should be limited to the parental consent statute under con-
sideration by the Court in that case., 49 In making this argument, the appell-
ants cited to mainly federal law.50 Appellants argued that the courts have
recognized a critical distinction between parental consent and parental notice
statutes.5 1 Appellants then quoted a United States Supreme Court opinion:
[T]he difference between notice and consent [requirements] was
apparent to us before and is apparent now. Unlike parental consent
laws, a law requiring parental notice does not give any third party
the legal right to make the minor's decision for her, or to prevent
her from obtaining an abortion should she choose to have one per-
formed. We have acknowledged this distinction as "fundamental"
parental involvement. FLA. STAT. §§ 384.30, 394.4784 (2001).
45. InreT.W.,551So. 2datl196.
46. Appellants' Initial Brief at 22, State v. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling
Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D419 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (No. 1999-3279).
47. Id. (quoting Santos v. State, 629 So. 2d 838, 840 (Fla. 1984)).
48. Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1091 (Fla. 1994)).
49. Id. at23.
50. Id. at 23-25.
51. Appellant's Initial Brief at 23 (citing Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292 (1997);
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) (Akron II); Hodgson v.
Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407 (1981)).
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and as one "substantially modify[ing] the federal constitutional
challenge."
52
Appellants stated that, unlike a consent statute, "a parental notice statute has
neither 'the purpose nor effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman seeking an abortion."',
5 3
A third argument of appellants was that the circuit "failed to give
deference to the Legislature's findings and conclusions as to the 'compelling
state interest' for the Act.",54 They argued that legislative determinations of
public purpose and facts should not be ignored and are presumed correct and
entitled to deference, unless clearly erroneous.
5 5
52. Appellants' Initial Brief at 23-24 (quoting Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 496).
53. Id. at 24 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)).
54. Id. at 20.
The legislature made the following specific findings:
1) "immature minors often lack the ability to make informed choices that take
into account both immediate and long-range consequences;" 2) the "unique
medical, emotional and psychological consequences of abortion are some-
times serious and can be lasting, particularly when the patient is immature;"
3) the "capacity to become pregnant and the capacity for mature judgment
concerning the wisdom of an abortion are not necessarily related;" 4) parents
ordinarily possess "information essential to a physician's exercise of his or
her best medical judgment concerning the child;" 5) parents who are "aware
that their minor daughter has had an abortion may better ensure that she
receives adequate medical attention after her abortion;" 6) "parental consulta-
tion is usually desirable and in the best interests of the minor;"
As to the compelling state interests in the Act, the statute provides as follows:
The Legislature's purpose in enacting parental notice legislation is to
further the important and compelling state interests of protecting minors
against their own immaturity, fostering family unity and preserving the family
as a viable social unit, protecting the constitutional rights of parents to rear
children who are members of the household.... reducing teenage pregnancy
and unnecessary abortion .... and ensur[ing] that parents are able to meet
their high duty to seek out and follow medical advice pertaining to their
children, stay apprised of the medical needs and physical condition of their
children, and recognize complications that might arise following medical
procedures or services, to preserve the right of parents to pursue a civil action
on behalf of their child before expiration of the statute of limitation if a
facility or physician commits medical malpractice that results in injury to a
child, and to prevent, detect, and prosecute batteries, rapes, and other crimes
committed upon minors.
Id. at 20-21.
55. Appellants' Initial Brief at 21 (citing State v. Division of Bond Fin., 495 So. 2d
183 (Fla. 1986); Miami Home Milk Producers Ass'n v. Milk Control Bd., 169 So. 541
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Finally, appellants argued that minors do not share the same degree of
privacy as adults and, therefore, the state may impose restrictions on minors'
privacy interests less intrusive than that of parental consent.5 6 They argued
that "the right to privacy of an unemancipated minor is more limited than
that of an adult. 57 Appellants asserted that the
Florida Legislature has in numerous areas prohibited or restricted a
minor's ability to make choices implicating privacy, including mar-
riage without parental consent (§ 741.04(1), donating body parts (§
381.0041), consenting to sexual intercourse with an adult (§
800.04), receiving a permanent tatoo (§ 877.04), obtaining a
driver's license (§ 322.09), using a tanning facility (§ 381.89(7)),
entering into contracts (Chapter 743), or remaining in public places
during certain hours (§ 877.22).58
IV. APPELLEE'S ARGUMENTS
Among the appellants' arguments against the circuit court's holding
was the claim that the circuit court should not have held the case of In re
T.W. as controlling precedent, since In re TW. was only a plurality
opinion.59 In response, appellees argued that all the legal principles applied
by the circuit court in North Florida Women's Health & Counseling
Services, Inc. were espoused by a majority of the justices in In re T. W.
(1936)).
56. Id. at 25.
57. Id. at 26.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 22.
60. Appellees' Answer Brief at 20-21, State v. N. Fla. Women's Health &
Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D419 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001). These legal
principles include:
1. Florida's State Constitution.... establishes a right of privacy that is
stronger and more broad in scope than the right to privacy found in the fed-
eral constitution. [See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190-92, 1197 (Fla.
1989)]
2. This right to privacy protects a woman's right to freely choose whether or
not to continue her pregnancy without interference from government or third
persons. [See id. at 1192-93,1197]
3. This right to choose to terminate extends to minors. [See id. at 1193,
1197]
4. It is a right so fundamental that the State may intrude upon it only if it can
demonstrate (a) a compelling state interest in doing so; and (b) seeks to
accomplish it through the least intrusive means. [See id. at 1192, 1197]
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Furthermore, appellees contended that the Supreme Court of Florida has
reteatedly recognized the precedential weight of the In re T. W. decision, and
therefore, the circuit court was correct in applying this decision as con-
trolling precedent.
61
Another argument of the appellants was that even if In re T. W. is
precedent, "[tihe T.W. holding should be limited to the parental consent
statute under consideration by the Court in that case.",62 Appellees responded
to this argument by claiming "that the parental notice law intrudes upon
minors' right to choose abortion and is similar in effect to a consent law."
63
Appellees averred that:
Under both notice and consent laws, minors fear that telling their
parents about an impending abortion will result in abuse, being ex-
pelled from the home, disturbing an already dysfunctional or trou-
bled family situation, or a parent exercising a de facto veto power
over the minor's decision by, for example, confining her to the
house or threatening punishment.
64
A third argument of the appellants was that the circuit court failed to
give deference to the legislature's findings and conclusions as to the
"compelling state interest" for the Act.65  In response to this argument,
appellees claimed that the legislative findings contained in the Act do not
satisfy the state's burden of demonstrating that the Act furthers a compelling
state interest.66  Appellees asserted that declaring a certain objective a
5. Neither the health of the mother nor the potentiality of life in the fetus can
be a compelling state interest justifying an intrusion on the right to choose if
it applies to terminations of pregnancies within the first trimester. [See id. at
1193-94, 1197-98]
6. The State's interests in protecting an immature minor and fostering the
integrity of the family, while important and worthy, do not justify restricting a
minor's right to choose abortion where similar restrictions are not imposed on
comparable choices or decisions. [See id. at 1194-95, 1198-99]
Id.
61. Appellees' Answer Brief at 22 (citing B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla.
1995); Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086-87 (Fla. 1994); Post-Newsweek Stations v. Doe,
612 So. 2d 549, 552 (Fla 1992)).
62. Appellants' Initial Brief at 23.
63. Appellees' Answer Brief at 27.
64. Id. at 27-28.
65. Appellants' Initial Brief at 20.
66. Appellees' Answer Brief at 29-31.
2002]
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67compelling state interest is not enough. It must be demonstrated through
comprehensive and consistent legislative treatment.68 Appellees then stated
that "[i]f the state could meet the compelling interest standard by inserting
the word 'compelling' into legislative findings, the protection of fundamen-
tal rights under Florida law would be eviscerated, because any statutory
restriction on privacy could satisfy this standard by legislative self-proclama-
tion. 69
Finally, appellants argued that minors do not share the same degree of
privacy as adults, and therefore, the state may impose restrictions on minors'
70privacy interests less intrusive than that of parental consent. In reply,
appellees contended that "whether minors have the same right to privacy as
adults, and whether the state may have compelling state interests that allow it
to intrude on minors' privacy rights although not on the rights of adults," are
two separate concepts. 71 Therefore, the fact that many laws prohibit or
restrict a minor's ability to make choices implicating privacy, does not mean
that a minor does not have a right to privacy. It simply means that each of
those statutes furthers a compelling state interest through the least intrusive
means.
V. THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL'S RULING
The court began its analysis by pointing out that the Florida constitu-
tional right to privacy has been interpreted more broadly than any right to
72privacy guaranteed under the federal Constitution. The court then cited to
In re T. W. for the proposition that the "Right to Privacy is implicated when
the Legislature imposes restrictions on the ability, even of minors, to obtain
abortions."73 The court also cited the plurality opinion of In re T. W. for the
proposition that while minors' rights to privacy include "freedom of choice
concerning abortion," they are not coextensive with adults' rights to privacy
and "that a minor's rights are not absolute.,
74
67. Id. at 29.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 30.
70. Appellants' Initial Brief at 25-26.
71. Appellees' Answer Brief at 24.
72. State v. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly
D419, D421 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001).
73. Id. at D421.
74. Id. (citing In re T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1193).
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The court then noted that since the Act requires that a minor's parent or
guardian be notified that [the minor] intends to undergo an abortion, the Act
plainly interferes with "the right to be let alone and free from governmental
intrusion into the person's private life."75 The court therefore concluded that
in order to withstand a constitutional challenge, the Act must serve a
compelling state interest and do so by the least intrusive means practicable.
76
The court then discussed whether the Act does in fact serve a compelling
interest. 77 The court noted that it does not have the authority to strike down
the Parental Notice of Abortion Act even if the state only establishes that
one interest is a compelling state interest and the Act furthers that interest by
the least intrusive means.7 The First District Court of Appeal then held that
the Act does establish at least one compelling state interest and accomplishes
this interest through the least intrusive means:
[b]y facilitating the ability of parents and guardians to fulfill their
duty to provide appropriate medical care for their daughters or
wards, the Act serves a compelling state interest. Parents are le-
gally responsible for their minor children's health insofar as it is in
their power to foster it. They have a duty to stay alert to their minor
children's medical needs, and to secure appropriate medical assis-
tance if they are able to do. See § 827.03(3)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (1999)
(defining neglect as including the failure to provide necessary
medicine and medical services); see also Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d
726, 730 (Fla. 1975) ("[A] parent has the obligation to nurture,
support, educate, and protect his minor children and the child has
the right to call on him for the discharge of this duty.") 79
In coming to this conclusion, the First District Court of Appeal cited In
re T. W., and held that "[a]n important step in gauging whether an interest
should be deemed compelling is ascertaining whether the Legislature has
acted consistently in protecting the interest."80 The court then held that,
since it is necessary for a minor child to obtain consent before that child can
receive medical treatment (and therefore the parent must receive notice), the
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D421.
78. Id. at D422.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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legislature has acted consistently in protecting the state's general interest in
facilitating adult assistance in managing medical problems.fl
It is the subject of the state's compelling interest that causes the
difference in opinion between the First District Court of Appeal and the
circuit court. The lower court noted that, according to the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act, notice is required to a parent or guardian of a minor before
that minor may obtain an abortion.8 z Yet, the circuit court also noted that
under Florida law, notice is not required to a parent or guardian of a minor
before that minor may obtain pregnancy treatment other than an abortion.83
Further, the circuit court held that, under Florida law, notice is not required
to a parent or guardian of a minor before that minor may obtain treatment for
sexually transmitted diseases. a The circuit court thus concluded that the
legislature's treatment of a minor's decision to choose an abortion is
inconsistent with its treatment of comparable decisions by a minor; hence, it
found the Parental Notice of Abortion Act unconstitutional.85 The First
District Court of Appeal rejected the contention that the laws regarding
pregnancy related treatment and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases
substantiate a legislative discounting of the importance of adult assistance in
managing minors' post-surgical care.86 The court stated that "[t]here are
obvious and important differences between sexually transmitted diseases,
pregnancies that go to term, and abortions and these differences logically
account for the differential statutory treatment. 87
The court noted that the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases is
rising at an alarming rate. 8 The court further stated that
rather than risk a (larger) epidemic, the Legislature has made a
clearly rational decision to minimize barriers to treatment for sexu-
ally transmitted diseases. Not requiring minors to notify their par-
ents or guardians in order to obtain medical treatment for sexually
transmissible diseases evinces a public policy which in no way un-
dermines or discredits the state's interest in trying to assure the
81. Id.
82. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 1, State v. N. Fla. Women's
Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2000) (No. 99-3202).
83. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly, at D422.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. State v. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly
D419, D422 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001).
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adequacy of minors' care while they are recovering from surgery,
including abortions.
89
The First District Court of Appeal of Florida then gave its reason why it
felt that pregnancies that go to term were treated differently by the
legislature than abortions. The court reasoned that absent abortion,
pregnancy-related treatment is by no means always surgery.91 "Such surgery
as is necessary commonly occurs at the time of birth. By then most minors'
pregnancies are likely to be known to a parent or guardian so that a formal,
legal requirement to give notice would not meaningfully advance any state
purpose."
92
VI. THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA SHOULD REVERSE THE HOLDING OF
THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
The first district agreed with the circuit court that: 1) the Florida
constitutional right to privacy is greater than the federal constitutional right
to privacy;93 2) the right to privacy is implicated when the legislature
imposes restrictions on the ability to obtain abortions;94 3) minors also enjoy
rights to privacy under the Florida Constitution;95 4) in order to withstand a
constitutional challenge, the Act must serve a compelling state interest and
do so by the least intrusive means practicable;96 and 5) an important step in
gauging whether an interest should be deemed compelling is ascertaining
whether the legislature has acied consistently in protecting the interest.97 The
first district only disagreed with the circuit court in that the circuit court
found that the Act does not serve a compelling state interest and the first
district found that it does.98 Therefore, the first district reversed the circuit
court's holding solely because the first district found that the Act serves a
compelling state interest. Consequently, the first district's holding should be
reversed if its reasoning that the Act serves a compelling state interest is
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D421.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D421.
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illogical. With that in mind, the following discussion attempts to show that
the court's reasoning here is, in fact, illogical.
In the first district's opinion, the court cited to the case of In re T. W. on
numerous occasions and clearly recognized the precedential weight of the In
re T.W. decision. However, the first district ruled completely against the
Supreme Court of Florida when it found that the Act serves a compelling
state interest. In In re T.W., the Supreme Court of Florida found that the
Parental Consent to Abortion Act was unconstitutional, because the
legislature had not acted consistently in protecting the immature minor and
the family unit.99 The Supreme Court of Florida found that, under Florida
law, a minor may consent, without parental approval, to any medical
procedure involving her pregnancy, except abortion.' ° The court then found
that:
In light of this wide authority that the state grants an unwed minor
to make life-or-death decisions concerning herself or an existing
child without parental consent, we are unable to discern a special
compelling interest on the part of the state under Florida law in
protecting the minor only where abortion is concerned.' 0'
In the present case, the first district held, in complete contrast to In re
T.W., that "[f]or parental notification purposes, the legislature also has a
legitimate basis for distinguishing between abortion and other pregnancy-
related medical treatments."102  The court reasoned that, absent abortion,
pregnancy-related treatment is by no means always surgery. 103  ,Such
surgery as is necessary commonly occurs at the time of birth. By then most
minors' pregnancies are likely to be known to a parent or guardian so that a
99. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1195 (Fla. 1989).
100. Id.
101. Id. In N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., the circuit court also
found that sections 384.30 and 394.4784 of the Florida Statutes were inconsistent with the
Parental Notice of Abortion Act. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 11-12,
State v. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly D419 (1st Dist.
Ct. App. Feb. 9, 2001). These statutes provide that physicians, health care professionals, and
health facilities "may examine and provide treatment for sexually transmitted diseases to any
minor" without any parental involvement, and a minor aged thirteen or over may obtain
mental health diagnostic and evaluative services and outpatient crisis intervention services
without parental involvement. FLA. STAT. §§ 384.30, 394.4784 (2000).
102. N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D422.
103. Id.
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formal, legal requirement to give notice would not meaningfully advance any
state purpose."'
The first district also held that the state has an interest in encouraging
minors to seek treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, but has no such
interest in encouraging abortions.1
0 5
These alleged differences are no different now than when In re T. W.
was decided and the Supreme Court of Florida in In re T. W. obviously
considered them insignificant when the court held that the Florida
Legislature had acted inconsistently in protecting the immature minor and
the family unit. 
°6
For the foregoing reasons, the holding of the First District Court of
Appeal of Florida is inconsistent with the Supreme Court of Florida's hold-
ing in In re T. W. Furthermore, it is illogical, and therefore, should be
reversed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of the constitutionality of the Parental Notice of Abortion Act
is far from over. There are many possibilities of what the future may hold.
One slight possibility is that the plaintiffs will choose not to do anything at
all and, in effect, surrender. If this happens, trial courts. throughout the state
will have to obey the first district's holding that the Act is constitutional.1
7
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Final Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction at 12, N. Fla. Women's Health &
Counseling Serv., Inc., 26 Fla. L. Weekly at D419.
107. This will be the result, because the issue of whether the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act is constitutional has not been addressed by any other District Court of Appeal in
Florida. State v. Hayes was the first case in Florida to address this issue. This case held that
in absence of a contrary Fourth District Court of Appeal opinion a Palm Beach County circuit
court was bound to follow an opinion of the First District Court of Appeal.
In Florida the District Courts of Appeal are courts of final appellate jurisdic-
tion except for a narrow classification of cases made reviewable by the Flor-
ida Supreme Court (citations omitted). The District Courts of Appeal are
required to follow Supreme Court decisions. As an adjunct to this rule it is
logical and necessary in order to preserve stability and predictability in the
law that, likewise, trial courts be required to follow the holdings of higher
courts District Courts of Appeal. The proper hierarchy of decisional holdings
would demand that in the event the only case on point on a district level is
from a district other than the one in which the trial court is located, the trial
court be required to follow that decision (citations omitted). Alternatively, if
20021
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A more likely possibility is that plaintiffs will file a motion to stay the
issuance of the mandate from the First District Court of Appeal, pending
review by the Supreme Court of Florida.'08 If the first district grants a stay
pending review by the Supreme Court of Florida, then the Parental Notice of
Abortion Act will not become effective until the Supreme Court of Florida
has made a ruling on the case. However, the Supreme Court of Florida
might make a ruling not to make a ruling. In other words, they might deny
certiorari. This is unlikely, and the Supreme Court of Florida will most
likely hear this case, because it raises questions of great public importance
that are likely to recur.'0 9 It is hard to make a prediction on how the
Supreme Court of Florida will rule, but if it affirms the decision of the First
District Court of Appeal, this case is most likely over. Even if the United
States Supreme Court would decide to hear this case, it would most likely
hold the Parental Notice of Abortion Act constitutional. The reason for this
is that in Lambert v. Wickland,"0 the United States Supreme Court upheld a
Montana notice statute that is very similar to the statute in the presentIll
case.
No matter what happens in the future of this case, the issues raised will
forever be debated. This is because, in some cases, it is extremely beneficial
for a parent to receive notice before his or her daughter obtains an abortion,
while in other cases, it is very detrimental. This makes it very hard for us to
decide on the constitutionality of a law that requires notice for the whole
state of Florida. Fortunately, we do not need to make this decision. We
leave this to the courts, for judges have and will continue to struggle with
cases involving such difficult issues.
the district court of the district in which the trial court is located has decided
the issue, the trial court is bound to follow it.
State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
108. Id. at 54.
109. Id.
110. 520 U.S. 292 (1997).
111. Id. at299.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress passed the federal welfare reform bill' to help move
millions of Americans from welfare to work. Primary in this bill is a
provision, known as Charitable Choice, that authorizes faith-based
organizations2 to compete along side secular organizations to provide a wide
range of federally funded welfare, health, and social services.
1. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193 (1996) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. 604a).
2. Gretchen M. Griener, Charitable Choice Welfare Reform: Collaberation between
State and Local Government and Faith-Based Organizations, 4 WELFARE INFORMATION
NmWoRK 1 (Sept. 2000), at http://www.welfareinfo.orgissuenotecharitablechoice.htm. The
term "faith-based organization" includes at least three different types of organizations: 1)
national denominations with social service arms like Catholic Charities and Jewish Family
Services; 2) community development corporations that are incorporated separately from
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The First Amendment, in the language of its clauses, erects a boundary
between the federal government and religious institutions by ensuring that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... . 4 The two clauses of the
amendment guarantee two distinct forms of religious liberty. "The
Establishment Clause prevents the government from imposing religion on
people," and the Free Exercise Clause prevents government from interfering
with the religion people choose to exercise. Because Charitable Choice
allows pervasively religious organizations to compete for federal funding to
provide services to the needy, potential conflicts with the separation of
church and state guaranteed in the First Amendment may arise.
6
This article will explore Charitable Choice and its practical implica-
tions, as well as its possible constitutional conflicts. It argues that despite
well crafted language, which may allow Charitable Choice legislation to pass
constitutional muster, profound issues are raised when the states extend
Charitable Choice laws as a new national social policy. These policies,
particularly in regard to providing healthcare services for the poor through
religious outreach, appear to be designed primarily as an effort to shift more
responsibilities currently filled by government to the private sector.7
congregations but with a religious base, and; 3) congregations and churches. Id. There is no
agreement as to what specifically defines a faith-based organization. See id.
3. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilitation Act of 1996, supra
note 1. The Charitable Choice Provision, § 104, encourages states to involve community and
faith-based organizations in providing federally funded welfare services to the needy. Id.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
5. RICHARD B. COUSER, MINISTRY AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 30 (1993).
6. Id. at 40. "Pervasively sectarian" institutions are defined as those where "religion
is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are subscribed in the religious
mission." Id. In such an institution, even aid designated for secular purposes "may
nonetheless advance the pervasively sectarian institution's 'religious mission."' Id. "The risk
of such inappropriate grants, however, did not justify striking down the act as unconstitu-
tional .. " Id. See also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 610 (1988) (quoting Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973)).
7. See Rebecca Carr, Leader of Faith-Based Proposal Is a Fighter, PALM BEACH
POST, Apr. 8, 2000, at 21A. John Dilulio is now the director of the new White House Office
of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives. Id. He promotes Charitable Choice legislation to
give religious organizations more "access to federal money to deliver social services." Id.
Appointed by President George W. Bush, Dilulio says he first realized the power of African-
American churches on his community growing up in his Catholic blue-collar Philadelphia
neighborhood. Id. Dilulio stated, in a recent White House interview, that much of America's
social capital is thriving in churches, mosques, and synagogues that government should
support those efforts. Id. "To work around these organizations as if they are somehow
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First, the nature and history of Charitable Choice on the federal and
state levels will be discussed. Second, the article will examine the legal
evolution of the boundary between church and state, and analyze the
relevance of that boundary to Charitable Choice legislation. Third, since
there has been no Supreme Court case that has ruled directly on the
constitutionality of Charitable Choice, a real-life scenario involving the
proposed closing of a hospital in West Palm Beach, Florida will be studied.
This example will highlight some possible ramifications in the event that a
community faces the choice of providing its safety net healthcare through
pervasively religious groups rather than providing no healthcare access for
their poor.
]I. WHAT IS CHARITABLE CHOICE?
A. Definition of Faith-Based Services
The 1996 federal welfare reform bill restructured the federal welfare
system. This legislation, formally entitled the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), replaced the
former federal entitlement program known as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) with a block grant program, Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), to be administered by the
states. This block grant to the states provides cash assistance to needy
families within a five-year lifetime limit.9 When the welfare reform law
'radioactive' because we presume they are proselytizing, because we presume they can do
nothing other than sectarian worship, is just the height of civic irrationality .... I d.
8. The controversy is clear in the comments of Marvin Olasky, senior fellow at the
Acton Institute and editor of World magazine, who was President George W. Bush's chief
architect for the "compassionate conservative" philosophy. Olasky criticizes John Dilulio's
approach to open up federal money to "fringe" religions. Olasky says Diluilio should avoid
controversies and stick to promoting less controversial faith-based proposals like regulatory
reform, tax code incentives, and non-discrimination in grant making. The controversy is
further underscored in a recent poll for the People and the Press and the Pew Forum on
Religion and Public Life, which found seventy-five percent of Americans favored the
president's faith-based initiative, but only thirty-eight percent favored giving money to
Muslim mosques or Buddhist temples. See Kingsley Guy, Cult Status As Much Political As
Theological, SUN-SENTiNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Apr. 20, 2001, at 23A.
9. Leighton Ku & Teresa A. Coughlin, How the New Welfare Reform Law Affects
Medicaid, URBAN INSTrrUTE, 1997, available at http://newfederalism.urban.orglhtmlanfla5
.htm.
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passed as H.R. 3734,10 Medicaid might also have been reorganized along
similar lines. However, Medicaid's entitlement status was not changed,
despite an initial attempt to restructure Medicaid as a block grant as well.
Instead, the bill delinked welfare and Medicaid eligibility, narrowed
Medicaid eligibility for disabled children in the Supplementary Security
Income (SSI) program, terminated access to Medicaid for some legal
immigrants through loss of SSI, and barred most future legal immigrants
from Medicaid.
Basically, the welfare reform law reduced the number of people
covered and lowered federal expenditures by a projected $4 billion over six
years, through 2002, while giving the states more flexibility in structuring
their welfare and health insurance programs."t Yet, the former welfare
population could still qualify for Medicaid health insurance coverage under
separate standards. Within this welfare reform law, in section 104, is a key
provision called Charitable Choice. 12 This provision is designed to stimulate
10. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra
note 1.
11. Ku, supra note 9, at 14. The major policy goal of the new welfare law was to
provide more flexibility to states in both welfare and Medicaid, albeit with fewer dollars. Id.
But counties and cities that maintain public or safety net hospitals that serve large numbers of
indigent and uninsured patients would need to tap other local or state revenue sources to cover
the uncompensated care costs. Id. Most affected will be hospitals and clinics in high
immigrant areas such as South Florida, South Texas, or New York City. Id. at 5.
12. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, supra
note 1.
The specific sections of § 604(a) provide:
(a) In general
(1) State options
A State may-
(A) administer and provide services under the programs described in
subparagraphs (A) and (B)(i) of paragraph (2) through contracts with charita-
ble, religious, or private organizations; and
(B) provide beneficiaries of assistance under the programs described in
subparagraphs (A) and (B)(ii) of paragraph (2) with certificates, vouchers, or
other forms of disbursement which are redeemable with such organizations.
(2) Programs described
The programs described in this paragraph are the following programs:
(A) A State program funded under Part A of title IV of the Social Security Act (as
amended by section 103 (a) of this Act).
(B) Any other program established or modified under title I or I of this Act, that-
(i) permits contracts with organizations; or
(ii) permits certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement to be
provided to beneficiaries, as a means of providing assistance.
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(b) Religious Organizations
The purpose of this section is to allow States to contract with religious organizations, or to
allow religious organizations to accept certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement
under any program described in subsection (a)(2) of this section, on the same basis as any
other nongovernmental provider without impairing the religious character of such organiza-
tions, and without diminishing the religious freedom of beneficiaries of assistance funded
under such program.
(c) Nondiscrimination against religious organizations
In the event a State exercises its authority under subsection (a) of this section, religious
organizations are eligible, on the same basis as any other private organizations, as contrac-
tors to provide assistance, or to accept certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disburse-
ment, under any program described in subsection (a)(2) of this section so long as the pro-
grams are implemented consistent with the Establishment Clause of the United States Con-
stitution. Except as provided in subsection (k) of this section, neither the Federal Govern-
ment nor a State receiving funds under such programs shall discriminate against an organi-
zation which is or applies to be a contractor to provide assistance, or which accepts certifi-
cates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement, on the basis that the organization has a re-
ligious character.
(d) Religious character and freedom
(1) Religious organizations
A religious organization with a contract described in subsection (a)(1)(A) of this section,
or which accepts certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement under subsection
(a)(1)(B) of this section, shall retain its independence from Federal, State, and local gov-
ernments, including such organization's control over the definition, development, practice,
and expression of its religious beliefs.
(2) Additional safeguards
Neither the Federal Government nor a State shall require a religious organization to-
(A) alter its form of internal governance; or
(B) remove religious art, icons, scripture, or other symbols; in order to be eligible to
contract to provide assistance, or to accept certificates, vouchers, or other forms of dis-
bursement, funded under a program described in subsection (a)(2) of this section.
(e) Rights of beneficiaries of assistance
(1) In general.
If an individual described in paragraph (2) has an objection to the religious character of the
organization or institution from which the individual receives, or would receive, assistance
funded under any program described in subsection (a)(2)of this section, the State in which
the individual resides shall provide such individual (if otherwise eligible for such assis-
tance) within a reasonable period of time after the date of such objection with assistance
from an alternative provider that is accessible to the individual and the value of which is not
less than the value of the assistance which the individual would have received from such or-
ganization.
(2) Individual described
An individual described in this paragraph is an individual who receives, applies for, or
requests to apply for, assistance under a program described in subsection (a)(2) of this
section.
(f) Employment Practices
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new collaborations between government and faith-based organizations
(FBOs),13 particularly in regard to spending Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) funds, the new name for federal welfare money
provided as block grants to the states to administer.
Pursuant to section 104 of PRWORA, state governments which opt to
contract with social service providers cannot legally prevent FBOs from
competing for contracts simply because they are pervasively sectarian. The
Charitable Choice provision, authored by Senator John Ashcroft of Missouri,
prior to his recent appointment as Attorney General, has three basic
goals: 1) to encourage states to expand the involvement of community and
faith-based organizations in providing local services; 2) to protect the
religious character of participating faith-based organizations; and 3) to
protect the religious liberty of the individuals they may serve.14
The theory behind Charitable Choice relies on three statutory
principles: 1) to provide a nondiscrimination provision against religious
providers; 2) to protect the rights of faith-based providers to keep their
institutional autonomy; and 3) to provide choice through the free exercise
rights of beneficiaries to say "no" to the services provided by a religious
provider. 15 By stating that beneficiaries who object to receiving faith-based
services have the choice of which service provider to utilize, section 104
codifies the constitutional requirements for governmental interaction with
faith-based providers in a way that intends to honor United States Supreme
A religious organization's exemption provided under section [702 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-1 a)] regarding employment practices shall not be affected by its
participation in, or receipt of funds from, programs described in subsection (a)(2) of this
section.
(g) Nondiscrimination against beneficiaries
Except as otherwise provided in law, a religious organization shall not discriminate against
an individual in regard to rendering assistance funded under any program described in sub-
section (a)(2) of this section on the basis of religion, a religious belief, or refusal to actively
participate in a religious practice.
13. The term "faith-based" organization or provider of services is used here very
broadly to include whatever is generally construed to mean a religious organization under the
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.
14. See http://www.fed-sQc.orgfPulblications/practicegroupnewsletters/PG%2OLinks/
charchoice.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002). Carl Esbeck, Director of the Center for Law and
Religious Freedom, described these goals in a panel debate with Elliot Mincberg, Policy
Director for the People for the American Way Foundation sponsored by the Federalist Society,
a conservative group. Id. Esbeck, one of the chief architects of Charitable Choice, argues that
it is consistent with the Establishment Clause, while Mincberg argues that it is unconstitu-
tional. Id.
15. Id.
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Court precedents for government neutrality.' 6 How the Supreme Court will
ultimately decide the constitutionality of Charitable Choice remains unclear,
but it seems likely from President Bush's track record in Texas on Charitable
Choice, and his proactive stand on the concept since entering the White
House, that the federal government will avidly embrace the concept of
working with faith-based organizations.
Since the Charitable Choice law is designed to make social service
grants available to religious groups without impairing the religious character
of those groups, the very essence of these faith-based organizations seems to
lie in the strength of their religious message. Since this is emerging territory
for the boundaries between church and state, and moves the boundary line, it
is likely to stimulate defining litigation in at least four areas which may pose
concerns: proselytizing beneficiaries; employment discrimination on the
basis of religion; government entanglement; and adverse effects on religious
missions. 7 But key to any court analysis on how far to go in deregulating
religion will be whether Charitable Choice truly provides choice to
beneficiaries to avoid religious coercion as a condition of getting govern-
ment funded services.
The language of section 104 requires the states to provide an alternative
to a religious provider if there is objection, and the alternative must be both
timely and of comparable service. The Charitable Choice provision got little
attention when it was first adopted as part of the welfare overhaul in 1996.
Nor did it appear on many radar screens when it was expanded to cover drug
treatment and community development grants in 1998.18 However, when
President Bush created the White House Office of Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives in late January to launch his plan to use government
money to fund religious charities providing social services, new attention
focused on this existing provision of the law.
16. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 230-31 (1997). The neutrality principle
inherent in the Establishment Clause does not bar the government from providing public funds
to religious organizations, provided the purpose is interpreted as neutral. Id. The Agostini
Court held that public school teachers could provide federally funded remedial education to
disadvantaged students in parochial schools. Id. Agostini assumes public funding distributed
in a neutral fashion is "less likely to have the effect of advancing religion." Id.
17. See Julie A. Segal, Welfare for Churches: Buyers and Beneficiaries Beware, 5
GEO. J. ON FIGHTING PovERTY 71 (Winter 1997). The writer is a policy analyst for Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, which argues against the constitutionality of
Charitable Choice. Id.
18. Laura Meckler, Bill Expands 'Charitable Choices,' SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Mar. 4,2001, at lB.
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Presently, members of Congress are pressing ahead with legislation to
allow religious groups to compete for government money, including a major
expansion of charitable choices, which allows groups to qualify for grants
without divorcing their programs from religion. Senator Rick Santorum, (R-
Pennsylvania), along with Representatives J.C. Watts, Jr. (R-Oklahoma), and
Tony P. Hall, (D-Ohio), plan to introduce expanded legislation later this
year, which translates President Bush's plans into future law.' 9 Faith-based
providers held an organizational summit for Congress in Washington on
April 24-25, 2001, to further advocate for legislation to expand the plans.
But legislators have recently slowed down the effort to give more time
to fine-tune the proposals, which ran into controversy and were unexpectedly° ° .,. • • ° 20
criticized by religious conservatives, as well as civil libertarians. Critics on
the right reportedly fear the program could cause churches to become
dependent on government funds, and objectionable sects could be funded .2
On the left, opponents fear an expanded program would chip away at the
separation between church and state and permit government funded hiring
discrimination. President Bush said at a press conference on February 22,
2001, defending his plan: "I believe that so long as there's a secular
alternative available, we ought to allow individuals who we're helping to be
able to choose a program that may be run by a faith-based program.,
22
19. Elizabeth Becker, Bill on Church Aid Proposes Tax Incentives for Giving, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2001, at 18. These bills will include tax credits to help low income workers
open savings accounts at banks, charitable contribution deductions for people who do not
itemize deductions on their income tax returns, and full deductions for donations of food to
charities for restaurants and grocers. Id. Interestingly, this suggests that private, profit-
making organizations like banks, restaurants, and grocers are the first in line to get tax breaks
from faith-based initiatives.
20. Dana Milbank, Senators Slow Action on 'Faith-Based' Aid, WASH. POST, Mar.
14, 2001, at Al. Sen. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.) will wait several months to a year now to act on
Charitable Choice in order to build consensus for his proposal and will likely split the bill in
two. Id. The first bill will focus on tax incentives for charitable giving which has broad-based
support. Id. The second part will likely be an incremental approach to charitable choice
which he hopes to expand to five Cabinet agencies. Id.
21. See Debate 2, Should the Government Provide Financial Support for Religious
Institutions that Offer Faith-Based Social Services?, at 7, available at http://www.camlaw
.rutgers.edu/publications/law-religion/debate_2.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2001). "I do not
want to see state budget battles in my home state of Virginia, between the Methodists, the
Scientologists, and Jerry Falwell over the amount of the welfare block grant that is going to
each one." (quoting the Rev. Barry W. Lynn, an ordained minister in the United Church of
Christ and attorney with Americans United for Separation of Church and State). Id.
22. Laurie Goodstein, Bush's Charity Plan is Raising Concerns for Religious Right,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3,2001, at Al1.
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President Bush's comment stresses the choice factor inherent in the
charitable choice provision. However, a central question is not being raised.
What occurs under Charitable Choice provisions when, in terms of practical
applications, there is no alternative choice available?
B. Background
Throughout America, healthcare is undergoing a major structural
transformation. According to the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, "one-
third of all hospitals in the United States are failing financially, an equal
percentage is [approaching fiscal failure], and the other third is barely
making it."23 As healthcare in the United States faces a significant financial
crisis resulting in aggressive managed care and changing government
policies, hospital markets around the country face declining occupancy rates
and inpatient activity. These declines suggest many markets will face the
continuing shrinkage of their healthcare providers through merger and
consolidation. Such a scenario assures many markets fewer choices for
healthcare and may undercut the implicit promise in Charitable Choice, that
there will be alternative providers if needed.
Charitable Choice legislation represents a significant change from the
historical practices and approaches of government in funding reli ous
groups. Faith-based providers have long provided services to the poor. In
the past, the government often would contract with religious groups to
provide certain services, but safeguards were typically kept in 9lace to
protect the integrity of the groups and the interests of taxpayers. Previ-
ously, religious institutions had to create separate secular entities, (separate
501(c)(3) organizations), or sanitize its religious nature to receive public
23. Consultants Study of Intracoastal Health Systems 35, (Oct. 30, 2000) (quoting the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, June 1, 2000) (on file with author).
24. See Sean Mehegan, The Federal Connection: Nonprofits Are Looking More and
More to Washington, NON PROFrr Trims, Nov. 1994, at 43. According to a non-profit study,
sixty-five percent of Catholic Charities' revenues, seventy-five percent of the Jewish Board of
Family and Children's Services revenues, and ninety-two percent of Lutheran Social
Ministries' revenues, come from government. Id.
25. See ACLU Briefing Paper Number 3-Church and State, at http://www.lectlaw
.comtfiles/con07.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2002). The ACLU believes government funding of
services within religious facilities is constitutional only if: 1) the program is run by a
nonreligious group; 2) the nonreligious group's staff has no association with the religious
facility; 3) the program has no religious content; 4) no religious symbols are displayed; 5)
children are admitted on a nondiscriminatory basis, and; 6) government pay only to rent the
religious facility. Id. This view contrasts sharply with the Charitable Choice provision. Id.
20021
176
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
funds. Theoretically, these separate corporations allowed government to
ensure that tax money was used for secular purposes, such as health services
•• 26
only, rather than for religious worship or proselytizing.
Charitable Choice removes the safeguards, allows groups to evangelize
while providing publicly financed services, and permits groups to discrimi-
nate in hiring on religious grounds. 27 There may be significant, if not radical
changes in the way healthcare is funded in the future. Since the welfare
reform bill passed, millions of people were moved from welfare to the job
market, but needed transitional healthcare benefits, paid for by Medicaid, to
do so. 28  Medicaid, the joint federal-state government-funded healthcare
program for low income citizens, insures forty-one million Americans
through a federal-state partnership. The Charitable Choice provision applies
when states enter into purchase-of-service contracts or voucher arrangements
with independent sector organizations under the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families program (TANF).29
TANF provides states with grants to be spent on time-limited cash
assistance. 30 TANF generally limits a family's lifetime cash welfare benefits
to a maximum of five years and permits states to impose a wide range of
other requirements, such as employment.3 1  If a person was eligible for
AFDC, he or she would still be eligible for Medicaid, but although most
persons covered by TANF will receive Medicaid, it is no longer required by
law-in essence, Medicaid and welfare eligibility are no longer linked.
32
26. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 631 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In
discussing pervasively sectarian environments and proselytizing, the case described these
issues as terms of art with roots in the "Court's recognition that government must not engage
in detailed supervision of the inner workings of religious institutions . I..." d.
27. See generally Americans United for Separation of Church and State, (Apr. 11,
2001), at http://www.au.org/press/pr4110l.htm (opposing the Watts-Hall bill, (H.R. 7) as
subsidizing religious discrimination and citing a poll released by the Pew Forum showing that
78% of Americans say government-funded religious groups should not be able to hire only
people who share their beliefs to staff programs, a key component of the Bush plan).
28. Interview with Louis Sullivan, M.D., Goodwin Seminar Speaker, Shepard Broad
Law Center, Nova Southeastern University in Ft. Lauderdale, Fla. (Apr. 16, 2001). According
to Dr. Louis Sullivan, former head of HHS, current HHS Director Tommy Thompson may be
creative in forging national healthcare policy for the poor through transitional healthcare
waivers now being crafted through welfare reform. Id.
29. Letter from Timothy M. Westmoreland, Director of Health Care Financing
Administration, to State Medicaid Directors (Jan. 6, 2000).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (codified in Title 1 of DROWRA).
31. Id.
32. Id. AFDC was codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (repealed by § 103(a) of
DRWORA).
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Charitable Choice also applies to the Supplementary Security Income
(SSI) program, and therefore can be read to include food stamps and
Medicaid programs,33 to the extent that states administer these programs
using contracts or vouchers with non-governmental providers.34 Broadly
interpreted, faith-based providers could offer everything from maternity
homes, medical and health services that include drug and alcohol treatment,
and primary healthcare. Since states may also contract with faith-based
providers to administer social services, this could encompass setting
eligibility standards for beneficiaries. Medicaid spending rose nine percent
nationally last year, the largest increase in seven years, and now costs the
36states more than $200 billion a year. Legislators are scrambling to find
ways to cut these costs and to provide more flexibility for shifting the costs
of government programs to local providers.37
C. The National Situation
On the national level, Charitable Choice has become one of the key
struggles in church/state legislative activities with many special interest
groups lining up on both sides of the issue. Its supporters include the Center
for Public Justice, the Christian Legal Society, the National Association of
Evangelicals, and the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations, to name but
a few. Groups opposed include the American Civil Liberties Union, the
American Jewish Committee, Americans United for the Separation of
Church and State, and many conservative religious groups. 38 These groups
33. In 1996, the State of Texas asked the Clinton Administration to approve their plan
to contract out welfare, Medicaid, and food stamps. See Barbara Vobejda, Privatization of
Social Programs Curbed; Texas Is Told Finns Can't Determine Medicaid, Food Stamp
Eligibility, WASH. POST, May 10, 1997, at A9. Clinton approved only the welfare waiver, but
not Medicaid and food stamps. Id. But under President Bush, new interest in broader waivers
seems likely.
34. According to the analysis of the Congressional Research Service, these additional
programs are the SSI program, and probably the food stamps, and Medicaid programs. See
CRS memo, "Questions Re Section 104 of P.L 104-193 (H.R. 3734) Concerning Services
Provided by Charitable Religious or Private Organizations," Sept. 1996 (from the American
Law Division), and CRES memo "[a]pplication of Section 104 of P.L. 104-193" Oct. 18,
1996 (by the Education and Public Welfare Division).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(1)(A) (1997).
36. Id.
37. Robert Pear, Governors Offer 'Radical' Revision of Medicaid Plan, N.Y. TIMEs,
Feb. 26, 2001, available at http:llwww.nytimes.com/2001/2/26/politics/26GOVS.html.
38. Marc D. Stem, Resist Temptation, JTS MAG., Spring 2000, at http://www
.jtsa.edulpubs/jtsmag.
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perceive that funding and regulation in the long run are inescapably
intertwined, and it is unwise to allow religious organizations to become
financially beholden to government. 39 They see great risk in allowing
government funds to go to pervasively religious institutions without
adequate safeguards.4°
These groups hold that Charitable Choice chips away at the wall
between church and state, and unconstitutionally permits government
advancement of religions, while risking a general weakening of religious
autonomy and integrity.4' Some social policy advocates also fear that
government reliance on faith-based organizations for social services could
weaken the social safety net, by allowing the government to retreat from its
traditional role as a health and social service provider, and to shift the social
and financial burden to private institutions.42 Whether this shift of services
from public to private providers is a realistic possibility is questionable
given the current amount of social services provided by the private sector.
There have been major efforts to document how much aid church-related
groups give to the poor.
In 1994, private contributions to the six largest faith-based organiza-
tions totaled $1.67 billion. This sum included $644 million to the Salvation
Army; $315 million to the Union of Gospel Missions; $250 million to
Jewish Federations; $204 million to Catholic Charities USA; $106 million to
Christian Social Service Agencies; and $15 million to the YMCA.43 The
percentage of funds that goes to social services is hard to determine because
many of the major denominations, including the Evangelical Lutherans, the
Southern Baptists, the United Methodists, and some Catholic archdioceses
do not keep records on what social services its churches or parishes provide.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, What is "Charitable Choice?"
(2000), at http://pewforum.org/issues/charitablechoice.php3.
43. There is no common definition as to what comprises a faith-based or religious
institution. President Bush has talked about Chuck Colson's prison ministry. But such a
mainstream concept may be quite different in operation than the street ministry of Minister
Louis Farrakhan's Nation of Islam or the beliefs held by the Church of Scientology, all of
which could likely qualify to compete for tax money. See Griener, supra note 2; Mark
Chaves, Religious Congregations and Welfare Reform: Who Will Take Advantage of
Charitable Choice? AM. Soc. REV. 836-46 (Dec. 1999) (noting few clerics understand the
issue yet, but black churches are more likely than white to participate in government faith-
based contracts). Id.
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The American Association of Fund Raising counsel estimates about
twelve percent of the amount raised by churches and synagogues "annually
goes to 'direct social service provision by congregations.' [which] [i]n 1995
would have amounted to $12.6 billion."44 Since 1996, Congress has passed
additional legislation involving Charitable Choice provisions. These
include: the Welfare-to-Work program (1997); the Community Services
Block Grant program funded by the Health and Human Service Reauthoriza-
tion Act (1998); the drug treatment programs funded by the Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Services Administration (2000); and the Community
Renewal and New Markets Act of 2000. The purpose of President Bush's
aforementioned Executive Order of January 29, 2001, which authorized the
establishment of an Executive Department Center for Faith-Based and
Community Initiatives, is to expand Charitable Choice legislation, and to
ensure that states, local government, and its contractors comply with the law.
He estimates it would cost $8 billion in the first year of his administration.45
Proponents continue to attach Charitable Choice provisions to popular
legislation. In the last session of Congress, several acts of health-related
legislation included the provisions. The American Community Renewal Act
(H.R. 815), could require substance abuse beneficiaries to "actively
participate in religious practice, worship and instruction." The Adoption
Awareness Act of 1999 was marked up as part of the Child Health Act of
2000, but not included. Other pieces of legislation include a Safe and Drug
Free Schools and Communities bill, the Substance Abuse Mental Health
Reauthorization Act (SAMHSA),46 and the Faith-Based Drug Treatment
Enhancement Act, which explicitly allows religious organizations to receive
federal funds for substance abuse treatment and rehabilitation, and requires
beneficiaries to actively participate in religious practice, worship, and
instruction.
44. Martin Morse Wooster, Faith-Based Charity: Poised for a Revival?, Capital
Research Center, TPTm.-REv., Apr. 30, 2000, at http:lwww.capitalresearch.orglap/ap-
0400.html.
45. White House Press Release, George W. Bush, Executive Order, Agency
Responsibilities with Respect to Faith Based and Community Initiatives (Jan. 29, 2001). When
Bush was Governor of Texas he signed a similar order. The Texas Legislature then approved
four bills in 1997 to encourage "faith-based organizations to offer child care, drug and alcohol
counseling, medical services and other welfare-related services ...." H.R. 2481, 75th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); H.R. 2482, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); H.R. 21, 75th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997); and S. Con. Res. 44, 75th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1997).
46. Faith Communities: Studies, Articles and Reports, SAMHSA, (Sept. 1997) at
http://www.samhsa.gov/searchlsearch.
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Faith-based models for rehabilitating inner-city drug addicts abound,
and popular support for church-state partnerships seems to be on the rise. A
poll for the Democratic Leadership Council in 1999 found seventy-two
percent of Americans favor close collaboration between government,
religious, and charitable organizations to address the nation's problems, and
"[t]he Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life reports even higher support
among minorities and low- income families for such collaborations.A
7
These trends suggest a climate which would welcome the shift of social
services and costs to the private sector.
Already, Congress has jumped on the idea of a market-based system for
healthcare delivery. A market-based system, in which economic market
forces regulate healthcare provisions, has been the pet project of conserva-
tive groups such as the Heritage Foundation for some time.49 Senator John
Breaux (D)-La. and Senator Bill Frist (R)-Tenn.49 introduced their version of
a market-based bill to reform Medicare in which private insurance
companies compete to provide healthcare coverage for the elderly and
disabled.
Section 104 authorizes two types of governmental financial arrange-
ments with independent providers. One method includes purchase-of-
service contracts by which government pays providers to deliver specified
services. 51 Such contracts are a means for the government to deal directly
with providers.52 The other type of financial arrangement consists of
government-provided certificates, vouchers or other forms of disbursement,
which are redeemable with the providers.53 This government relationship
47. Aimee Welch, Charitable Choice for Washington, INSIGHT MAG., (Mar. 23,
2001), at http://www.insightmag.com/archive/200101091.shtml.
48. Larry Lipman, Market-Based System Not Cure for Medicare Woes, PALM BEACH
POST, Feb. 12, 2001, at 1E. The Breaux-Frist proposal allows companies to compete to offer
plans at least equal to current Medicare levels and to offer a separate option plan to include
prescriptions. Id. Based on bids, a government board determines how much Medicare would
pay. Id.
49. It is noted that Senator Bill Frist's brother is Dr. Thomas F. Frist, chairman of
HCA/Columbia, the nation's largest for-profit healthcare provider.
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A) (1994). The Center for Public Justice, A Guide to
Charitable Choice: The Rules of Section 104 of the 1996 Federal Welfare Law Governing
State Cooperation with Faith-based Social-Service Providers (1997) analyzes this section in
its pamphlet from an advocate's perspective, at http://web.cyberis.net/vhosts/nlrc.org/public
docs/charityl.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2001).
51. § 604a(a)(2).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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with the provider is indirect, as the assistance goes to the beneficiary before
passing to the provider. Both forms can be used in a market-based system.
In the case of TANF, states are authorized to use both "direct" and
"indirect" means of paying for services provided by independent organiza-
tionsF 4 Section 104 leaves it up to the states whether to involve independent
sector providers of social services or to provide all services through
government agencies.55 If a state elects to involve any independent sector
providers, then it may not exclude religious providers from consideration.
56
Certainly there may be other ways to indirectly provide government funds to
faith-based charities such as channeling funds through intermediary
organizations; the federal tax credit is another vehicle that could provide
government assistance indirectly. Unlike the existing tax deduction for
charitable contributions, a tax credit would allow a greater sum to be given
to charity since the amount would be directly subtracted from the total tax
bill.
57
President Bush's proposal calls for easing regulations that make it
difficult for religious-based charities to work with government agen-
cies. The Bush plan offers "a $500-per-person tax credit for charitable
donations and a charitable deduction for the 70 percent of Americans who do
not itemize tax returns; ... ."" In addition, "it allow[s] religious charities to
compete for government grants on equal footing with secular organiza-
tions."59
On September 21, 2000, Bush wrote in USA Today that he would
allocate $80 billion over ten years in tax incentives to help churches provide
services. Such unabashed plans certainly underscore why the Charitable
Choice laws have been described by the Center for Public Justice, as an
equal employment opportunity plan for faith-based providers.6 Bills already
filed in the 107th Congress put private sector profit-making organizations
54. The Center for Public Justice, A Guide to Charitable Choice: The Rules of
Section 104 of the 1996 Federal Welfare Law Governing State Cooperation with Faith-based
Social-Service Providers, available at http://web.cyberis.net/vhosts/nlrc.org/public/docs/
charityl/htm. (last visited Mar. 20,2001).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Louis W. Sullivan, M.D., former head of HHS in Special Keynote, Health
Status, Health Maintenance and Health Care in the 21st Century, (Feb. 2000), available at
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archiveMC/0002/0002.p3.html. (last visited Feb. 1, 2000).
58. Dana Milbank, Bush's Faith-Based Group Initiative Will Meet Resistance, WASH.
PoST, Jan. 27, 2001, at AI0.
59. Id.
60. See Stem, supra note 38.
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like banks, restaurants, farmers, and grocers, all in line for tax breaks-in-
waiting for the blessings of faith-based initiatives.
1
On the federal level, much legislation has now been enacted with
charitable choice provisions but on the state level, only about 125 new
initiatives emerged in nine states since 1996.62 Of these collaborations, fifty-
four were with traditional agencies and seventy-one were with faith-based
organizations, not traditionally involved in federal welfare programs,
suggesting Charitable Choice provisions do attract and increase competi-
tion.63
Most states are not yet in compliance with the law. Few seem well
educated or even seem to know about the law. According to the Charitable
Choice Compliance Report Card issued by the Center for Public Justice, a
majority of states have failed to put the new rule into effect by eliminating
old restrictions and restructuring contracts." At this point, only Texas,
Indiana, Wisconsin, and Ohio have begun codifying Charitable Choice
provisions into their formal contracts.
"Indiana has become a leader in... implementing government-faith-
based collaborations."65  In November 1999, FaithWorks Indiana began to
develop partnerships. 66 The initiative has awarded $5 million in contracts to
forty-four different faith groups, using a large private accounting firm,
Crowe-Chizek, as the independent contractor to develop the connections, but
the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration distributes the TANF
money to the efforts. 67 In California, the state-level Office of Community
Relations screens the applicants but Shasta County's FaithWorks! acts as the
intermediary for training the church members in best practices, using
61. Editorial, Faith-Based Indulgence, Bush Plan Encouraging Greed, Not Charity,
PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 30, 2001, at 18A.
62. See The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, supra note 42.
63. Gretchen M. Griener, Charitable Choice and Welfare Reform: Collaboration
Between State and Local Governments and Faith-Based Organizations, WELFARE INFO.
NETWORK, (Sept. 6, 2000), at http://www.welfareinfo.org/issuenotoecharitablechoice.htm.
64. The Center for Public Justice, A Guide to Charitable Choice, at
http://web.cyberis.net/uhots/nlrc.orglpublicdocs/charity/.htm. The Center for Public Justice in
Washington, D.C. conducts public policy research and civic education from a Christian
perspective. Id. It works closely with the Christian Legal Society's Center for Law and
Religious Freedom, a network of attorneys and lay people doing legal advocacy. Id.
65. Greiner, supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 6-7.
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Catholic Charities as its fiscal agent for administering to the TANF clients
appropriately.
68
In Texas, TANF funds are divided between the Department of Human
Services and the Texas Workforce Commission. 69 They use a contract group
called Texas Family Pathfinders to match TANF families with services.7
Texas Family Pathfinders involves 174 active teams, 122 that are faith-
based. Apparently, most other states have not yet begun the work to bring
government procurement policies and procedures into sync with the law on
Charitable Choice, perhaps mistakenly believing these guidelines are
optional, when in fact, they are required.
D. The Florida Situation
In Florida, over the past three years, as more people were moved from
welfare to work under the welfare reform bill, they too needed transitional
health benefits paid for by Medicaid. As more children applied for state
sponsored, low-cost healthcare, they discovered their families were poor
enough for Medicaid too.73 These factors, on top of swelling drug prices and
faulty Medicaid growth estimates made by state economists, have led to an
estimated $944 million deficit in Medicaid this year in Florida.74
With an unexpected $944 million hole to fill this legislative session,
program cuts loom and proposals to eliminate prenatal care for thousands of
pregnant women and to move Medipass clients to a Medicaid HMO all have
surfaced in the legislature. The Agency for Health Care Administration
proposes to move 107,689 people in twenty-eight Florida counties from its
Medipass program into Medicaid health maintenance organizations to save
the agency about $17 million, since Medipass pays more money than the
HMOs." The National Governors' Association is also proposing radical
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Greiner, supra note 63.
72. See Welch, supra note 47.
73. Danielle Conn Rosenberg, Florida Kidcare Act of 1998: How Will It Benefit
Your Child? Children First Project (1998), at http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/children-firstl
kidcarz.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2001).
74. Linda Kleindienst, Proposals for Budget Cuts Hurt Poor, Needy, SuN-SENTINME
(Ft. Lauderdale), Mar. 11, 2001, at 17A.
75. Sanjay Bhatt, State Plan Could Hurt Local Health Clinics, PALM BFACH POST,
Feb. 15, 2001, at 5B.
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changes in Medicaid to allow states to have greater flexibility to cover more
76people, but with fewer benefits.
Some Florida legislators clearly intend to bring Charitable Choice to
this state in a far more comprehensive way, since $630 million has been
"tucked away in the Florida House's budget" this legislative session to be
earmarked for social programs modeled upon Charitable Choice law.77 If it
survives, it will open the door for the state to begin codifying charitable
choice accountability rules in its contracts.
78
Concurrently, it was announced on April 6, 2001, that Florida will get
further leeway in how it spends certain Medicaid dollars and receive at least
another $159 million from the federal government to spend on the state's
major healthcare centers, where the poor are served and charity care is
79provided. Seventy Florida hospitals, most of which are not state run,
including Jackson Memorial, Broward General, Imperial Point, South
Florida State, North Broward Hospital District, Columbia Hospital, St.
Mary's Hospital in West Palm Beach, and A.G. Holley State Hospital will
benefit.80
Governor Jeb Bush said that "[tihis is part of a strategy with the new
administration, [his brother's], to trust states,"81 and "Florida is among a
handful of states suddenly winning approval for Medicaid spending
82changes" under the first waiver to a state for its Medicaid programs. Four
more waivers are expected to be granted shortly.83 This appears to be a clear
signal that the federal government is poised to help Florida avert its
healthcare budget crisis. Undoubtedly this can be viewed as a political favor
from the President, underscored even more by the recent appointment of
Ruben King-Shaw, the Secretary of the Florida State Agency for Health Care
Administration that oversees Medicaid, to become the second-in-command
76. See Segal, supra note 17.
77. Rep. Johnnie Byrd, R.-Plant City, "is the sponsor of legislation to make no-strings
grants to churches legal" in Florida and the GOP members of the House are supporting it.
Editorial, House Tithes Taxpayers on Behalf of Churches, PALM BEACH POST, Apr. 6, 2001, at
18A.
78. Id.
79. Mark Hollis, U.S. Frees up Medicaid Cash for State, SUN-SENTNnL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Apr. 6, 2001, at 5B.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Florida has had Medicaid waiver requests pending before the federal Health Care
Financing Administration for nearly three years. In less than three months, President Bush
acted on his brother's request. Id.
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at the federal agency, HCFA, the agency that runs the national health
programs.
84
It also suggests much work has already gone on behind the scenes to
prepare the state for entering the Charitable Choice era. The Medicaid
waivers give Florida more power to experiment with new healthcare delivery
systems and to offer care to uninsured people who otherwise would not be
eligible for the program. Charitable Choice provisions in federal law already
cover certain medical and healthcare services, including operation of health
clinics, drug and alcohol treatment, and abstinence education programs.
The radical changes proposed for Medicaid85 warrant further scrutiny as
the potential long-term effects on healthcare for the poorest and most
vulnerable population are affected by expanding Charitable Choice.86 As
government moves forward in its attempt to shift more of these services to
the local communities' religious providers, there also appears to be an influx
of private entrepreneurial providers lining up at the gates in wait. Many of
these efforts represent a philosophical shift or paradigm in how best to
revitalize urban neighborhoods, which many believe have seemingly failed
to thrive under traditional government entitlement programs.8s
84. Robert Pear, Lobbyist Top Contender to Run Medicare, Medicaid, SUN-SENTINEL
(Ft. Lauderdale), Mar. 4, 2001, at 6A. King-Shaw will be deputy to Thomas A. Scully, a
lobbyist for the hospital industry. Scully will be nominated to be administrator of the Health
Care Financing Administration, of the Department of Health and Human Services, that runs
Medicare, Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program. If Scully and King-Shaw
are both confirmed, market-based health care delivery seems likely to continue. Id.
85. Jena Heath, Governors Want More Freedom with Medicaid, PALmi BEACH POST,
Feb. 26, 2001, at 3A. The National Governors Association has proposed radical changes in
Medicaid with less generous benefits because healthcare costs are rising at the same time tax
revenues are declining. Id. The proposed plan would allow states to combine Medicaid with
private health insurance and use it to pay for part of the employee share of premiums under
employer-sponsored health plans. Id.
86. African-American churches are more likely to respond to charitable choice than
any other denomination according to a study by Mark Chaves, associate professor at the
University of Arizona. Mark Chaves, Congregations' Social Service Activities, Policy Brief
No. 6 (Dec. 1999). Urban Institute, Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy, available at
http://www.urban.org/periodcl/cnp-6.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2001) (on file with author).
87. See The Kaiser Commission on Medicaid: Racial, and Ethnic Disparities in
Access to Health Insurance and Health Care, UCLA Center for Health Policy and Research &
the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, (Apr. 2000), at http://www.kff.org.
88. See generally Alliance for Redesigning Government, available at, http:Ilwww
.alliance.napawash.org/alliance/index.htmI (last visited Oct. 31, 2001). This advocacy group
acts as a catalyst in neighborhoods looking to revitalize. Governor Jeb Bush operates Front
Porch Florida, a faith and community-based concept which intends to jump-start black
neighborhoods. In its first eighteen months of operation it has failed to attract sustainable
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H. CHARITABLE CHOICE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Background
To prevent the Charitable Choice provision from violating the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, its proponents have carefully
crafted its language to offer "choice" to potential beneficiaries who may
choose not to accept faith-based services when offered.8 9 The language in
the proposed bill carefully tries to avoid potential ramifications on the
separation of church and state. Specifically, it describes that the state has
the option to and may administer its services "through contracts with
charitable, religious, or private organizations."
9
The current language of the bill states that if a potential beneficiary
objects to the religious character of the organization from which he or she
would receive assistance, the appropriate federal, state, or local governmen-
tal entity shall provide that individual with alternative assistance of equal
value within a reasonable time period.91 The crux of whether Charitable
Choice programs will succeed constitutionally lies in its actual field
implementation. In other words, constitutionality is based upon whether the
government can truly provide an alternative of equal value to accessible
.... 92
providers in a timely fashion. This requirement appears to be a challenging
one in light of proposals for radical changes in Medicaid that would allow
states to offer significantly less generous benefits than are now guaranteed to
the poor.93
If current and proposed government healthcare policies succeed in
significantly cutting back government spending in favor of shifting costs to
non governmental organizations, particularly local faith-based providers, this
shift may alter the long term effects of providing the healthcare "safety net"
for vulnerable populations. If such a result also interferes with the doctrine
of separation of church and state, such a change raises the question of
whether the states have gone beyond constitutional boundaries. As each
state wrestles with how it will change its procurement policies and practices
partnerships with churches and companies due to lack of training and personality clashes. See
Brittany Wallman, State's Front Porch Falling Down, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Apr.
15, 2001, at 1A, 17A.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 604(a) (Supp. V 1994).
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 1994).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Ku, supra note 9.
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to comply with these new provisions, Section 104 is a new law untested in
the courts and applicable constitutional law is developing. At this time, only
some isolated trial court litigation in Texas, California, Kentucky, and
Wisconsin has been filed.94
B. The Legal Evolution of Church/State Relations
A wall has been built between church and state since the time of the
Founding Fathers. In 1802, Thomas Jefferson wrote on the subject in a letter
to the Danbury Baptists:
Believing ... that religion is a matter which lies solely between
man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith
or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach ac-
tions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign rever-
ence that act of the whole American people which declared that
their Legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.' 95
The dilemma confronting legislators and the judiciary lies in the degree
to which one builds the wall of separation between church and state. Much
of the case law on the matter comes out of a long tradition of suspicion of
government funding for religious education, not for the religious provision
of social services. Most case law on church and state issues is about
education. These cases may be helpful in understanding the court's thinking
over time, but education cases also may not be quite on point.
The United States Supreme Court's most significant modem interpreta-
tion of the wall between Church and State stems from Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing Township,96 which relies on a strict separationist
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. In Everson, the Court held that
94. Legal Watch: Charitable Choice Lawsuits, Center for Religion and Civic Culture
at the University of Southern California, (2001), at http:llwww.usc.eduldeptlLAS/
religion~online/welfare/lawsuits.htnl (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
95. See Eyler Robert Coates, Sr., Thomas Jefferson on Politics & Government:
Freedom of Religion at http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeffl650.htm (last
visited Jan. 27, 2002). The "wall of separation" metaphor used by Justice Hugo Black in the
1947 Everson case came from a letter Thomas Jefferson wrote to the Danbury Baptists, during
his presidency, explaining his view of the meaning of the religion clauses. Jefferson's concern
was likely as a way to prevent religion from interfering with government, rather than the
reverse. Id.
96. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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state reimbursement for bus fares to attend religious schools was constitu-
tional.97 The Court acknowledged that the First Amendment was intended to
erect a wall of separation between church and state; however, the Court
found that the plan to reimburse parents for bus transportation benefits the
child, and can therefore be differentiated as a more neutral purpose.98
Voting five-four, the Court rejected the contention that no aid was
necessary, and appeared to distinguish between money going to parochial
schools for secular functions like busing, and money going for religious
purposes. 99 While the dissenters believed free transportation to religious
schools was aiding religion,10 the majority differentiated the specific
purpose for which the money was used.10 1
The Court's opinion in Everson states:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another .... No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institu-
tions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion.
10 2
Thus, Everson sets some judicial precedent for beginning to define the wall
of separation as something which might be viewed more neutrally or equally
if the money's purpose did not aid religion specifically.
There was a proliferation of religious freedom cases in the courts after
the incorporation doctrine made the religion clauses applicable to all
government entities and the chance for conflict multiplied. This was no
doubt accentuated by changes in perspective since the 1960's that brought
into constitutional question many long standing government practices, such
as school prayer.103
Stricter separation case law is developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman,'1
4
when the Court found it unconstitutional to augment parochial school
97. Id. at 18.
98. Id. at 17.
99. Id. at 16.
100. Id. at 18.
101. Everson, 330 U.S. at 20.
102. Id. at 15-16. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. Id.
103. See COUSER, supra note 5.
104. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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teachers' salaries with state funds. 05 The Court held that such a plan caused
excessive entanglement of civil authority and religion. 0 6 Lemon puts forth a
three-prong test for determining when government violates the Establish-
ment Clause: 1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 2) the
principal effect of the statute must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and
3) the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' 07 For a law to be forbidden under Lemon, the government, itself,
must have advanced religion through its own activities and influence.
This separatist test sufficed for nearly a generation until Bowen v.
Kendrick'0 8 signaled a shift in policy by allowing the Adolescent Family Life
Act to provide federal funding to religious organizations for services and
counseling in the area of premarital, adolescent, sexual relations, and
pregnancy. 0 9 The Act in Bowen did not violate the Establishment Clause
because the Court found on its face that the Act did not have the principle
purpose or effect of advancing religion, an accommodating view. n ° Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, writing for the majority, noted that it met the
three-prong test for aid to parochial schools established in Lemon."' Grants
went to religious organizations to fund a sincere and legitimate secular
purpose in dealing with problems of adolescent sexuality. While the act
encouraged grant recipients to involve religious organizations, among others,
in addressing the problem, it was considered too incidental to advance
religion in a way to be a constitutional problem.1 3 The act was neutral." 4 It
was determined that the use 1) had a valid secular purpose; 2) did not have
the primary effect of advancing religion; and 3) did not create an excessive
entanglement of church and state."5 The Court held that it was not a
violation of the Establishment Clause for a religious organization to
participate in the state program even when certain religious goals were
furthered." 6
105. Id. at 612. This case consolidated First Amendment challenges from Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania that provided state aid to parochial schools. Id. at 606-07.
106. Id. at 625.
107. Id. at 612-13.
108. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
109. Id. at 622.
110. Id. at 617.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 593.
113. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 617.
114. Id. at 617.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 622.
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Even in Bowen, however, one finds an educational component in
teaching sexual responsibility to teenagers, which may take it outside the
narrower focus of Charitable Choice. Perhaps the most interesting message
in Bowen is Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion, where she noted that
funding for the moral issue of teenage sexuality was "inevitably more
difficult than in other projects, such as ministering to the poor and
sick."' 1 7 Accordingly, O'Connor's view suggests that government funding
for health needs and hospitals that include faith-based providers would be
constitutional."
8
Not surprisingly then, there are no Supreme Court cases specifically
restricting government financing of church-affiliated social services, so the
case law on this issue is not particularly clear. In fact, there is a long history
of government funding going to church hospitals and other non-educational
social services starting at the turn of the century.
In Bradfield v. Roberts,119 a Catholic-run hospital in Washington,
obtained a capital improvement grant from the government, with the
Supreme Court indicating that organizations devoted to social welfare
activities, such as this Catholic hospital, should not be otherwise denied
governmental money on account of the First Amendment. 120 The Court then
held that the secular charter granted to the hospital, and controlled by
Congress, made the hospital a secular corporation, regardless of the Catholic
sisters that operated it, which can be seen as a rather neutral holding.
121
Arguably, religion has long played a part in religious health ministries from
the early days of alms houses to religious drug and alcohol treatment centers
which revolve around twelve-step recovery programs based on calling upon
higher powers of the spiritual kind.122
117. Id. at 623 (O'Connor, J., Concurring). See also Marshall J. Breger, Don't Fight
the Power of Faith, JTS MAGAZINE, Spring 2000, available at http://www.jtsa.edu/news/
jtsmag/9.3/forum.shtml (on file with Nova Law Review).
118. Characterizing Justice O'Connor's controlling votes on the Supreme Court in
Establishment Clause cases, Bret Kavanaugh, a partner at Kirkland and Ellis in Washington,
moderated a panel on Charitable Choice at the conservative Federalist Society which describ-
ed O'Connor's influence to be most significant. See http://www/fed-sco.org/2%20esbeck
%205%20REVISED.html.
119. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
120. Id. at 298.
121. Id. at 299. See also Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and
Neutrality, 46 EMORY L.J. 43, 63 (1997).
122. Alice A. Noble et al., Charitable Hospital Accountability: A Review and Analysis
of Legal and Policy Initiatives, 26 J. L. MED. & ETICS 116-17 (1998).
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C. Judicial Action: The Establishment Clause and Health and Social
Services in Trial Cases
While there are no Supreme Court rulings specifically on the constitu-
tionality of Charitable Choice, the Supreme Court has spoken on the issue of
the use of tax money for religious purposes in Mitchell v. Helms.123 In
Mitchell, in a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld a program giving library and
media materials, such as computer software and hardware, to mostly
Catholic schools in Louisiana. 124 In Mitchell, the secular, neutral, and non-
ideological nature of the aid was perceived as being within the law. The aid
was allocated on private choices and with permissible content.
The opinion by Justice Thomas on behalf of a four-justice plurality held
that in assessing such cases, the Court should no longer attempt to determine
whether such aid goes to a pervasively sectarian school.'2 Justice Thomas
noted that "nothing in the Establishment Clause requires the exclusion of
pervasively sectarian schools from otherwise permissible aid pro-
grams .... t26  There are several pending trial court cases that will bear
watching in light of Mitchell as they will test what that decision means for
healthcare. 127
In July 2000, the American Jewish Congress and the Texas Civil Rights
Project filed a suit in Texas state court. American Jewish Congress and
Texas Civil Rights Project v. Bost'2 will consider the constitutionality of
"welfare to work" funds flowing to the Jobs Partnership of Washington
County, an organization whose evangelical Christianity, according to the
petitioners, "permeates their curriculum."' 129 In April 2000, Americans
United and the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit against the State of
Kentucky and the Kentucky Baptist Homes, alleging discrimination on the
basis of religion in hiring for publicly funded positions, in its welfare-to-
work programs, representing a violation of the Constitution's Establishment
123. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
124. Id. at 836.
125. Id. at 828.
126. Id. at 829.
127. See Becker, supra note 19, at 18.
128. Charitable Choice Lawsuits, Center for Religion and Civic Culture at the
University of Southern California, available at http:llwww.usc.eduldeptlLAS/religion-
online/welfare/lawsuits.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2002). Summary of case available at
http/lajcongress.orgpagesRES2OOO/JUL_2 juloo_04.htm (on file with Nova Law
Review).
129. See Charitable Choice Lawsuits, supra note 128.
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Clause. 130  It attempts to test a principle embodied in Charitable Choice,
which allows religious institutions that receive government funds, to
discriminate in their employment practices at least on the basis of religion.'
3 1
The American Jewish Congress filed suit January 5, 2001, in the
Superior Court, State of California, in San Francisco. 11 It charges that the
California Employment Development Department solicited proposals for
five million in funding out of TANF funds from the 2001 California state
budget, designated solely for faith-based groups 133  The Freedom from
Religion Foundation sued the governor of Wisconsin alleging a Christian
twelve-step course for addicted fathers is "pervasively sectarian.'
' 34
If there were a doctrinal shift underway, it would appear to be about
recognizing secular activities as government-fundable through indirect aid
such as vouchers and tax deductions, because the nature of indirect aid
underscores the individual's choice to receive the aid and spend it in
different places. This premise was taken even further in Mitchell v. Helms
35
where the Supreme Court ruled that providing educational equipment to
religious schools with taxpayer money meets constitutional muster.
Clearly, this decision altered the current law, which allowed local
school boards to have the power to decide how the federal money allocated
for Title VI block grants for technology would be spent. From the school
130. Eyal Press, Faith-Based Furor, NEW YORK TIMES MAG., April 1, 2001 at 62-65.
This case centers on a therapist terminated because her "homosexual lifestyle is contrary to
[Kentucky Baptist Homes for Children's] core values," according to the termination letter she
received from her employer. Id.
131. "Participating faith-based organizations, notwithstanding their receipt of Federal
funds, retain their exemption under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which permits
employment discrimination on the grounds of religion. Organizations with fewer than 15 full-
time employees are not subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of Title VII." See Faith
Communities, supra note 46, at 4.
132. American Jewish Congress, AJCongress Asks California Court to Invalidate Job
Training Program Limited to Faith-Based Providers only, available at http://ajcongress.org/
pases/RELS200l/JAN_2001/janOl_06.htm.
133. Id.
134. See generally Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
135. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
136. Id. at 835-36. According to University of Texas law professor Douglas Laycock,
there are six theories espoused by various justices from time to time on how money can be
allocated from government to religious groups. See Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious
Liberty in the United States, 46 Orno ST. L. J. 409, 443-46 (1986). They include: 1) no-aid
theory; 2) purchase-of-services theory; 3) equal-treatment theory; 4) child-benefit theory; 5)
tracing theory where the money is traced to be sure it only goes to a secular expenditure, and;
6) little-bit theory, where a little bit of money going to a religious school is all right. Id.
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boards' perspective, this decision further chips away at the wall of
separation, as they have no way of monitoring whether the computers will be
used for religious purposes or not.
137
It is this background of neutrality and its nexus with individual choice
that forges the entry to the era of Charitable Choice. While the Supreme
Court did not rule on the constitutionality of Charitable Choice per se, it
clearly indicated a plurality would likely find a voucher approach to
government funding constitutionally acceptable. Judge Clarence Thomas
wrote, "It is the students and their parents-not the government-who,
through their choice of school, determine who receives Chapter 2
funds. The aid follows the child."
138
Thus, the principle that emerges in the context of Charitable Choice
legislation is that the public purpose is for the government and the private'
sector to work together to address beneficiaries' needs for services. If the
private sector providers are religious, and they perform a neutral service, the
government's interest ends. Healthcare is neutral as to religion. Thus,
Charitable Choice would presume to meet any constitutional test as long as
the beneficiaries have a choice as to where they can obtain services, to
ensure there is no religious coercion. The neutrality of healthcare then, sets
the stage for health vouchers and health contracts based upon choice.
Whether there is a real choice becomes the central issue of concern.
Some experts on Charitable Choice, notably Stanley Carlson-Thies of
the Center for Public Justice and Carl Esbeck of the University of Missouri
at Columbia, believe the Charitable Choice law strongly protects faith-based
charities against government intrusion. 39 But others, such as the conserva--
tive Heritage Foundation's Joe Loconte and Baylor University law professor
Derek Davis, believe the religious nature of faith-based groups will
ultimately compromise Charitable Choice, a view many in the conservative
community have also recently voiced.1'4 Marvin Olasky, a University of
Texas professor who is a close adviser to President Bush and the author of
137. See Press Release, National School Boards Association, National School Boards
Association Says High Court Ruling in Mitchell v. Helms Chips away at Church-State
Separation (June 28, 2000) (on file with author).
138. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 830. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
139. The Center for Public Justice, A Guide to Charitable Choice: The rules of
Section 104 of the 1996 Federal Welfare Law Governing State Cooperation with Faith-based
Social-Service Providers, at http:llweb.cyberis.netlvhostslhlrc.orglpublic/docslcharityl.htm
(last visited Mar. 20, 2001).
140. Joe Loconte, The Bully and the Pulpit, PoucY REvmw, Nov.-Dec., 1998, No. 92,
at http:llwww.policyreview.comLnov98/pulpit.html. (on file with author).
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his book on compassionate conservatism, does not think the Founders
wanted the country to give preference to either secularism or atheism.
41
It would seem for now that Charitable Choice has been crafted in a way
that will pass First Amendment scrutiny. The greater concerns lie in the
question raised in situations when there may be no viable alternative service
provider, a situation that could easily result from the closing of community
non-profit or public safety net hospitals, leaving only faith-based providers.
How will they be monitored?
IV. CHARITABLE CHOICE IN ACTION: SOUTH FLORIDA
A. Background: Catholic Health Care
Clearly, there is nothing inherently wrong in adding a religious aspect
to healthcare; indeed, religion provides a strong belief system and the
positive effects of spiritualism and prayer are certain. In addition, a religious
healthcare provision certainly is not new. Traditional religious providers,
whether Catholic, Jewish, Methodist, or Baptist, all have long and successful
hospital traditions. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, a preeminent
healthcare charitable group, for example, has 1100 faith-based healthcare
programs up and running with the support of nearly forty million in private
charitable funds.
142
Catholic healthcare provides an interesting example of the traditional
religious provider. The Sisters of Charity founded Catholic healthcare in
this country 150 years ago. 143  Today, the Catholic system boasts 601
hospitals in forty-eight states that collectively admit sixty-five million
patients per year.1" "In nineteen states, more than twenty percent of hospital
141. Martin Morse Wooster, Faith-Based Charity: Poised for Revival?, CAPrrAL
RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 2000), at http://www.capitalresearch.orglap/ap-0400.html. (on file
with author).
142. See About Faith in Action, A National Program of The Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation, 2001, at http://www.interfaithcare.org/about/index.htm. This is the nation's
largest philanthropy devoted solely to improving health and healthcare for Americans. Id. It
created the Faith in Action program to fund community efforts in 1993 and since then, their
Interfaith Volunteer Caregivers program has helped build over 1100 faith-based volunteer
programs nationally with two thousand more partnerships planned. Id. These projects are
privately supported with foundation charitable dollars.
143. Lawrence E. Singer & Elizabeth J. Lantz, The Coming Millenium: Enduring
Issues Confronting Catholic Health Care, 8 ANN. HEALTH L. 299, 301 (1999).
144. Lois J. Uttley, Religious Hospital Mergers & HMOs: The Hidden Crisis for
Reproductive Health Care, MERGERWATCH, 1997-98 ed., 12-13.
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admissions are to a Catholic facility.... In 1997, Catholic hospitals
generated thirty-five billion in net patient revenues."145 Including respite,
rehabilitation, and skilled nursing care, Catholic facilities collectively
comprise the single largest provider of institutional care in the country.
The impact of Roman Catholic healthcare is particularly interesting
because all Catholic hospitals are governed by a single, unifying set of
religious principles known as the "Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Health Care Services."'1 Developed and issued by the National
Conference of Catholic Bishops, the directives contain seventy rules that
spell out which health services can and cannot be provided based on whether
or not they are deemed "morally and spiritually harmful."' 47 Contraception,
sterilization, abortion, and infertility services are among the types of
healthcare which are specifically disapproved.148 There have been problems
in communities across the country in acceptance of these restrictive policies.
As collaboration and demographic trends have affected the healthcare
ministry, consolidation of Catholic healthcare has increased under its New
Covenant Initiative and has called for sponsoring religious congregations to
work together in furtherance of the Church.1 49 Twelve separate Catholic
religious community sponsors have merged to form single governance and
management structures, such as Catholic Health East, Catholic Health West,
and Catholic Health Care Partners. 50  "[In some markets, Catholic
healthcare finds itself aggressively growing, and in many instances
converting heretofore nonsectarian non-profit facilities to Catholic
facilities.''
B. Hospital Consolidation in West Palm Beach
One such proposed consolidation by a Catholic organization attempted
to join two hospitals, St. Mary's and Good Samaritan, in West Palm Beach,
Florida. On March 23, 2001, Intracoastal Health Systems agreed to sell its
two non-profit hospitals in West Palm Beach, to Tenet Healthcare
Corporation, the nation's second largest for-profit chain. This proposed sale
ended more than a year of intense media scrutiny, public criticism, and a
145. Singer, supra note 143, at 301
146. Uttley, supra note 144, at 12-13.
147. Id. at 13.
148. Id.
149. Singer, supra note 143, at 302.
150. Id. at 302-03.
151. Id. at 303.
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lawsuit by Florida's Attorney General to prevent Intracoastal from closing
its unionized St. Mary's Medical Center, or from consolidating St. Mary's
acute care, emergency, and trauma services at the non-unionized Good
Samaritan campus, two and one-half miles away.
For thirty-eight years, St. Mary's Medical Center was a Catholic-owned
hospital run by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegany. St. Mary's operates the
largest emergency room in Palm Beach County, including one of two county
trauma centers that specialize in treating accident victims. Licensed to
operate 460 beds, St. Mary's Medical Center had formed a jointly operated
health system in 1994, with secular, Good Samaritan Hospital, hoping to
reap combined efficiencies in a changing healthcare reimbursement
environment.
The entity created under this Joint Operating Agreement, called
Intracoastal Health Systems, was organized on a parity basis (50/50), but like
many other attempted mergers across the country, failed to bring together its
two disparate cultures. While the merger agreement had contemplated an
unwinding if certain objectives were not met, the board did not act upon that.
Instead, they subsequently approved one of the two parity sponsors, Catholic
Health East,152 to become the primary creditor, holding approximately $150
million in tax-exempt bonds through its master trust indenture.
53
By the end of fiscal year 2000, losses including one-time write-offs
totaled $88 million. Clearly, this was not a sustainable scenario.154 To stem
the losses, Intracoastal proposed to consolidate all of its acute, trauma, and
emergency room services at its more compact, lakeside 341-bed Good
Samaritan site. The proposed plan set off a firestorm of intense community
reaction. The hospital system blamed reduced reimbursements and the rising
costs of treating the uninsured and poor for its predicament, but critics
blamed the hospital's failed billing system, its inability to sign up eligible
uninsured for coverage, and management missteps, for the river of red ink
that administrators predicted would cause the hospitals to run out of cash by
May 2001.155
152. The Franciscan Sisters of Allegany merged as a sponsor with Catholic Health East
(CHE) in 1998; they consider themselves an owner of CHE.
153. See Community Advising Board, Consultants' Study of Intracoastal Health
Systems, Oct. 30, 2000, at 27.
154. Id. at 55.
155. Id. I served on a twelve-member community board that commissioned six
nationally recognized experts in healthcare to form a consulting team to study the problems
facing the West Palm Beach hospitals. The consultants studied whether both hospital
campuses could be maintained without consolidation. The Consulting Team included Apache
National Health Advisors for strategy; SMG Marketing Group for marketing assessment;
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The process the hospital system used to make its consolidation decision
was deemed inadequate. It did not seek community input until forced to do
so; discussions took place largely behind closed doors; and its decisions
were perceived as politically motivated to favor a demographically upscale
location over the needs of the minority community, which identified almost
exclusively with the St. Mary's campus.156
Further, a crisis of credibility grew within the community over what
was perceived as a disastrous decision to move the trauma system, coupled
with no real transition plan to meet the needs of the nearly 90,000 people
who visit the St. Mary's emergency room annually. 57 Community activists
came together to push for an independent study of the situation. 58 A local
healthcare conversion foundation granted $500,000 toward such a study and
national consulting experts were hired to analyze the situation. That study
determined there was insufficient political will to create a public trust
hospital, but as a compromise, consolidation could proceed if there was a
major redesign of the St. Mary's campus to convert it to ambulatory and
specialty care uses, with urgent care capabilities there.
Community outcry attracted the attention of Florida Attorney General
Bob Butterworth, who filed suit in January to block the plan.' 59 After court-
ordered mediation failed, Intracoastal abandoned its consolidation plan and
agreed to sell its hospitals to Tenet,16° a move that for some triggered
concerns that the "grass-roots" community activism that had fanned the
controversy, was really a purposeful strategy all along, designed to push the
hospitals into the private, for-profit sector.
6 1
Hamilton HMC for facilities assessment; Gill/Balsano consulting for physician issues;
McDermott, Will and Emery for legal issues; and Kaufman Hall for financial analysis.
156. Executive Summary, Consultants Study of Intracoastal Health Systems, Oct. 30,
2000 at 3 (on file with author).
157. Id. at 14. Of the nearly 90,000 who visited the emergency room, only 12,000
were admitted.
158. See Laycock, supra note 121.
159. State of Florida, Dept. of Legal Affairs ex rel. Robert. A. Butterworth, Attorney
General of the State of Florida on behalf of the Citizens of the State of Florida, v.
Intracoastal Health Systems, (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 2001), in and for Palm Beach County, Florida,
Civil Division, Case Number CL 01-0068 AB. Order on Defendants Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, granted Feb. 27, 2001 by Judge Jorge Labarga. A settlement agreement
between the parties was negotiated on March 4, 2001, avoiding trial. (on file with author).
160. See Press Release, Tenet Healthcare Corporation & Intracoastal (Mar. 23, 2001)
(on file with author).
161. Both Tenet and HCA were bidders for the hospitals and are members of the
Federation of American Hospitals, a powerful healthcare advocacy group which supports
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But the hospital's financial predicament could be a microcosm for what
is happening to safety net hospitals across the United States. St. Mary's
payer mix had changed over the years to include seventy percent of the
Medicaid and non-paying patients in Palm Beach County. 162 St. Mary's
central location in the northern part of West Palm Beach, in close proximity
to inner city neighborhoods right off the interstate highway, ideally situates
it geographically to serve as an access point of entry to the lower income
population. Its Catholic tradition also made it welcoming to immigrants and
people of color who were historically made to feel unwelcome at Good
Samaritan Hospital, which did not even accept Medicare patients until
1964. 
61
Good Samaritan Hospital sits on the Intracoastal Waterway overlooking
the island of Palm Beach. The decision to do a wholesale consolidation on
the Good Samaritan site seemed to many in the Palm Beach County
community as counter-intuitive.'6 The Good Samaritan site was only
twenty-three acres, landlocked on the Intracoastal Waterway. St. Mary's
campus, on the other hand, was 105 acres, with good access from the
interstate and with an approved, intact trauma system.
The average per capita income of Good Samaritan's immediate area
exceeds $88,000 per year. St. Mary's Hospital sits adjacent to an urbanized
area where the per capita income is $17,889 per year. 65 Perhaps most
striking is the payer mix between the two hospitals, for the uninsured are not
evenly distributed. Medicaid covers 6.1% of Palm Beach County residents
and 16.1% of Palm Beach County residents are uninsured (compared to
13.5% for Florida and 14% nationally). 66
St. Mary's Medical Center has 40% of the Medicaid market and 67% of
the Medicaid HN4O market in the county. About 80,000 people qualify for
Medicaid in Palm Beach County. 67 The people who qualify for Medicaid
must fall at or below 150% of the poverty level and meet designated criteria
market-driven initiatives and runs a grassroots advocacy center. During the crisis, there was
some workforce speculation that there were also "grass-tops" at work, "AstroTurf" groups
that a number of healthcare coalitions front, that are actually public relations tactics or groups
that pose as community-based organizations to promote a product or political aim.
162. See Consultants Study of Intracoastal Health Systems, Oct. 30, 2000, at 51.
163. Id. at 10.
164. Id. at 17.
165. Id. at 8.
166. See Consultants Study of Intracoastal Health Systems, Oct. 30, 2000, at 51.
167. Interview with Dwight Chenette, Deputy Director of Health Care District of Palm
Beach County (Apr. 4, 2001) [hereinafter "Chenette"] (on file with author).
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on income, assets, residency, and identification. There are fourteen
Medicaid HMOs run in Palm Beach County, one of which is run by the
public Health Care District of Palm Beach County (HCD). The reason the
HCD set up its own Medicaid HMO was to ensure a safety net if the private
insurers were to ever decide to exit the market due to insufficient margins.
There are about 3000 enrollees in the HCD-run Medicaid HMO currently.
168
The taxpayer-supported HCD raises more than $80 million annually
through its 1.05 millage rate.169 It has built up a surplus equity reserve of
nearly $100 million which they intend to fund down in the future. This is a
purposeful strategy intended to smooth out any millage hiccups to avoid any
unexpected major increases for taxpayers. The HCD formerly ran two
hospitals but consciously got out of that business to focus its mission on
financing healthcare. There are policy implications in whether it is doing
enough to have amassed an equity surplus of $100 million while the safety
net hospitals suffer significant losses.
The HCD, however, believes that hospitals should not be bailed out
from their own management missteps.17 More importantly, it perceives that
it should run more like a healthy insurer than like a provider. To be able to
pay out claims, it intends to assure an adequate surplus. At this time, the
HCD Board, which is politically appointed, has tabled any consideration for
increasing eligibility rates above 150% below poverty. However, the board
is working on improving its ability to reach the target market it currently
serves through easier sign-up procedures and improved data management.
Five of its seven members turned over in the past year with some additional
gubernatorial appointments.1 71 Yet, St. Mary's share of the Medicaid market
is three times the share of the next highest provider and five times the
Medicaid HMO share of the third highest provider. Furthermore, demo-
graphics do not suggest there will be fewer poor people in the future.
In many respects, private not-for-profit St. Mary's functioned like a
government hospital or a hospital of last resort, accepting non-paying
168. Id.
169. The Health Care District of Palm Beach County serves as an unregulated health
insurance company for low income residents. Three programs serve these populations
including Medicaid, Florida Healthy Kids and the Health Care District's Coordinated Care
program which runs through the Health Department at five clinics. The voters approved up to
2 mils in 1987. However, the District almost went bankrupt in 1992 when they discontinued
services at 1.47 mils due to poor eligibility decisions. They reinstated the program the next
year at 1.25 mils. They have rolled back the millage rate during the subsequent years as they
gained operating experience. Id.
170. Id.
171. Chenette, supra note 167.
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patients, even as referrals from joint-venture activities on their own campus.
For all practical purposes, St. Mary's became the public safety net hospital
for Medicaid and indigent patients from a wide geographic area, but without
adequate financial assistance from others. 172 Even though nearly 90,000
Palm Beach County residents use the St. Mary's emergency room annually,
and even as the hospital faced closure, not one additional dime of public
subsidy was forthcoming from county officials, city officials, or the Health
Care District of Palm Beach County.173 The main source of uncertainty,
perhaps, which chills public health safety net providers to augment its
involvement, lies in the threat of losing Medicaid revenues because of the
push to enroll beneficiaries in managed care.
C. Managed Care and the Shift to Market-Based Systems
Florida has moved the majority of its TANF population into Medicaid
managed care, and the state has been among the leaders nationwide in
moving elderly and disabled Medicaid enrollees into managed care as
well. 174 An estimated 205,000 non-elderly people with disabilities, or 66.4%
of the total caseload of that type, were in Medicaid managed care in Florida
in 1998. Florida continues to shift to a managed care model.
With a shift away from the model that there is only one provider with
an entitlement to the money, (such as the role Jackson Memorial Hospital
provides in Miami-Dade County), there will likely be a shift to the new
market-based systems. Jackson is a public hospital with 1567 licensed beds
and is affiliated with the medical school at the University of Miami.
Medicaid and charity cases account for 44% of Jackson Memorial's gross
patient charges, compared with only 14% at Cedars and 6% at Baptist, the
next highest providers in Miami-Dade County. Charity care is negligible
172. Id.
173. The HCD limited their support to only their regular $9 million a year contract for
trauma services and ongoing support through their Medicaid HMO, the Florida Healthy Kids
project, and their Coordinated Care program through the Health Department. They may
increase penetration levels for those who qualify at 150% poverty level, or consider raising
their hospital in-patient reimbursement rates, which have not increased since 1993. id.
174. Larry Lipman, Bush Picks Brother's Nominee, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 31, 2001,
at 8A. Ruben King-Shaw, Jr. will become deputy administrator of Health Care Financing
Administration based upon his leadership record of moving people into managed care. This
may bode well for Florida in structuring Medicaid waivers or other future policy decisions.
175. See J.P. Bender, Seven Hospitals Sue Miami Dade, SouTH FLA. Bus. JOURNAL,
Apr. 5, 2001, at 51A. Seven hospitals in Miami-Dade County have filed a lawsuit over
Jackson Memorial Hospital's exclusive use of county general revenue and a half-penny sales
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at all other hospitals in Miami-Dade County; all thirty-five hospitals
combined provide only 29% of what Jackson does in one year. Jackson has
unusually secure sources of external funding to cover an operating loss that
is relatively small to begin with, at about 25% of expenses. 176 But even
Jackson must factor in the threat of losing Medicaid revenues because of the
push to enroll beneficiaries in managed care.
Much of the market-based approach to cost-effective healthcare strategy
features early intervention, outreach, and primary care structured in a
community-wide strategy. In such a solution, providers like Jackson would
have to compete for funds, by responding along with other institutions, to a
Request For Proposals (RFP) developed by the County. Jackson would have
to make its competitive case on how it would help Miami-Dade County
fulfill its public health goal. It is likely that as the state complies with its
requirement to allow faith-based providers a chance to compete for provision
of services in lower-cost facilities, faith-based providers will gain many of
these contracts, particularly since the most vulnerable residents often live in
urban neighborhoods far from the hospitals.
The distance factor, combined with a lack of public transportation, and
poor English proficiency on the part of the beneficiaries, present a
significant barrier to care. While Jackson runs a network of clinics designed
to involve community outreach, other operators that are more familiar with
these satellite communities could provide a competitive threat. 177 There are
also equity concerns about letting each county in Florida fend for itself in
devising ways to treat its indigents. While Miami-Dade chooses to fund a
public hospital, the 1.5% hospital revenue tax collected by Florida from all
providers, which is redistributed on a county-specific basis tied to indigent
care, proves to be disadvantageous to Palm Beach County.
From the four million dollar Intracoastal Health Systems paid in
hospital revenue tax in fiscal year 1999, less than $400,000 comes back in
return, because Miami-Dade County providers apparently soak up the
distribution. 18 While there may be advantages to distribution by counties,
tax to care for the indigent. Plaintiffs want the dollars to follow the patients at some
proportionate share and object to Jackson's strategy to continue to expand its cash reserves,
while other area hospitals provide substantial uncompensated indigent healthcare without a
single dollar of public compensation. Id.
176. Jack Meyer et al., The Role of Local Governments in Financing Safety Net
Hospitals, URBAN INSTrTUTE, at 11-12 (June 1999), available at http:/newfederalism
.urban.org/htrnllocca25.htmnl.
177. Id. at 29-39.
178. See Consultants Study, supra note 166, at 30.
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this equity concept has not moved forward. There are many differences in
access to care for many lower-income households. Access to care depends
on the generosity of local taxpayers, and the priorities placed on indigent
healthcare. The need for greater access is pressing. In Palm Beach County,
few private doctors accept Medicaid; in fact, in the West Palm Beach service
area, only six out of seventy-four family practitioners accept Medicaid or
Health Care District clients. 179  Thus, while Miami-Dade and Broward
County both tax its residents to meet healthcare needs of the indigent with a
hospital care subsidy, other counties, such as Palm Beach County, deal with
the burden differently.
Palm Beach County's philosophy mirrors national policy. According to
national healthcare public policy adviser Christopher Jennings,180 there are
two possible solutions to the St. Mary's situation and other situations like it
around the nation. First, the burgeoning cost of uninsured indigent care,
particularly in the efforts to fill the deficits at specific safety-net hospitals,
can be covered with public subsidy, a solution many find to be inefficient.181
Alternatively, the income threshold of eligibility for Medicaid insurance
coverage can be raised to include more people, allowing them to obtain
coverage from various providers under prevailing market forces. The latter
type of plan is the more efficient solution in a changing market according to
Jennings.
182
Discussions with local healthcare planners at the Palm Beach County
Healthcare District suggest that the latter strategy is more appealing to them
as well. 183 The potential closing of the St. Mary's emergency room showed
that out of 90,000 annual emergency room visits, only 12,000 converted to
admissions to the hospital, meaning 78,000 patients were treated and
released, and could arguably therefore be more appropriately cared for in an
Urgi-Care Center were such a system to be redesigned to improve delivery
179. Letter from Edwin W. Brown, President, Florida Community Health Centers, Inc.,
to Bureau of Primary Health Care (Jan. 5, 2001) seeking Federally Qualified Health Center
application for St. Mary's Campus, (on file with author).
180. Interview with Christopher Jennings, former Clinton Health Care Policy adviser
and Goodwin Seminar speaker at Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University
(Jan. 26, 2001) (on file with author).
181. See Bender, supra note 175. While Jackson Memorial continues to use this
strategy, to understand its effect on other hospitals in its region. Id.
182. See generally Ruth Faden & Madison Powers, Incrementalism: Ethical
Implications of Policy Choices, The Kaiser Project on Incremental Health Reform, Oct. 1999,
available at http:l/www.kff.orglcontentl1999/1534/faden.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2002).
183. Chenette, supra note 167.
[Vol. 26:563
203
: Nova Law Review 26, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Goodman
through greater access. 18 In fact, local funders and social providers
proposed a comprehensive redesign of the St. Mary's campus if the
consolidation had occurred. These plans were conceptual and revolved
around attracting a federally qualified health center.' 8 5 It is unclear whether
the collaborations and leveraging of the 120-acre St. Mary's site for new
community uses might also have provided opportunities under Charitable
Choice for new types of religious or social service provider entrepreneurs to
step in. But leaving it all to the marketplace may be dangerous, as can be
seen in this real-life example of what can be proposed by the marketplace if
left entirely to its own design.
D. The Initial Intracoastal Plan: Faith-Based Clinics
In Palm Beach, healthcare planners seem to support the increasing
involvement of faith-based providers. At the time that the plans to close St.
Mary's were first announced, the solution offered by Intracoastal Health
Systems was to moderate demand by getting people to more appropriate
care, and that much of the care provided today in hospitals can be moderated
by greater access to lower-cost ambulatory facilities.186 Specifically, the
more appropriate care that Intracoastal initially believed would be the best
solution for the 90,000 people annually, who would no longer be served by
closing its emergency room, was to offer a partnership with a faith-based
provider clinic. Intracoastal proposed to create walk-in clinics in poor
neighborhoods. Initially, the company ran full-page newspaper ads in June
2000187 that cited its partnership with First Baptist Church as its model for
those community clinics.
Intracoastal spokesmen said then that its board began studying the
concept in 1998, and began to partner with First Baptist Church in opening
its first clinic, which offers basic medical, dental, and vision care in
February 2000. There is also a Pregnancy Resource Center and a Christian
Care Center housed on the church grounds offering food, clothing, and
services to the poor. Teen mothers and their children are housed at the site
for up to a year. The First Baptist Church clinic offers walk-in care in its
office suites on two weeknights. When a prospective patient arrives, there is
"a video about Jesus playing on the television, framed Scripture hung on the
walls, and patients [are provided] little pamphlets titled Steps to Peace with
184. See Consultants Study of Intracoastal Health Systems, supra note 156.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See generally, PALM BEACH POST, June 2000.
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God."' 88 The patients also get a free gift along with their free healthcare,
"The New Believer's Bible," courtesy of the First Baptist Church of West
Palm Beach, where the clinic sits on its grounds.
Before getting the free care and gift, the clinic also uses a "spiritual
history" questionnaire during the intake process, after the patients' eligibility
is determined, before they see a doctor. The spiritual survey is intended as a
tool to ensure evangelism "gets done" in the frantically busy office, the
director says. "The most important reason we're there is ministering to them
and sharing our love of Jesus Christ," said the clinic's medical director, Dr.
Tom Rose. The questionnaire asks: "If you were to die today, do you know
for certain whether you would go to Heaven or Hell?" and, "Do you consider
yourself a Christian?"
18 9
Nonprofit healthcare funders, like the Quantum Foundation, who paid
for dental equipment in the clinic, found the proselytizing unseemly.
"They're saying it's optional, but this is a very vulnerable population they're
serving; people know how they should answer," said Quantum health policy
director Tim Henderson.19° "To have that questionnaire literally as a first
step in the process and the questions, it's inappropriate."' 19 "God? I love
very, very much God," said Haitian immigrant Alexandre Magloire, at the
clinic for the first time after hearing through the grapevine that he'd see a
doctor for free.
192
Intracoastal has abandoned its consolidation proposal by settlement
agreement with the Attorney General and its proposed hospitals' sale to
Tenet. Any future role for the First Baptist Clinic as the model for the
community's safety net provider is now unclear. Under the new Charitable
Choice provisions, such a scenario as described in the First Baptist Church
Health Clinic is apparently fine. Religious organizations, with a contract for
services as described under section 104 may operate with total religious
autonomy. 193
188. Marian Dozier, Church Clinic Ministers to Body and Soul, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), June 18, 2000, at lB.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Personal Responsibility & Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2161, (codified at 42 U.S.C. 604a (1996)). Under section
104(a)(2)(A), states that accept certificates, vouchers, or other forms of disbursement under
subsection (a)(1)(B) shall retain their independence from federal, state, and local governments,
including any governmental control over the definition; development, practice, and expression
of the organizations' religious beliefs. In addition, neither the federal government nor a state
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Beneficiaries of assistance, such as Mr. Magloire, may object if he has
an objection to the religious character of the organization and must be
offered an alternative provider of equal value. But, is it reasonable to
assume that an indigent person, with limited English skills, and possibly
alien status, feeling vulnerable due to sickness, would not feel a subtle
coercion to be dependent upon those who offer him comfort at the time of
his affliction? The subtle manipulation of this kind of exchange, with its
generally one-way communication, strikes some as inappropriate, even if the
person is not turned away for not listening, and lies at the heart of the
religious coercion issue central to the debate as to how far government.
should go in deregulating religious providers.
Here, a Baptist church clinic is not a government actor, even if it
receives its funding indirectly from the government, through tax exemption,
vouchers, or directly through contract. 94 If the state elects to use federal
welfare funds to provide services solely through its own governmental
agencies, not utilizing any independent providers, then it has not violated the
antidiscrimination requirement of section 104, by not involving faith-based
providers.
195
The question arises of whether the federal Charitable Choice law can
even be applied to the State of Florida. Florida's Constitution actually
expressly prohibits such uses of funds:
There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or
penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify prac-
tices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state
or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the
public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious
denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.1
96
shall require a religious organization to (A) alter its form of internal governance; or (B)
remove religious art, icons, scripture or other symbols. Id.
194. In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, (1990), the Supreme Court
eliminated the requirement that government justify burdens on religion imposed by laws
neutral toward religion and the compelling interest test in prior federal court rulings is a
workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing
government interests.
195. See Section 104(g) Nondiscrimination Against Beneficiaries----"Except as
otherwise provided in law, a religious organization shall not discriminate against an individual
in regard to rendering assistance funded under any program described in subsection (a)(2) on
the basis of religion, a religious belief, or refusal to actively participate in a religious practice."
Id.
196. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
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The State Constitution specifically forbids use of state or county revenues to
directly or indirectly aid churches, but it has not posed a roadblock to
Charitable Choice proponents. 97 While Charitable Choice does not preempt
state constitutions which restrict or prohibit disbursement of state funds to
religious organizations, Charitable Choice applies to federal funds.
Proponents claim federal Charitable Choice legislation provisions
trump state constitutional rights. 98 Actually, all federal welfare funds are
subject to the Charitable Choice provision, and states choosing to involve
nongovernmental providers must follow the provision's rules regarding
nondiscrimination against faith-based organizations. In states which
commingle state and federal welfare funding, in order to comply with its
own constitutional provisions, a state must segregate state funds from federal
grants. If necessary, a state may keep its own funds separate to expend in
accordance with its own constitutional provision, while allowing federal
funds to flow to religious organizations to serve the poor. 199 This conclusion
follows from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which
provides that rights granted by congressional action are exempt from any
state or local laws to the contrary.
There seems to be nothing to prohibit a state from choosing to contract
with a faith-based organization to be the sole provider of services in a
particular area, other than the requirement that there be an alternative
provider available, if requested. In essence, Charitable Choice grants all
religious organizations a statutory right to be eligible to contract with a state
to administer social service. This right can be enforced with a lawsuit
against the state.2°1 It stands to reason, however, that in areas where there
are few providers and to obtain greatest efficiency, it will, for practical
purposes, be impossible to find nonfaith-based providers in certain
circumstances. In this situation, where nonfaith-based providers are not
available, certain issues must be considered. Since there is no specific time
framework for the alternative provider to be set up, and no limits on where
the alternative might be geographically provided, alternatives provided might
be totally impractical if offered some distance away.
197. Id.
198. Daniel Katz, Constitutional and Policy Problems with Senator Ashcroft's
"Charitable Choice Provisions," American Civil Liberties Union, Mar. 11, 1996 at
http://www.aclu.org/congress/ashcrft.html.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 604a(k) (Supp. 1999).
200. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
201. See Chenette, supra note 167.
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Florida certainly has encouraged contracting out and providing grants to
faith-based and religious organizations. The Florida Pregnant Women Act 2°2
for example, authorizes five county health departments including those in
Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach County to contract with "faith-based
organizations ... and other social-services related entities."20 3 This
legislation targets outreach to high-risk pregnant women who may not seek
proper prenatal care, who suffer from substance abuse, or who are infected
with HJV, in order to provide services to them.2
4
E. Concerns About Charitable Choice and Its Operation
The issues that Charitable Choice raises are far ranging. Currently,
there are three different federal revenue streams that pick up Charitable
Choice-TANF, Welfare to Work, and Community Services Block grants-
and many more are planned. But in the broader sense, these concepts
represent a shift in the political thinking about whether faith-based
organizations might deliver more and more social services that previously
were delivered by state and local governments. The wall of separation began
to collapse in the 1980s with the increasing political development under
Ronald Reagan and George Bush of the privatization of the public sector.
Liberals and conservatives alike both lost confidence in the ability of
government to provide welfare and education services in the inner cities.
African-Americans grew tired of no improvements coming and turned
205increasingly to help from black churches.
The central thrust of Charitable Choice is to involve faith-based
providers in providing services to the poor, while protecting the religious
integrity of the organizations. Building on the work of Marvin Olasky and
other religious liberty scholars, the policy shift reflects a view that
government welfare programs have failed, and should be replaced by private
and religious charities. Faith-based organizations have literally "fed the
hungry, clothed the naked, sheltered the homeless, cared for the sick, visited
the imprisoned, counseled and recovered the addicted, trained the unem-
202. FLA. STAT. § 381.0045 (2000).
203. § 381.0045(5).
204. Id.
205. South Florida's Donors Forum has for five years run its Philanthropy and the
Black Church project for private funders to fund faith-based programs addressing problems
such as affordable housing, foster care, and child care availability in low income neighbor-
hoods.
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ployed, educated the ignorant, protected the weak, and advocated for the
powerless."
206
Faith-based organizations have carried on their works of mercy,
love, peace, and justice, with and without government money be-
cause of a divine mandate. The key questions are these: who are
the credible partners and stakeholders in the local communities that
genuinely care? Who has the capacity to deliver the services? And
do American citizens let government off the hook of responsibility
by caring for its needy citizens by transferring that responsibility to
faith groups?
207
On the surface it would seem that the key consideration for capacity is
whether the program has a secular purpose and that the organizations
selected for service delivery be effective and efficient. This is a capacity
question that seems to beg for compliance mechanisms whether they be
208
monitoring, self-reporting, audits, or regulatory actions. This then opens
up the question of whether state agencies will now write rules of account-
ability into their contracts, opening up religious providers to a scrutiny they
may not be willing to accept.
2°9
Some Christian conservatives are leading the charge against Charitable
Choice in that they see how problematic it might be. They fear an adverse
effect on religious mission. If a state were to completely shift government
social services for a certain area or a type of service to a religious institution,
one can foresee the possibilities that beneficiaries may be subjected to
religious indoctrination while they are attending the religious organization to
obtain their government benefits. There is no way one can detect this unless
one is on the scene. It stands to reason that this kind of governmental
monitoring could lead to the type of excessive entanglement prohibited
currently.
210
206. Reverend Edward King, Jr., speaking on Faith Based Initiatives, Urban Institute
Media Relations Project, Carol City, Fla. (Mar. 1, 2001) (on file with author).
207. Id.
208. Id. (quoting Reverend Ana Price, Universal Truth Center, speaking on Faith-
Based Initiatives at the Donor Forum, "Government grants to faith-based organizations will
have a better chance of success and continuity if they require infrastructure, written proposals,
evaluation criteria, budget plans and other criteria ... ").
209. Id. Charisse Grant, Dade Community Foundation, stated that, "Churches must not
lose sight of their conviction or mission if they accept federal funding for social service
work .... It will be important not to let the availability of money detract from that power."
210. Reverend Donna Schaper, Address at the donor Forum's Media Breifing, Coral
Gables Congregational Church, (Mar. 1, 2001), "Will faith-based organizations be able to
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It is interesting how closely the positions of some of the justices
correspond to their own religious backgrounds. Three of the four most
ardent supporters of equal treatment for religion, Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy and Clarence Thomas, are practicing Catholics,21 while Stephen
Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, are both Jewish, and maintain more
separationist instincts. 2  President George W. Bush, who has described
himself as a born-again Christian, has allied himself with the pro-prayer
213
camp. Since he may have the chance to appoint one or more justices who
could make a majority shift in the Court, this could usher in a largely
privatized public sphere in which education and welfare services are
contracted out to religious organizations on a far broader scale.
In relation to Medicare and Medicaid, many are projecting that we are
just a heartbeat away from seeing churches directly administer the Medicaid
214program. What churches will those be? Only about three percent of the
congregations surveyed in a recent study of 1200 churches receive
215government funds today. Catholic and moderate Protestant denominations
were more likely to apply for government funds than conservative or
evangelical congregations. 216  But sixty-four percent of African-American
congregations expressed interest in bidding for charitable choice contracts. 7
This shift could likely turn religious groups into social service providers
with multimillion dollar budgets, and the risks of corruption and patronage
speak freely about government policy if they are receiving vital federal grants?" Id. This
concept was further expanded at the same seminar by Rick Englert for Project Teamwork
when he said, "An intermediary organization can help a church to stand by its principles while
also acknowledging and meeting government expectations. It is also important for churches to
know when to part company with government programs if they do not suit the church's
principles or mission." Id.
211. Jeffrey Rosen, Is Nothing Secular? N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, § 6, at 40.
212. id.
213. Id.
214. Rev. Barry Lynn, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, is quoted
on whether Medicare and Medicaid would ever be administrated directly by faith-based
providers:
I would not be surprised to see that as a proposal somewhere down the line, if this concept be-
comes emboldened by more and more presidential candidates supporting it. But I do not want to
the see the local church on the comer compete with the synagogue on the comer, and the temple on
the third comer to decide who is going to be the administrators of the Medicaid program. I think
that is exactly where you go if you let this concept fester.
See Debate, supra note 21, at 20.
215. Chaves, supra note 43.
216 Id. at 2.
217. See Chaves, supra note 43.
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that inevitably accompany large government grants will also likely loom.
There are already signs of the entrepreneurial types that have lined up to take
advantage of school vouchers to also be in line to make money off
government contracts as religious providers.
V. CONCLUSION
Prospectively, the pendulum has swung to such a degree that Charitable
Choice legislation-similar to the programs being broadly developed in
Indiana, Texas, and California-seems inevitable for Florida as the trend in
public policy continues. Justice Thomas' analysis for the plurality in
Mitchell v. Helm 218 and the likelihood of President Bush moving the
Supreme Court more to the right, suggest Charitable Choice programs will
be upheld constitutionally, even if doing so means moving well beyond its
current view of the legal interpretation of the Establishment Clause. In
recent years the Court has increasingly shown accommodation of religious
organizations, even pervasively sectarian ones.
It is increasingly likely that the Court will reflect the trend supporting a
shift toward a more market based system and away from government
provision in social services. This is really a redirection of money, and likely
not an expansion. It suggests the Court will permit public monies to go to
organizations that mix secular and sectarian activities together for neutral
purposes like healthcare. In essence, this is taking a limited pot of money
and diverting some of it to religion, to shift more services to the private
sector and weaning the responsibility for entitlement programs from
government.
Such a shift will require more attention in implementation. There is
reason to believe that the field implementation may be significantly flawed.
It is likely that there will not be adequate provider capacity. Particularly in
the poorer inner city neighborhoods, where black churches are more likely to
want to fulfill this charge, without there being a further blurring of the line
between church and state. As Charitable Choice develops, there will need to
be more government regulation to monitor and support its implementation.
To minimize problems like the civil rights employment discrimination
disputes in Kentucky and the religious liberty disputes in California, or the
blatant over the top proselytizing or coercion that went on in the West Palm
Beach health clinic, there will need to be certain technical assistance
packages and workshops for faith-based organizations (FBOs). These
218. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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training programs will need to make sure government staffs understand
Charitable Choice guidelines, how to reform their procurement procedures,
and how to market and subcontract these joint ventures to best ensure a
broad variety of vendors, particularly in communities faced with only one
choice of faith-based provider.
There will need to be a far greater strategy to reach out to congregations
that are not part of the human services network, in order to initiate meetings,
advertise, and to provide dialogue, partnership environments, and mentoring
for these FBOs prior to monitoring its efforts. States will need to change
their internal rules on procurement, update contract language, and delete
religious prohibitions on hiring decisions. FBOs will need to mandate
noticing requirements to give choice to providers, and beneficiaries, as well
as to draft and codify formal contracts.
There will need to be fiscal audit monitoring, tracking projects,
performance based bill or invoice submission systems, and receipt of
vouchers. There could also be extensive rulemaking on the provision of
vehicles, machinery, office space, and other outside reference, referral, and
outsourcing policies. There will need to be help in attracting working
capital, to finance the administration of these contracts, originate requests
for proposals, and initiate some kind of on-site field monitoring to detect
religious proselytizing. There will also need to be case management to
monitor contract performance, documentation in keeping eligibility for
attendance, work requirements and volunteer requirements intact, as well as
a willingness to accept government sanctions. It all needs to be developed
and operationally monitored.
If a client is not comfortable with a religious aspect, it is the responsi-
bility of the program designers to provide the service in another way, or
withdraw their religious messages in order to retain certain clients. In rural
areas, where there are no alternative providers, or in communities where the
provider inventory has shrunk due to market place factors, government will
need to keep an alternative, such as a government run HIIMO, and to provide
services through private providers. For Charitable Choice to be effective,
the boundaries between church and state must be respected to the degree that
the beneficiary feels that its choice has been adequately served and properly
protected.
Judith B. Goodman
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act' was
part of the Florida Legislature's efforts to manage both the spiraling medical
malpractice costs and diminishing liability insurance availability during the
1970s and 1980s.2 During that period, medical liability insurance had
become so expensive that, although "technically available", it was "function-
ally unavailable."3  In trying to ferret out the causes of the malpractice
situation, the legislature determined that there was an identifiable group of
physicians that disproportionately accounted for medical liability claims,
both in number of claims and amount of payout.4  There were multiple
specialties in this group, but it was not hard to realize that obstetrician-
gynecologists ("ob-gyns") were important contributors.5 Therefore, in 1986,
1. FLA. STAT. § 766.301-.316 (2001).
2. See generally Thomas R. Tedcasfle & Marvin A. Dewar, Medical Malpractice: A
New Treatment for an Old Illness, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 535 (1988).
3. Id. at 547 n.90.
4. Id. at 552.
5. Id. (noting that these physicians paid claims that were two to three times as high
as the remainder of physicians). Obstetricians are defined as physicians (medical doctors or
osteopathic physicians) who diagnose, care, and treat pregnancy and associated disorders.
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the legislature created a special academic task force to study the Florida
malpractice problem and to assist the ob-gyns in particular.6
The task force evaluated the rising insurance costs. It reported that
"litigation costs and attorney's fees" had increased from 1975-1986, yet
there was no particular change in the relevant substantive law to account for
it.7 While it was true that the tort environment had shifted in favor of the
plaintiff with the change to a national medical standard and the use of res
ipsa loquitur, these changes alone should not have accounted for the
increases. 8 As the marketplace would allow, the skyrocketing medical
liability insurance costs were being partly passed on to increasingly
dissatisfied patients and their insurance companies.
9
Cost alone was not the sole problem. Some patients became nearly
disenfranchised as physicians resisted treating high-risk patients; in fact,
physicians resisted practicing in certain high-risk specialties alto-
gether.10 The more litigious patients became even more disillusioned with
medical care, possibly as a result of poor medical performance of physicians
or hospitals, and possibly, it was suggested, as a result of "incompetence or
DAN J. TENNENHOUSE, ATTORNEYS MEDICAL DEsKBOOK § 6:13 (3d ed. 1993). Their specialty
includes birth control and sterility problems. Id. These physicians perform major surgery, and
their specialty is usually combined with gynecology (ob-gyn). Id. Their training generally
includes one year of internship and three years of obstetrics and gynecology specialty training,
which occurs after the usual four years of medical school. Id.
6. Tedcastle, supra note 2, at 544.
7. Id. at 550.
8. Id. at 550-51. Res ipsa loquitur is a tort doctrine whereby the plaintiff need only
prove that the defendant had exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused the injury and
that the type of accident is one that would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence on
the part of the party in control of that instrument. McDougald v. Perry, 716 So. 2d 783, 785
(Fla. 1998) (proving a defendant's negligence regarding a wayward automobile wheel by
using the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur). Because res ipsa loquitur allows for a common sense
inference of negligence where hard evidence is wanting, it is self-evident that it is a plaintiff-
friendly doctrine.
9. Tedcastle, supra note 2, at 554. Physicians who practiced or trained in that era
recall that it was a difficult time. Interview with Harvey Schoenbrum, M.D., Board Certified
Urologist, in Palm Beach County, Fla., (June 20, 2001). Patients blamed physicians for their
skyrocketing fees, and physicians blamed the insurance companies for their rapidly increasing
premiums. Id. Physicians were angry that the insurance companies were happy to collect
premiums in Florida when there was no malpractice crisis, but leave the state when times got
tough. Id.
10. Walter Gellhorn, Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.S.)-Medical Mishap
Compensation (N.Z), 73 CORNELL L. REv. 170, 173 (1988); Elizabeth Swire Falker, The
Medical Malpractice Crisis in Obstetrics: A Gestalt Approach to Reform, 4 CARDOZO
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 14 (1997).
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inattentiveness, negligence or neglectfulness, faulty diagnosis or faulty
equipment."" The stage was set. There were increased medical care costs,
increased liability insurance costs,' 2 "overly generous jury awards,' ' 13 and
difficulties in obtaining insurance.' 4 Patients and physicians were angry and,
irrespective of where one wanted to place the blame, what had started as a
malpractice epidemic had become a malpractice crisis.'
5
The ob-gyns were a dramatic part of the malpractice crisis. Astonish-
ingly, in 1985, ob-gyns in Florida paid an average medical malpractice
liability F remium of $185,460, compared to a national average of
$23,300. The Florida Legislature correctly realized that ob-gyns were a
subset of physicians that had a disproportionate, if not unbearable insurance
liability, but without whom our society would not function. 17 They also
believed that the newborn was a subset of these physicians' patients who
were apt to be injured catastrophically, and because of them, they decided to
• 18
delve into what could only be called a medicolegal, insurance experiment.
The Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act,
("NICA"), was Florida's contribution to the idea of a hybrid no-fault and tort
medical liability system. This comment will first develop the historical
perspective that led to this legislation. It will next review the NICA statute
and goals in detail. From there, it will focus on whether NICA has met its
stated and implied goals, and discuss some of the problems involved in
reaching those conclusions. Lastly, this comment will analyze four
important issues that NICA has faced. It will detail how it faced those issues
and further explain why these four miscues, along with its marginal success,
prove that this malpractice reform law should be repealed.
11. Gellhom, supra note 10, at 170.
12. Malpractice insurance rates for ob-gyns reportedly increased 113% during the
four-year period from 1982-86, and there were more lawsuits involving these specialists than
any other. Falker, supra note 10, at 1-2.
13. Matthew K. Richards, The Utah Medical No-Fault Proposal: A Problem-Fraught
Rejection of the Current Tort System, 1996 BYU L. REV. 103, 104 (1996).
14. B. Richard Young, Medical Malpractice in Florida: Prescription for Change, 10
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 593, 593 (1983). More than twenty medical liability insurers withdrew
from the Florida market in the 1970s. Id.
15. David M. Studdert et al., The Jury Is Still in: Florida's Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Compensation Plan After a Decade, 25 L HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 499,
500 (2000).
16. Gellhom, supra note 10, at 173.
17. FLA. STAT. § 766.301 (2001) (indicating the legislative findings and intent for the
NICA statute).
18. ld. NICA has been called the "most significant experiment with compensation for
medical injury yet undertaken in the United States." Studdert, supra note 15, at 500.
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II. NICA Is BORN
The academic task force, along with outside recommendations,
ultimately recommended NICA as a solution to the uniquely severe situation
of the ob-gyns. 19 The legislature found that ob-gyns were a high-risk,
essential specialty that had suffered rapid advances in their malpractice
liability costs. 20 They found that any birth of a child that did not go well
21would usually be accompanied by litigation. One should realize, however,
that there is not necessarily a quid pro quo between a physician's errors and
litigation. For example, in a traditionally low insurance risk medical
specialty like dermatology, although it is self-evident that skin cancer
patients unfortunately suffer iatrogenic injuries, they sue relatively
infrequently; therefore, dermatologists enjoy relatively low insurance
22premiums. The reasons are speculative, but possibly the generally older
group of patients the dermatologist treats may have a greater tolerance and
patience for error or poor result. One might infer also that obstetrical
injuries are worse, although not every obstetrical error is expected to be
horrible. Regardless of the reason, the Florida Legislature intended to
stabilize, or possibly reduce, the ob-gyn's insurance premiums.2 3  They
concluded that the birth-related neurologically injured were an especially
high risk and expensive tort subset, and they therefore required a dramatic
new mechanism to deal with that problem.2 Their solution was to carve out
these claims and provide compensation irrespective of fault.5
19. Tedcastle, supra note 2, at 556-57.
20. Id. at 583.
21. Id. The medical consumer appears to have very little tolerance for obstetrical
accidents. Every mother expects a "perfect" baby, and when an adverse birth happens,
litigation frequently results. When a neurologically injured newborn is delivered, nearly all
will sue, independent of whether their doctor was at fault.
22. Bruce L. Allen, M.D. & Josef E. Fischer, M.D., Caps on Malpractice
Awards: Update, HIGHLIGHTS BULL. AM. C. SURGEONS, June 1999, available at
http://www.facs.orgldept/hpalproliab/0699a.html (generally showing the relationship of
dermatology malpractice fees to other medical specialty fees). For example, dermatology
malpractice fees for the State of Florida ($1 million/$3 million coverage) is quoted as $35,440
per year compared to ob-gyn which is quoted as $140,346 per year. Id.
23. Insurance premiums amounted to an average of eleven and six-tenths of one
percent of gross practice revenues in 1986-87 for physicians in general, but they amounted to
twenty-three and one-tenth percent of gross practice revenues for ob-gyns in the same time
period. Tedcastle, supra note 2, at 553 n.122.
24. Id. at 557.
25. Id.
[Vol. 26:609
216
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss2/1
Martin
The legislature decided "to provide [a] compensation [plan], on a no-
fault basis, for a limited class of catastrophic injury that result[ed] in
unusually high costs for custodial care and rehabilitation. 26 The situation
had become so severe, that in addition to that laudable goal, part of the
legislative goal was to stabilize or reduce insurance costs to ensure that ob-
gyns would not be forced out of practice due to the malpractice crisis.27
Toward their goal, the Florida Legislature's first foray into no-fault
compensation, NICA, was narrowly written to include only birth-related
neurological injuries. 28 This was not the only option available in terms of
malpractice reform, however. For example, the legislature could have
plunged medical negligence in toto into a no-fault, workers' compensa-
tionlike system.29 Instead, the not yet functioning "Virginia Plan" became
the model upon which NICA was patterned, and this plan was and still is
limited to the birth-related neurologically injured.30
I. THE NICA STATUTE
Both the Virginia Plan31 and NICA were to be strict liability workers'
compensation type plans, where the claimant did not need to establish fault
and the claim was taken out of the tort system and managed administra-
26. FLA. STAT. § 766.301(2) (2001).
27. Fla. Birth Related Neurological v. Fla. Div. of Admin. Hearings, 664 So. 2d 1016,
1020 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), certifying question to 686 So. 2d 1349 (1997). See
Gellhorn, supra note 10, at 173 (showing that medical malpractice premiums rose sufficiently
to cause some doctors to stop practicing). See also Mary A. Cavanaugh, Bad Cures for Bad
Babies: Policy Challenges to the Statutory Removal of the Common Law Claim for Birth-
Related Neurologic Injuries, 43 CASEW. RES. L. REv. 1299, 1320 (1993).
28. § 766.302(2).
29. Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and
Evidence, 67 U. CiN. L. REv. 53, 76-79 (1998). Workers' compensation exclusively provided
compensation to those workers who suffered a disabling injury or illness on the job. Id. at
76. Most states (forty-seven) require employers to purchase or self-insure. Id. Workers may
be unhappy with the relatively low compensation as opposed to that available in tort. Id. at
78. Therefore, workers have frequently tried to circumvent the exclusivity provi-
sion. Id. Other problems include the real or perceived lack of high quality care in some cases
due to the various plan limitations. Id. See Richards, supra note 13, at 103 (describing a
1996 Utah tort reform plan that calls for wholesale abandonment of the existing tort system in
favor of no-fault).
30. Tedcastle, supra note 2, at 582. See also Virginia Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5000-5021 (Michie 1999).
31. The Virginia Plan became the country's first malpractice reform effort that
adopted the no-fault method of compensation. Bovbjerg, supra note 29, at 56.
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32
tively. In reality, there was a significant difference between NICA and
workers' compensation. With workers' compensation, if the employee was
injured on the job, he did not need to prove anything else in order to obtain
compensation. With NICA, the claimant not only needed to have been
injured during birth, but he also had to prove that the injury was related to
oxygen deprivation or mechanical failure.34 The definition under the NICA
was as follows:
"Birth-related neurological injury" means injury to the brain or
spinal cord of a live infant weighing at least 2,500 grams... at
birth caused by oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring
in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate
postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant perma-
nently and substantially mentally and physically impaired. This
definition shall apply to live births only and shall not include dis-
ability or death caused by genetic or congenital abnormality.
35
36
Reading the statute, one can appreciate its restrictive details. For
example, an obstetrician delivering an inijured baby physically outside of a
hospital could fall outside the criteria. Similarly, a "bad baby ' 38 that
32. Tedcastle, supra note 2, at 590. The similarities between workers' compensation
plans and NICA were that in both of these plans, purportedly in return for a relatively assured
compensation handled through an administrative solution, the injured party gave up his
common law tort rights. Bradford v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, 667
So. 2d 401, 403 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
33. Tedcastle, supra note 2, at 590 n.424.
34. Id. Because of this proof requirement, NICA was neither pure tort nor pure no-
fault.
35. FLA. STAT. § 766.302(2) (2001).
36. Studdert, supra note 15, at 519.
37. This is not inconceivable. Although no cases of this nature are yet reported, an
expectant mother might deliver a catastrophically injured baby at home or on the way to the
hospital. The issue might arise whether the obstetrician who had delivered prenatal care is
eligible to receive NICA protection, or whether he or she loses that benefit because the mother
failed to make it to the hospital. In a related scenario, there is an issue as to whether an ob-
gyn would receive the benefit of NICA protection if he or she cared for a pregnant woman
who negligently abused illicit drugs or alcohol during the pregnancy and unexpectedly
delivered at home.
But see Fluet v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurologic Injury Comp. Ass'n, 788 So. 2d 1010
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001). In Fluet, a mother of a neurologically injured baby who died
was denied NICA benefits by the administrative law judge because she was delivered by a
midwife, and her ob-gyn was not physically in the hospital when he ordered medication for
her telephonically. Id. at 1010-11. The appellate court reversed, finding there was no specific
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weighed 2400 grams or an infant that was the result of a genetic accident
would not be covered, yet potentially are just as injured. 39 NICA was meant
to be the sole and exclusive remedy for an infant who satisfies the above
criteria of a birth-related neurologically injured infant.40 A hospital and
mandate that the physician be physically present in the delivery room. Id. at 1013. The
holding discussed the difference between delivering the baby and the delivery of obstetrical
services and concluded that NICA refers to the delivery of obstetrical services. Id. The
statement of facts, however, do not tell if the physician was present in the hospital or out of
the hospital when he telephoned his medication order. Id. This too may influence a court.
Also, consider the situation where a NICA-participating physician emergently delivers a
mother in a migrant labor camp situation rather than in a hospital, and that mother has not had
the benefit of prenatal care. While the statute provides for no notice in a situation like this, it
does not speak directly to the "out of hospital" instance. This physician, who fully paid his or
her assessment, might not be covered in the event of a birth-related neurological injury. If that
same infant weighed slightly less than 2500 grams at birth, the ob-gyn would not be covered
despite the fact that he paid his or her assessment into the program and notified the pregnant
patient that he participated in NICA. These hypotheticals make the hazards of NICA's
restrictive statutory definition clear.
38. A "bad baby" is medical jargon for an obstetrical accident that results in a
neurologically defective infant. See generally Cavanaugh, supra note 27, at 1299-1300 n.3
(giving a graphic example and discussion of the "bad baby" syndrome).
39. In order for an infant to be covered, the infant must meet the statute's criteria. If a
newborn infant is neurologically impaired, there may be questions as to whether the infant's
impairment resulted from hypoxemia (oxygen deprivation) or mechanical injury, and therefore
covered, versus undiagnosed genetic injury or even maternal drug use, and therefore not
covered. The no-fault aspect is already suspect since it will be a "my expert says this versus
your expert says that" argument from the beginning. It has the potential to resemble
traditional tort actions in medical negligence. Cavanaugh, supra note 27, at 1312-13
(describing the uncertain and complex interrelationship between events during pregnancy and
perinatal events that lead to neurologically injured infants). It is not always certain whether
the physician's actions caused the injuries. Id. See Studdert, supra note 15, at 519-21;
Bovbjerg, supra note 29, at 53-123 (discussing in detail the "no-fault" alternative to the
medical malpractice crisis and propounding it as a substitute for the current system in
tort). They explain in general that the central premise of no-fault is to "make third-party
insurance for medical injuries more like first-party health or disability insurance." Bovbjerg,
supra note 29, at 64.
40. Cavanaugh, supra note 27, at 1321.
The rights and remedies granted by this plan on account of a birth-related neurological
injury shall exclude all other rights and remedies ... against any person or entity directly
involved with the labor, delivery, or immediate postdelivery resuscitation during which
such injury occurs, arising out of or related to a medical malpractice claim with respect to
such injury[.]
FLA. STAT. § 766.303(2) (2001). The same subsection of the statute also states that one may
pursue a tort action if there is clear and convincing evidence of bad faith or malice on the part
of the provider. Id.
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physician must provide specific and timely notification to their pregnant
patients in order to claim the protection of NICA's no-fault benefits, except
in certain defined emergent circumstances. The statute initially provided
that when a claimant filed a claim, it was to be reviewed by a P2anel of
physicians selected by the Division of Workers' Compensation. That
nonbinding, advisory panel is composed of three appropriately skilled
physicians whose review determines whether the infant meets NICA's
statutory criteria.43 If the infant's injuries are found to be noncompensable,
then the claimant may pursue her remedy in tort. On the other hand, if the
infant has suffered compensable injuries, NICA provides for as much as
$100,000 in damages to the parents, plus actual expenses for medically
reasonable bills related to the infant's medical care, rehabilitative care,
training, and custodial care.44 Excluded from these listed covered expenses
41. Cavanaugh, supra note 27, at 1320. The Florida Statutes state that each hospital
that has a participating physician and each participating physician shall:
provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for birth-
related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the
association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and
limitations under the plan. The hospital or the participating physician may elect to have the
patient sign a form acknowledging receipt of the notice form. Signature of the patient
acknowledging receipt of the notice form raises a rebuttable presumption that the notice
requirements of this section have been met. Notice need not be given to a patient when the
patient has an emergency medical condition as defined in s. 395.002(9)(b) or when notice
is not practicable.
FLA. STAT. § 766.316 (2001).
42. Cavanaugh, supra note 27, at 1320-21. Due to dissatisfaction with claims
handling, the Division of Workers' Compensation was replaced by the Division of
Administrative Hearings in May 1993. Bovbjerg, supra note 29, at 87.
43. Cavanaugh, supra note 27, at 1320-21. Section 766.308(1) of the Florida
Statutes states:
Each claim filed with the division under ss. 766.301-766.316 shall be reviewed by a
medical advisory panel of three qualified physicians appointed by the Insurance Commis-
sioner, of whom one shall be a pediatric neurologist or a neurosurgeon, one shall be an
obstetrician, and one shall be a neonatologist or a pediatrician. The panel shall file its
report, with its recommendation as to whether the injury for which the claim is filed is a
birth-related neurological injury, with the division at least 10 days prior to the date set for
the hearing. ... The administrative law judge shall consider, but not be bound by, the
recommendation of the panel.
FLA. STAT. § 766.308(1) (2000). It is the administrative law judge of compensation claims of
the Division of Workers' Compensation that makes the final determination. FLA. STAT.
§ 766.309(1) (2001).
44. FLA. STAT. § 766.31(1)(b)1. (2001).
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are various payments made to the claimant, such as from the government,
various health care plans, or other insurance policies.
4 5
The Act provides for attorneys' fees as well, although the restrained
attorneys' fees under NICA will not be as attractive as the usual contingency
tort fee. 47 Additionally, section 766.306 of the Florida Statutes state that
"[t]he statute of limitations with respect to any civil action that may be
brought by, or on behalf of, an injured infant allegedly arising out of, or
related to, a birth-related neurological injury shall be tolled by the filing of a
claim. '4 8  Strictly read, it would appear that this provision grinds civil
actions to a halt while the administrative action is settled, allowing time for
the claimant to pursue her common law remedy later should the injuries
prove to be noncompensable under NICA. However clear this language
appears, in Humana of Florida, Inc. v. McKaughan,49 the court found and
discussed the uncertainties that it perceived.50
IV. HAS NICA BEEN SUCCESSFUL?
Gauging the success of a program like NICA is not easy. First of all, in
general, it is hard to agree as to which parameters indicate success. The
stated legislative goal was "provid[ing] compensation, on a no-fault basis,
for a limited class of catastrophic injur[y] that result[ed] in unusually high
costs for custodial care and rehabilitation;" 5 this goal has no easily
monitored and quantifiable parameters. In general, it is problematic to be
highly confident in the value and interpretation of physician oriented
information due to medical and legal complexities. 2 Additionally, Studdert
45. § 766.31(1)(a)1.-4.
46. § 766.31(1)(c). But cf. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n v.
Carreras, 633 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (showing that an attorney's fee of
$300 per hour was excessive and that any time the attorney spent in researching whether the
patient's claim should be filed in tort was not compensable as an attorney's expense).
47. Studdert, supra note 15, at 521 (noting that plaintiffs' attorneys have an economic
incentive to go around NICA and file in tort).
48. § 766.306.
49. 652 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995), certifying question to 668 So. 2d
974 (Fla. 1996).
50. This ambiguity meant to this court that when a malpractice defendant invokes
NICA as an affirmative defense, the malpractice action did not necessarily automatically
abate. Id. at 861.
51. § 766.301(2).
52. Ann Stewart, Comment, Physician Profiles: Consumer Protection or Excessive
Exposure? 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 957, 957-59 (1998).
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noted how hard it is to isolate the forces that account for any causal change
given the complexity of the medical malpractice arena.53  Thus, no real
clarity evolves out of any method of gauging NICA's success.
For example, one might realize it would not be difficult to measure the
cost of today's medical malpractice premiums and compare them in relative
dollars to the premiums ob-gyns paid during the height of the malpractice
crisis. However, the factors that may have affected those premiums are
practically impossible to quantify given the dramatically changing health
care climate over the relevant period.5 4 Consider that prior to the Clinton
presidency, it would have been a rare American who understood what
"managed care" was. Today, to the contrary, managed care is perva-
sive, 55 and it would be a rare American who does not know what an HMO
56is. Any change in either the malpractice premiums, the availability of
insurance, or the generally quieter malpractice climate might have resulted
from any cause or combination of causes. However, it is at least as likely
that the natural progression of managed care, rather than the effects of
NICA, has been most influential. The end result is that NICA proponents
will rave about NICA, and managed care proponents will rave about
managed care.
Stewart notes just how difficult it is to understand malpractice trends
and relates a relevant example.57 A slight alteration of her example would
compare two physicians with different policy limits, one at $200,000 and
53. Studdert, supra note 15, at 500.
54. Id.
55. Judith E. Orie, Comment, Economic Credentialing: Bottom-Line Medical Care,
36 DUQ. L. REv. 437,447 (1998).
56. Whether the premiums are inflating, deflating, or stable, any statistical analysis
would be hard pressed to accurately interpret the dramatic health care delivery changes that
have coincidentally accompanied the birth and adolescence of NICA.
57. Stewart, supra note 52, at 977-78. In the Stewart scenario, there are two
physicians, one with $1,000,000 and one with $200,000 in malpractice insurance policy
limits. Id. Stewart hypothesizes that where there is a nuisance suit (non-negligent physician)
of $200,000, the insurer for the $1,000,000 holder will be willing to settle because litigation
costs will exceed that amount. Id. at 978. When the other physician clearly commits an act of
malpractice, his or her insurer will be quick to settle to the policy limit knowing that their
client will probably lose. Id. The question posed is how will these similar insurer settlement
actions be classified for analysis. Id. In one case, the payment compared to coverage ratio is
twenty-five percent; in the other, it is 100%. Id. Therefore, this frequently used ratio provides
little analyzable data: both cases settled, one physician was negligent, and the ratio does not
indicate who it is. Id. Stewart also points out that effective classification may be obfuscated
because it might be analyzed in terms of the type of injury or the type of physician. Id. She
convincingly shows that use of these statistics may not be probative. Id.
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one at $1,000,000. Even nonculpable conduct on the part of the physician
with the lower policy limit might cause his or her insurer to settle because
defending against the claim might cost more that the policy limit. On the
other hand, the high policy limit holder's insurer might defend "to the hilt"
even culpable conduct, and bring in the crrme de la crrme of defense
attorneys in order to avoid a judgment. A certain number of these high
policy limit cases are going to be won, while the lower policy limit cases
will be settled out of court. The result is a skewed and irrational view of
malpractice trends, depending on the particular variable studied. Conse-
quently, if physicians by chance or design over the relevant time period
decide to increase or reduce their policy limits, then this might confound the
understanding of the results of malpractice trend curves. Thus, one sees how
medical and legal complexities may make one less confident in the integrity
of possible causative parameters.
In addition, the Florida malpractice climate had calmed, and more
insurers were looking to reenter the Florida market. The reality was, though,
malpractice premiums had stabilized and decreased around the entire
country over the time period NICA has been in effect, not just in Flor-
ida.58 Even administrators from the Florida Department of Insurance, like
William Bodiford, admit that it is thereby unreasonable to attribute this
improved malpractice climate as one of NICA's successes.59 As Richards
noted, "[tihe effectiveness of these limited [no-fault] plans.., is dubious-
both in their ability to adequately compensate injured newborns and in
restoring insurance coverage to obstetricians." Nevertheless, there was
additional access to health care in Florida during the 1990s, even though
"there is no empirical evidence that no-fault caused these improve-
ments."'61 More recently, though, medical malpractice insurance is once
again difficult to come by and increasing in cost.62 These data suggest that
58. Richards, supra note 13, at 109 n.39; Studdert, supra note 15, at 500
(commenting that it is hard to isolate the forces that account for any change given the
complexity of the medical malpractice insurance market).
59. Richards, supra note 13, at 109 n.39 (detailing a telephone interview between
Richards and Bodiford where Bodiford himself opined that Florida's 'social insurance
program' [was] not deserving of any 'rave reviews").
60. Id. at 109.
61. Bovbjerg, supra note 29, at 110.
62. Letter from Jenan L. Ariff, Vice President Aon Healthcare Practice, to Sandy
Martin, M.D. (July 17, 2001) (explaining the generally worsening malpractice insurance
situation and expected premium increases, as part of a mailing to all physician clients
renewing medical malpractice insurance). The letter also notes mergers along with the
pullouts. Id. This type of consolidation is rarely market friendly. Id.
20021 619
223
: Nova Law Review 26, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
even with NICA in existence for over a decade, there may be another
medical malpractice crisis in the near future.
The absolute number or relative trend of malpractice suits for birth-
related neurologically injured patients might be an appropriate measure of
NICA success.: 3 Proponents might argue that if NICA does an excellent
job, there would be fewer NICA claims and fewer payouts than antici-
pated. Detractors might look at the same data and lament that NICA is not
doing its share or that the advisory panel is refusing to certify appropriate
injuries. Other proponents might look to the reduced frequency and size of
obstetrical malpractice suits in general and claim victory for NICA since it
occurred since NICA's inception. However, this improvement can hardly be
64 . 65attributed to NICA, and even the improvement appears to be waning.
While it is difficult to arrive at a number, studies suggest that NICA
should have approximately twenty-seven to fifty-three certified claims per
year.66  Yet, from 1989 through 1997, a total of eighty-six claims were
67
approved. The reasons for this are not clear, but it is not likely to be
because of a sudden improvement in health care itself.68 Perhaps it may have
had something to do with a reduced "claiming behavior' 69 pattern or that
some of these cases are simply just "los[t] to tort."70
Studdert conducted a statistical, empirical investigation and concluded
that with respect to data as of 1998, "the annual frequency of tort claims did
not undergo a statistically significant change after 1989 in either the
$250,000+ or $500,000+ group of cases., 71 Given that there are weaknesses
with the statistical data, Studdert admits anyway that high cost tort claims, of
63. See generally Studdert, supra note 15, at 503-20.
64. Id. at 516. The authors note, however, that NICA has been relatively efficient at
distributing the money it did distribute (approximately $12,000,000 of $15,700,000 went to
the injured and their parents during the 1989-1997 interval). Id. at 503-04. Also, NICA's
staff has been a source of advice and counsel, as well as money, to its beneficiaries. Yet, a
significant number of patients who were denied compensation under NICA did receive
compensation in tort, several at levels beyond the $1,000,000 level. Id. at 515. This leaves
one with the gnawing question as to why the statute did not forseeably include these birth-
related injuries. Id. at 503.
65. Ariff, supra note 62.
66. Studdert, supra note 15, at 504.
67. Id. at 503-04.
68. Id. at 504-05.
69. Id. at 505. For example, Plaintiffs attorneys may have steered their clients away
from NICA given the sparse attorney remuneration compared to tort recovery; or, for example,
even some confusion as to NICA's role. Id.
70. Id. at 506.
71. Studdert, supra note 15, at 509.
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the type that the no-fault NICA was designed to eliminate, per-
sist.72 Ultimately, if there is a persistence of the type of high cost malprac-
tice claim that NICA is designed to eliminate, then absent an increased
number of actions of this kind, NICA's benefit is less than convincing.
In some articles, investigators seemed to have concluded that a firm
indicator of NICA's success might be efficiency, defined as speed of
resolution and level of administrative cost compared to tort.73 When these
parameters were evaluated, as best as they could be, the authors concluded
that NICA was a resounding success. 74 Unfortunately, the devil is in the
details. They note that while the program was intended to be restrictive, it is
more narrow than intended; that there are still tort remedies leading to a
manipulation of the program based on "perceived benefits" to both the
claimants and their attorneys; and that a small program such as this leads to
inefficiencies that perhaps could be overcome by a larger program.75 Some
might claim that the exceptions defeat the conclusion, particularly when just
about the same number of high claim injured infant tort actions occur now as
before NICA.
76
V. THE REALITY OF NICA HAS NOT MET ITS EXPECTATION
There are expected advantages of a no-fault system. For example, one
would expect reduced lawyer costs, one of the highest of overhead costs of
the tort medical malpractice system; presumably less time delay in monetary
recovery and time involvement by the defendants; and less need for the
practice of defensive medicine due to the strict liability nature of the
harm. 7 The reality of the system, however, does not seem to have matched
72. Id. (noting the "lively persistence" of these high cost tort claims).
73. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Administrative Performance of "No-Fault"
Compensation for Medical Injury, 60 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 71, 73 (1997).
74. Id. at 106-08.
75. Id.
76. Studdert, supra note 15, at 517.
77. Kirk B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving
Medical Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365, 1374 (1989); Bovbjerg et al., supra
note 73, at 84. "Defensive medicine" refers to the practice of physicians ordering many tests
and procedures that they would ordinarily not consider necessary, all because they consciously
or subconsciously realize that they may be sued and have to take the witness stand to defend
why they didn't perform that esoteric test. See generally Michael C. Thornhill et al., Health
Care Reform: Perspectives from the Clinton Campaign, 15 WTrMrlM L. REV. 3, 7-8 (1993)
(relating that physicians on a panel discuss the amount of defensive medical care they
administered during their previous twelve-hour shift). The result of this is a general increase
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the promise, at least in Florida.78 Studies show that there is over a three-fold
increase in Florida tort activity with respect to the types of claim NICA is
designed to compensate, as compared to Virginia, where the other no-fault
birth-related neurologically injured program is in effect.79
The reasons for the increased litigious nature of the Florida patient are
speculative, but practicing Florida physicians intuitively sense that Florida is
a different type of medical environment. The older patient relocates from
"up north" where they have spent their lives with a given set of physi-
cians. They are suddenly faced with the situation of securing a new team of
physicians to guide them through many of life's most difficult prob-
lems. They are at a point in their lives when more medical problems
develop, problems that never occurred when they were "up north" and
younger. Maybe because it is human nature to search for a cause for these
new problems, they often blame their Florida physicians. Also, perhaps they
may be agitated into malpractice action by the plethora of attorney
advertising on television, on the radio, and on the front and back covers of
their local "Yellow Pages." Obviously, as a group, they do sue, but the
preceding speculation more accurately pertains to the elderly than it does to
the younger obstetric group, who are more or less twenty or thirty-
something. How the older group influences the obstetrical group toward
their proclivity to sue in tort is ill defined; but even at twenty or thirty-
something, it is not unreasonable to believe that they have acquired their
parents' and relatives' opinions concerning their health care and their
physicians. Then, if something goes awry, they are ready to pull the
malpractice trigger. It is a fact that even among no-fault claimants, the large
majority does not believe that the cause of their medical injury was
accidental, but rather name a "provider 81 as being at fault.82
in the costs of medical care and occasionally morbidity. See also Cynthia J. Dollar, Note,
Promoting Better Health Care: Policy Arguments for Concurrent Quality Assurance and
Attorney-Client Hospital Incident Report Privileges, 3 HEALTH MATRIX 259, 261-62 (1993)
(noting that the "proliferation of medical malpractice suits, which began in the 1980s, has
caused physicians, nurses, and other hospital personnel to practice defensive medicine.., to
ward off potential liability"). More tests and procedures along with more paperwork which
occupy a greater percentage of health care time are all incident to this. Id.
78. Frank A. Sloan et al., The Road from Medical Injury to Claims Resolution: How
No-Fault and Tort Differ, 60 LAW & CONTEmp. PROBS. 35, 48 (1997).
79. Id.
80. Stewart, supra note 52, at 979 (explaining the litigious nature of the Florida
patient).
81. In defining a "provider," the Florida Statutes state:
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It is interesting to note that in a 1989 article, during the height of the
malpractice crisis, proponents of an alternative fault based system of tort
reform said that their proposed alternative "responds directly to the flaws in
the current [tort] system... [and would] permit more injured parties to be
compensated than does the current system. '83 If one considers this a
laudable goal of tort reform, there is no evidence that the no-fault NICA has
been able to reach this goal. The authors also looked forward to an
enhanced predictability of claim compensation, 84 but there is no evidence
that this goal, as applied to NICA, has been reached. After all, it is nearly
impossible to predict whether a neonate will be adjudicated to be both
physically and mentally impaired, as is required by the statute's definition.8
The authors thought that their alternative no-fault based system would lead
to a larger number of meritorious claims because recovery would not be
limited to those claims that were high enough to attract a contingency paid
86
attorney. Once again, if one assumes that this is a laudable goal, NICA has
not reached it. Parents and guardians will generally seek out the assistance
of counsel when a "bad baby" situation arises. The first goal of counsel is
going to be to prove that this baby did not meet the restrictive criteria of
NICA, in order that he can go forward in tort.8 7 The authors of the article
believe that a NICA type of no-fault plan "offend notions of justice and
The term "health care providers" means physicians licensed under chapter 458, osteopathic
physicians licensed under chapter 459, podiatric physicians licensed under chapter 461,
optometrists licensed under chapter 463, dentists licensed under chapter 466, chiropractic
physicians licensed under chapter 460, pharmacists licensed under chapter 465, or hospi-
tals or ambulatory surgical centers licensed under chapter 395.
FLA. STAT. § 766.101(2)(b) (2001).
This term insidiously entered the insurance vernacular in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
as physicians began to receive insurance letters that began: "Dear Provider" instead of "Dear
Doctor." Most practicing physicians abhorred that tendency to depersonalize their
professional lives, but they could do nothing. It may have represented the beginning of the
managed care "push," where physicians became interchangeable commodities as patients
purchased health care plans rather than made appointments for personal physicians. Patients
were no longer life-long patients of their doctor, but were consumers of their insurance plans'
products.
82. Sloan, supra note 78, at 48.
83. Johnson, supra note 77, at 1389-90.
84. Id. at 1390.
85. § 766.302(2).
86. Johnson, supra note 77, at 1390.
87. Humana of Fla., Inc., v. McKaughan, 652 So. 2d 852 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (presenting just such a case where the claimant's goal was to prove he was not eligible
for NICA).
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individual accountability by imposing liability on health care providers even
when they have done everything humanly possible to treat a patient but were
unable to prevent a bad outcome."88 Although this article was not directly
analyzing NICA, it is applicable because it was nevertheless discussing fault
versus no-fault principles.
Perhaps NICA has excelled in other areas that outweigh its lukewarm
performance in claims management. For example, in addition to the goal of
compensation, Cavanaugh states that another goal of tort law that a no-fault
program should attempt to accomplish is to deter poor medical practice. 89 If
the no-fault NICA program were to be completely successful, it would be
successful at reducing the frequency and severity of birth related injuries,
but that implies that these variables are within the control of the physi-
cian. 90 Some variables are within the physician's control, such as the clumsy
obstetrician who drops the neonate and breaks its spine or incorrectly uses
extraction forceps and causes neurological damage. However, it is intuitive
that a no-fault system would not deter poor medical practice in the same way
a tort system would, where the accused physician sits in the courtroom and
listens to the zealous advocacy of the plaintiffs attorney as he or she
describes in embarrassing detail his or hers each and every mistake. This
ego deflating fear is what deterrence is about. A no-fault system simply
cannot address this with equal force.
The above analysis shows that while there have been some successes to
NICA, the reality is that NICA simply has not lived up to its expecta-
tion. Whether it has been harmful is speculative. Perhaps it has been
harmful because it has deterred consideration of a more meritorious plan.
During its evolution, NICA has faced four legal hurdles that have
molded the statute, its construction, and effectiveness. The following four
sections of this comment will present and analyze each of these legal
problems in detail. The first section concerns the nature of NICA's funding
mechanism. Both claimants and nonparticipating physicians, whether ob-
gyns or nonobstetrical physicians, dislike the funding mechanism, although
the funding has been adjudicated constitutional. 91 It fails to meet the most
basic tenet of an assessment of any kind, which is to allow the payer to see
and reap the benefit of the tax. The second section concerns the notice
requirement, which is burdensome and unfriendly to both the patient and
physician. The notice requirement was added to avoid constitutional
88. Johnson, supra note 77, at 1376.
89. Cavanaugh, supra note 27, at 1338.
90. Id.
91. Bovbjerg, supra note 29, at 98 n.224.
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weakness, yet it may ultimately lead either the patient or the physician to
inadvertent loss of benefit. The third section of this comment will look at
the ongoing jurisdictional struggle between the judiciary and the legislature.
This comment will provide insight into how that struggle parallels the
plaintiff and defense bars' struggle for tort versus no-fault causes of
action. The last section of this comment will analyze how the narrow
medical definition of the potential claimant has often times eliminated the
very party most in need of assistance.
A The Oppressive Nature of NICA 's Funding
Section 766.314 of the Florida Statutes defines the assessments to the
NICA program. It provides that all licensed physicians, exclusive of
92participating physicians, shall pay an initial assessment of $250 per
year.93 If the physician became licensed after January 1, 1989, the physician
would not be able to get away with a lower initial assessment since he or she
would need to pay an initial assessment equal to the most recent assess-
ment.94 With respect to those physicians who deliver obstetrical services, if
the physician elected to become a participating physician, then the physician
would pay an initial assessment of $5000,95 as well as the various annual
92. "Participating physician" means:
a physician licensed in Florida to practice medicine who practices obstetrics or performs
obstetrical services either full time or part time and who had paid or was exempted from
payment at the time of the injury the assessment required for participation in the birth-
related neurological injury compensation plan for the year in which the injury occurred.
Such term shall not apply to any physician who practices medicine as an officer, employee,
or agent of the Federal Government.
§ 766.302(7).
93. § 766.314(4)(b)(1).
94. § 766.314(4)(b)(3).
95. Before December 1, 1988, physicians who wish to participate:
shall pay an initial assessment of $5,000. However, if the physician is either a resident
physician, assistant resident physician, or intern in an approved postgraduate training
program, as defined by the Board of Medicine or the Board of Osteopathic Medicine by
rule, and is supervised by a physician who is participating in the plan, such resident
physician, assistant resident physician, or intern is deemed to be a participating physician
without the payment of the assessment. Participating physicians also include any employee
of the Board of Regents who has paid the assessment required by this paragraph and
paragraph (5)(a), and any certified nurse midwife supervised by such employee. Participat-
ing physicians include any certified nurse midwife who has paid 50 percent of the physi-
cian assessment required by this paragraph and paragraph (5)(a) and who is supervised by
a participating physician who has paid the assessment required by this paragraph and
229
: Nova Law Review 26, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
assessments indicated above. There are exceptions to the assessments,
which include certain classes of physicians such as residents in training,
those who work for the Veterans Administration, and those with limited
licenses.96
The Florida Statutes also provided that each hospital had to pay an
assessment that was equal to fifty dollars per infant delivered in the hospital
during the previous calendar year.97 The statute also provides for additional
assessments to the hospital entities, if needed.98
In addition to the above, in order to maintain the plan on "an actuarially
sound basis," 99 the statute also provides that up to $20,000,000 in additional
money may be transferred from the Insurance Commissioner's Regulatory
Trust Fund and, in certain instances, from casualty companies. 100
A source of contention from the receipt of the first NICA assessment,
Florida physicians, in a class action, challenged the constitutionality of the
funding mechanism. t0  The class of physicians that did not practice
paragraph (5)(a). Supervision shall require that the supervising physician will be easily
available and have a prearranged plan of treatment for specified patient problems which
the supervised certified nurse midwife or physician may carry out in the absence of any
complicating features. Any physician who elects to participate in such plan on or after
January 1, 1989, who was not a participating physician at the time of such election to
participate and who otherwise qualifies as a participating physician under ss. 766.301-
766.316 shall pay an additional initial assessment equal to the most recent assessment
made pursuant to this paragraph, paragraph (5)(a), or paragraph (7)(b).
§ 766.314(4)(c).
96. § 766.314(4)(b)4.a.-f.
97. § 766.314(4)(a).
98. § 766.314(7)(a). These are based upon actuarial calculations and valuations,
provided that at no time the premium shall be greater than one quarter of one percent of the
net direct written premiums. Id.
99. McGibony v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, 564 So. 2d
177, 178 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
100. § 766.314(5)(b). "If the assessments collected... are insufficient to maintain the
plan on an actuarially sound basis, there is hereby appropriated for transfer to the association
from the Insurance Commissioner's Regulatory Trust Fund an additional amount of up to $20
million." Id.
Taking into account the assessments collected pursuant to subsection (4) and appropria-
tions from the Insurance Commissioner's Regulatory Trust Fund, if required to maintain
the plan on an actuarially sound basis, the Department of Insurance shall require each
entity licensed to issue casualty insurance as defined in s. 624.605(l)(b), (k), and (q) to
pay into the association an annual assessment in an amount determined by the department
pursuant to paragraph (7)(a), in the manner required by the plan of operation.
§ 766.314(5)(c)(1).
101. McGibony, 564 So. 2d at 178.
[Vol. 26:609
230
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss2/1
Martin
obstetrics argued that they were no more likely to receive a benefit from this
assessment than any other member of the general public.102 They maintained
that their rights to due process and equal protection under both the Florida
and Federal Constitutions were violated.103 They saw the assessment as
nothing more than an ill-conceived tax against the profession in general.
1 °4
The class asserted that there was "no rational basis for singling [them] out"
to pay this tax, 105 except based upon an arbitrary and discriminatory
action.
10 6
Because the Supreme Court of Florida agreed that "[o]nly clear and
demonstrated usurpation of power will authorize judicial interference with
legislative action," the burden was on the class to prove that there was no
conceivable basis to support the disliked tax' 07 Unfortunately for the
plaintiff physicians, their class was not a protected class,10 8 and the court
stated that the tax would be constitutional so long as the state had a rational
basis for its taxation decision and the decision was not arbitrary.10 9
Nonparticipating, nonobstetrical physicians (the majority of the
physicians in Florida) complained, in effect, that it was unfair to lay a tax
upon them selectively when all they did to "deserve" the tax was be a
physician."o One can assume from the class action that those that never
delivered obstetrical services or had anything to do with labor and delivery
could not believe that it was fair, or constitutional, to force them to
selectively finance a malpractice problem in which they had no specific
interest. By way of example, if a colo-rectal surgeon had a malpractice
problem or indeed if colo-rectal surgeons as a group had a malpractice
problem, the ob-gyns were not offering to pay toward their increased
insurance premiums." This feeling amongst physicians became a near
102. Id. at 179.
103. Id. at 178.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 179.
106. McGibony, 564 So. 2d at 179.
107. Id.
108. To fall within the construction of the equal protection provision of the Florida
Constitution, "a 'suspect class' is any group that has been the traditional target of irrational,
unfair and unlawful discrimination." Coy v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Comp. Plan, 595
So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1992).
109. McGibony, 564 So. 2d at 179.
110. Id.
111. Interview with Harvey Garber, M.D., Board Certified Colo-Rectal Surgeon, in
Palm Beach Co., Fla. (June 30,2001).
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revolt, as nearly 17,000 physicians did not pay their NICA assessment early
in NICA's history.
12
The court studied the legislative intent of the Florida Legislature and
determined that there was a malpractice crisis in Florida and a severe stress
on the efficient delivery of health care, which ultimately affected all
physicians in the state.'13 They relied upon the concept of a team approach
to medicine, and thus the court held that the legislature's decision to
selectively tax all physicians, but not the public at large, was not arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious and was therefore constitutional." 4  The court
used the syllogism that all doctors rely upon efficiently operated hospitals,
and when the delivery of obstetrical care is disrupted as a result of the
malpractice crisis, hospitals will not be efficiently operated.1t5 As a result,
all physicians will be negatively impacted. Thus, physicians alone should
pay the assessment.
t1 6
To the dismay of the nonobstetrical physicians, the court stated
precisely the opposite of what the Florida physicians had been think-
ing: "[w]e are convinced that all physicians, regardless of whether they
practice obstetrics, derive a benefit from this legislation that is greater in
degree than that derived by the general public."" I7  Thus, in general
112. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 945.
113. McGibony, 564 So. 2d at 179.
114. Id. In addition, the Coy court was extremely concerned about the system-wide
disruption that could ultimately befall the citizens, hospitals and physicians of Florida as a
result of the malpractice crisis. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 946. The following exchange occurred:
Question: "Hypothetically, let's assume for a moment that all of the obstetrical physicians
on that staff, because of malpractice premiums and because of-frankly, because of the
problems associated with malpractice, including having to come to the courthouse and
testify, and so forth, decided they had had enough. And they had decided that they have
had enough so much that they decided to stop either treating indigent patients, which are
sometimes a common problem pregnancy, or otherwise just stop practicing OB. Based on
that hypothetical I gave you and your small knowledge of Jackson, would that have an
effect on that hospital's operations?"
Answer: "It would be disastrous."
Question: "That disaster would permeate that hospital; wouldn't it?"
Answer: "I presume, yes."
Id.
115. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 946.
116. Id. at 946-47.
117. Id.at947.
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constitutional terms, the legislature's methods were rationally related to
legitimate governmental objectives and were constitutional, and, not being a
protected group, the physicians would have to pay a tax they considered
spiteful. It was a close four to three decision," and the dissent echoed the
feelings of every one of those 17,000 physicians who did not pay their
assessment.
Speaking for the dissent, Justice Kogan wrote, "I can find no rational
basis for imposing much of the burden of this program primarily on
physicians as a class... particularly... in light of the fact that obstetricians
are not obliged to join the plan, and many have exercised this option."'" 9 He
said that this was nothing more than a "status tax" based on one's station in
life, and, unless there was a nexus between that status and the goal the tax
was designed to achieve, it would not pass even rational basis scrutiny.
120
He believed that imposing this tax denied equal protection because similarly
situated persons were not being treated similarly. 12 Also, in this case, there
was no quid pro quo-the nonobstetrical physicians were paying a tax and
they received no specific benefit that the public at large did not receive. 22
A different consideration was accepted without challenge by all of the
justices. This consideration was whether the assessment was a tax at all or
was it a user fee.123 That the justices agreed the assessment was a tax
allowed them to rapidly decide that rational basis, or severe deference,
would be appropriate.1 4 Had the court instead decided that the assessment
was a user fee, this jump would not have been so clear. 125 For example, a
user fee is one in which the fee is collected for a specific benefit, and thus
the collecting entity must show that the fee fairly approximates the benefit
received.126 Based upon this, some critics, however, have disagreed with the
tax interpretation.12 7 They point out that although the assessment superfi-
cially resembles a tax, the court presented an analysis that was more along
118. Id. at948.
119. Id.
120. Coy, 595 So. 2d at 948.
121. Id. at 947.
122. Id.
123. Sharon Liebman, Comment, State-Enforced Fees For Special Benefits
Conferred: Taxes or User Fees? (Coy v. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Plan, 595 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1992)), 45 FLA. L. REV. 325 (1993).
124. Id. at 329.
125. Id. at 333.
126. Id. at 329.
127. Id. at 331-33.
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the lines of a "benefits-received" analysis. 12 The absolute value of the
difference between what the obstetrical physicians had to pay as opposed to
the nonobstetrical physicians was meant to indicate the legislature's
construction as to the difference in value ($250 versus $5000) between the
two groups. 129 The ob-gyns were to receive this value benefit for their
pecuniary burden, and it was appropriate for them to pay more. 13  Other
courts, however, have found that "benefits-conferred" principles did not
govern taxes but were appropriate instead for user fees or special assess-
ments, thereby creating a constitutional question as to the funding mecha-
nism. 1
31
Therefore, they opined, where assessments were for specific govern-
ment provided services, the assessment was not a tax, but a special
assessment or a user fee. 132  "Similarly, the physician's fee is not a
tax... [and] [t]he court should have looked beyond the literal tax definition
because a charge which superficially satisfies the definition might still be
governed by [user fee] principles.' '133 Therefore, it was concluded that the
court incorrectly applied user fee principles and labeled the physician
assessment as a tax. i3 4  This is an important observation. With such a
narrow majority and new members of the court, should this issue come
before the court again they might find this assessment a user fee. In that
case, the statute would not be presumptively valid, and the extreme
deference accorded the legislature would not be automatic.
135
128. Liebman, supra note 123, at 331-33.
129. Id. at 331.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 332. See also Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth.,
906 F.2d 516, 518 (11th Cir. 1990) (following the reasoning that for a user fee to not violate
the commerce clause, it must be a fair approximation of the value of the benefit conferred);
City of Naples v. Moon, 269 So. 2d 355, 358 (Fla. 1972) (differentiating ad valorem taxes and
special assessments); State ex rel. Clark v. Henderson, 188 So. 351, 354 (Fla. 1939)
(explaining that a tax and a special assessment are similar, but a special assessment is an
enforced contribution that is imposed on a segment of the community as a result of special or
peculiar benefit).
132. Liebman, supra note 123, at 332.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 335.
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B. The Notice Requirement or How Not to Win Friends and Influence
People
The NICA statute requires that each hospital with a participating
physician and each participating physician shall give notice to their
patients.1 36  The notice will advise the patient that a limited no-fault
compensation program covers their provider in the event of severe
neurological birth-related injury and the provisions of this insurance
represent their only remedy in the event of a severe birth-related in-
jury.137 The features of the notice requirement include that it shall be clear
and concise; 138 that the notice shall be given on a specific NICA-provided
form;139 that the providers may elect to have the patients sign a receipt
indicating they signed the form (in order to benefit from the rebuttable
presumption clause that notice has been given);14° and that notice need not
be given in the event of an emergency that meets the State of Florida's
statutory definition or when it is not practicable. 14  If the physician or
hospital fails to provide such notice, neither they nor the claimant will obtain
the benefit of NICA protection in the event of birth-related neurological
injury. 42
136. FLA. STAT. § 766.316 (2001). The full text is as follows:
Each hospital with a participating physician on its staff and each participating physician,
other than residents, assistant residents, and interns deemed to be participating physicians
under s. 766.314(4)(c), under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Plan shall provide notice to the obstetrical patients as to the limited no-fault alternative for
birth-related neurological injuries. Such notice shall be provided on forms furnished by the
association and shall include a clear and concise explanation of a patient's rights and
limitations under the plan. The hospital or the participating physician may elect to have the
patient sign a form acknowledging receipt of the notice form. Signature of the patient
acknowledging receipt of the notice form raises a rebuttable presumption that the notice
requirements of this section have been met. Notice need not be given to a patient when the
patient has an emergency medical condition as defined in s. 395.092(9)(b) or when notice
is not practicable.
Id.
137. § 766.303(2).
138. § 766.316.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Braniff v. Galen of Fla., Inc., 669 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1995), certifying question to 696 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1997).
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In Braniff v. Galen of Florida, Inc.,143 the plaintiff filed a malpractice
action and alleged that the negligent delivery of their daughter led to a severe
neurological birth-related injury. 144 The defendant claimed that he gave
proper and adequate notice but that in any case, the statute did not mandate
pre-delivery notice and that the exclusivity feature was not conditional upon
pre-delivery notice. 45  The trial court agreed and dismissed the civil
malpractice action holding that the plaintiff could not recover any more than
what the administrative action allowed.
46
The appellate court reversed, however, finding that the defendant had
not properly given notice to the plaintiff. 47 The defendant had not been
successful in proving that the purpose of the notice requirement was just to
informpatients of the procedures they needed to go through in order to file a
claim. Had this been the legislative intent of the notice requirement, it
would have made sense to be able to provide this notice even postdeliv-
ery. 149 However, the court noted that the statute's language speaks of "the
limited no fault alternative" which indicates a choice between health care
alternatives (limited no-fault vs. traditional tort); hence, the intent of the
notice was more than simple claim procedure.' 50 At the same time, the court
stated that it made even less sense to have a pre-delivery notice requirement
if that notice was not a condition precedent to benefiting from the exclusivity
of a NICA lawsuit.1
5
'
The court of appeal found that notice only became an issue when the
defendant sought to shield himself against a tort claim. 152 As a result of this
ruling, the case was remanded for jury trial because there was a factual
disagreement as to whether notice was actually given. Because the court
considered this issue to be of great public importance, it certified the
following question to the Supreme Court of Florida: "WHETHER
SECTION 766.316, FLORIDA STATUTES (1993), REQUIRES THAT
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS GIVE THEIR OBSTETRICAL PATIENTS
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1052.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Braniff, 669 So. 2d at 1052.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1052-53.
150. Id. It would not have made sense to discuss alternatives in a notice when the
patient might have already received the medical service and could no longer effectively choose
an alternative. It only made sense that the notice was a predelivery notice. Id.
151. Id.
152. Braniff, 669 So. 2d at 1053 n.2.
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PRE-DELIVERY NOTICE OF THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE
FLORIDA BIRTH RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSA-
TION PLAN AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE PROVIDERS'
INVOKING NICA AS THE PATIENTS' EXCLUSIVE REMEDY?
15 3
The Supreme Court of Florida held that in order for the provider to
claim NICA as the exclusive remedy for his or her obstetrical patient's
catastrophic delivery, the provider must have given predelivery notice in a
reasonable time in advance of the required obstetrical services, where
practicable. 154  The court stated that what would constitute reasonable
advance notice and "when practicable" would vary from circumstance to
circumstance. 55 The court reviewed the legislative history of the NICA
statute and found that the academic task force that originally recommended
the adoption of a limited no-fault compensation plan was concerned that the
Virginia Plan did not have a notice requirement. 56  The cause for the
concern was that patients who elected to be treated by an ob-gyn participat-
ing in the Virginia Plan had ostensibly given up their ability to sue in tort,
perhaps without adequate due process.1 57 The task force, therefore, included
the notice requirement in the Florida law to avoid any such question of
unconstitutionality.
58
"The Task Force obviously believed that because not all health care
providers [were] required to participate in the NICA plan, fairness require[d]
that the patient be made aware that she has limited her common law
remedies by choosing a participating provider.' 59 If limiting one's remedies
was an unacceptable method of dealing with the malpractice crisis, the
legislators could have avoided the whole issue by mandating the limited no-
fault plan to all providers and therefore all patients. With the composition of
the Supreme Court of Florida at the time, it is likely that they would have
found that action rationally related to a legitimate Florida interest. Instead,
they saddled another bureaucratic burden on providers, which left another
loophole through which either the physician or the claimant could find
himself or herself unwittingly uncovered. Most distressing was the
uncertainty, because after the physician or hospital had paid their increased
assessment to provide NICA coverage, they could find themselves "bare" to
153. Id. at 1053.
154. Galen of Fla., Inc. v. Braniff, 696 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 1997).
155. Id. at 310.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Braniff, 696 So. 2d at 310 n.1.
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face a malpractice action in common law tort anyway. 6  The logic of the
Supreme Court of Florida, which mandated pre-delivery notice, is less than
compelling when compared to the logic of the dissent in another important
case, Bradford v. Florida Birth-Related Neurologic Injury Compensation
Ass 'n. 1
61
In Bradford, the parents of a birth-related neurologically injured child
were successful in their "end run" around NICA. 162 They applied for NICA
administrative benefits and then claimed that because their physician had not
complied with the notice requirement, they were not eligible for NICA
benefits. 163 Although the trial judge disagreed, the Fourth District did agree
with the parents. Judge Klein's dissent is more lucid and logical and may
yet hold the day. He stated that when the legislature intends to make a
statutory provision a condition precedent, it does so with clarity.164 He gives
- • • 165
the example of the medical malpractice statute pre-suit provision. After
the prospective plaintiff complies with the provision, he is given explicit
directions on how to notify the soon-to-be defendant. This includes when to
notify the defendant, the mandated use of certified return receipt mail, and
what must be included in the notice. 66 In the NICA notice section, on the
other hand, the hazy procedure is only generally stated and does not say
when the notice must be given. 67
Judge Klein also makes an excellent point as to the meaning of the
statutory definition of "participating physician." He notes that the statute
defines participating physician as:
a physician licensed in Florida to practice medicine who practices
obstetrics or performs obstetrical services either full time or part
time and who had paid or was exempted from payment at the time
of the injury the assessment required for participation in the birth-
160. Id. at 312.
161. 667 So. 2d 401,402-04 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
162. Id. Studdert, supra note 15, at 520 (discussing the concept of the "end run"
around the no-fault program).
163. Bradford, 667 So. 2d at 401-02 (implying they were not limited to an
administrative solution by NICA but could pursue their common law remedy in tort).
164. ld. at403.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
[Vol. 26:609
238
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss2/1
Martin
related neurological injury compensation plan for the year in which
the injury occurred. 168
The judge said that from his point of view, any physician who would read
that definition would properly think that all they would need to do to be
completely covered would be to elect to participate. 169 It would then be
within reason for the physician to discontinue their malpractice coverage for
this type of event.
170
Generally accepted canons of statutory construction suggest that it is
unreasonable to make the notice requirement a condition precedent if the
legislature did not expressly indicate it.171 Judge Klein stated that courts
should be reluctant to add words to statutes unless the word has obviously
been omitted, the context of the statute is clear and unequivocal, and adding
the word will assist the intent. 72 As to the notice provision, there are no
missing words (i.e., condition precedent) and none should be added.7 3
The notice provision can be onerous or burdensome in a number of
ways. If a parent has a child that fits the statutory definition of birth-related
neurologically injured, but there has been no common law negligence, the
parent would be able to collect from NICA, if the provider remembered to
supply predelivery notice.' 74 If a negligent physician had absentmindedly
allowed his liability insurance to lapse, with a suitable injury the parent
could be covered by NICA, but only if the physician remembered to give
predelivery notice. If a child suffers an obstetrical injury of a suitable type,
one can argue the parent might not receive NICA benefits if the physician
did not provide the prescribed NICA form. If a child suffers a qualifying
injury and the physician did not give notice, there is uncertainty as to
whether the parent could waive her right to notice. 75 Also, if a NICA
physician without liability insurance failed to give adequate notice, and
negligently caused such an obstetrical injury, one might wonder if his or her
entire career could be jeopardized. The Supreme Court of Florida apparently
thought so.
168. Bradford, 667 So. 2d at 403.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 403-04.
172. Id. at 404.
173. Bradford, 667 So. 2d at 402.
174. Id.
175. E.g., O'Leary v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, 757 So. 2d
624 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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C. The Jurisdictional Squabble: From McKaughan to O'Leary
NICA threatened to self implode because of other matters beyond the
funding and notice issues. The issue of jurisdiction is an important
example. It was critical to clarify whether it was the courts or the adminis-
trative framework of NICA or some combination of both that was to
determine the inclusion or exclusion of various types of birth-related
neurological injuries. 176 Failure to do so would leave NICA in even more
confusion. In one convoluted case, a plaintiff found themselves being forced
to prove their child did not meet NICA requirements in order to prevail in
their civil malpractice action. 177 The confusion over NICA's jurisdictional
underpinnings brought that case all the way to the Supreme Court of
Florida.
78
In McKaughan, the infant son was the product of a breech delivery, at
which time the infant was intubated1 79 The child suffered injuries that
eventuated in the filing of a medical malpractice lawsuit. 80 The defendants
answered affirmatively that the exclusive remedy provision of NICA covered
the birth-related injuries.18  The parents did not believe that their son's
injuries fit the narrow definition of NICA-injured.182  The circuit court
ordered the malpractice action stayed while the parents sought an
administrative determination by the Division of Administrative Hearings
("DOAII") as to whether the child was covered or not.' 83 Hence, the parents
filed a petition to prove that their son was not covered because the injury did
not occur "in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate
postdelivery period."'
' 84
The parents asked DOAH to send the case back to the circuit court
since they were not truly "claimants" seeking NICA benefits. 85 DOAH held
that the parents had not filed a claim suitable for administrative resolution
176. Studdert, supra note 15, at 517-18.
177. Humana of Fla., Inc. v. McKaughan, 652 So. 2d 852, 857 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1995).
178. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n v. McKaughan, 668 So. 2d
974 (Fla. 1996).
179. Respondent's Answer Brief at 3, Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp.
Ass'n v. McKaughan, 668 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 1996) (Nos. 85,445; 85,447; 85,469 consolidated).
180. McKaughan, 668 So. 2d at 976.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. McKaughan, 668 So. 2d at 976.
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and, in fact, dismissed the parent's petition, sending the case back to the
circuit court. 1 6 DOAH stated that the health care providers should not have
the ability to force administrative resolution on the plaintiff.187 On appeal,
the district court agreed and certified a question of great public importance
which in essence was what "procedure to follow or... [what the] hearing
officer's duty [is] when a claimant who denies having a NICA-covered
injury is forced by the circuit court into the administrative forum."188
Things were topsy-turvy with NICA. Instead of parents seeking
coverage by NICA, they were trying to figure out how to prove that their
child was not covered by NICA. Instead of NICA protecting the physician
that paid an assessment for coverage, the DOAH was saying that these
parents were not claimants so there could be no coverage and DOAH could
have no jurisdiction. Just who had jurisdiction over the whole situation
remained to be clarified.
The Supreme Court of Florida agreed that NICA legislation did not
hold that the administrative hearing officer had exclusive jurisdiction to
decide whether an injured infant was to be covered under NICA, a question
that would arise when NICA is being used as a shield to a medical
malpractice action.1 89 So, the administrative judge was correct, at least
temporarily, when he determined that he did not have jurisdiction and sent
the case back to the courts for further action.19 The court saw no clear
legislative intent to prevent a plaintiff who believed their birth-related injury
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Respondent's Answer Brief, supra note 178, at 4. The full text of the certified
question was:
DOES AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER HAVE THE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN INJURY SUFFERED BY A NEW-
BORN INFANT DOES OR DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A "BIRTH-RELATED
NEUROLOGICAL INJURY" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE FLORIDA BIRTH-
RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PLAN, SECTIONS 766.301-
.316, FLORIDA STATUTES (1993), SO THAT A CIRCUIT COURT IN A MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ACTION SPECIFICALLY ALLEGING AN INJURY OUTSIDE THE
COVERAGE OF THE PLAN MUST AUTOMATICALLY ABATE THAT ACTION
WHEN THE PLAN'S IMMUNITY IS RAISED AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
PENDING A DETERMINATION BY THE HEARING OFFICER AS TO THE EXACT
NATURE OF THE INFANTS INJURY?
McKaughan, 668 So. 2d at 975.
189. McKaughan, 668 So. 2d at 978.
190. Id. at 977.
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fell outside of NICA, even if incorrect, to prevent them from litigating their
complaint in court.191
Now NICA was squarely open for the courts to second-guess the
administrative law judge's compensability decisions, 192 making things
somewhat of a free-for-all. Therefore, the legislature faced their prior
miscue and changed the law. 193  The significant change was that now the
administrative law judge had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether
an injured infant satisfied the NICA statute or not.
The 2000 case of O'Leary v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Ass'n'94 concerned an emergency obstetrical delivery of a
pregnant woman who had been in an automobile accident. 195 The baby was
delivered but had complications and suffered neurological defects. 19 The
baby died a little over two years later, and the parents filed a malpractice
191. Id.
192. Studdert, supra note 15, at 518.
193. Section 766.301(1)(d) of the Florida Statutes (1993) was amended in 1998 to
read:
The Legislature makes the following findings:
The costs of birth-related neurological injury claims are particularly high and war-
rant the establishment of a limited system of compensation irrespective of fault. The issue
of whether such claims are covered by this act must be determined exclusively in an
administrative proceeding.
FLA. STAT. § 766.301(l)(d) (2001). But cf. FLA. STAT. § 766.301(1)(d) (Supp. 1988)
(showing that the last sentence was not in the original language). Similarly, section 766.304
of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988)) was amended as follows:
The administrative law judge shall hear and determine all claims filed pursuant to ss.
766.301-766.316 and shall exercise the full power and authority granted to her or him in
chapter 120, as necessary, to carry out the purposes of such sections. The administrative
law judge has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a claim filed under this act is
compensable. No civil action may be brought until the determinations under s. 766.309
have been made by the administrative law judge. If the administrative law judge deter-
mines that the claimant is entitled to compensation from the association, no civil action
may be brought or continued in violation of the exclusiveness of remedy provisions of s.
766.303. If it is determined that a claim filed under this act is not compensable, the doc-
trine of neither collateral estoppel nor res judicata shall prohibit the claimant from pursuing
any and all civil remedies available under common law and statutory law.
FLA. STAT. § 766.304 (2001) (emphasis added). The original statute read: "The deputy
commissioner shall hear and determine all claims filed pursuant to ss. 766.301-766.316 and
shall exercise the full power and authority granted to him with respect to workers'
compensation claims, as necessary, to carry out the purposes of such sections." FLA. STAT. §
766.304 (Supp. 1988).
194. 757 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 624-25.
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action.197 The defendants sought to abate the malpractice action while the
plaintiffs sought a determination from the administrative judge as to whether
NICA benefits applied or not, although they maintained they had not
received adequate NICA notice. 98 The administrative law judge ruled that
the issue of whether notice had been given was not in his jurisdiction and
dismissed it back to the circuit.199 The defendant physicians appealed, which
was the basis of this action.m
The Fifth Circuit took note of the 1998 amendments to the NICA
statute, done in recognition of the dual jurisdiction issue left open in
McKaughan.20' Under the new law, the administrative law judge had
exclusive authority to determine whether the injury was compensable under
NICA and that any medical malpractice action was stayed until such time as
202the decision was made. The court reversed the administrative law judge's
decision (that he lacked authority) and remanded back to him for determina-
tion of whether notice was given or waived.20 3
It was a long road from McKaughan to O'Leary, but the final
jurisdictional chapter may not yet be written in this battle between the
judiciary and the legislature. However, there has already been one
acceptance of O'Leary during the current year (2001). In University of
Miami v. M.A.,2 4 the court denied the medical malpractice defendant's
request to abate the civil action while the administrative judge made his
NICA determination so the defendants appealed.205 The district judge found
that the trial judge erred in denying their motion to abate because now the
administrative judge had exclusive jurisdiction to determine the compensa-
bility under the amended sections of the Florida Statutes.
20 6
The jurisdictional confusion spills over to both attorneys'
bars. Previous to NICA, plaintiff attorneys essentially had one obstacle to
overcome. They had to prove that a preponderance of the evidence showed
that their client was injured and these defendants negligently caused that
injury. With NICA, a new dimension is added, that of having to prove that
197. Id. at 625.
198. Id.
199. O'Leary, 757 So. 2d at 625.
200. Id.
201. id. at 626.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 628.
204. 793 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
205. Id. at 999-1000.
206. Id. at 999-1000 (citing to O'Leary, 757 So. 2d 624). The amended subsections
were 766.301 and 766.304 of the Florida Statutes (1993).
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their client does not have a NICA injury that would literally suck the claim
out of tort and into no-fault. Similarly, defense attorneys who previously
concentrated on proving their clients were not negligent or the plaintiff was
not injured, now make every gasp at proving that the plaintiff was injured-
and injured badly enough to be covered by NICA. This extra layer of
bureaucracy would all be fine, if the end result was an improved system with
reduced costs, and better coverage for all. However, the evidence above
does not show that to be the case.
D. The Swiss Cheese Narrow Medical Definition
In McKaughan and in M.A., the underlying issue upon which the
jurisdictional tangle operated was whether the injured infants met the narrow
207statutory definition of injury. In both of these cases, the plaintiffs were
anxious to show that their injured child did not meet it. It is not difficult to
imagine the situation where a defendant might not have adequate malpractice
insurance (to cover multiple incidents, for example) and where the narrow
definition precludes coverage for a family because their child, although
208severely neurologically injured, is not physically injured as well.
Studdert contends that the criterion used to determine whether an
injured infant will be covered by NICA are restrictive, and their study
provides both direct and indirect evidence. 20 9 For example, they show that
there is a high rate of dismissal of NICA claims. 210 They proved their point
by showing that fifteen of eighteen NICA dismissed claims ended success-
fully for the plaintiffs in tort, thus demonstrating the relative restrictiveness
of NICA.21 They acknowledge that since a portion of these claims were
settled as opposed to tried by a jury, their evidence that NICA criteria are
stricter than negligence criteria is somewhat "circumstantial. 212
However, they also looked at the clinical information; based upon that,
twice as many claimants met negligence criteria as met NICA criteria.2 13 As
they noted, this clinical disparity helps explain the indirect results noted
207. See discussion supra note 39.
208. The definition requires that the injured child be both mentally and physically
impaired. Therefore a child who was substantially mentally impaired due to birth-related
trauma but who did not have a substantial degree of physical impairment would not qualify.
209. Studdert, supra note 15, at 519.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
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above. On a more practical basis, it is clear that there are catastrophically
injured claimants who are not qualifying for the restrictive NICA definition
and whose providers were found to be not negligent. If the stated intent of
the program is to "to provide compensation, on a no-fault basis, for a limited
class of catastrophic injuries, ' '214 it is surprising that these catastrophically
injured patients should be left out.
When one says that the statute is restrictive or narrow, it is hard to
envision how damaging that can be upon a family. A heartbreaking example
is found in Florida Birth Related Neurological v. Florida Division ofS • 215
Administrative Hearings, where the infant was a product of a difficult
labor and delivery complicated by asphyxia that led to damage to the basal
ganglia area of the brain.2 6  The ob-gyn was a NICA participating
217physician. The infant, Eric, did not develop normally. He had severe
physical problems, which led to tongue problems and inability to talk; by
four and one-half years of age, he was unable to stand, walk or
crawl. 218 Experts believed he would never be able to clothe, feed or toilet
himself. 219 Tests showed, however, that despite the profound physical
defects, measurements of his cognitive skills surprisingly were not much
below average and the school board anticipated placing him in a mainstream
class.220 The cause of his injuries was an umbilical cord wrapped around his
neck at birth causing asphyxiation, hypoxemia and brain damage. 22'
NICA found that this child did not suffer a compensable injury because
his mentation was fairly good despite the profound and catastrophic birth-
related neurologic and physical injury that he suffered. 222 The family
appealed and the administrative hearing officer disagreed with NICA.223 1iS
argument sounded like an English lesson concerning how the word "or" and
how the word "and" should and could be construed.224 First of all, the
hearing officer states that although NICA wants the statute construed
narrowly because the statute is in derogation of common law rights, the
214. FLA. STAT. § 766.301(2) (2001).
215. 664 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995), certifying question to 686 So. 2d
1349 (Fla. 1997).
216. Id. at 1017.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1018.
219. Id.
220. Fla. Birth Related Neurological, 664 So. 2d at 1018.
221. Id. at 1019.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1020.
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family wants the statute construed liberally because it is remedial. The
hearing officer concludes the statute should be construed to maximize the
legislative intent, and the statute reads that an injury is one "caused by
oxygen deprivation or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor,
delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital,
which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and
physically impaired." 226 The hearing officer then delves into a Clintonesque
interpretation of whether "and" really means "and" or does it mean "or:"
In ascertaining the meaning and effect to be given in construing a
statute the intent of the legislature is the determining factor. Al-
though in its elementary sense the word 'or' is a disjunctive parti-
ciple that marks an alternative generally corresponding to 'either'
as 'either this or that;' a connective that marks an alterna-
tive. There are, of course, familiar instances in which the conjunc-
tive 'or' is held equivalent to the copulative conjunction 'and,' and
such meaning is often given the meaning 'or' in order to effectuate
the intention of the parties to a written instrument or the legislative
intent in enacting a statute when it is clear that the word 'or' is used
227in the copulative and not in the disjunctive sense.
He considered the policy reasons for NICA and stated that if the policy
was to cover "catastrophic injuries that result in unusually high costs for
custodial care and rehabilitation" in order to reduce insurance costs, there
was no suggestion that even if this infant was more mentally impaired that
the costs of care could possibly be any higher.2  He concluded by saying
that sometimes "[c]ircumstances may require courts to construe the word
'and' to mean 'or' whenever such a conversion is mandated by the context of
the words" or where it is needed to make legislative intent clear, as in this
case.229
The court recognized the severe impact this would have on NICA, so
they certified a question of great public importance to the Supreme Court of
Florida.230 The question essentially asked whether the NICA injury mustinclude physical and mental defects or may either defect alone suffice.231
225. Fla. Birth Related Neurological, 664 So. 2d at 1019.
226. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 766.302(2) (2001).
227. Fla. Birth Related Neurological, 664 So. 2d at 1020.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1021.
230. Id.
231. Id.
[Vol. 26:609
246
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss2/1
Martin
The Supreme Court of Florida made a hash of the whole matter by
agreeing that the child suffered a NICA compensable injury, but by that, they
meant that this child was, in fact, both physically and mentally injured as a
result of his catastrophic delivery. 2 The court reasoned the circuit court did
not take certain factors into consideration. For example, "Eric will not be
able to translate his cognitive capabilities into adequate learning in a normal
manner. Moreover, as a direct consequence of his injuries, Eric's social and
vocational development have been drastically impaired. Consequently, it is
concluded that Eric is permanently and substantially mentally and physically
impaired .... ,233 However, as far as interpreting "and" as "or," the court
was having nothing to do with that.234
The court stated "[tihe Statute is written in the conjunctive and can only
be interpreted to require permanent and substantial impairment that has both
physical and mental elements. ' ' 5 This slams a door in the face of certain
catastrophic birth-related neurological injuries or at the least requires the
family to run the gauntlet of litigation-precisely what the no-fault benefit
was supposed to avoid.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act,
section 766.301-.316 of the Florida Statutes, was born in an era of rapidly
accelerating malpractice costs and was specifically designed "to provide
compensation, on a no-fault basis, for a limited class of catastrophic injury
that resulted in unusually high costs for custodial care and rehabilita-
tion., 236 Its underpinning was to insure that ob-gyns were not forced out of
business by these excessively high insurance costs. It was designed to carve
out the most severe of the birth-related neurologically injured patients, in
part so that malpractice insurance companies would not be so fearful of
doing business in a litigious Florida environment. This comment has
presented evidence that shows that NICA has been only moderately
successful in reaching its stated goals and cannot be credited with the
232. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n, v. Fla. Div. of Admin.
Hearings, 686 So. 2d 1349, 1353 (Fla. 1997).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 1355-56.
235. Id. at 1356. The conjunctive operationally means that it is requires both physical
and mental injuries. Id. The alternative was called the disjunctive and would have been an
"either/or" condition. Id. at 1355.
236. FLA. STAT. § 766.301(2) (2001).
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generally improved malpractice climate that some physicians now enjoy. In
fact, there is evidence that the malpractice environment is once again
hardening despite NICA's existence. In addition, there is a high rate of
NICA claim dismissal that will end up in tort anyway.237 Lawyers game the
no-fault system by doing an "end-run" around NICA when it serves their
238purposes.
Early on, the state's physicians challenged the funding mechanism but
as of this writing, it is constitutional. Yet it depends on the correctness of
the interpretation by the Supreme Court of Florida that the assessment to all
nonobstetrical physicians is a tax and not a hidden user fee. This is dubious
because there is very little correlation between the amount paid and the
benefit received. In the best of circumstances, nonobstetrical physicians
resent paying a fee for the benefit of one particular specialty without their
consent, when the rest of Florida's population is exempt. In the worst of
circumstances, it is illegal taxation.
The statute has had two severe structural difficulties that undermined
the faith one might have developed in the program. First, predelivery notice
was written into Florida's version of limited obstetrical no-fault in the hopes
that NICA could survive a due process attack. Erstwhile, it puts the
provider's family and livelihood on the line, directly contradicting one of the
main legislative intents. Second, the narrow, restrictive definition of birth-
related injury also threatens the very beneficiaries it was ostensibly designed
to assist. The exceptions to coverage poke so many holes in NICA's
availability that the coverage ends up resembling Swiss cheese. It invites
litigation where some of the primary benefits of a partial no-fault system viz
a viz NICA is to avoid litigation and speed up solutions.
Jurisdictional infighting between the judiciary and the legislature is
even today not resolved. As discussed, the Supreme Court of Florida put its
foot down and showed that there was concurrent, contingent jurisdic-
tion.239 However, the legislature was not to be outdone, and they amended
the statute to provide that the administrative law judge would have exclusive
jurisdiction in NICA determinations and that no civil actions would proceed
until this was resolved. This has been followed in the Third Circuit recently,
but the judiciary may not yet have fired their final salvo.
A statute that is written to correct a specific problem and that fails to
accomplish its stated goal after more than ten years is one that should be
examined closely. In particular, where a statute has significant flaws-such
237. Studdert, supra note 15, at 519.
238. Id. at 520.
239. Id. at 517-18.
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as its funding mechanism, its notice requirements, its limiting definitions,
and its jurisdictional authority-it should be more than examined closely, it
should, in fact, be repealed. Limited no-fault liability for obstetrical
catastrophes is an idea whose time has come and gone.
Sandy Martin, M.D.
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